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Personal Study Plan
2. Overall Aims and Objectives
The overall aims and objectives of the course are stipulated in the Course
Handbook & Programme Regulations for PsychD Clinical Psychology Conversion
Programme (October 1998 edition):
Aim:
• To attain greater professional competence in order to enhance the contribution of 
clinical psychology to health care.
Objective:
• To produce a portfolio of study, practice and research that will demonstrate 
increased competence in these three areas.
My additional aims in taking up the PsychD Conversion Programme:
1. To further my academic knowledge in the understanding of negative affect 
structure which underpins the mood states of anxiety and depression.
2. To update my skills in research design, methodology, and data analysis through 
close supervision from my research supervisor.
3. To become more conversant in the use of computerised statistical packages such 
as the SPSS for Windows version 7.5 and the Lisrel 8 Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis through sessions with my research supervisor.
4. To keep abreast with publications in two areas of personal interest, namely, (1) 
recent controversies on the effectiveness of Critical Incidence Stress Debriefing 
(CISD); and, (2) the detection of malingered memory disorders injudicial cases.
Personal Study Plan
My objectives in taking up the PsychD Conversion Programme:
1. To produce a portfolio of study, practice and research before the end of March 
1999 which will demonstrate my increased knowledge and competence in the 
chosen areas.
2. To keep up-to-date with recent publications in selected areas of interest.
3. To be able to submit my PsychD portfolio by 31st March 1999.
4. To be able to attend my viva voce examination in 1999.
The process to achieve my aims and objectives:
1. Through a one-year concentrated study programme tailored by audit to my 
professional needs.
2. I have successfully negotiated a 14-month leave-without-pay from my present 
employment so that 1 can concentrate on the proposed study programme. My 
period of leave will be from 1.1.1998 to 28.2.1999.
3. 1 shall do my studies and related academic pursuit in Adelaide, South Australia.
1 have library support from the University of Adelaide, the Flinders University,
and the University of South Australia. 1 have internet access to Medline and 
other academic information. 1 also subscribe to the Electronic Library CD-ROM 
on books and journals published by the American Psychiatric Association. 1 
have personal subscriptions to the following journals:
• American Psychologist
• Journal o f Clinical and Consulting Psychology
• Psychological Assessment
• Journal o f the Hong Kong Psychiatric Association
• Australian Psychologist
• Australian Journal o f Psychology
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4. I shall go to the University of Surrey in April 1998 for face-to-face meetings 
with my personal tutor. I shall also read up dossiers submitted by previous 
PsychD graduates during my visits to the Psychology Department. I shall keep 
in close contact with my tutor via e-mails through the internet.
5. Dr. Calais Chan, Adjunct Associate Professor of the Department of Psychiatry, 
School of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong, has agreed to be my 
research supervisor. He is an expert on human emotion, anxiety disorders and 
cognitive processes. Dr. Chan has on-going agreements with Dr. Peter 
Lovibond of the University of New South Wales, Australia, to use a Cantonese 
translation of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) which I shall be using 
as part of my research.
6. The Psychology Department at Kwai Chung Hospital, Hong Kong, has obtained 
an on-going exclusive contract with the Psychological Corporation in the United 
States of America to translate three Beck Scales into Cantonese for clinical 
research. The scales include:
• Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
• Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
• Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS)
Only the BDI and the BAI will be used in my research on affect structure of the 
local Chinese population.
7. During 1998, I shall attend workshops and seminars relevant to my fields of 
interest, and shall continue to update my knowledge and skills as appropriate. A 
detailed log book will be maintained for all courses, seminars and workshops 
attended during 1998.
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5. Professional Dossier
Aims and Objectives
1. To present to the University a realistic and achievable self study programme for 
the PsychD Conversion Programme between 1998-1999.
2. To demonstrate to the satisfaction of the University my previous clinical 
experience and competence in the field of clinical psychology.
3. To show a continuous improvement in my understanding, knowledge and 
expertise in clinical assessment and management.
4. To have the Professional Dossier ready for submission by the end of December 
1998.
Format of submission:
1. I shall include into the Professional Dossier a detailed curriculum vitae of myself, 
including a list of publications.
2. As evidence to my clinical development and achievement since qualification, I 
shall provide with the dossier a detailed account of my professional experience 
and notable achievements since qualification.
3. I shall submit a list of continuous education programmes undertaken in Hong 
Kong and Australia during the year 1998.
4. Based on a major work done by myself three years ago entitled "Casemix in 
psychiatry: Predicting the unpredictable", I shall submit with the Professional 
Dossier a newly compiled document entitled “Steps towards casemix in 
psychiatry: An exercise in the development o f grouping systems for local use ”. 
This document will be an abridged version of the original document, plus
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additional data and work done subsequent to the submission of the first report. 
The work helped to lay some important ground-work towards the development of 
casemix in psychiatry in the local context. The work also illustrates how a clinical 
psychologist can utilise his clinical and administrative skills in this very important 
area of research and programme development. Due to the complexity of the work 
involved, it was not possible to cull the present document to the recommended 
length of less than 5,000 words as stipulated in the Course Handbook & 
Programme Regulations for the PsychD Clinical Psychology Conversion 
Programme (October 1998 edition).
Suggested Time Frame:
1. Submission of my Curriculum Vitae and a detailed account of 
training and professional experience since graduation.
31st March
2. Discussion with supervisor on the Professional Dossier mid-April
3. Submit for inclusion: “Steps towards casemix in psychiatry” 31st July
4. Submission for inclusion: MPhil Dissertation (1974) 31st August
5. Finalise Professional Dossier and log of continuous education 30th November
11
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4, Academic Dossier 
Aims and Objectives
1. To demonstrate to the satisfaction of the University a proven increase of 
academic knowledge and understanding in two areas of clinical practice,
2. To keep abreast with the most up-to-date publications in the two areas of clinical 
practice,
3. To have the Academic Dossier ready for submission by the end of October 1998.
Review Paver 1 (4,500 Words)
Title:
"Recent controversies on the effectiveness o f Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing (CISD) "
Rationale for review:
I am a foundation member of the "Critical Incident Team" (CIT) of the 
Division of Clinical Psychology which was established in 1992 under the auspices of 
the Hong Kong Psychological Society. The team was formed in response to a 
stampede disaster in Hong Kong during a New Year's Eve celebration in 1991 in 
which 22 people were killed while revelling in a crowded alley in the heart of the 
city’s Central Business District. Apart from primary victims and on-scene witnesses, 
the effectiveness of the electronic media unfortunately meant that numerous television 
viewers at home were vicariously affected by the vivid and gruesome images. The 
CIT was formed to pioneer a set of psychological intervention strategies in the event 
of wide-spread civil disasters.
Jeffrey Mitchell's Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) model was 
imported and integrated into the disaster management plan of the CIT. In the past five
12
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years, the CIT offered voluntary hotline services and CISD debriefings to a number of 
major disasters in Hong Kong. Workshops were run on CISD in which I was one of 
the key trainers.
CISD has been subjected to critical reviews in recent years, and doubts were 
raised as to its claim of effectiveness in preventing the development of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). Some studies suggested that CISD could run the potential 
danger of 're-traumatising' the victims, thus making them even more psychologically 
vulnerable. Some workers even suggested that debriefing procedures could mask the 
symptoms of PTSD, thus hampering early diagnosis and treatment of this most 
debilitating psychiatric disorder. There was even a call for the termination of all 
debriefing procedures after critical incidents.
In view of the above, I have personal interests and a professional obligation to 
do a critical appraisal of CISD, and to review its efficacy as a prophylaxis for PTSD.
Suggested Time Frame:
1. Submission of review title Slst March
2. Discussion with tutor mid-April
3. Finish literature review and bibliography to tutor 31st May
4. First draft 30th June
5. Revision and finalise paper 31st July
Review Paver 2 (4,500 Words)
Title:
"The detection o f malingered memory disorders in judicial cases"
13
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Rationale for review:
As a senior clinician of the hospital, I was often asked to be an expert witness 
in Courts of Law for people suffering from various kinds of psychological trauma or 
head injuries. I have represented both the defence and the prosecution in 
compensation cases. Very often, the point of contention was whether the complaints 
and symptoms were feigned or exaggerated.
In a number of High Court cases involving criminal offences, I was asked by 
the Crown prosecutors to investigate claims by defendants who were allegedly 
suffering from psychiatric and psychological conditions ranging from stress and 
anxiety to senile dementia. In such cases, my testimony is pivotal to the jury's 
decision, and the detection of malingering becomes an area of immense importance.
Screening tests for malingering came in different varieties, some simple, some 
complicated. There is, however, a common thread that underpins the philosophy and 
approach in malingering detection; and it would be an extremely interesting and useful 
exercise to critically review the literature in this highly specialised area of clinical 
neuropsychology. A more in-depth understanding of the different screening tests for 
malingered memory disorders is essential to the practising forensic psychologist 
because such assessment results could directly influence the outcome of court 
adjudication.
Suggested Time Frame:
1. Submission of review title 31st March
2. Discussion with tutor mid-April
3. Finish literature review and bibliography to tutor 31st August
4. First draft 30th September
5. Revision and finalise paper 31st October
14
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5. Research Dossier 
Aims and Objectives
1. To demonstrate to the satisfaction of the University the ability to design and
implement a scientific research on a topic of clinical relevance, plus a
demonstration of the ability to collect, to analyse, and to interpret data.
2. To become more conversant with the use of computerised statistical packages 
such as SPSS for Windows version 7.5, and the Lisrel 8 Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis.
3. To have the Research Dossier ready for submission by the end of March 1999.
4. To be able to attend my viva voce examination in 1999.
Title
Negative affect structure o f Chinese in Hong Kong: A psychometric
investigation on anxiety and depression.
Background
In the field of psychopathology, anxiety and depression have often been found 
to overlap with each other both clinically and psychometrically. The comorbidity of 
anxiety and depression has raised significant attention amongst researchers and 
clinicians alike. Anxiety was often found to co-exist with depression, and 
pharmacological treatments for anxiety disorders were often found to be equally 
effective in treating depressive disorders, and vice versa. The most interesting 
evidence on comorbidity of anxiety and depression came from psychometric studies. 
Self-report questionnaires and rating scales which purported to measure either anxiety 
or depression were found to correlate highly with one another. This had cast doubt on 
the long-assumed 'specificity' of anxiety and depression, and the ways that these 
disorders were assessed.
15
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This puzzle has led to some interesting research into the 'constructs' of anxiety 
and depression. A group led by David Watson and Lee Anna Clark followed up an 
original postulation by Tellegen (1985), and identified a number of symptoms which 
were common to both anxiety and depression. Since these symptoms were, in a sense, 
'non-specific' to both anxiety and depression, they were called symptoms of negative 
affect (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).
Subsequent studies by the Watson & L.A. Clark group found that the essential 
property which distinguished anxiety from depression was the absence of positive 
affect in depressed patients which, in turn, led to a state characterised by an inability 
to experience pleasure (anhedonia) (Watson, L.A. Clark & Carey, 1988). In contrast, 
manifestations of somatic tension and arousal were found to be relatively specific to 
anxiety (Clark & Watson, 1991).
Based on their findings, the Watson and Clark group further extended their 
postulation in 1991 into a "tripartite model" consisting of a non-specific 'negative 
affect' shared by both anxiety and depression, a factor of autonomic hyperarousal 
which was characteristic of anxiety patients, and a factor of anhedonia (decreased 
positive affect) which was characteristic of depressives (Clark & Watson, 1991; 
Watson et al, 1995a, 1995b). Their postulation seemed to explain both the 
overlapping and the distinctive features between anxiety and depression (Watson & 
Clark, 1992). In subsequent postulations (Watson & L.A. Clark, 1992), a hierarchical 
arrangement of the tripartite model was construed with NA as a higher-order factor 
which subsumes the first order factors of anhedonia (depression) and autonomic 
hyperarousal (anxiety)
Another group of researchers led by David Barlow (Barlow, Chorpita & 
Turovsky, 1996; T.A, Brown, Chorpita & Barlow, 1998) favoured a non-hierarchical 
three-factor model of depression, anxiety/apprehension, and fear/panic. This group of 
workers (Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996; Zinbarg, Barlow & Brown, 1997) also proposed a 
hierarchical model in which there was a higher order general factor similar to NA that 
subsumes the anxiety disorders.
16
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In Australia, Lovibond and Lovibond (1995) developed a self-report 
instrument called The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) which could maximise 
differentiation between the emotional states of anxiety and depression. In their 
psychometric approach of scale development, a third factor emerged over the 
constructs of anxiety and depression, which resembles the construct of stress as 
originally defined by Selye (1956, 1974). The 'stress' factor, which was a measure of 
persistent arousal and tension, has since become a general construct worthy of further 
investigation.
Interesting though it might be, little has been done on the applicability of the 
'negative affect structure' on a Chinese population. Previous publications have 
insinuated that the Chinese have a tendency to “somatise” their depressive 
symptomatology (Cheung, 1982, 1985, Kwong & Wong, 1981), and it would be 
interesting to find out if the negative affect structure of a Chinese sample is in any 
way different from its Western counterparts in terms of physical, cognitive, and 
autonomic symptoms. At this juncture. It would be interesting to investigate in a 
cultural context the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis of Beck (1976) which 
distinguishes the thinking styles between anxiety and depression.
From the afore-mentioned discussion, it would make good sense to study, by 
way of psychometric scales, the inter-relationship among these three purported factors 
of negative affectivity, autonomic hyperarousal (stress), and anhedonia (low positive 
affectivity) within a normal sample of Chinese participants in Hong Kong. Moreover, 
it would also be interesting to investigated the relative parsimony of the tripartite 
model of L.A. Clark and Watson (1991) versus the three-factor model of Barlow et al 
(1996) within a Chinese sample.
Research Objectives
The present research was aimed to examine the local construct of negative 
affect and its relation to anxiety and depression. The research will also examine the
17
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psychometric properties of commonly used self-report mood scales when 
administered to a local Chinese population.
To achieve these objectives, the present research will:
1. examine the psychometric properties of the self-report scales, namely, BDI,
BAI, DASS and PANAS in a normal Chinese population,
2. perform exploratory factor analysis to examine the factor structures of the
questionnaires employed,
3. perform confirmatory factor analysis to examine the extent to which the
obtained factor structure conforms to those obtained in the West,
4. investigate the viability of L.A. Clark and Watson's tripartite model as 
compared to Barlow’s three-factor model with a Chinese sample.
Participants
A sample of 700 normal participants will be drawn from the following sources: 
(a) students from the Introduction to Psychology Course of the Open Learning 
University (GLU), (b) medical students from a local university, (c) parents of students 
from a secondary school, (d) nursing officers and student nurses from local hospitals, 
and (e) other miscellaneous participants. A cover sheet on the respondent's 
demographic data will also be collected. Procedures in data collection will adhere 
closely to the protocols as defined by the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (1996). 
The procedure for data collection has been approved by the Ethics Committee of Kwai 
Chung Hospital in July 1997.
Assessment Tools
All subjects will be required to complete the following questionnaires:
1. The Beck Depression Inventory - Revised (BDI)
(Beck & Steer, 1987)
18
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2. The Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(Beck & Steer, 1990)
3. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)
4. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988)
Data Analyses
Statistical analyses, including descriptive statistics, exploratory factor 
analyses, correlational studies, and multivariate analyses will be processed by the 
SPSS for Windows version 7.5 package. Confirmatory factor analysis will be done on 
the Lisrel 8 programme.
Suggested Time Frame:
1. Submission of review title and reference list 31st March 1998
2. Discussion with tutor mid-April 1998
3. Literature review 30th June 1998
4. Finalise design and methodology 31st July 1998
5. Data collection August - September 1998
6. Statistical analysis 31st September 1998
7. Write-up 1st December 1998
8. Revision and finalise paper 31st March 1999
19
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6, MPhil Dissertation
My MPhil dissertation on "The relationship between pain and psychological 
factors in a general practice population" submitted to the Institute of Psychiatry, 
University of London (1974), will be attached to my PsychD Portfolio.
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Curriculum vitae
Section 2.1: Curriculum Vitae and List of Publications
PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS
The United Kingdom (1972 -1974)
1972 - 1974 Assistant Psychologist
Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital, 
London.
Hong Kong (1974-1985)
1974 - 1984 Clinical Psychologist
Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong Mental Health 
Service.
1974 - 1978 Specialist Consultation in Forensic Psychology
Sin Lam Psychiatric Centre, Correctional Services 
Department.
1975 Consulting Specialist
Police Tactical Unit, Royal Hong Kong Police 
Force.
1975 - 1985 Honorary Lecturer and Clinical Supervisor
Post-graduate School in Clinical Psychology, 
University of Hong Kong.
1984 - 1985 Clinical Psychologist
Kowloon Hospital Psychiatric Unit.
South Australia (1985-1991)
1985 Clinical Psychologist
Port Adelaide Community Health Services.
1985 - 1986 Clinical Psychologist
Hillcrest Hospital
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1986- 1989
1986- 1991
1989- 1991
1985- 1991
1986- 1990
1989- 1990
Senior Clinical Psychologist
Emergency Unit, Hillcrest Hospital.
Visiting Clinical Psychologist
Woodleigh House, Modbury Hospital.
Chief Clinical Psychologist
Community Psychology Services, Hillcrest 
Hospital.
Visiting Clinical Psychologist
Port Lincoln Community Health Centre.
Visiting Clinical Psychologist
Parks Community Health Services.
Visiting Clinical Psychologist
Gilles Plains Community Health Centre.
Hon2 Kons (1991 -1997)
1991 - 1994
1991 - Present
1991 - Present
1994 - Present
1995 - Present
Clinical Psychologist
Kwai Chung Hospital, Hospital Authority.
Honorary Lecturer
(Honorary Associate Professor since 1997)
Post-graduate Programme in Clinical Psychology, 
University of Hong Kong.
Honorary Lecturer
(Honorary Associate Professor since 1997)
Discipline of Clinical Psychology,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Senior Clinical Psychologist
Kwai Chung Hospital.
Honorary Clinical Lecturer 
(Adjunct Associate Professor since 1997)
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE
1974 - 1984 Teaching Introduction to Psychology course to student
nurses, Government School of Psychiatric Nursing, 
Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong.
1975 - 1984 Lectures on Clinical Psychology to medical students.
University of Hong Kong.
1976- 1978 Seminar Series entitled "The Psychology o f.  ",
Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong.
1980 - 1984 Lectures on "Behaviour Therapy", Postgraduate
Programme in Clinical Psychology, University of Hong 
Kong.
1986 - 1989 Supervisor to postgraduate Clinical Psychology
trainees. Psychology Discipline, Flinders University, 
South Australia.
1986 - 1990 Lectures on ''Applied Psychology" to postgraduate
nurses. Nurse Education Centre, Hillcrest Hospital, 
South Australia.
1987 - 1990 Lectures on ''Clinical Psychology" to medical students,
Adelaide University, South Australia.
1987 - 1990 Research supervisor to undergraduate dissertations.
Department of Psychology, Adelaide University, South 
Australia.
1987 - 1991 Honorary Lecturer, Clinical Colloquium, Psychological
Board of South Australia.
1989 April Management Module: Introduction to Organisational
Behaviour, Department of Psychology, Hillcrest 
Hospital, South Australia.
1989- 1991 Supervisor to postgraduate Applied Psychology
trainees. Department of Psychology, Adelaide 
University, South Australia.
1991 February Quality Assurance Proj ect: Formalised Performance
Appraisal, Department of Psychology, Hillcrest 
Hospital, South Australia.
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1991 - 1994
1991 - Present
1991 - Present
1992- 1995
1993
1994 - 1996
1994 - 1995
1994 - 1995
1995
1995 - Present
1996 - 1997
1996 - 1997
Teaching Applied Psychology to student nurses at the 
Government School of Psychiatric Nursing, Kwai 
Chung Hospital, Hong Kong.
Lectures on "Clinical Psychology", Postgraduate 
Programme in Clinical Psychology, University of Hong 
Kong.
Lectures on "Clinical Psychology", Discipline of 
Clinical Psychology, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong.
Teaching Introduction to Psychology at the Open 
Learning Institute of Hong Kong.
"Innovative Course in Psychology", Centre for 
Psychological Research and Development, Hong Kong.
Lecture series on Community Psychology, City 
Polytechnic of Hong Kong.
Guest Lecturer to "Certificate Course in Child Mental 
Health", School of Professional and Continuing 
Education, University of Hong Kong.
Guest Lecturer to the course in "Drug Effects,
Drug Abuse and Treatment", School of Continuing 
Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Workshop on "Critical Incident Stress Debriefing", 
Division of Clinical Psychology, Hong Kong 
Psychological Society.
Stress Management Workshops, School of Public 
Health Nursing, Department of Health, Hong Kong.
The Application o f Behavioural Principles in Child 
Management, Positive Living United Services, Hong 
Kong.
Corporate Stress Management Workshops, Supported 
Employment Services, Kwai Chung Hospital, Hong 
Kong.
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PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
1975 Associate of the British Psychology Society
1976 Member, Division of Clinical Psychology, British 
Psychological Society.
1978 Full Member, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
1981 Member, Division of Clinical Psychology, Hong 
Kong Psychological Society.
1982 - 1983 President-elect, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
1983 - 1984 President, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
§ 1985 Registered Psychologist, South Australian
Psychological Board.
1985 Full Member, Australian Psychological Society
1986 Affiliate, College of Clinical Neuropsychologists, 
Australian Psychological Society.
1986 Member, College of Community Psychologists,
Australian Psychological Society.
1991 Associate Fellow, Hong Kong Psychological 
Society. (AFHKPS)
1992 Associate Member, American Psychological 
Association.
1994 Associate Fellow, British Psychological Society.
§ 1994 Chartered Psychologist (Clinical Psychology),
British Psychological Society.
§ 1995 Registered Psychologist, Hong Kong Psychological
Society (Clinical Psychology).
§ Professional Registration /  Chartership
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PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
1975 - 1979
1978- 1982
1979- 1984
1979- 1984
1980- 1981 
1982- 1984
1986- 1990
1989- 1991
1989- 1991
1990- 1991
1991 - 1997
1994 - Present
1994 - Present
Co-editor, Hong Kong Journal o f Mental Health.
Foundation member of the Working Party in the 
standardisation of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children (WISC) in Hong Kong.
Member of the Executive Committee, New Life 
Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association, Hong Kong.
Chairman, New Life Farm, a New Life Psychiatric 
Rehabilitation Association project of a 40-bed half­
way house and sheltered workshop.
Secretary to the Association of Government 
Clinical Psychologists.
Member of the Mental Testing Committee working 
towards the translation/adaptation of psychological 
tests in a cross-cultural context, e.g. the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R).
Member of the Ethnic Affairs Committee, Hillcrest 
Hospital.
Member of the Advisory Committee, Gilles Plains 
Community Health Services, South Australia.
Member of the General Team Management 
Committee, Hillcrest Hospital.
Treasurer, Division of Professional Affairs, 
Australian Psychological Society.
Member, New Life Farm Subcommittee, New Life 
Psychiatric Rehabilitation, Hong Kong.
Chairman, Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) 
Committee, Kwai Chung Hospital.
Member, Investigation Committee (Professional 
Conducts), Hong Kong Psychological Society.
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1994 - Present Member, Hospital Management Committee, Kwai
Chung Hospital
1995 Member, Task Group on "Injury On Duty", Kwai 
Chung Hospital
1995 Member, Committee on "Staff Motivation and
Retention", Kwai Chung Hospital.
1995 - 1997 Member, Medical Records Committee, Kwai
Chung Hospital
1996 - 1997 Chairman, Chuk Yuen Subcommittee (Halfway
House and Sheltered Workshop), New Life 
Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association, Hong Kong.
1996 - 1997 Member, Executive Committee, New Life
Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association,
Hong Kong.
1996 - 1997 Member, IS/IT Strategic Planning Group, Kwai
Chung Hospital.
CONFERENCES AND TRAINING IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS
1994 Commissioned Training Course, HAHO.
"Cognitive Behaviour Therapy" hy Dr. Paul Salkovskis.
1994 Basic Putonghua Course.
Civil Services Training Branch.
1995 Five-week study leave to the South Australian Mental
Health Service.
"Casemix in Psychiatry" under Dr. Rob Elzinga.
1995 National Casemix Conference: "Managing Better with
Casemix".
Adelaide Convention Centre, South Australia.
1996 National Casemix Conference: "Casemix: An Inter­
national Perspective". Sydney Convention Centre, Darling 
Harbour, Sydney, Australia.
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1997 Commissioned Training Course, HAHO.
"Neuropsychological Rehabilitation: Memory Disorders" 
by Dr. Barbara Wilson.
1997 Enrolment to the PsychD (Clinical Psychology)
Conversion Programme at the University of Surrey.
NOTABLE ACHIEVEMENTS IN  THE PAST FIVE YEARS
1994 Appointment to Senior Clinical Psychologist, Kwai Chung
Hospital:
• New Management Initiative (NMI) in Clinical 
Psychology Service, including re-aligning clinical 
psychologists to individual Clinical Management 
Teams (CMTs).
• Development of Clinical Psychology Services to 
the Consultation and Liaison Team.
• Expansion of Clinical Psychology Services within 
the Kwai Chung Hospital Division.
1994 Appointed Chairperson, CQI Committee, Kwai Chung
Hospital:
• Upgrading quality concepts of the original Quality 
Assurance Committee to a CQI/TQM framework.
• Implementation of Total Quality Management 
within the hospital.
1995 Member, Task Group on "Injury On Duty"
• As integral member of the Work Group.
• Gave advice on the compilation of the report.
1995 KCH Casemix Project: The delineation o f  Patient Related
Groups (PRG) for psychiatry
• Study leave to South Australian Mental Health 
Service.
• Visited psychiatric services in Melbourne.
• Attended National Casemix Conference in South 
Australia, 1995.
• Compiled a report on "Casemix in Psychiatry: 
Predicting the Unpredictable".
• Attended National Casemix Conference in Sydney, 
1996.
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1996 Co-ordinator, Quality Assurance Subcommittee, Central
Co-ordinating Committee for Clinical Psychologists,
Hospital Authority, Hong Kong.
• Co-ordinate QA initiatives for the clinical 
psychology profession working in the Hospital 
Authority.
• Compilation of a "Guide to Professional Services".
• Clinical Audit of the profession.
• Development of treatment protocols.
1996 Member, Quality Assurance Subcommittee, Central
Co-ordinating Committee for Psychiatrists,
Hospital Authority, Hong Kong.
• Development of Patient Related Groups for 
Psychiatry.
• Consultation in the development of treatment 
protocols.
1997 Co-ordinator, Research Interest Group, Kwai Chung
Hospital and Prince of Wales Hospital Departments of
Psychology.
• Co-ordinate researches within the two hospitals.
• Contract with Psychological Corporation for 
exclusive rights to translate three Beck Scales into 
Cantonese.
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PUBLICATIONS
1972 Wong, C.W. (1972). "The performance o f schizophrenic patients on
the Chinese Proverbs Test", B.A.(Hons.) dissertation. University of 
Hong Kong, September, 1972.
1973 Wong, C.W. (1973). "A preliminary study of schizophrenic patients:
Chronological age, family size and sibling rank", Hong Kong Journal 
o f Mental Health, 2 (2), 8-13.
1974 Wong, C.W. (1974). "The relationship o f pain and psychological
factors within a general practice population", MPhil dissertation. 
Institute of Psychiatry, University of London, October, 1974.
1975 Wong, C.W. (1975). "Systematic desensitisation: Cognitive or
behavioural ?", Hong Kong Journal o f Mental Health, 4 (1), 3-8.
1977 Wong, C.W. (1977). "Clinical psychology reappraised", Lfowg
Journal o f Mental Health, 6 (2), 2-7.
1978 Wong, C.W. (1978). "Contributions of a clinical psychologist in
rehabilitation", Hong Kong Journal o f Mental Health, 7 (1), 13-14.
1979 Wong, C.W. (1979). "Psychiatric Ancillary Services: A rhapsody",
Hong Kong Journal o f Mental Health, 8 (3), 27-29.
1981 Wong, C.W. (1981a). "Behaviour therapy in practice". Paper
presented to the 1981 Annual Conference of the Association of 
Psychological and Educational Counsellors of Asia (Hong Kong 
Branch), held on 20.6.1981 at the City Hall, Hong Kong.
1981 Wong, C.W. (1981b). "Recent trends in psychiatric treatment:
Behaviour therapy". Paper presented at the International Year of 
Disabled Persons (lYDP) Seminar on "Current Trends o f  Psychiatric 
Treatment" held on 26.9.1981 in the Auditorium of the Duke of 
Windsor Building, Wanchai, Hong Kong.
1981 Wong, C.W. (1981c). "Behaviour modification: A return to some
basic issues", Hong Kong Journal o f Mental Health, 10 (2), 13-24.
1982 Wong, C.W. (1982). "Propensity to violence: The appraisal of
dangerousness in mental patients", Hong Kong Journal o f  Mental
9-17.
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1985 Mak, K.Y., Wong, C.W., & Lo, W.H. (1985). "The Capgras
Syndrome in Hong Kong Chinese", Journal o f  the Hong Kong 
Psychiatric Association, 5, 14-16.
1985 Wong, C.W. (1985). "Ten years at Castle Peak Hospital: Some 
personal reflections and propositions". Journal o f  the Hong Kong 
Psychiatric Association, 5, 43-44.
1986 Law, S.K., Chen, W.C., Wong, S.W., Wong, C.W., & Kwong, B. 
(1986). "Mitral valve prolapse and anxiety disorder in Hong Kong 
Chinese", Journal o f the Hong Kong Psychiatric Association, 6, 2-5.
1986 Wong, C.W. (1986). "Basic principles in behavioural management: 
An operant training course for Correctional Services officers". 
Department of Psychology, Hillcrest Hospital.
1987 Wong, C.W., & Elzinga, R.H. (1987). "The use o f  the Visual
Analogue Scale in behavioural assessment: An experimental study". 
Department of Psychology, Hillcrest Hospital.
1993 Leung, E.Y.S., Wong, C.W., Li, E.K.W., Lau-Yu, P.K., & Wu, K.K. 
(1993). "What can clinical psychologists contribute after a disaster ? 
Post-disaster intervention model in the local context." Bulletin o f  the 
Hong Kong Psychological Society, Nos. 30/31, January and July, 
1993,93-103.
1994 Wong, C.W., & Leung, E.Y.S. (1994). "Critical Incident Stress
Debriefing: An effective way o f short-circuiting maladaptive 
emotional reactions after a traumatic experience" Paper presented at 
the Annual Conference of the Hong Kong Psychological Society, 
University of Hong Kong, 1994.
1995 [Wong, C.W. (1995a). "Misconceptions about neurasthenia" in
"Aspects o f  Stress" edited by the Division of Clinical Psychology, 
Hong Kong Psychological Society. Hong Kong Christian Service,
1995.] (in Chinese)
1995 Wong, C.W. (1995b). "Casemix in psychiatry: Predicting the
unpredictable ?" Monograph, Kwai Chung Hospital.
1997 Leung, E.Y.S., Wong, C.W., Wu, K.K., Li, E.K.W., Lau-Yu, P.K., &
Lee, L.K. (1996). "Disaster management: A report on psychological 
interventions after two major disastrous fires in 1996". Bulletin o f  the 
Hong Kong Psychological Society, Nos. 36/37, January and July
1996, 85-97.
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1998 Cheng, S.K., Chong, G.C., & Wong, C.W. (1998). “Roles o f self­
esteem and perfectionism in the relation between life stress and 
psychological stress among Chinese adolescents: A structural 
equation modelling”. Paper presented at the First International 
Conference on Child and Adolescent Mental Health, Hong Kong, June, 
1998.
1999 Cheng, S.K., Chong, G.C., & Wong, C.W. (1999). “Chinese Frost 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale: A validation and prediction on 
self-esteem and psychological distress”. Journal o f  Clinical 
Psychology, Vol. ^ ( 9 ) ,  1051-1061.
BOOK REVIEWS
1989 Barraclough, B. & Hughes, J. (1987) "Suicide: Clinical and
epidemiological studies", London: Croom Helm.
Reviewed in the Australian Journal o f  Psychology, 41 (2), (1989) 
p. 225.
1989 Coleman, E. (ed.) (1987) "Psychotherapy with homosexual men
and women: Integrated identity approach for clinical practice". 
New York/London, the Haworth Press.
Reviewed in the Australian Journal o f Psychology, 41 (3), (1989), 
p. 346.
1989 Green, R. (1987) "The "Sissy Boy Syndrome" and the
development of homosexuality". New Haven & London : Yale 
University Press.
Reviewed in the Australian Journal o f Psychology, 41 (3), (1989) 
p. 351.
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Section 2.2 Professional Experience Since Qualification
OUTLINE
The present account of my professional training and practice is organised into 
the following sub-sections in chronological order:
2.2.1 Undergraduate Studies, University o f  Hong Kong 37
(1969-1972)
2.2.2 Postgraduate Training, Institute o f  Psychiatry, London 37
(1972-1974)
2.2.3 Work in Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong 39
(1974-1985)
2.2.4 Work in Hillcrest Hospital, South Australia 42
(1985-1991)
2.2.5 Work in Kwai Chung Hospital, Hong Kong 47
(1991-1997)
2.2.6 Summary and Epilogue 50
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2.2.1: Undergraduate Studies, University of Hong Kong (1969 - 1972)
As an undergraduate at the University of Hong Kong between 1969 and 1972, 
I chose to major in psychology, and undertook a research dissertation with a heavy 
clinical component entitled "The performance o f schizophrenic patients on the 
Chinese Proverbs Test". During my undergraduate years, I published my first journal 
article entitled "A preliminary study o f  schizophrenic patients: Chronological age, 
family size and sibling rank" (Wong, 1973).
I graduated from the University of Hong Kong in 1972 with a Bachelor of Arts 
degree in psychology in the Upper Second Class Honours Division. In the same year, 
I was accepted to the MPhil Clinical Psychology Programme at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, University of London.
2.2.2: Postgraduate Studies, Institute of Psychiatry (1972 -1974)
When I began my postgraduate training at the Institute of Psychiatry, I was 
appointed Assistant Psychologist at the Bethlem Royal and Maudsley Hospitals. Dr. 
Jack Rachman was my personal tutor, and Dr. Clare Philips was my research 
supervisor. My clinical placements during the two-year training are summarised in 
the following table:
Specialty Supervisor Consultant Location
Neuropsychology Dr. E. Drewe Mr. Falconer Maudsley
Adult Psychiatry Dr. S.J. Rachman Dr. I. Marks 
Dr. R.H. Cawley
Maudsley
Forensic Psychiatry Dr. S.J. Rachman Dr. P.D. Scott Maudsley
Child Psychiatry Dr. W. Yule Dr. L. Hersov Maudsley
Adolescent Psychiatry Dr. W. Yule Dr. J. Corbett Maudsley
Adult Psychiatry Dr. M.B. Shapiro Dr. R.H. Cawley Bethlem Royal
Psychogeriatrics Dr. M.B. Shapiro Dr. F. Post Bethlem Royal
Community Psychiatry Dr. F.N. Watts Dr. D. Bennett Maudsley
Adult Psychiatry Dr. M. Brindley Dr. M. Shepherd Maudsley
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My first clinical placement was in the highly demanding Neurosurgical Unit of 
the Maudsley Hospital under Mr. Murray Falconer. At the time, the Neurosurgical 
Unit specialised in the surgical treatment of temporal lobe epilepsy. As a trainee 
clinical psychologist, I was required to test patients who underwent temporal 
leucotomy to document their pre- and post-operative cognitive functions. The 
experience at the Neurosurgical Unit laid a very good foundation in clinical 
neuropsychology for me. In particular, I acquired good understanding of, and 
assessment skills in, human memory and perceptual disorders following brain injury.
I spent an extended placement under the supervision of Dr. Jack Rachman. 
My clinical commitment at the time was mainly adult outpatients work, with a 
predominant share of patients with monosymtomatic phobias who responded well to 
systematic desensitisation therapy. I also attended the forensic psychiatry rounds of 
Dr. Peter Scott, which I found immensely useful, even up to the present date.
I did a placement at the Child Psychiatry Unit under the supervision of Dr. 
William Yule and Dr. Lionel Hersov. The work included assessment and treatment 
planning for autistic children, and the management of conduct disorders in 
adolescents. During the placement, I also attended ward rounds conducted by Dr. 
Michael Rutter.
During my second year of training, I was under the supervision of Dr. Monte 
Shapiro at the Bethlem Royal Hospital. The unit dealt with adult inpatients with 
mood disorders, and I also took referrals from the Psychogeriatric Unit headed by Dr. 
Felix Post. It was an inspiring experience working with Dr. Shapiro, and I was very 
much impressed by his unique approach of the individual using scientific 
methodology.
I did my fifth placement with Dr. Fraser Watts in Dr. Douglas Bennett's 
Community Psychiatry Unit. The major bulk of work centred on the rehabilitation of 
chronic schizophrenics. I attended ward meeting and group therapy sessions, as well 
as working in the nearby community houses for schizophrenic patients.
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At the outset of my training, I have targeted my ftiture career to adult 
psychiatry. I therefore did an elective placement with Dr. Mary Brindley at the 
Maudsley Hospital doing mainly social skills training, and using therapeutic 
modelling in treating patients with obsessive compulsive disorders.
In the early 1970’s, there was a tremendous interest in the application of 
clinical psychology to general medicine. I became interested in the modulation of pain 
perception and pain reaction by personality dimensions and other psychological 
correlates. My MPhil dissertation entitled "The relationship o f  pain and 
psychological factors within a general practice population " (Wong, 1974) attempted 
to address this issue, and delineated pain dimensions which were related to anxiety 
factors. The research was supervised by Dr. Clare Phillips, and the external examiner 
was Dr. Reginal Beech. A copy of my MPhil dissertation will be attached to my 
PsychD portfolio.
My doubts about a 'purisf behaviourist viewpoint gradually surfaced, and I 
published a paper entitled "Systematic desensitisation: Cognitive or behavioural" 
(Wong, 1975) soon after my graduation from the Maudsley Course. I became aware 
of the "cognitive movement" in the early 1970's, despite the stem behaviouristic 
influence of the Maudsley course.
I graduated from the Institute of Psychiatry in October 1974 with an MPhil 
degree in Clinical Psychology awarded by the University of London.
After my graduation, I was offered a job at Castle Peak Hospital. This was the 
second clinical psychologist position established by the Mental Health Service of 
Hong Kong, and I was the first clinical psychologist posted to the hospital.
2,2.3: Work in Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong (1974 -1985)
Castle Peak Hospital (CPH) was a 2,400 bed psychiatric hospital built in 1961. 
Working as the first clinical psychologist in an institution with no previous 
psychological service, there was a lot of ground work to be done. The first and
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foremost chore was to establish a referral system for psychological services. This 
entailed a lot of liaison with psychiatrists, and delineating clearly to them the role and 
function of a clinical psychologist. I started to run a series of seminars on psychology 
which the young doctors found extremely useful for their Diploma of Psychological 
Medicine (DPM) and Member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists (MRCPsych) 
examinations.
This marked the beginning of an amicable working relationship between the 
clinical psychologist and psychiatrists in CPH; and it ultimately helped to foster 
mutual respect between the two professions.
My job at CPH was a purely clinical one, with some teaching duties at the 
Government School of Psychiatric Nursing. I gave lectures to medical students who 
came to the hospital for their psychiatry clerkship, and I also ran a monthly 
psychology colloquium entitled: “The Psychology o f.. ..” series. The seminars were 
well-attended by doctors, nurses and allied health professionals, and helped to foster 
their understanding of clinical psychology.
I worked single-handedly at CPH for seven years before an additional clinical 
psychologist was recruited in 1981. The staff strength for clinical psychologists 
remained at two by the time I left the hospital in 1984.
My clinical duty at CPH was initially 80% assessment and 20% treatment. By 
the time I left, the percentage was changed to 60% assessment and 40% treatment. 
Assessment work involved the use of the WAIS, the WISC, the MMPI, the EPI, and 
other neuropsychological tests such as the WMS, the Kendrick Battery and other 
neuropsychological tests of memory. In 1983, I developed a computerised scoring 
programme for the Bannister-Fransella Grid Test for Schizophrenic Thought 
Disorder using the Apple II-Plus personal computer.
Psychological treatment opened up new horizons at the hospital which 
traditionally relied on pharmacological and physical treatments. The use of behaviour 
modification on several difficult patients with behavioural problems was highly
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regarded by the psychiatrists. A social skills training project for chronic 
schizophrenics was also introduced.
Soon after I arrived at CPH, I was asked by the Correctional Services 
Department to provide consultation services to the Siu Lam Psychiatric Centre 
(SLPC) which was a special hospital similar to Broodmore Hospital in the UK. I 
became their fist Consultant Forensic Psychologist doing psychological reports on 
some of their selected inmates. For the next four years, I spent about one session per 
week at SLPC until they employed their own clinical psychologist in 1978.
In 1975, I was asked by the Royal Hong Kong Police Force to be their 
selection advisor to the newly established Special Duties Unit (SDU) which was 
equivalent to the SAS in Britain or the SWAT in the USA. I was also asked to assist in 
the literature review on international terrorism, management of hostage-taking 
situations, and negotiating skills. I initiated some early lectures in their Negotiators 
Training Course, and also participated in two of their hostage-taking exercises.
From 1975 onwards, I was supervisor to the Post-graduate Programme in 
Clinical Psychology of the University of Hong Kong. I also became an Honorary 
Lecturer to their programme. In the ensuing ten years that followed, over 40 clinical 
psychology trainees came under my supervision at CPH.
In 1975, I became a Member, and later an Associate, of the British 
Psychological Society. I was also a member of their Division of Clinical Psychology. 
In 1978,1 became a full member of the Hong Kong Psychological Society. When the 
Division of Clinical Psychology was established in 1981, I became one of their 
foundation members. In 1982-1983, I was President-elect of the Hong Kong 
Psychological Society, and became the President of the Society in 1983-1984. During 
the period of my presidency, I was asked to co-ordinate a working group to draft the 
Society's position statement in support of the proposed décriminalisation of 
homosexuality in Hong Kong. The final position statement was promulgated to the 
media in 1984.
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In 1976, I started a Saturday Behaviour Therapy Clinic at the Kowloon 
Hospital Psychiatric Unit for anxiety disorders and sexual dysfunction. The service 
was finally terminated after 8 months because of my heavy workload at CPH and 
elsewhere.
I was co-editor of the Hong Kong Journal o f Mental Health, a foundation 
member of the working parties in the standardisation of the WISC and the WAIS-R, and 
devoted a considerable amount of my after-office hours as a volunteer in psychiatric 
rehabilitation. Between 1979 and 1984, I was Chairperson of the New Life Farm, a 
unique open-air sheltered workshop devoted to farming activities grafted onto a 40-bed 
halfway house for discharged psychiatric patients from CPH. The facility was situated 
adjacent to the hospital, and was one of the many initiatives of the New Life Psychiatric 
Rehabilitation Association (NLPRA). The NLPRA was a subsidised voluntary agency to 
which I was also a member of their Executive Committee.
2.2.4: Work in Hillcrest Hospital, South Australia (1985-1991)
After immigrating to Australia in 1985, I became a Registered Psychologist 
with the South Australian Psychological Board. I became a full member of the 
Australian Psychological Society, a member of the Board of Community Psychology, 
and an affiliate member of the Board of Clinical Neuropsychology. The Professional 
Boards were later renamed "Colleges" in 1994.
I started to work in Australia as a clinical psychologist in the Port Adelaide 
Community Health Centre (PACHS) doing mainly health promotion and health 
education work. My clientele was predominately Aborigines and the socially 
disadvantaged, with presenting problems such as alcoholism, substance abuse, and 
depression. I ran an Agoraphobic Support Group, and also participated in an 
educational camp for disadvantaged teenagers.
Three months later, I was offered a base-grade clinical psychologist position at 
Hillcrest Hospital, which was one of the two major psychiatric institutions in South 
Australia. It was remarkably similar to CPH both in its history, organisation and
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client-type. Instead of 2400 beds at CPH, Hillcrest Hospital had only 350 beds. 
Instead of two clinical psychologists at CPH, Hillcrest Hospital had 16 full-time- 
equivalents. My work at Hillcrest was enjoyable because of the vastly improved staff- 
patient ratio compared with my previous job in Hong Kong.
In mid-1986, I was appointed Senior Clinical Psychologist at the Emergency 
Unit (EMU) of Hillcrest Hospital. I had three base grade clinical psychologists under 
my supervision. My work at EMU involved attending to psychiatric emergencies in 
the community. It was an assertive outreach service of psychiatric assessment and 
treatment in the home-environment. My work involved home-based treatment for 
patients with severely agoraphobia, and those suffering from incapacitating obsessive 
compulsive disorders. One challenging duty in EMU was the need to be rostered as a 
duty officer in their 24-hour emergency admission clinic. The work involved mental 
state examination of patients referred for admission to Hillcrest Hospital using the 
DSM-III-R protocol. The duty officer had to make an on-the-spot diagnosis according 
to the DSM-III-R criteria, and decide whether or not the patient should be admitted. 
The cases would be reviewed by the consultant psychiatrist in next morning's ward- 
round.
Apart from my clinical commitments at the EMU, I was seconded on a half- 
time basis to Woodleigh House, a custom-built psychiatric unit adjacent to Modbury 
General Hospital which was a large regional hospital. My work at Woodleigh House 
was 70% outpatients, 20 % inpatients, and 10% teaching of medical students from the 
Adelaide University Medical School.
From 1986 onwards, I taught at the Nurse Education Centre of Hillcrest 
Hospital. In the same year I also started to supervise clinical psychology trainees from 
the Flinders University. From 1987 onwards, I was appointed Research Supervisor to 
undergraduate dissertations by the Department of Psychology, Adelaide University. I 
was also an Honorary Lecturer to the Clinical Colloquium organised by the South 
Australian Psychological Board.
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I provided consultation services to the nearby Yatala Prison, and advised them 
on behavioural strategies in the management of behavioural disturbances. I gave 
lectures to correctional service officers on topics such as behaviour disorder and 
personality disorder. I also produced a self-learning booklet entitled "Basic Principles 
in Behavioural Management: An Operant Training Course for Correctional Services 
Officers" (fSf on%, 1986).
While I was at Hillcrest, I participated in a review of seclusion procedures and 
their effectiveness in managing behavioural disturbances in the wards. I also did a 
study on the use of the Visual Analogue Scale in behavioural observation which was a 
standard procedure amongst the nursing staff of the hospital (Wong and Elzinga, 
1987).
From 1985 onwards, I was Visiting Clinical Psychologist to the Port Lincoln 
Community Health Centre. Port Lincoln is a small fishing community which can be 
reached by a 250 km flight across the Spencer Gulf from metropolitan Adelaide. The 
work involved one two-day clinic per month. The clients were mainly referred by 
general practitioners working in a local Community Health Centre. The clientele 
presented with a wide variety of problems ranging from depression, anxiety disorders, 
to brain injuries and nocturnal enuresis. I maintained a highly valued clinical service 
to the country town for over six years, and established a trusting relationship with the 
local authorities.
My experience in country services soon expanded to other rural towns such as 
Gladestone (200 km north of Adelaide by road) and Whyalla (250 km north-west of 
Adelaide by air). Although I was not required to provide direct services to Whyalla 
and Gladestone, I had to travel to the respective centres periodically to liaise with the 
local health authorities and to co-ordinate services rendered by clinical psychologists 
of my section.
Between 1986 and 1988, I participated in an 18-month intensive training 
programme in Family Therapy under Dr. Anne Sved Williams using the “strategic 
approach”. My training and background in scientific and empirical behaviourism
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eventually proved detrimental to the training, and the sessions were terminated by 
mutual agreement in 1988.
Between 1986 and 1990, I was Visiting Clinical Psychologist to the Parks 
Community Health Centre in the Western suburbs dealing with disadvantaged 
immigrants from South-East Asia. Some of my clients were suffering from post- 
traumatic stress disorder as a result of war and torture. I started several Stress 
Management Courses and Relaxation Training Classes there.
On account of my work portfolio, I was re-classified as Chief Clinical 
Psychologist in 1989, and took charge of a large division within the Hillcrest 
Psychology Department infrastructure, viz. as Head of the Community Psychology 
Section. My section had three senior and four base-grade clinical psychologists. 
Altogether, we constituted over half of the departmental strength.
The Community Psychology Section covered acute psychiatric services both in 
the hospital and in the community. Apart from country services to Port Lincoln, 
Whyalla and Gladestone mentioned above, clinical psychologists were seconded to 
various general hospitals and community health centres in the catchment area. These 
included the Modbury General Hospital, the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Port Adelaide 
Community Health Services, Parks Community Health Centre, and the Gilles Plains 
Community Health Centre. I eventually relinquished my clinical duties at the 
Emergency Unit and continued my half-time work at Woodleigh House as my main­
stay clinical commitment. I continued with my consultation visits to Port Lincoln and 
the migrant services at the Parks Community Health Centre.
One notable achievement during the period was the establishment of the 
Northern Outreach Team based at Lyell McEwin Hospital which functioned as a 
community psychiatric outreach cum outpatients clinic for patients in the northern 
suburbs.
I became a member of the General Team Management Committee which 
looked after the Emergency Unit and the Litchfield Mood Disorder Unit at Hillcrest
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Hospital. I was a member of the Ethnic Affairs Committee which dealt with the needs 
of ethnic minorities within the hospital. I was also a member of the Advisory 
Committee to the Gilles Plains Community Health Centre.
From 1989 onwards, I was appointed Clinical Supervisor to the newly 
established Applied Psychology Course at the Adelaide University, and started to 
supervise their trainees.
My work has gradually shifted from clinical to a more managerial portfolio. 
To facilitate the hospital's re-application for full accreditation by the Australian 
Council on Hospital Standards (ACHS), the Psychology Department of Hillcrest 
Hospital initiated a series of quality management movements. I started a teaching 
module on "Organisational Behaviour", and drafted the Department's Formalised 
Performance Appraisal Form using a "Management By Objective" (MBO) framework.
In 1990, I was involved with out-sourcing of our psychological services to 
outside corporation such as Employee Assistance Programmes (EAP) with large 
companies. I also helped to run pre-retirement seminars for Commonwealth 
Government employees.
Between 1989 and 1991, 1 was Treasurer to the Division of Professional 
Affairs of the Australian Psychological Society, looking after budget allocations to the 
seven Professional Boards of the organisation. The position required me to travel 
periodically to Melbourne for face-to-face meetings with the Executive Director and 
the Board representatives. Serving at the Australian Psychological Society was a 
valuable corporate experience for me.
Between 1990 and 1991, the South Australian Government decided to devolve 
Hillcrest Hospital and re-distribute the resources to community services for the 
psychiatrically ill. In the wake of changes, 1 finally decided to leave my job at 
Hillcrest Hospital and took up a clinical psychologist position at Kwai Chung Hospital 
in Hong Kong.
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2.2.5: Work in Kwai Chung Hospital, Hong Kong (1991 -1997)
In September 1991,1 returned to Hong Kong to work in Kwai Chung Hospital 
(KCH) as one of the two clinical psychologists. Similar to the Australian scene, the 
Mental Health Service in Hong Kong was also under drastic re-structuring to make 
way for the newly established Hospital Authority (HA). The HA was an incorporated 
body subvented by the Hong Kong Government to manage the 42 hospitals in the 
region using modem management philosophies.
After the inception of HA in December 1991, management autonomy was 
gradually decentralised to the individual hospitals. This in essence resulted in a 
thorough re-organisation of the once centralised Clinical Psychology Services within 
the Mental Health Service. Prior to the inception of the HA, the centralised Clinical 
Psychology Service was staffed by one senior and 14 clinical psychologists. The re­
allocation of clinical psychology staff into area hospitals meant that a total of five 
clinical psychologists were placed under the KCH umbrella, including those who used 
to work in the outpatient psychiatric centres.
Within KCH itself, there was also drastic re-stmcturing under the mbrics of a 
"New Management Initiative" (NMI). The corporate strategy was to establish seven 
specialty Clinical Management Teams (CMTs) each headed by a consultant 
psychiatrist with its own compliment of professional staff. At that time, I was 
working half-time with the Child Psychiatry Unit helping it to develop a new Child 
and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS). The other half of my clinical 
commitment was spent with the Adult Services. The NMI was seen as an opportunity 
to expand the Clinical Psychology Service, and we started to negotiate for at least one 
full-time clinical psychologist for each CMT to align with its matrix management 
system.
I was appointed Senior Clinical Psychologist (SCP) of KCH in 1994, and the 
Clinical Psychology Service started to expand rapidly. By 1997, KCH has two SCPs 
and nine clinical psychologists (CPs) serving the seven CMTs. To date, KCH
47
Professional Experience
remained the largest employer of CPs within the HA, and our staff accounts for about 
one-fifth of the total clinical psychology staff employed within the HA hospitals.
Clinical psychology input to the Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Team has 
since been expanded to one SCP and two CPs. The team is being recognised as the 
Centre of Excellence for child psychiatry in Hong Kong.
Since my return to Hong Kong, I was elected an Associate Fellow of the 
British Psychological Society (AFBPsS), and obtained my BPS Chartered 
Psychologist (Clinical) status in 1994. I was elected an Associate Fellow of the Hong 
Kong Psychological Society (AFHKPS), and became a Registered Clinical 
Psychologist of the Hong Kong Psychological Society in 1995. I also became an 
Associate Member of the American Psychological Society since 1992.
Starting from 1991, I was appointed Honorary Lecturer to both Clinical 
Psychology Programmes at the University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong. My appointments were later renamed to Honorary Associate Professor 
in 1997. From 1995 onwards, I was appointed Honorary Clinical Lecturer by the 
Department of Psychiatry of the School of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. The title was renamed Adjunct Associate Professor in 1997.
After my promotion to SCP of KCH, my job portfolio has shifted to a more 
managerial level. I was appointed Chairperson of the newly established Continuos 
Quality Improvement (CQI) Committee which was the steering body to implement 
Total Quality Management (TQM) in the hospital.
Notable achievements in the past seven years were listed in my Curriculum 
Vitae. The most ambitious project started in 1995 when I was the first person to 
explore the feasibility of implementing outcome-based funding to psychiatric services. 
The KCH Casemix Project took me back to South Australia for a five-week study 
leave, followed by two subsequent Casemix Conferences in Australia. I compiled a 
document entitled "Casemix in psychiatry: Predicting the unpredictable" (Wong, 
1995) and an abridged version of the report with new data entitled “Steps towards
48
Professional Experience
casemix in psychiatry: An exercise in the development o f grouping systems for local 
use ” will be included into my Professional Dossier.
The list of conferences and training that I have attended in the past seven 
years, as well as a complete list of my publications is listed in my curriculum vitae.
In spite of the heavy clinical load at KCH, clinical psychologists of the 
Psychology Department continued to stay up-front with academic activities such as 
seminars and clinical research. We were able to send one staff each year over to the 
UK, Canada and the Beck Institute in the USA for staff development purposes. On 
the research side, the department has a budget allocation for a research assistant to 
come two months each year to assist in data collection and statistical analyses. A 
close working relationship was formed with the University Department of Psychiatry 
at the Prince of Wales Hospital (PWH) to conduct research of clinical interests. From
1997,1 was the co-ordinator of the Research Interest Group for KCH and PWH.
In 1997, our research group was successful in obtaining the exclusive right 
from the Psychological Corporation of USA to translate three Beck Scales into 
Cantonese for research purposes. These include, the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) and the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS). 
Ongoing research works include projects on pain management in patients suffering 
from low back pain, the treatment of anorexia nervosa, motivational interview with 
sufferers of substance abuse, and the collection of normative data for various clinical 
instruments. The Psychology Department has also developed a software for scoring 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and a new software to delineate Axis-II Disorders 
using the MMPI-2 profile.
As a senior member of the Department, I was often called upon by the Crown 
Prosecutors to serve as an expert witness to various forensic cases. The work had 
since accumulated to over 80 court reports since my return to Hong Kong, many of 
which were High Court cases.
49
Professional Experience
My affiliation with paediatricians and family services provided me with 
ongoing clinical opportunities in the areas of child assessment and behavioural 
management. Under the auspices of various organisations, I gave lectures and 
workshops on applied psychology, community psychology, behavioural management 
of children, and stress management,
I was a founding member of the Critical Incident Team of the Division of 
Clinical Psychology, Hong Kong Psychological Society which looks at strategies in 
the psychological management of civil disasters. I have run workshops on post- 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and critical incident stress debriefing (CISD).
2,2,6: Summary and Epilogue
My training at the Maudsley, though limited in clinical variety, provided me 
with a very firm scientific foundation of behavioural principles which has proven to 
be immensely useful in my future professional career.
My initial ten years in Hong Kong was confined to a purely clinical job with 
little opportunity of administration and management. The good working relationship 
with psychiatrists at Castle Peak Hospital, however, helped to reinforce my personal 
reputation as well as the status of clinical psychology within the Mental Health 
Service.
My work experience in South Australia provided me with invaluable clinical 
and management skills. The six-and-a-half-years at Hillcrest Hospital also saw 
numerous personal achievements which helped to build up my confidence.
After my return to Hong Kong in 1991, I was successful in establishing the 
largest and the most reputable Clinical Psychology Department within the Hospital 
Authority. My portfolio carries with it very heavy managerial commitments mainly in 
areas of quality management and service development. I was landed the task of 
evaluating the feasibility of implementing casemix funding in psychiatry, a project
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which endeavours to align with Patient Related Groups (PRO) Project within the 
Hospital Authority agenda.
In retrospect, my heavy clinical and managerial commitments in the past 25 
years had regrettably prevented me from pursuing continuous academic excellence. In 
the area of design and research methodology, I felt left behind in the newer data 
management techniques such as multivariate factor analysis using the SPSS for  
Windows package and the confirmatory factor analysis techniques such as the Lisrel 
package. Enrolment with the PsychD Clinical Psychology Conversion Course at the 
University of Surrey would provide me, at this stage of my career, the much needed 
opportunity of keeping abreast with current research and scientific knowledge so that I 
shall be in a much more advantageous position to advise and to supervise.
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2.3.1 Legal Issues fo r  Clinical Psychologists: An Introduction 53
2.3.2 Trauma Management Workshops 54
2.3.3 Law and Ethics fo r  Practising Psychologists 5 5
2.3.4 South Australian State Psychology Conference 56
2.3.5 Stress Reactions and their Treatment following Motor 5 7
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2.3.6 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Theoryf Diagnosis and 58
Treatment
2.3.7 Assessment and Treatment o f  Anxiety Disorders in General 59
Clinical Practice
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2.3.1: Lesal Issues for Clinical Psycholosists: An Introduction
Date:
Presenter:
Venue:
Time:
31 March, 1998 
Mr. Mark K.M. Lam 
Solicitor,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Conference Room,
Psychological Services of the Hong Kong Police Force, 
Hong Kong.
Two hours
Contents:
Introduction to some basic legal concepts.
Tort of negligence
Duty of care
Breach of duty
Causation
Negligent statement 
Equitable duty of confidence 
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 
Vicarious liability 
Defamation 
Concluding remarks
Legal examples were quoted to illustrate the points. Excerpts from law journals were 
also available as hand-outs. The session was useful as a general introduction to 
common legal issues facing the clinical psychologist in Courts of Law.
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Trauma Manasement Workshops
Dates:
Presenter:
Venue:
Time: 
Contents: 
Day 1:
15th and 16th June, 1998 
Dr. Robyn Robinson 
Director,
Trauma Support Consultants Pty. Ltd. 
Melbourne, Australia.
The Lakeside Centre,
Royal Melbourne Zoological Gardens, 
Australia.
Two full days
Trauma Manasement
Introduction and definitions and historical overview 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD)
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Critical incident stress response
One-on-one trauma counselling and skill practice session 
Psychological support programmes 
Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)
Call out protocol
Peer support programmes and programme evaluation 
Debriefing “walk-though” demonstration
Day 2: Critical Incident Stress Manasement (CISM) for Larse Scale Incidents
• Defining incidents as “large scale”
• Cultural considerations
• Duty of care
• Psychological response to large scale incidents
• Establishing psychological support programmes in the work place
• The administrative response in managing care of staff following a 
critical incident
• Systems and structures: Preparing the major events
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25.J; Law and Ethics for Practisins Psycholosists
Date:
Presenter:
Venue:
Time:
Contents:
20 June, 1998
Ms. Gabrielle Martin
The Attorney-General Department,
South Australia 
Laffer Room
South Australia Postgraduate Medical Education Association 
One full day
1. The structure, content and lesal requirements o f a vsvcholosical revert with 
particular reference to the Criminal Court 
(Presented by Ms. Gabrielle Martin)
Preliminary concepts 
Purposes of the report 
The sources of the factual information 
Reliance on tests and reference material 
Confidentiality
Reliance on professional expertise 
Pre-sentence reports
Miscellaneous matters on structure and style
Expert Evidence
(Presented by the Honourable Justice Lander)
Obligations of an expert witness to the court 
Distinction between facts and opinions
Ensuring the report identifies the distinction between facts and 
opinions
Determination of facts 
Identifying assumptions
Offering alternative opinion upon different assumption 
Rules of the Court 
Professional honesty and integrity 
Concluding remarks
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2.3.4: South Australian State Psvcholosv Conference
(PsychTrek: New Frontiers in Psychology)
Dates:
Venue:
Time: 
Contents: 
Day 1:
28th and 29th August, 1998 
Conference Hall 
Balyana Rehabilitation Centre 
South Australia.
Two full days
Friday 28thAu2ust, 1998
Keynote Speech by Professor Kevin Howells:
“To boldly go where none have gone before: Psychology and the 
treatment o f offenders ”
Future aspects of community psychology
Mental health and multiculturalism
Children and adolescents in community health
Ageing and psychological health
Effects of organisational change on psychologists
Future requirements for registration and training
Day 2: Saturday 29th Ausust, 1998
Quality assurance for psychologists 
Professional development: The Medical Model 
QA and professional competency 
Psychologists as medical experts 
Status of psychologists in court 
Psychopharmacology and psychology 
Psychotropic medication 
Practical applications in psychotherapy 
Psychology and addictions 
Prescription rights for psychologists in Australia 
To prescribe or not to prescribe: Is the answer to be found in the brain 
or in the psyche ?
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2.3.5: Stress Reactions and their Treatment following Motor Vehicle 
Accidents
Date:
Presenter:
Venue:
Time:
Contents:
30th August, 1998 
Professor David J. de L. Home
University of Melbourne and Royal Melbourne Hospital 
Disability Information and Resource Centre, Inc.
195 Gilles Street, Adelaide.
One half day
Overview of the problem 
Historical and current perspectives of PTSD 
Assessing the patient using the DSM-IV criteria 
The role of psychometric tests
Ideographic measures: Behavioural checklists and analogue measures 
Medico-legal issues 
Therapy issues
Dealing with panic and phobic anxiety
Intmsiveness and avoidance
Hyperarousal and vigilance
Anger and pain
Loss and grieving
Current status of BMDR and CISD
Resources available:
Psychologists 
Psychiatrists 
Government agencies
A video tape demonstration of victim interview was presented after the workshop.
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2 2 6 ; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Theory, Diasnosis and Treatment
Date:
Presenter:
Venue:
Time:
Contents:
12th September, 1998 
Professor Sandy McFarlane 
Head of the Department of Psychiatry 
University of Adelaide 
Laffer Room
South Australia Postgraduate Medical Education Association 
One full day
Overview
The role of psychological trauma in the genesis of psychopathology
History of the societal importance of trauma
The prevalence and longitudinal course of PTSD
Development of an inner representation of a traumatic experience
Process by which a traumatic narrative is formed
Underlying neurobiology of PTSD
The effects of time on the psychopathology of PTSD
Individual psychotherapy for PTSD
CBT and PTSD
EMDRand PTSD
A multi-dimensional treatment programme 
Concluding remarks
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23.7: Assessment and Treatment of Anxiety Disorders in General 
Clinical Practice
Dates: 16th and 17th October, 1998
Presenter: Associate Professor Ron Papee
Macquarie University 
Venues: Workcover Corporation, Adelaide
Regal Park Motor Inn, Adelaide 
Time: Total of 9 hours
(Day 1) 
(Day 2)
Contents:
Day 1: Anxiety Disorders: Recosnition and Manasement
• Recognition: anxiety, depression and stress
• Interviewing: general versus specific information
• Intervention: relaxation, problem solving, coping, active exposure
Day 2: Saturday 29th Ausust, 1998
• Diagnostic criteria for anxiety disorders
• Comorbidity with other disorders
• Structured interviews
• Psychometric measures
• Cognitive re-structuring
• Exposure
• Treatment packages for: panic disorder
generalised anxiety disorder 
social phobia
• Concluding remarks
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Section 2.4 Major Work in the Clinical Field
Document submitted for inclusion:
^^ Steps towards casemix in psychiatry: An exercise in 
the development of grouping systems for local use
The submitted paper satisfied the following criteria as stipulated in the 
Course Handbook & Programme Regulations (1998-1999):
1. The first section was based on an original work by myself entitled; “Casemix in 
Psychiatry: Predicting the unpredictable ?” (Wong, 1995). The original work 
has not been published elsewhere, and was compiled in 1995 as a report to the 
Hospital Executive of Kwai Chung Hospital, Hong Kong.
2. The literature review of the submitted paper was abridged from the original 
document, and has been extensively re-Avritten with a new section on the UK 
scene.
3. The second section of the paper was compiled and written specifically for 
inclusion into the Professional Dossier. The data was collected in 1995 as part of 
a research project on diagnostic grouping undertaken in Kwai Chung Hospital.
4. I still have access to the raw data on which my results were based.
5. The document, in its present form, has not been submitted for publication, and I 
am the sole author of the entire project.
(Running head: Steps towards casemix in psychiatry)
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Steps Towards Casemix in Psychiatry:
An exercise in the development of 
grouping systems for local use
by
Chee-Wing WONG
BA (Hons), MPhil (Lend)
AFBPsS, AFHKPS, MAPS 
Registered Clinical Psychologist (Hong Kong) 
Registered Psychologist (South Australia) 
Chartered Clinical Psychologist (UK)
Senior Clinical Psychologist 
Kwai Chung Hospital
Paper submitted as part of the Professional Dossier in 
partial fulfilment for the PsychD Clinical Psychology 
Conversion Programme ( 1997-1999), 
University of Surrey, UK.
July 1998
Adelaide, South Australia.
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Executive Summary
The first part of this paper is an abridged version of a report by the present 
author entitled “Casemix in Psychiatry: Predicting the unpredictable ?” (Wong, 
1995). The report summarised information collected during a five-week study leave 
with the South Australian Mental Health Services (SAMHS) between 12 April 1995 
and 20 May 1995.
While the spirit of prospective funding to hospitals has been adopted by a 
number of developed countries as a more rational and equitable means of distributing 
the health dollar, the casemix system on which such funding allocation is based 
remains controversial. Casemix sets out to describe the volume, mix and type of 
patients treated by a hospital or other health services. The theory is that individual 
episode of care can be pigeon-holed into clinically consistent groups on the basis that 
the total resources required to treat each care episode within the group are, on 
average, roughly the same. The resources allocated to run a service can therefore be 
estimated according to the expected number of episodes in each group. When put into 
practice, it offers the very attractive possibility of providing an objective basis for 
resource allocation. In the long run, it is supposed to improve efficiency by 
rationalising the type and length of treatment, thus saving on healthcare costs.
Despite the extensive promulgation of prospective funding in some developed 
countries, clinicians remain skeptical, if not outright hostile, to the apparent problems 
in casemix implementation. These include:
• poor predictive value of the diagnosis related groups,
• down-grading of service standards through encouragement of the ‘cheapest’ 
treatment alternatives,
• incomplete treatment before discharge and high rates of re-admission when 
funding for each treatment episode is capped.
62
Steps towards casemix in psychiatry
• inflexibility of the existing grouping system to cater for comorbidities,
• applicability of casemix funding to inpatient care only, and,
• encouragement of un-ethical measures by clinicians in order to attract more 
funding, such as over-diagnosing the more ‘expensive’ illnesses.
Psychiatry has always been regarded as the "renegade” in casemix because of its 
imprecise and unreliable diagnoses, unpredictable illness course, haphazard 
involvement of allied health resources, and cutting into non-hospital based services 
for undefined periods of time. Furthermore, psychiatrists have reasons to perceive 
casemix as a threat to their professional integrity. They often see their service as 
“quality-based” rather than “quantity-based”, and believe that casemix is something to 
do with surgical or medical procedures only. Mental illness, by virtue of its complex 
and unpredictable nature, should best be kept out of it.
The Americans have been doing casemix for almost 20 years using a diagnosis 
related grouping system (DRG). While prospective funding has been implemented in 
the general hospitals for many years, the Americans have only limited success with 
the mental health field. The Australians emulated the American DRG system and 
developed their own Australian National Diagnosis Related Grouping (AN-DRG) 
which was a virtual copy of the American DRG system. The Health Related Groups 
(HRG) developed in the UK shared many similarities with the American DRG system 
and the Australian AN-DRG system.
The Hospital Authority in Hong Kong has a more ambitious vision towards 
output-based funding for its hospital services. Rather than confining their grouping 
systems to the DRG nomenclature, it strides one step forward by developing a Patient 
Related Groups (PRG) system to take into account the types of treatment, clinical 
guidelines and outcome indicators.
The second part of the paper presents data collected in Kwai Chung Hospital’s 
Casemix Project in 1995. The exercise was, in essence, a preliminary step towards 
the development of a grouping system for psychiatry. An 18-category Major
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Diagnostic Group (MDG) system was put into trial. The MDGs would serve as a 
starting point for further grouping separations. Emerging from the exercise was a set 
of clinically meaningful data which accurately reflected the “mix of cases” amongst 
the seven specialty teams within the hospital, bringing one closer to a “casemix 
model” from which costing could be calculated. Based on the results and feedback 
from front-line clinicians, a revised 16-category MDG was proposed.
Before the revised MDG could be put into further trial, the KCH Casemix Project 
was shelved by the Hospital Authority in favour of its more ambitious PRG project 
which bears little resemblance to the traditional DRG approach. To align with this 
corporate initiative, clinicians in KCH drafted preliminary models of critical decision 
pathways for schizophrenia and depression, which together accounted for over 65% of 
all cases serviced by the hospital and its outpatient clinics. In mid-1997, the PRG 
project was put in abeyance when PRGs were officially de-linked from the funding 
formula.
The KCH Casemix Project illustrated the unique and important role of an 
experienced clinical psychologist who has functioned as a clinician, a planner, a co­
ordinator and a researcher in this most complex exercise.
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1
Introduction
1.1 The Past
Clinicians are worried.
Hospitals and health services alike are no longer the sanctuaries they used to
be.
Remember those good old days when hospitals were shrines and doctors were 
gods performing miracles on the gratifying patients ? Remember that blissful sense of 
omnipotence when clinical procedures were never questioned and "things are what 
they are" because "the doctor says so" ? Remember those funding allocations for 
research and the purchase of fancy equipment ? No questions were asked because 
administrators were not supposed to understand the complexities of all the goods the 
doctors do.
1.2 The Present
Now all these have changed.
Resources become limited. Budgets are tight. Doctors suddenly become 
providers, and patients suddenly become consumers. Hospitals are no longer the 
philanthropic institutions people once knew, but have become entrepreneurial 
corporations with their ovm chief executive officers. In the midst of medical jargons, 
there is a sudden influx of new management speak. Accountants, administrators and 
managers invade the central hub of power, and clinicians suddenly find themselves
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Stripped from their mystical shroud and are made more accountable and transparent. 
All these, so they say, have something to do with 'efficiency' and 'rationalisation o f  
resources'.
In the foreboding distance loomed "casemix", a tool which will avowedly 
increase productivity on a shoe-string by making hospitals more competitive. 
Casemix is not new. The Americans have been doing it for twenty years (English et 
al, 1986; Fetter et al, 1980; Freiman et al, 1987; Schumacher et al, 1986; Widem et al,
1984), and it has spread to countries such as Canada, Australia, Britain, Portugal, 
Israel, to name but a few. Hong Kong is no exception. Whether you like it or not, 
casemix is here to stay.
The 'cultural change' is uncomfortable to clinicians, to say the least, and there 
is a pragmatic need to understand more about casemix and the conglomerate of 
activities that go with it.
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2
Why do we need casemix ?
2.1 Funding Through Historical Costing
To try to explain casemix to the layman is not easy. To try to convince 
psychiatrists that casemix applies to mental health is asking for trouble. It all has to 
do with the complexity and unpredictability of mental illness. The fact that 
psychiatric diagnosis is an unreliable and a poor predictor of health care consumption 
did not help either. Ben-Tovim and Elzinga embarked on the daunting task of 
explaining casemix to a psychiatric audience via several publications (Ben-Tovim & 
Elzinga, 1993,1994a, 1994b, 1994c).
In order to understand what casemix is all about, it is important to distinguish 
between historical funding and prospective, or outcome-based, funding. One way to 
explain this is through an analogy.
2.2 The Restaurant Analogy
In the historical funding system, it works as if the government is funding all 
restaurants in the country so that its people will be fed at heavily subsidised prices. 
The government does so by paying each restaurant a certain sum of money based on 
last year's expenditure even before the food is produced. Whether you like it or not, 
years of historical funding have bred restaurants of different shapes and sizes which 
consume quite disproportionate chunks of public money although their food output are 
more or less the same.
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We can assume that everybody will get food from the restaurants, but the 
government rarely questions about the kind of food that is served and how much it 
actually costs per serve. After all, we should have absolute faith in our chefs who, we 
trust, will be bound by their code of professional ethics and will serve quality food to 
the needy. Strangely enough, we never question about the process of how food is 
produced. One restaurant may be spending thousands of dollars per year researching 
into how lamb chops should be cooked. It looks at the different types of heat source, 
the different types of frying pans, the interaction between heat source and frying pans, 
and so on; not to mention the types of ingredients used and in what combination 
amount and in what sequence ! The restaurant may also buy very expensive cooking 
utensils, and pay very high salaries for world renowned chefs to be on their staff list. 
The result is an immensely expensive lamb chop that they will put on the dinner plate. 
As the government has no prerogative to question what the cooking process is, or why 
such a process is necessary, it will continue to pay hefty sums of money to the 
restaurant at the beginning of each financial year in order to have a certain amount of 
lamb chops served to its people.
In the historical funding arrangement, the government takes very little interest 
in finding out how other restaurants could, in actual fact, produce similar quality lamb 
chops but at a much cheaper price. The chef from the expensive restaurant would 
inevitably say, "Ah! But we are the best because we need the money for research and 
teaching, and this is something which the other restaurants do not do!"
Ludicrous it may sound, but this is exactly what historical funding is all about, 
and we have been doing it to our hospitals since time immemorial ! Of course, all 
would be well if resources are unlimited. That is, the government or the funding 
agency has more than sufficient money to throw around, and would pay the restaurant 
for whatever food they produce at whatever price.
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In reality, this is unrealistic. In a time of economic rationalisation, resources 
are limited but demands are limitless. So there is a need for a scheme to put some 
sense back into the system.
This is where casemix comes in.
2.3 Steps Towards Casemix
First of all, we need to specify under what circumstances health services such 
as hospitalisation are required. In most cases, a medical diagnosis will be a point to 
start. Then there is a need to specify the exact service products we provide. This can 
be treatment bundles expressed in terms of 'length o f stay' (LOS) in the hospital. In 
casemix, we often assume that all medical procedures are undertaken with the aim of 
making the patient better. The quality of service standards are therefore assumed 
rather than specified.
Going back to the restaurant analogy, once we have specified a food product, 
say lamb chops, we can immediately proceed with a costing exercise. The most direct 
approach would be to ask all restaurants from around the country to report on their 
individual costs required to cook a lamb chop. This can be calculated on the basis of 
the costs of ingredients, purchase of equipment, staff salaries, plus other over-head 
costs such as rent, gas, water and electricity.
With such information in hand, the government will have some basis to 
allocate funding to each restaurant calculated on the basis of the average cost per each 
type of dish multiplied by the number of dishes served in the previous year. Funding 
will thus be indexed according to output rather than to historical reasons. To stay 
competitive, restaurants from across the country will soon realise that non-value- 
added tasks will have to be trimmed. The objective will be to produce lamb chops of 
comparable standards at competitive prices.
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Some chefs will see that they are more innovative and thus are different from 
others. They are of course free to produce their own idiosyncratic brands of lamb 
chop through high volume cooking time and other forms of recipe research. But 
because the funding agency will only pay for lamb chops at the agreed price, the 
restaurant will eventually find that it will run at a loss. If the restaurant insists on 
putting up a higher price tag, consumers will go elsewhere for lamb chops and the 
restaurant will find that it has become the loser in the "bid-for-funding” game because 
the volume of consumption has been reduced. By making costing more transparent to 
both the provider and the consumer, restaurants are compelled to provide good value- 
for-money lamb chops.
In a true casemix system, funding is indexed on the volume of customer-flow 
(or 'throughput' in casemix parlance). Expensive restaurants will run into dire 
financial consequences and will, for the sake of survival, adjust their volume output to 
align with the available resources. In time, restaurants from across the country will 
start to produce lamb chops at a more or less standardised price. To minimise wastage 
and to maximise output, efficiency and productivity will inevitably be looked into, and 
fat will be trimmed from the organisation such as output-unrelated activities. Human 
resources will also be more equitably planned. The end result is a much leaner (and 
cheaper) organisation producing the required number of service episodes.
2.4 The Need For Classification
As all gourmets will appreciate, the variety of food and the number of possible 
dishes is mind-boggling. So we need to group certain dishes together in order to 
simplify the costing/budgeting procedures and to make the accounting more 
manageable. We want to know the costs in buying raw materials, the complexity of 
preparation procedures before the food is passed onto the cook, and the actual cooking 
time required. Later on, we can group our menu according to the type of meat (all 
lamb dishes), or according to the method of cooking (all grilled dishes), or according
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to the sequence of serving a meal (appetiser, main course and dessert), and so on. The 
possibilities are limited only by one's imagination. In the health services, we call this 
related-grouping. Diagnosis related grouping (DRG) as used in the US and Australia 
is one good example.
Grouping is important if we are into money and resources. Grouping gives us 
a manageable costing system to calculate how much we need to spend on each 
restaurant per year. All we need to do is to count the number of dishes in each group, 
multiply it by its unit cost, add up the total value, and (Voila !) we have a casemix- 
based funding estimate for the restaurant in the next financial year.
With the system in situ, we can be assured that restaurants (hospitals) will opt 
for the most effective and efficient ways of delivering food (health care products) to 
the consumers. The more value-for-money their services are, the more will be the 
customer (patient) volume. The higher the patient volume, the more resources the 
hospital will get in the next financial year.
In the simplest language, this is how casemix is supposed to work.
2.5 What is Casemix ?
Casemix sets out to describe the volume, mix and type of patients treated by a 
hospital or other health service. It is a management tool to improve the delivery of 
health care, and has been used to increase throughput, and to shorten bed-days 
significantly . It does so by making the cost of health care procedures more 
transparent via information protocols so that not only the funding agency will know 
how much each service episode would cost, but hospitals can also compare with one 
another regarding their own expenditure per treatment episode in any diagnostic 
category.
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Hindle (1992) defined casemix as ".....an information tool directed at 
understanding and controlling the production process o f health care delivery. It 
comprises the product classifications themselves, and ideas about how they can be 
used". So casemix has something to do with an information system on what we 
produce, how it is produced, and how the product can be used in health care provision.
Good resource materials in casemix are abundant (AHMAC, 1992; Eagar & 
Hindle, 1994; Fetter et al, 1980; Hindle, 1992; South Australian Health Commission, 
1994). A special report on casemix published by the Australian Health and Medical 
Law Reporter (1994) provides a good starting point to understand the objectives and 
strategies of casemix.
2.6 Features of Casemix Classification
Eagar & Hindle (1994) specified three features of a casemix classification which 
differentiate it from other classifications:
•  clinical meaningfulness
Patients in the same class should have clinical similarities in terms of 
clinical symptoms, treatment methods, and outcome.
resource use homogeneity
Patients in the same class should cost roughly the same to treat. We need 
to consider various kinds of patient care episodes and the attributes that go 
with it, e.g. diagnoses, functional abilities, and types of admission. It is 
therefore necessary to apply statistical methods to find and evaluate all the 
options. A good information system and statistical support are essential.
the right number of classes
It is important to have an optimum number of classes of patients. If there 
are too many classes, some will have too few observations to allow
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conclusions to be drawn. On the other hand, there should not be too few 
classes. If large numbers of dissimilar cases are placed in the same class, 
real differences in healthcare provisions will be concealed and clinical 
meaning will be lost.
2.7 Status of Casemix Acceptance in Australia
Clinicians in Australia have agreed in principle that casemix is an acceptable 
system whereby resources allocation can be distributed more equitably and more 
objectively. The Australian Medical Association has formally endorsed casemix 
funding in hospital care. Hanson & O'Dea (1994) said that clinicians have largely 
come to accept the inevitability of casemix measures, although a minority remain 
apathetic or are skeptical about how casemix will assist the process of change. They 
also commented that the political backlash from clinicians has been limited, with 
many professional associations responding positively to the development phase. 
Nelson (1994) also conceded that the Australian medical profession can no longer 
dismiss casemix funding as a passing fad. As funding is related to the volume of 
throughput, length of stay in hospitals and waiting lists will be shortened, and 
efficiency will improve.
Traditionally, psychiatry has been exempted from the casemix funding formula 
because of many inherent difficulties in costing the wide spectrum of inpatient, 
outpatient and community services. The National Mental Health Policy published in 
1992 clearly spelled out the trend towards ‘mainstreaming’. That is, stand-alone 
psychiatric institutions will be progressively closed down, and resources will be re­
allocated to the community and other regional mental health programmes. Psychiatric 
inpatient services will be provided by specialty beds grafted onto general hospitals. 
As a result, acute psychiatric inpatient services will eventually come under the 
casemix system of their respective host hospitals (Whiteford, 1993; Whiteford et al, 
1993). Given the circumstances, it would seem inescapable that casemix in psychiatry 
will be a reality rather than just a possibility.
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3
What Clinicians Think
3.1 Casemix as a Threat
For all practical reasons, it is expected that clinicians in general, and 
psychiatrists in particular, reacted to casemix with a mixture of abhorrence and 
indignation. First and foremost, the process of implementing casemix means that their 
work has to be made more accountable, and hence more transparent. Now people 
want to know why they do it, how they do it, and how effective their efforts are. Their 
work is no longer an art, let alone a science, but something akin to a process worker in 
a factory churning out treatment episodes with pre-defmed outcome criteria in 
accordance with certain clinical protocols. This is what psychiatrists are most 
uncomfortable about.
In the past, clinicians are mainly concerned with treating their patients. 
Resources for equipment, medication, staff training and research came naturally via 
annual budget submissions. All they need to do every year is to inflate their requests 
somewhat, knowing for sure that after the ceremonial cuts by the government 
bureaucrats, they will end up getting more or less what they originally demanded for.
3.2 The Clinician’s Perspective
From as far back as history goes, clinicians do not see the provision of 
resources as their primary responsibility, only the spending of them (Ben-Tovim & 
Elzinga, 1994a). So when casemix started to loom in the horizon, they fear that the 
new system is designed to diminish their capacity to influence their own destinies. In
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the power game, they do not want to give any extra influence to bureaucrats, whom 
they instinctively believe to be their enemies.
In the historical costing system, clinicians are used to the few antics that they 
use to squeeze money from the funding agency. They know that they will usually get 
it by exerting pressure. The more weight you have to throw around, the more likely 
you are to get the money. Sometimes they use a bit of exaggeration and a touch of 
shroud waving.
Most clinicians hold the firm belief that any new system will involve filling in 
a lot of useless forms, and having to account for their actions to people whom they 
think have no real appreciation of how long it has taken them to acquire their clinical 
skill and no understanding of the pressure involved in exercising them (Ben-Tovim & 
Elzinga, 1994a).
3.3 Problems in Psychiatry
Take any average psychiatrist and mention casemix. The chances are that you 
will get a snort for a reply and an outright dismissal that casemix will never work for 
psychiatry. The reasons are simple, and quite rightly so. Casemix was originally 
conceptualised with surgical procedures in mind — procedures that to a larger extent 
is predictable and therefore can be cost with some degree of reliability. Medical 
procedures fair somewhat worse, but many of their clinical protocols, procedures and 
decision trees are still pretty straight-forward. But when all these are transposed to the 
realm of psychiatry, one would immediately see the problems.
The practice of psychiatry is still quite as much an art as a science. There is 
the 'arf of diagnosis and the 'art' of treatment. This may be another way of saying that 
diagnoses are unreliable and the treatment outcomes are unpredictable. Different 
clinicians may arrive at different diagnoses, and different clinicians may instigate
81
Steps towards casemix in psychiatry
different treatment approaches for the same diagnosis. In the casemix system, these 
are not going to help.
Then comes the unpredictability of the illness course. Given the same 
diagnosis, be it accurate or otherwise, different patients may have different 
manifestations of symtomatology. Some respond to treatment quickly while some 
linger on. Some will remain symptom-free for an extended period of time after the 
first treatment episode, while some will come back frequently due to relapse of their 
illness. Even with the same diagnosis, there is a host of treatment possibilities that a 
clinician can choose at pleasure. This is where the 'arf bit comes in. Unlike surgery, 
to try to draw up a neat and tidy clinical decision flow-chart for psychiatric disorders 
which underpins clinical procedures seems almost an impossible task. The 
possibilities are so varied and the permutations are so numerous that the whole 
exercise would become unthinkable.
But the worse is yet to come. Psychiatric treatment is not all hospital-based as 
it was half a century ago. Inpatient treatment is reserved for the severely mentally ill 
and the very disturbed. It is often argued that the bulk of psychiatric services is 
provided outside the hospital campuses rather than inside: outpatient follow-up for 
discharged inpatients, day patients under rehabilitation, ambulatory care for those not 
requiring hospitalisation, domiciliary visits in the community psychiatry arena, and 
those requiring continuous extended care both in the hospitals and in the community. 
With all these variables in operation, it is understandable that mental health workers 
have conceded that casemix based on diagnosis is not going to work. It is also true to 
say that psychiatric diagnosis is itself a very poor predictor of health care consumption 
because of the variability and unpredictability of mental illness (English et al, 1986; 
Goldman et al, 1984; Horgan & Jencks, 1987; Light et al, 1986; Phelan & McCrone, 
1995^
As mentioned before, the current trend in psychiatry around the world is 
"main-streaming". Psychiatric services will be gradually decentralised to more area-
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based services with greater integration between acute psychiatric inpatient care and 
the regional general hospitals.
Under the proposed scheme, psychiatrists are being moved from their safety 
hide-outs in mental hospitals to the highly competitive world revolving around 
medicine and surgery. Psychiatry does not need expensive machines or flashy 
procedures that one can show off to other medical colleagues. Psychiatrists maintain 
the contention that all they need are time, space and human resources. To 
psychiatrists, the talk of "production process and products" turns hospitals from 
places of healing into factories of remedies. They do not equate their doctor-patient 
relationship with assembly-line output. Topping it all, psychiatry is definitely not at 
the glamour end of the medical trade, and resources allocation within a general 
hospital context is likely to result in more disadvantages and a diminished bargaining 
power.
3.4 Problems with Casemix
While casemix is a viable system to rationalise funding allocations to hospitals, it 
has a number of inherent problems.
1. First, casemix systems are descriptive. In other words, it can be used to 
address the resource implications of delivering particular services, but not to 
address their efficacy. In the absence of agreed measures of service standards 
or outcome indicators, casemix systems will encourage the use of the cheapest, 
rather than the most effective, services. Worse still, casemix systems may 
continue to fund procedures which are protracted but clinically ineffective. 
Some clinicians argue that by attaching a dollar value to treatment episode, it 
will discourage innovative medical procedures that are expensive but 
efficacious, thus putting the patients at an disadvantageous, if not dangerous, 
position.
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2. Second, when there is capping of funding allocations for specific diagnosis 
related groups, clinician are under pressure to discharge patients within the 
period defined by the funding constraints. Experience with the Veteran 
Administration in the US showed that under casemix funding, patients may be 
discharged prematurely, and frequent re-admissions will be the order of the 
day. Some governments have tried to circumvent this drawback by imposing a 
time period within which re-admissions under the same diagnosis will not 
attract any additional funding. This, of course, results in very delicate ethical 
issues for illnesses which have a propensity for relapse such as mental illness. 
In some cases, it is still possible for the patient to seek hospital admission in 
another region, or use non-hospital based services in the community.
3. Third, since funding allocations are diagnosis related, clinicians may find a 
way of attracting more resources by opting for diagnoses that require more 
expensive procedures and longer bed-days, or gear their hospital towards 
serving patients who require ‘high-cost-short-stay’ services and turn away 
patients requiring extended care. Ethically, this should not have happened. In 
reality, clinicians find it an attractive option to take under a casemix funding 
scheme.
4. Fourth, to provide incentives for increase in throughput, casemix systems often 
have an in-built bonus funding allocation based on turnover. While it has 
proven to be a very strong motivation for throughput increase, some hospitals 
often out-perform their expectations by rapid discharges, resulting in 
unexpected high volume of bonuses which eats up the reserve ftind within the 
first quarter of the financial year. Should the bonus be stopped due to 
insufficient funding, motivation towards throughput efficiency would drop 
abruptly, leaving clinicians feeling cheated and disgruntled.
5. Fifth, using DRGs to determine such factors as ‘cost of care’ and ‘length of 
stay’ has presented various problems particularly when treating the elderly or
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the mentally ill. In psychiatric units it is common for social and psychological 
factors to influence length of stay rather than the diagnostic group in which the 
patient belongs. For example, a homeless schizophrenic with no family 
support is likely to have a longer length of stay than a young schizophrenic 
who lives at home where family links are still strong. Once social and 
personal variables are introduced into the formula, predictability of resource 
consumption dwindles.
6. Finally, the present casemix system caters exclusively for acute inpatient 
admissions. It does not address health care services provided outside the 
hospital such as ambulatory care, community care, extended care and 
rehabilitation. The development of non-inpatient grouping systems is needed, 
but so far, very little progress have been achieved in this area.
3.5 Comorbidities and other Confounding Factors
The presence of complications and comorbidities can also create problems in 
the casemix formula based on diagnostic groupings. In the present DRG system, 
patients can only be placed in one diagnostic group even though there are costs 
associated with a comorbidity. Considerable work has been done to take 
complications and comorbidities into account (Fulop et al, 1987; Kiesler & Morton, 
1988).
As DRGs do not generally measure the severity of illness, the use of severity 
as a secondary diagnosis is also important to determine factors such as the cost of care 
and length of stay (Horn et al, 1989; Sharfstein & Beigel; 1984). It has been 
suggested that refined DRGs should be developed to measure different levels of 
illness severity (English et al, 1986; Freiman et al, 1987; Mitchell et al, 1987; Strain, 
Fupol & Hammer, 1992; Widem et al, 1984). Other factors which were found to 
affect length of stay include patient characteristics (Essock-Vitale, 1987), clinical
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functioning (Choca et al, 1988; Mezzich, 1991); hospital environment (Taube et al,
1985); and a physician factor (Lyons, O’Mahoney & Larson, 1991).
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4
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs)
4.1 The Need for Grouping
Remember the need to introduce some kind of a grouping system into our 
restaurant menu ? Grouping is necessary because by grouping patients of comparable 
costs, it will make the accounting procedures much simpler. What we need, therefore, 
is a well-established system to classify patients into groups which share some 
similarities with one another by way of clinical procedures or resource consumption. 
In medicine, the commonly accepted classification system is that of diagnoses. By 
putting patients with different diagnoses into "related groups", we can work with a 
manageable data system for costing projects instead of ending up with thousands of 
individual diagnoses.
4.2 History of DRG in the US
In the 20-year history of casemix funding in the US, patients were classified 
into Health Care Financing Administration Diagnostic Related Groups (HCFA- 
DRGs). The HCFA-DRG system, however, does not generate a clinically meaningful 
casemix grouping system which delineates patients with mental disorders 
(Schumacher et al, 1986). Early versions of the DRG system in both the US and 
Australia have a major diagnostic category 19 (MDC-19) for mental diseases and 
disorders, and a MDC-20 for substance use and abuse. There are obvious and 
important differences between the two MDGs, but there are also some similarities. 
This has led to their being addressed simultaneously in most casemix design studies. 
The term 'psychiatric ’ was used to refer to both MDC-19 and MDC-20.
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Between 1984 and 1988, the Veteran Administration in America introduced a 
DRG-based funding system for psychiatric services provided in VA hospitals. During 
those four years, roughly the same number of patients were treated, but their lengths 
of stay fell substantially. However, they were treated more often in a year, and an 
unusually large number were readmitted within fourteen days of discharge 
(presumably because they had been discharged prematurely to fit in with the allowed 
lengths of stay under the casemix system). All these stopped fairly rapidly after DRG- 
based funding was discontinued (Ben-Tovim & Elzinga, 1992).
All-in-all, the introduction of a DRG-based casemix funding strategy clearly 
was not neutral in regard to clinical practice. Instead, it appeared to "foster practice 
patterns that were not consistent with clinicians' best clinical judgement or preferred 
practice patterns" (Rosenheck & Massari, 1991). To date, the majority of psychiatric 
hospitals in the US are still historically funded.
4.3 The Australian AN-DRG System
Australia emulated the US system and developed the Australian National
Diagnostic Related Groups (AN-DRGs) which has undergone three reviews
(Australian Casemix Clinical Committee, 1991; 1992; 1993). As far as MDC-19 and 
MDC-20 are concerned, AN-DRG-1 and AN-DRG-2 were virtual copies of the 
original HCFA-DRG nomenclature which provided little clinical meaning to the wide 
spectrum of mental disorders (3M Health Information Systems, 1991; 1992).
The AN-DRG classification system has now undergone three reviews
(Australian Casemix Clinical Committee, 1991, 1992, 1993). AN-DRG-1 was
completed in October 1991 with 527 DRGs (3M Health Information Systems, 1991). 
Minor changes were made to AN-DRG-2 when it was released (3M Health 
Information Systems, 1992). More significant modification on the classification of 
mental disorders took place in AN-DRG version 3 (Australian Casemix Clinical
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Committee, 1993). In AN-DRG-3, MDC 19 was drastically revamped to make 
diagnostic classification more meaningful (Elzinga, Ben-Tovim & Burgess, 1994).
In the new AN-DRG-4 development, clinical and demographic factors such as 
age, malignancy, secondary diagnosis and severity of the disease will also be 
considered as complicating factors which could have bearings on resource 
consumption.
4.4 Weaknesses of the DRG System in Psychiatry
There were concerns over the effectiveness of the DRG classification in MDGs 
19 and 20. There is still a concern that however they might be modified, DRGs may 
not be the best approach. Many clinicians argued that AN-DRGs are weak in terms of 
handling episodes of unpredictable lengths associated with chronic conditions 
(English et al, 1986; Essock & Norquist, 1988; Goldman et al, 1984; Horgan & 
Jencks, 1987; Light et al, 1986).
Lipton (1993) pointed out that diagnosis alone is not predictive of resource usage 
in mental health because:
• Psychiatric diagnosis does not clearly predicate the nature and intensity of 
treatment.
• The same diagnosis may be treated effectively in a number of settings with 
a number of approaches each having different resource implications.
• The same setting (for example, the acute hospital ward) may have a mix of 
new, rehabilitation and convalescent patients all experiencing an acute 
episode, each of whom have similar diagnoses but have different cost 
implications. The line of demarcation between these categories can be 
difficult to define — short term care is not synonymous with acute care 
nor is prolonged care synonymous with subacute or convalescent care.
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• The care of psychiatric patient in a specialist psychiatric service has 
different cost implications to the care of the same diagnosis in any other 
setting.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that DRGs were designed exclusively for acute 
care hospitals in the US, whereas most psychiatric treatment episodes occur outside 
the inpatient setting.
4.5 Health Care Resource GroupsYHRGs)
In the UK, work has been done to develop a Health Resources Grouping 
(HRG) system which takes into account the estimated amount of health resources 
consumed by each category (National Health Service Management Executive, 1993). 
The grouping system for mental illness and drug/alcohol dependency is quite similar 
to the MDC-19 and MDC-20 in the AN-DRG-3 version. The fact that workers in the 
UK and South Australia have been maintaining a close liaison with respect to the 
development of the HRG system may explain some of the striking similarities 
(Elzinga, 1995, personal communication).
The following table lists the AN-DRG-3 classifications under MDC-19 and 
MDC-20, and is contrasted with comparable HRG (version 2) groupings.
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AN-DRG-3 HRG (version 2)
* dementia toi dementia and acute confusion
— t02 presenile dementia
841 schizophrenia t03 schizophrenia
842 paranoia and acute psychotic reaction t04 paranoia and acute psychotic reaction
843 major affective disorders
844 other affective and somatoform disorders - —
t05 mania and excited psychoses
t06 psychotic depression
t07 neurotic depression
845 anxiety disorders t08 anxious neuroses
844 eating disorders and compulsive disorders t i l eating disorders and OCD
847 personality disorders and acute reactions tl2 acute reactions and personality disorders
848 childhood disorders tl3 childhood non-psychotic disorders
860 alcohol intoxication and withdrawal
861 drug intoxication and withdrawal ———
862 alcohol abuse and dependence ——“
863 other drug abuse and dependence
---- t09 alcohol and drugs (non-dependent abuse)
---- t ie alcohol and drugs (dependent abuse)
---- tl4 mental retardation
. . . tl5 specific learning disabilities
The National Health Service (NHS) in the UK introduced a market-led 
approach towards financing health care, with the separation between health purchasers 
and health providers. Hospitals are being encouraged to become self-governing trusts, 
while primary care physicians are being encouraged to become fiind-holders. Under 
this arrangement, the latter are allocated a specific budget to purchase specialist health 
care, including psychiatric care, for their patients. They also have the option of 
choosing the hospitals to which they refer patients (Harrison, 1993).
In the UK, HRGs are being used as a method for attaching a price to inpatient 
care (NHS Management Executive, 1993). However, the potential use of HRGs has 
only received limited discussions (Coles, 1986; Parkin et al, 1993; Royce, 1993).
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Phelan and McCrone (1995) did a study on the effectiveness of DRGs in 
predicting psychiatric resource utilisation. A total of 2,926 psychiatric inpatient 
episodes were collected from the Bethlem Royal and Maudsley Joint Hospitals. The 
finding of the study was that, overall, DRGs were a poor indicator of the length of 
inpatient stays. There was limited homogeneity of length of stay within specific 
DRGs, and there were few statistically significant differences between different 
DRGs. In other words, DRGs explained little of the overall variation in length of stay 
within the entire sample. Trimming of the outliers improved the predictive value of 
the DRGs, but only to a limited extent.
The HRG (version 2) is more in line with the Australian AN-DRG-3 
development, and gives finer diagnostic delineation for mental health problems than 
the previous version. However, the poor predictive power of DRGs invariably 
imposes limitations on the use of HRGs in prospective funding for psychiatric 
illnesses (Phelan & McCrone, 1995).
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Patient Related Groups (PRGs)
5.1 Patient Related Groups (PRGs)
In 1995, the Hospital Authority in Hong Kong decided to come up with its 
own Patient Related Groups (PRGs) system which supposedly has advantages over 
the DRG system used in the west. PRGs are clinically meaningful groups of patients 
managed by a common set of clinical guidelines and outcome indicators. By grouping 
patients in terms of needs of treatment and outcome, data about patients will become 
more manageable. In its crudest form, PRGs are represented as a flow diagram made 
up of critical decision pathways for that particular disease (Fung, 1995a, 1995b).
Each PRG will have the characteristics of covering all episodes of care the 
patient will encounter within a defined time frame for the same condition within the 
health services. It looks at costs of managing the number of patients who belong to 
the same PRG within a 12-month period instead of counting the costs on an episode 
basis. This would allow the hospital to look at the management and resource 
consumption pattern spanning different types of care in the existing services.
The clinical guidelines, particularly those on the criteria for referral and 
discharge, will help to harmonise management and ensure that resource consumed 
within each PRG will be as homogeneous as possible. This builds up the basis for 
setting priorities in resource allocation and outcome evaluation.
PRG development is also a quality assurance exercise aimed at making the 
work of clinicians more accountable and more transparent. In the process of 
developing the PRG system, clinicians were required to specify as much as they could
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the clinical guidelines which underpin treatment procedures and resource 
consumption. The benefits of having clinical guidelines have been discussed in some 
detail (Grinshaw & Russel, 1993; Lomas et al, 1989; McDonald & Overhage, 1994). 
The delineation of clinical outcome indicators added further rigour to the quality 
movement (Epstein, 1990; Orchard, 1994). Through such an exercise, clinicians 
could become more aware of what they are doing, why they are doing it, and how 
effective they are.
By incorporating both cost drivers as well as outcome drivers into PRG 
development, the Hospital Authority envisaged that the system will side-step some of 
the casemix problems encountered by their western counterparts, such as incomplete 
treatment and premature discharge from the hospital.
The PRG configuration, therefore, is quite different from the DRG format. 
PRGs for each disease group will involve the drawing-up of critical decision pathways 
as the clinician navigates the patient through the various health services in accordance 
with the patient’s illness course. The ‘clinical protocol’ which is in-built into the PRG 
flow-chart will take into account the course and severity of the illness, as well as 
treatment modalities and other physical, social or psychological variables that may 
influence the clinical outcome.
In the beginning of 1995, PRGs have been successfully delineated for 34 
major medical and surgical problems. To date, however, there was still no agreeable 
PRG for any of the psychiatric conditions.
5.2 Present and Future of PRGs
PRGs at the present stage are no more than a set of clinical guidelines and 
outcome indicators for a number of disease groups, with emphasis on medical and 
surgical procedures. The nomenclature used still adheres to the disease coding of 
ICD-9-CM (US Department of Health and Human Services, 1989). Data were
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collected for each of the critical decisions along the PRG flow-chart, and costing 
models were developed as more information was gathered.
The next attempt by the Hospital Authority was to put the PRG model into a 
casemix funding formula. In the financial year 1996-1997, casemix was tried on 9 
major general hospitals. During the initial stage, about 20% of acute admissions and 
procedures was casemix-funded. It was planned that casemix funding would be 
progressively increased in the following years.
The PRG is unique in the sense that it attempts to incorporate non-hospital 
based costs to the casemix system, but its idea of costing treatment bundles across a 
specified time span would invariably impose variability (and hence unpredictability) 
to the entire exercise. In the PRG system, 180 days is used as a demarcation between 
acute care and extended care. Within the 180-day period, there could be such wide 
variability in the types and intensity of treatment bundles that could be a nightmare to 
costing experts. The PRG approach initiated by the Hospital Authority in Hong Kong 
may be seen as a bold and ambitious endeavour. At the same time, it is also an 
unorthodox digression from the conventional casemix development procedures in 
other countries.
The corporate plan forwarded by the Hospital Authority was to develop 
psychiatric PRGs between the years 1998 and 2000. If one insists on developing a 
PRG system for psychiatry, one must be aware of the complexity and unpredictability 
of mental illnesses. In other words, every decision point along the PRG pathway will 
mean adding variables into the already complicated formula. Lessons have been 
learned in the west with regard to the difficulties of implementing casemix funding in 
psychiatry. To hope that the PRG system can side-step these problems is indeed over- 
optimistic. Even when a psychiatric PRG is drafted, it may have such poor predictive 
power for costing that it will cease to be meaningful. Ben-Tovim (1995, personal 
communication) expressed his amusement regarding the ambition of the PRG
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configuration, and said that it was an idealistic concept, but will remain an ideal which 
could not be realised with any degree of predictive reliability.
5.3 Information System in PRG Development
As intimated in previous chapters, the prerequisite for PRG development, and, 
indeed, for any casemix implementation, is the establishment of a comprehensive 
information system within the hospital services. We are not talking about information 
system within any single hospital. We are talking about a standardised information 
system which all hospital will use —  a system which is applicable to all patients, to 
all specialties and to all diagnoses. We are also talking about a system which allows 
information to be fed back to a centralised database which is continuously updated. 
One good example is the Psychiatric Records Information System Manager (PRISM) 
used in the Australian state of Victoria (see PRISM 1994a, 1994b). The information 
must cover not only the demographic data of patients and their diagnoses — it should 
ideally reflect the categories of care provided and the time consumed by each category 
of provider so that costs could be reflected.
Clinicians in Hong Kong still lack the culture to see information technology as 
an important aspect of their work, and many are cynical about the futile wastage of 
valuable clinical time filling in useless forms just to please the administrators. The 
ethos will inevitable affect the accuracy of data entry, which, in turn, will result in 
misinterpretation of information.
Another difficulty in the establishment of information system is the lack of 
information networking between hospitals. Individual hospitals, even if they are lucky 
enough to become computerised, would remain stand-alone systems sending bulks of 
information to the Hospital Authority at the end of each month. Until a more 
comprehensive information system network is in place, there is very little one can do 
about extracting meaningful data territory-wide for casemix implementation.
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For the past 15 years, the Mental Health Service in Hong Kong has been 
keeping a centralised information data-base called the Mental Health Information 
System (MHIS) which was no more than a collation of monthly returns from 
psychiatric inpatient and outpatient services on patients’ demographic data and 
diagnostic categories. Between 1995 and 1997, the Information Technology Branch 
of the Hospital Authority began to look into the development of an integrated 
Psychiatric Clinical Information System (PsychCIS) which has a central server 
accepting real-time information updates from its terminals. In the process of 
PsychCIS development, clinicians were divided with respect to the type and format of 
information to be collected. One camp favoured the inclusion of vital clinical 
information such as symptom severity as measured by the Brief Psychiatric Rating 
Scale (BPRS), while the more conservative camp insisted that such a process would 
erode valuable clinical time from the medical personnel, and thus favoured a more 
traditional demographic-based information format. In the end, it was the more 
conservative camp who got the better of the argument, and the ensuing PsyCIS which 
rolled-out in 1997 was essentially not much different from the ageing and out-going 
MHIS. In any case, the development of PsychCIS was a welcomed advance towards 
better data collection and management.
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Section 2:
Development of MDGs and PRGs
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6
The KCH Casemix Project
6.1 Kwai Chung Hospital
Kwai Chung Hospital (KCH) is the second psychiatric hospital in Hong Kong 
which began its service in 1981. It is a 1,500-bed stand-alone psychiatric‘institution 
complimented by about 1,000 staff. It offers inpatient psychiatric facilities as well as 
outpatient services in five polyclinic locations around the region. It is located adjacent 
to a large general hospital with good inter-referral facilities. As from 1994, it also 
provides an assertive community psychiatric service with emphasis on community 
liaison, domiciliary assessment and treatment in the patients’ natural surrounding.
Following the inception of the Hospital Authority in 1991, KCH adopted new 
management initiatives in 1992, and the hospital service was re-organised into seven 
Clinical Management Teams (CMTs) each headed by a consultant psychiatrist with its 
compliment of supporting staff such as nursing, clinical psychology, social work, 
occupational therapy and physiotherapy. Working on a ‘Matrix Organisation’ 
approach (Holt, 1993), the CMTs are self-sufficient service units with its own 
distinctive specialty and independent budget. It has been argued that the organisation 
of KCH resembles seven ‘mini-hospitals’ under one large infrastructure.
The seven psychiatric specialty teams are:
Team 1 Adult Psychiatry With em phasis on fa m ily  intervention in
schizophrenia
Team 2 Consultation and Liaison P rovides p sych ia tric  consultative serv ices  to  three
Psychiatry gen era l hospitals in the region
Team 3 Adult Psychiatry H as a  large outpatient service w ith  a  la rge  chronic
schizophrenia popu lation
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Team 4 Adult Psychiatry
Team 5 Community Psychiatry
Team 6 Psychogeriatrics
Team 7 Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry
Two new initiatives within the team  are substance  
abuse an d  learning d isab ilities
H as an assertive com m unity assessm ent a n d  
treatm ent team
H ospita l-based  services, ou tpatien t serv ices  an d  
com m unity liaison f o r  p sych ogeria tric  p a tien ts
A w ell-estab lish ed  ch ild  an d  ado lescen t m ental 
health service  w ith tw o inpatient w ards
6.2 The KCH Casemix Project
In early 1995, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Kwai Chung Hospital 
took keen interest in the future of outcome-based funding which was one of the 
corporate visions envisaged by the Hospital Authority at the time. The CEO reckoned 
that KCH should take the initiative to explore the feasibility of doing casemix in 
psychiatry, so that the hospital management can be better-prepared when the tide 
comes in. The present author was appointed to embark on a study in this area because 
of his close contact with the South Australian Mental Health Services (SAMHS). At 
the time, SAMHS stood out as one of the few centres in the world with a more 
positive attitude towards casemix in psychiatry.
What eventuated was a fully sponsored five-week study leave by the author to 
SAMHS between 12.4.1995 and 20.5.1995 under Dr. Rob Elzinga. After an extensive 
literature review and information collected from a number of visits around Adelaide 
and Melbourne, the author produced a report entitled “Doing Casemix in Psychiatry: 
Predicting the unpredictable .^ ” (Wong, 1995).
Notwithstanding the conglomerate of difficulties enumerated in the report 
concerning casemix in psychiatry (Wong, 1995), the KCH management decided to go 
ahead with some preliminary ground work. In July 1996, a strategic plan was 
submitted to the CEO by the present author regarding a trial of grouping systems
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designed specifically for local use. The approach followed some of the original 
footsteps of AN-DRG development in Australia, and recommended the development 
of a diagnostic-related grouping system that is meaningful to clinicians.
6.3 Initial Considerations
The organisational structure of KCH provides an ideal environment for the 
present study. The hospital is serviced by 7 separate CMTs each headed by a 
consultant psychiatrist. Each CMT has an independent budget which is historically 
funded, and has varying degrees of staff-mix. Each CMT also boasts its own 
distinctive specialty services. The KCH set-up thus represents a microcosm of a 
typical mental health service made up of psychiatric units and hospitals.
The present study was also undertaken at a time when KCH was in the process 
of improving its administrative infra-structure through the establishment of a new 
Hospital Information and Records Office (HIRO). The manager of HIRO gradually 
phased-in the ICD-9-CM diagnostic system (US Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1989) to replace the DSM-IV classification system used in the past 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). She also ensured that medical staff will 
make accurate ICD-9-CM codings in their case summaries by producing a pocket 
guide for psychiatrists. There was also a monthly feedback of coding accuracy to 
front-line clinicians. The move was to pave the way for adoption of the ICD-10 in the 
future.
The General Manager of Finance Services was also keen to work out a costing 
model for the CMTs which takes into account the overhead costs and recurrent 
expenditure so that a per capita cost could be calculated for each CMT. Close 
reference was made to the work of Knapp (1991).
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6.4 Delineation of Major Diagnostic Groups TMPGs)
First of all, we need to choose a grouping system that is suited for local use. In 
order to make the grouping system meaningful to clinicians, the ICD-9-CM 
nomenclature will be retained. The HIRO was able to capture accurate information on 
the type and distribution of diagnoses for discharged patients, but there is little 
information on patients still hospitalised or still under treatment in the outpatient 
units. The HIRO was unable to compile diagnostic information on the patient until 
the discharged summary was completed by medical staff. To get a more thorough 
picture of the distribution of diagnoses, a survey needed to be carried out which will 
give us some idea about the type, distribution, and 'mix’ of the current cases.
As a start, the author made close references to MDC-19 and MDC-20 of the 
Australian AN-DRG-3 system and the British HRG version 2 system (see Table i , 
page 13) and came up with an arbitrary 18-category diagnostic grouping system called 
Major Diagnostic Groups (MDGs). The proposed 18-category MDG is presented in 
Table 2.
Table 2;
Major Diagnostic Groups (MDGs)
M 01 dementia
M 02 other mental disorders due to organic diseases
M 03 schizophrenia
M 04 delusional disorders and acute psychotic reactions
M 05 mania and excited psychoses
M 06 depressive disorder
M 07 other affective, dissociative and somatoform disorders
M 08 adjustment disorders
M 09 anxiety disorders
M 10 sleep disorders
M 11 sexual disorders including sexual identity and sexual preference disorders
M 12 eating disorders and obsessive compulsive disorders
M 13 personality disorders
M 14 mental retardation
M 15 disorders o f psychological development
M 16 behavioural and emotional disorders in children
M 17 alcohol and drugs (non-dependent abuse)
M 18 alcohol and drugs (dependent abuse)
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6.5 Aims of the Survey
There were a number of fundamental questions which would hopefully be 
answered by the present study:
(1) Are the 18 MDGs clinically meaningful to medical staff ?
(2) To what extend can the current diagnoses of patients be pigeon-holed into 
the 18 MDGs, i.e. what is the degree of “fitness” as rated by the clinicians ?
(3) How are MDGs distributed amongst the 7 CMTs ? i.e. What is the 
‘casemix’ of the seven specialty teams ?
(4) What is the distribution of treatment types in the sample ? Definitions for 
types of treatment given by the Hospital Authority are as follows:
Acute care — less than 180 days length of stay in hospital
Extended care = more than 180 days length of stay in hospital
Ambulatory care = day patient and outpatient services
Community care = domiciliary care and consultation liaison
(5) What is the incidence of significant comorbidities ?
(6) Can the present MDG be improved ? and, if so, how ?
6.6 Survey Methodology
A special rating form was designed for the present study (see Appendix I). 
The layout of the form was to make data entry as simple and as quickly as possible.
The team designation (1 through 7) and the date were filled in by the nursing staff
prior to attaching the form to the cover of the case notes. The medical staff was 
required to 'tjdd in a MDG category to indicate the most suitable grouping that the
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patient belongs. In the event that there is significant comorbidity, the medical staff 
was required to mark a 'circle' next to the corresponding MDG. Finally, the medical 
staff will indicate the type of care being offered to the patient at the time, and to give a 
rating on the “goodness of fit” of the MDG grouping for that particular patient. In the 
event that the patient’s current diagnosis did not fall within any of the 18 MDGs, the 
medical staff will indicate so by specifying the diagnosis in the M-19 column.
The field test period was from Monday 2.10.1995 to Tuesday 31.10.1995 
inclusive. The survey covered inpatient, outpatient and day patient services during the 
period. An incidental sampling method of 1 in 4 was taken. Ward Managers would 
randomly assign one case-note out of four and attach the survey form on the cover of 
the file for attention of the attending doctor. During the four-week period, a total of
3,005 returns were gathered.
6.7 Results
(1) “Goodness of fit” on proposed MDGs
Rating by clinicians on how the proposed MDG grouping would ‘fit’ into their 
primary diagnosis showed an overall 95% rating of some degree of fitness: 16% of 
the rating was under “perfectly f i f \  33% was under “very f i f \  and 46% was under 
“f i f \  Only 5% of the rating was put under “not fit"  (see Figure 1). The results 
suggested that medical staff found the 18 MDGs clinically meaningful to them, and 
they had very little difficulty pigeon-holing their patients into one of the 18 MDGs.
Appendix X  gives a summary of examples where the primary diagnosis could 
not be fitted into the MDGs. Examples were written down by clinicians under the 
MDG 19 category in the survey form (see Appendix D . Of those diagnoses not 
classifiable under any of the MDGs, epilepsy constituted the largest percentage 
(27.1%) followed by subtypes of acute psychoses such as postpartum psychosis, 
schizophreniform psychosis, and schizo-affective psychosis (15%). Other problematic
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diagnoses include PTSD, mixed anxiety-depression, no psychiatric diagnosis (NPD) 
and other orgamc conditions. Bipolar affective disorder, hysteria and conversion 
disorders also posed some difficulties to clinician in allocating such diagnoses to a 
MDG. Feedback from clinicians also indicated that v-code diagnoses were not on the 
list. Clinicians from Child and Adolescent Psychiatry complained that the MDGs 
failed to cover their clientele, and suggested that there should be a sub-category of 
MDGs for child and adolescent psychiatry.
Figure 1;
Fitness of Rating on MDG Classification
% 25
Perfectly Fit Very Fit NotFtt
Fitness
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(2) Casemix for the seven Clinical Management Teams (CMTs)
After discarding incomplete data from the pool of 3,005 responses, a total of 
2,616 survey forms were tallied. Detailed breakdown in the frequency of MDGs 
occurring in the sample is represented in Appendix IX. A summary of simplified 
results is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2:
Distribution of MDGs in a sample of N = 2,616
Depression
9%
Others
20%
Anxiety 
8%
Dementia
3%
Schizophrenia
56%
□  Schizophrenia
□ Depression
□  M.R.
□  Others 
□Anxiety
□  Dementia
As can be seen, schizophrenia alone accounted for 55.7% of the total patient 
population, followed by depression (9.4%), anxiety (7.5%), mental retardation (4.4%) 
and dementia (3.3%). In other words, schizophrenia and depression together would 
account for over 65% of the total patient population in KCH. These two MDGs will 
therefore be the focus of future PRG development.
MDGs which accounted for very small proportions of diagnoses in the present 
study included sexual dysfiinction, eating disorders, adjustment disorder, disorder due
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to organic diseases, dissociative/somatoform disorder, and sleep disorders. Some of 
the rare-occurring disorders could be trimmed from the revised MDG list.
The present data provided very useful information regarding the MDG 
distribution, or the “mix” of cases, in the 7 CMTs (see Appendix I I  - VIID. The 
casemix profile were consistent with the purported specialties of each CMT.
(3) Types o f  care:
The present data showed that 79% of the patients were receiving ambulatory 
care (day patient or outpatient services) at the time of the survey. Only 4% was under 
acute care (less than 180 days length of stay in hospital), while 9% were receiving 
extended care (more than 180 days length of stay in hospital). The remaining 8% 
were under community care.
Appendix X I  gives the distribution of types of care in each of the 7 CMTs. An 
overall picture in a sample size of 2,723 is present in Figure 3 below:
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Types of Care Distribution
Ambulatory
79%
Community 
8% 
Acute 
4%
Extended
9%
□Acute
□  Extended 
□Ambulatory
□  Community
(4) Comorbidity
In the present study, only 5.5% of the survey form carried a comorbidity code. 
The rank order of MDGs being classified as a comorbidity were: depression, mental 
retardation, anxiety, personality disorder and substance abuse.
In the overall MDG distribution, personality disorder constituted a very small 
percentage of the total diagnostic groups (0.4%). But clinicians suggested that this 
MDG should be retained because it often existed as a comorbidity with other MDGs.
6.8 Revised Major Diagnostic Groups
From the data collected and suggestions forwarded by front-line clinicians, a 
16-categoiy revised MDG grouping was suggested. The proposed 16-category revised 
MDG is presented in Table 3,
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Table 3
Major Diagnostic Groups (MDGs) -  Revised
M 01 dementia and other long-term mental disorders due to organic disease
M 02 other mental disorders due to organic diseases (transient and good prognosis)
M 03 schizophrenia including delusional disorders (chronic and intractable)
M 04 schizophrenia including delusional disorders (moderate prognosis)
M 05 acute psychotic reactions, transient psychosis, schizophreniform psychosis 
M 06 depressive disorder
M 07 mania and excited psychoses
M 08 other affective, schizo-affective, dissociative and somatoform disorders
M 09 adjustment disorders including v codes
M 10 anxiety disorders and obsessive compulsive disorders
M 11 personality disorders
M 12 mental retardation
M 13 disorders o f psychological development
M 14 behavioural and emotional disorders in children
M 15 alcohol and substance abuse
M 16 Otherwise not classified
The major revamp of the revised MDG was that schizophrenia and delusional 
disorders were grouped together under M-02, M-03 and M-04. A new ‘prognosis 
dimension ’ was added to distinguish between these three MDG types as they were 
construed as consuming quite different amounts of healthcare resources. A new MDG 
covering acute and transient psychosis was added as M-05.
Depressive disorder (M-05) and the excited disorders such as mania (M-06) 
were coded separately. For bipolar affective disorder, it was coded either under M-05 
or M-06 depending on the prevailing phase of the disorder. From information 
collected in the present study, it is expected that MDGs M-02 through to M-06 in the 
revised 16-category MDG system will together account for over 65% of the total 
patient population in KCH.
Psychiatric conditions due to organic causes were streamed either into long­
term (M-01) or transient with good prognosis (M-02) categories. Anxiety disorders 
and obsessive compulsive disorders were grouped together as M-10, while sleep 
disorder, eating disorder and sexual dysfunction were taken off the list. Personality
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disorder was retained as M-11 because of the high number of cases with this disorder 
as a significant comorbidity. V-code diagnoses were given a place with adjustment 
disorders under M-09. M-16 was a safety-hatch for those problems which could not 
be otherwise classified.
6.9 Discussion and Conclusion
In spite of the range of problems enumerated in the 1995 report (Wong, 1995), 
KCH decided to go ahead with ground works for casemix implementation. The first 
exercise was to delineate a set of clinically meaningful groups which will form the 
basis for further grouping separation. The 18-category Major Diagnostic Groups 
(MDGs) was a parsimonious grouping system taken from the AN-DRG-3 of Australia 
and the HRG (version 2) of Britain.
Preparatory work for the present study was more arduous than expected. 
Close liaison with consultant psychiatrists from the seven specialty teams was 
necessary to solicit their co-operation in the data-collection process. Their co­
operation also meant that there would be top-down instructions to ensure unfailing 
support from medical and nursing staff. The biggest challenge was to reassure front­
line clinicians that the data-collection process would not significantly affect their 
precious clinical time. To do so, a special survey form was designed in such a way 
that only a few pen-strokes were required to generate the necessary information.
A total of 3,005 returns were completed during the four-week data-collection 
period. There were a number of incomplete data entries resulting in varying sample 
sizes when different parameters were analysed. 95% of the responses gave favourable 
feedback on the clinical meaningfulness of the MDGs. For the remaining 5%, 
clinicians gave valuable suggestions with respect to diagnoses not captured by the 
present MDGs. They also furnished useful information regarding how the MDGs 
could be further improved.
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Useful information was generated with respect to the ‘mix of cases’ among the 
seven specialty teams. The data were consistent with the specialty services provided 
by the CMTs. The data also gave useful information on the distribution of care types. 
The high percentage of patients receiving ambulatory care (outpatients and day 
patients) could be an artefact because the volume of throughput per day in the 
outpatient clinics far exceeded bed-side consultations for the inpatient population. 
Finally, only 5.5% of the returns indicated the presence of significant comorbidities.
Working with feedback from front-line clinicians during the survey period, a 
revised version of a 16-category MDG was proposed with significant changes and 
improvements over the original version. The most notable innovation was to 
introduce a severity/prognostic dimension to schizophrenia, and it is hoped that this 
continuous revision process in the development of grouping systems will bring one 
closer and closer towards the realities of casemix funding.
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7
Critical Pathways in a PRG Model
7.1 From MDG to PRG
Data analysis for the Casemix Project was completed in the first quarter of 
1996, and the revised 16-category MDG was ready for further field tests during the 
second quarter of the same year. Preliminary findings from the 1995 study at KCH 
was submitted to the Hospital Authority for comments. The feedback was that the 
KCH approach bore too much resemblance to the Australian model, and was 
considered ‘at variance’ with the PRG philosophy and direction. It was further 
suggested that KCH should channel its efforts towards the development of a 
schizophrenia PRG through the mapping of critical decision pathways for the 
disorder. As a result of this directive, further development of the MDG was shelved.
During the third quarter of 1996, a delegation of 8 senior staff from KCH, 
including the present author, was sponsored to attend the National Casemix 
Conference in Sydney. After the conference, senior clinicians were asked to 
contribute towards PRG developments for schizophrenia and depression, and a 
number of suggestions were received.
7.2 Schizophrenia as a PRG
The PRG models for schizophrenia were critical decision pathways driven by a 
set of clinical protocols with outcome measures in mind. As expected, the 
multiplicity of intervening variables during the course of the illness made it a 
monumental task, often beset by complexity, confusion and almost limitless 
permutations. All the senior clinicians involved in this exercise was able to appreciate 
how difficult it was to put forward an agreeable PRG model for schizophrenia.
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As an illustration, an example of PRG for "relapse schizophrenia” is presented in 
Diagrams 1-4 in the pages to follow. Diagram 1 (page 115) is a summary flow-chart 
for relapse schizophrenia which covers three “decision levels’. Decision Level I  
covers pathways decided by the patient, the relatives, and the generic mental health 
professions. The pathways determine where the patient will seek consultation, e.g. 
private psychiatrists, general outpatients, accident and emergency units in general 
hospitals, or psychiatric outpatients. Decision Level II covers pathways made by 
medical officers and psychiatrists once the patient enters the medical system. A 
decision is made whether the patient needs to be admitted for inpatient treatment, or 
can be dealt with in an outpatients clinic. Decision Level III covers pathways 
determined only by qualified psychiatrists regarding the treatment and disposal of the 
patient after a course of psychiatric intervention. Diagrams 2-4 are more detailed 
elaboration of these three decision levels.
Diagram 2 (page 116) maps out the Level I  critical decision pathways in 
relapse schizophrenia. The flow to the various service providers are decided by the 
patients, their relatives, or other mental health professions. Factors influencing the 
decision pathways are stated in bullet points. Some of these include accessibility of 
service, social support, severity of symptoms, presence of violent or suicidal 
behaviour, and so on.
Diagram 3 (page 117) maps out the Level II critical decision pathways in 
which the flow to more tertiary treatment centres such as psychiatric hospitals or 
outpatient services are decided by medical officers in the A&E departments, or by 
psychiatrists working in private practice, or medical staff in outpatient clinics. Factors 
influencing the decision pathways include the presence of disturbing behaviour, 
family rejection, manageability in residential service units, compliance to treatment, 
and so on.
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Diagram 4 (page 118) maps out the Level III critical decision pathways in 
which the flow between psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric outpatients, and day hospital 
services are primarily decided by qualified psychiatrists treating the patient. Factors 
influencing the decision pathway include response to medication, compliance, family 
support, chronicity of illness, benefits of psychosocial rehabilitation, and so on.
It must be stressed that the proposed PRG model for relapse schizophrenia 
have not been subjected to further deliberation and development. It only represents 
some very preliminary thoughts in the management of relapse schizophrenia. The 
models and their decision pathways are open to future discussions and modifications.
7.3 Depression as a PRG
Diagram 5 (page 119) is a more sophisticated PRG model for depression. 
This model is a fine example of PRG with clear clinical protocol and outcome 
indicators. The model clearly spelled out the recommended clinical protocols 
followed by a decision pathway driven by outcome. In the first stage of the flow 
chart, for example, decision regarding admission to a psychiatric hospital is 
determined by the presence of "psychotic symptoms causing significant psychosocial 
disturbance or high suicidal risk” as unveiled in a "comprehensive psychiatric 
assessment”.
The model also provides very clear outcome indicators which helps the 
clinician to appraise the success of the treatment course such as reduced suicidal rates, 
reduced frequency and duration of hospitalisation, improved role and occupational 
functioning, reduced outpatients attendance, and reduced subjective distress. The 
model provides a very useful reference for administrator and clinicians with respect to 
healthcare provision and their effectiveness.
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Notes on Clinical Management of Relapse SchiVophrenia fl)
Accessibility of Service 
Family Supportive 
Presence of Symptoms
Accessibility of Service 
Violent & Suicidal 
behaviour /
Family Rejection /  
Disturbing S y n ç to ^
Presence of Synçtoms 
Continuity of Care
Private Practitioner . 
GOPD
Presence of Symptôme Violent & Suicidal Behaviour
Psychiatric OPD
New Cases Old Cases
A&E Dept
Psychiatric OPD
Relapse Schizophrenia
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Notes on Clinical Management of Relapse Schirnphrpnia (H)
Relapse Schizophrenia
New & Old Cases Old Cases
A&E Dept
Presence of Syroptoms 
Family Supportive 
• Manageable in RSU
Psychiatric OPD
.Disturbing Synçtoms 
Family Rejection 
Violent & Suicidal 
behaviour 
• Unmanageable in RSU
Psychiatric Day Hospital
Disturbing Symptoms 
Family Rejection 
• Violent & Suicidal Behaviour 
Unmanageable in Residential 
Service Units (RSU)
Psychiatric Hospital 
Admission (Acute Care)
Presence of Symptoms 
Family Burdened but 
Supportive 
Poor Compliance
Disturbing Symptoms 
• Violent & Suicidal Behaviour
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Notes on Clinical Management of Relapse Schizophrenia fTTT)
Response to Medication 
Good ConçKance 
Family Supportive
Response to Medication 
Family Supportive
Lack Response to Medication 
Benefits of Psychosocial Rehab. 
Chronicity of Illness 
Family Rejection
Response to Medication 
Placement of Residential Services
Benefit o f  Psychosocial 
Rehabilitation 
Relapse Prevention
Benefits of Psycho social 
Rehabilitation 
Relapse Prevention
Relapse Schizophrenia
Psychiatric OPD
Psychiatric Day Hospital
Psychiatric Hospital 
Admission (Extended Care)
Psychiatric Hospital 
Admission (Acute Care) ,
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7.4 Epilogue
Based on the 34 PRGs delineated for medicine and surgery, the Hospital 
Authority in Hong Kong started to fund 20% of the annual budget in nine major 
general hospitals. It was anticipated that a casemix-based funding scheme will be 
progressively increased in proportion during the coming years.
Implementation of casemix funding in Hong Kong encountered problems not 
dissimilar to those of the western counter-parts. First, the PRG data-base was plagued 
by inaccurate coding entries making inter-hospital comparison difficult. A study on 
the reliability of diagnoses coding based on ICD-9 showed that the accuracy of 
diagnosis between hospitals can range between 65% and 90%. It would be 
meaningless to fund hospitals based on the PRG formula if the reliability of diagnoses 
cannot be established. There was also the tendency of over-diagnosing the more 
expensive PRGs in a number of major general hospitals so as to attract more funding 
allocations.
In the third quarter of 1997, PRGs were officially ‘de-linked’ from funding 
implications, thus making the whole PRG exercise more academic than practical. 
After de-linking PRG from resource allocation, all PRG developments were put in 
abeyance. At the time when this paper was written, PRG development in Hong Kong 
has slowly ground to a halt. A string of medical incidents occurring between 1997 
and 1998 resulted in public outcry, and the Hospital Authority was compelled to issue 
mandates for senior clinicians to re-deploy their time back to the bed-side.
The ambitious PRG project in Hong Kong proved to be a challenging and 
interesting exercise. Positive effect, if any, was to offer a good venue for clinicians to 
re-evaluate their clinical procedures and outcome measures through the delineation of 
critical decision pathways in the treatment protocol.
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In the wake of the current economic recession, clinicians have no illusions 
about budget constraints and all the measures the administration will take to 
rationalise healthcare resources. Many have already braced themselves for a come­
back of PRG and casemix funding in the not-too-long-from-now future.
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Kwai Chung Hospital 
Cascmix Project 
Survey on Major Diagnostic Groups
Appendix I
Clinical Management Team:
Date:
Part I
Items Major Diagnostic Groups
Testing Period: 1.10.95 - 31.10.95 
Sampling Method: 1 out of every 4
Primary Diagnosis/ 
Comorbiditv * 
(V or 0 )
M 01 dementia .....................................................................................................................
M 02 other mental disorders due to organic diseases ............................................
M 03 schizophrenia ............................................................................................................
M 04 delusional disorders and acute psychotic reactions .....................................
M 05 mania and excited psychosis ................................................................................
M 06 depressive disorder ..................................................................................................
M 07 other affective, dissociative and somatoform disorders ..............................
M 08 adjustment disorders ...............................................................................................
M 09 anxiety disorders .......................................................................................................
M 10 sleep disorders ..........................................................................................................
M 11 sexual disorders including sexual identity & sexual preference disorders
M 12 eating disorders and obsessive com pulsive disorders ..................................
M 13 personality disorders ...............................................................................................
M 14 mental retardation ....................................................................................................
M 15 disorders o f  psychological developm ent ...........................................................
M 16 behavioural and emotional disorders in children ...........................................
M 17 alcohol and drugs (non-dependent abuse) ........................................................
M 18 alcohol and drugs (dependent abuse) ..................................................................
M 19 Please Specify:
Part II
Types of Care; (Please tick as appropriate)
Acute Care [ ]
Ambulatory Care [ ]
Extended Care 
Community Care
Part HI
Rating on MDG Classification: (please tick as appropriate)
Perfectly Fit [ ] Very Fit [ ] Fit [ ] Not Fit At All [ ]
Notes; * V = primary diagnosis 0 = significant comorbidity
Acute Care 
Extended Care 
Ambulatory Care 
Community Care
less than 180 days length o f stay in hospital 
more than 180 days length o f stay in hospital 
day patient and outpatient services 
domiciliary care and consultation-liaison
Thank You Vety Much !
1 2 8
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Appendix II
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 1
MDG Item # Primaiy 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbiditv
(%)
Rank
1. Schizophrenia 3 59.4 1 0.4 7
2. Depressive 6 10.6 2 0.9 1
3. Anxiety 9 7.7 3 0.8 3
4. M. R. 14 5.5 4 0.9 1
5. Mania & excited psychosis 5 4.0 5 0 11
6. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 2.5 6 0 11
7. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 2.3 7 0 11
8. Dementia 1 1.5 8 0.6 4
9. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 0.9 9 0.6 4
10. Eating disorder & OCD 12 0.8 10 0.2 9
11. Personality disorder 13 0.8 10 0.4 7
12. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 0.4 12 0.2 9
13. Adjustment disorder 8 0.4 12 0 11
14. Sleep disorder 10 0.4 12 0 11
15. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 0.2 15 0 11
16. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0.2 15 0 11
17. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 0 17 0.6 4
18. Sexual disorder 11 0 17 0 11
Sub-aggregate 97.6 5.6
19. Please specify 19 4.7
Total aggregation 102.3 5.6
NB: Number of valid responses is 530.
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Appendix III
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 2
MDG Item # Primaiy 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbiditv
(%)
Rank
1. Schizophrenia 3 48.6 1 0 5
2. Adjustment disorder 8 8.6 2 0 5
3. M. R. 14 7.6 3 3.8 1
4. Depressive 6 7.6 3 0 5
5. Mania & excited psychosis 5 7.6 3 1.0 2
6. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 5.7 6 0 5
7. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 2.9 7 0 5
8. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 2.9 7 0 5
9. Dementia 1 1.9 9 0 5
10. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 1.9 9 0 5
11. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 1.9 9 0 5
12. Personality disorder 13 1.0 12 1.0 2
13. Sleep disorder 10 1.0 12 0 5
14. Anxiety 9 0 14 0 5
15. Sexual disorder 11 0 14 0 5
16. Eating disorder & OCD 12 0 14 0 5
17. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 0 14 0 5
18. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0 14 1.0 2
Sub-aggregate 99.2 6.8
19. Please specify 19 2.9
Total aggregation 102.1 6.8
NB: Number of valid responses is 105.
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Appendix IV
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 3
MDG Item # Primary 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbiditv
(%)
Rank
1. Schizophrenia 3 56.1 1 0.5 4
2. Anxiety 9 11.9 2 1.0 2
3. Depressive 6 10.2 3 2.8 1
4. M. R. 14 3.3 4 0.5 4
5. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 3.2 5 0.3 7
6. Mania & excited psychosis 5 2.8 6 0.3 7
7. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 2.4 7 0.2 11
8. Dementia 1 1.7 8 0 17
9. Adjustment disorder 8 1.5 9 0.2 11
10. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 1.2 10 0.1 13
11. Eating disorder & OCD 12 0.9 11 0.1 13
12. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 0.9 11 0.3 7
13. Personality disorder 13 0.8 13 0.7 3
14. Sleep disorder 10 0.8 13 0.5 4
15. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0.4 15 0.3 7
16. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 0.3 16 0.1 13
17. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 0.1 17 0.1 13
18. Sexual disorder 11 0.1 17 0 17
Sub-aggregate 98.6 14.8
19. Please specify 19 2.9
Total aggregation 101.5 14.8
NB: Number of valid responses is 969.
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Appendix V
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 4
MDG Item # Primaiy 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbiditv
(%)
Rank
1. Schizophrenia 3 62.2 1 0 12
2. Depressive 6 8.1 2 0.6 1
3. Anxiety 9 4.3 3 0.3 4
4. M. R. 14 3.8 4 0.5 2
5. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 3.7 5 0.2 6
6. Dementia 1 3.2 6 0.2 6
7. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 2.4 7 0.2 6
8. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 1.8 8 0.3 4
9. Personality disorder 13 1.7 9 0.2 6
10. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 0.8 10 0.5 2
11. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 0.6 11 0 12
12. Mania & excited psychosis 5 0.5 12 0.2 6
13. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 0.3 13 0 12
14. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0.2 14 0 12
15. Sleep disorder 10 0.2 14 0 12
16. Eating disorder & OCD 12 0.2 14 0.2 6
17. Adjustment disorder 8 0.2 14 0 12
18. Sexual disorder 11 0 18 0 12
Sub-aggregate 94.2 3.4
19. Please specify 19 8
Total aggregation 102.2 3.4
NB: Number of valid responses is 654.
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Appendix VI
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 5
MDG Item # Primary 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbidity
(%)
Rank
1. Schizophrenia 3 61.9 1 0 5
2. Depressive 6 7.4 2 1.7 2
3. Dementia 1 6.3 3 0.6 3
4. Anxiety 9 5.1 4 0 5
5. M.R. 14 3.4 5 2.3 1
6. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 2.8 6 0 5
7. Eating disorder & OCD 12 2.3 7 0 5
8. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 1.7 8 0 5
9. Adjustment disorder 8 1.7 8 0 5
10. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 1.1 10 0 5
11. Mania & excited psychosis 5 1.1 10 0 5
12. Personality disorder 13 0.6 12 0 5
13. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 0.6 12 0 5
14. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0.6 12 0.6 3
15. Sleep disorder 10 0 15 0 5
16. Sexual disorder 11 0 15 0 5
17. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 0 15 0 5
18. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 0 15 0 5
Sub-aggregate 96.6 5.2
19. ^lease specify 19 5.1
Total aggregation 101.7 5.2
NB: Number of valid responses is 176.
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Appendix VII
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 6
MDG Item # Primary' 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbidity
(%)
Rank
1. Dementia 1 41.0 1 6.6 1
2. Schizophrenia 3 19.7 2 0 5
3. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 13.1 3 1.6 3
4. Depressive 6 11.5 4 4.9 2
5. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 3.3 5 0 5
6. Adjustment disorder 8 3.3 5 0 5
7. M. R. 14 1.6 7 1.6 3
8. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 1.6 7 0 5
9. Mania & excited psychosis 5 1.6 7 0 5
10. Anxiety 9 0 10 0 5
11. Sleep disorder 10 0 10 0 5
12. Sexual disorder 11 0 10 0 5
13. Eating disorder & OCD 12 0 10 0 5
14. Personality disorder 13 0 10 0 5
15. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 0 10 0 5
16. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 0 10 0 5
17. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0 10 0 5
18. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 0 10 0 5
Sub-aggregate 96.7 14.7
19. Please specify 19 9.8
Total aggregation 106.5 14.7
NB: Number of valid responses is 61,
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Appendix VIII
M ix” of MDG Classifications for Clinical Management Team: 7
MDG Item # Primary' 
Diagnosis (%)
Rank Comorbiditv
(%)
Rank
1. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 27.8 1 10.2 1
2. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 24.1 2 3.7 3
3. M. R. 14 11.1 3 4.6 2
4. Schizophrenia 3 11.1 3 0 4
5. Depressive 6 8.3 5 0 4
6. Eating disorder & OCD 12 3.7 6 0 4
7. Anxiety 9 1.9 7 0 4
8. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 0.9 8 0 4
9. Dementia 1 0 9 0 4
10. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 0 9 0 4
11. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 0 9 0 4
12. Mania & excited psychosis 5 0 9 0 4
13. Adjustment disorder 8 0 9 0 4
14. Sleep disorder 10 0 9 0 4
15. Sexual disorder 11 0 9 0 4
16. Personality disorder 13 0 9 0 4
17. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0 9 0 4
18. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 0 9 0 4
Sub-aggregate 88.9 18.5
19. Please specify 19 12
Total aggregation 100.9 18.5
NB: Number of valid responses is 108.
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Appendix IX
Results ofKCH Casemix Project: Survey on Major Diasnostic Groups___________
MDG [tern # Primary Diagnosis 
(%)
Rank Comorbidity (%) Rank
1. Schizophrenia 3 55.7 1 0.3 6
2. Depressive 6 9.4 2 1.6 1
3. Anxiety 9 7.5 3 0.6 3
4. M. R. 14 4.4 4 1.1 2
5. Dementia 1 3.3 5 0.3 6
6. Delusion & acute psychotic 4 2.7 6 0.2 10
7. Mania & excited psychosis 5 2.4 7 0.2 10
8. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
2 2 .2 8 0.08 15
9. Disorders of psychological 
development
15 2.1 9 0.3 6
10. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
7 1.7 10 0.08 15
11. Adjustment disorder 8 1.3 11 0.08 15
12. Behavioral & emotional 
disorder in children
16 1.1 12 0.3 6
13. Personality disorder 13 1 13 0.4 4
14. Alcohol & drugs 
(dependent abuse)
18 1 13 0.4 4
15. Eating disorder & OCD 12 0.9 15 0.1 14
16. Sleep disorder 10 0.5 16 0.2 10
17. Alcohol & drugs (non­
dependent abuse)
17 0.3 17 0.2 10
18. Sexual disorder 11 0.04 18 0 18
Sub-aggregate 96.54 6.14
19. Please specify 19 5.3
Total aggregation 101.84 6.14
NB: Number of valid responses is 2616
 ^Among 13 cases, their Clinical Management Teams were not identified.
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Appendix X
Diasnoses Outside the MDG System: MDG (Item #19) in the Survey_____________
MDG in the Survey Written responses % Rank
1. Schizophrenia 1. Psychosis (paranoid, postpartum, 
NOS, catatonic, schizophreniform, 
atypical, childhood, 
schizoaffective)
15 2
2. Disorders of Psychological 
Development
2. ADHD, Tourette, enuresis,
hyperkinetic, child abuse. Autism
7.1 3
3. Anxiety 3. PTSD, Anxiety Depression 6.2 4
4. Mental Retardation 4. MR 4.3 8
5. Other affective, dissociative 
& somatoform disorder
5. Bipolar affective, affective 
disorder, emotional disorder
4.3 8
6. somatoform (hysterical reaction, 
hypochondriasis)
2.1 13
6. Delusion & acute psychotic 7. paranoid, morbid jealousy, 
paraphrenia
2.9 12
7. Dementia 8. Parkinsonism 2.1 13
8. Other mental disorders due 
to organic diseases
9. Post concussional syndrome 1.4 15
9. Adjustment disorder 10. Grief reaction 1.4 15
10. Eating Disorders and OCD 11. Compulsive water drinking 0.7 17
ICD-10 Category not 
included in the MDG;
Written responses % Rank
11. Other conditions from ICD- 
10 often associated with 
mental & beh. disorders
12. Epilepsy, TEE, Epileptic psychosis 27.1 1
12. Mental & behavioral 
disorders due to psychiatric 
substance use
13. Alcoholic psychosis, substance 
induced psychosis, benzodiazepine 
dependence
5.7 7
13. Disorders of adult 
personality & behavior
14. Beh. problem. Exhibitionism 
(MR), pathological gambling
3.6 10
other category Written responses % Rank
14. No diagnosis 15. No formal psychiatric diagnosis 6.2 4
15. Physical illness 16. HT, cerebral palsy, CVA, SEE, 
deafness
6.2 4
16. Intellectual problems 17. low IQ, limited IQ 3.6 10
NB: Number of written responses is 140.
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Appendix XI
Percentage o f  Types o f  Care
Types of Services in percent Valid
freq.
Acute Extended Ambulatory Community
Aggregate 3.5 9.3 79.6 7.6 2737
Team 1 3.2 11.5 85.1 0 529
Team 2 18.1 50.5 1.9 29.5 105
Team 3 3.1 5.8 90.6 0.5 969
Team 4 2.8 6.2 91 0 653
Team 5 0 2.1 55.9 42 288
Team 6 0 27.9 1.6 70.5 61
Team 7 6.5 14.8 77.8 0 107
138
SECTION 3
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Section 3.1: Critical Review I: 140
“Recent controversies on the effectiveness 
o f Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) ”
Section 3.2: Critical Review II: 169
“The detection o f malingered memory disorders 
in judicial cases ”
139
CISD review
Section 3.1: Critical Review One
Title:
“Recent controversies on the effectiveness of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing 
(CISD)”
Paper submitted as part of the Academic Dossier in partial fulfilment for the PsychD 
Clinical Psychology Conversion Programme at the University of Surrey (1997-1999)
Chee Wing WONG 
August 1998
Word count excluding Abstract and References: 5,504
140
CISD review
ABSTRACT
This review paper addresses the controversies over the empirical efficacy of 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) in the prevention or amelioration of post- 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While CISD has enjoyed wide-spread popularity 
and proliferation in many developed countries, its scientific efficacy in PTSD 
prevention has yet to be established. The issue remains largely unresolved due to 
many inherent methodological problems in disaster research, such as practical 
difficulties in conducting randomised controlled trials. It is argued that the aims of 
CISD need to be more clearly spelled out, as it is unclear whether the procedure is 
being used to ameliorate acute stress reactions after critical incidents, or is it being 
used as a prophylactic treatment for PTSD. It appears that doubts about the 
effectiveness of CISD stem in part from the premature expectation that CISD could 
prevent PTSD. The present review suggests that different sub-types of critical 
incidents should be distinguished as they can have quite different psychological 
impacts on the victims. Evidence for and against CISD are reviewed, and the 
potential dangers for the procedure are highlighted. Subcultural characteristics of 
victims being debriefed are also considered as salient factors affecting the outcome of 
CISD procedures. Until we have a more universally accepted CISD model with 
clearly stipulated protocols which can be subjected to more rigorous controlled trials, 
the effectiveness of this early intervention procedure will remain more a hazardous 
myth than an established panacea in post-disaster management of psychological well­
being.
141
CISD review
Introduction
In 1983, Mitchell described an organised approach to the management of stress 
responses in emergency service personnel which he termed “Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing"' (CISD) (Mitchell, 1983). It has been argued that Mitchell’s CISD process 
has its roots in the three principles of proximity, immediacy and expectancy in 
military psychiatry, the aim of which was to return the troops with acute combat stress 
responses back to action as soon as possible (Raphael, Wilson, Meldrum, & 
McFarlane, 1996). These three principles dictated that afflicted soldiers should be 
treated in close proximity to the combat zone, as soon as possible after the onset of the 
symptoms, and with the expectation of a quick return to combat (Solomon & 
Benbenishty, 1986). Other workers also argued that to prevent or minimise 
psychological morbidity following traumatic events, the earlier intervention occurs, 
the less opportunity there is for maladaptive and disruptive cognitive and behavioural 
patterns to become established (Rachman, 1980).
CISD according to the Mitchell model has enjoyed wide acceptance and 
proliferation among emergency personnel in developed countries. In the USA alone, 
more than 400 multi-professional teams have been trained in the Mitchell model 
(Mitchell & Everly, 1996; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995). The use of debriefing 
procedures has also been reported in Norway and England, although it was not made 
explicit whether the researchers had followed the procedures outlined in the Mitchell 
model (Ersland, Weisæth, & Sund, 1989; Joseph et al., 1992; Stallard & Law, 1993; 
Yule & Udwin, 1991). With the wide acceptance of CISD as an early intervention 
technique in multiple settings, it was inevitable that many workers quickly jumped
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onto the bandwagon without any critical appraisal of its empirical efficacy (e.g., Bell, 
1995; Hayes, Goodwin, & Miars, 1990; Lane, 1994; Ragaisia, 1994; Rubin, 1990; 
Smith & de Chesnay, 1994).
To set the stage for discussion, it is important to examine the processes and 
original aims of Mitchell’s CISD model (Mitchell, 1983), and to attain a more 
thorough understanding of its evolution and development in the past 15 years.
The Process o f  CISD
CISD is essentially a group process advisedly conducted by a team led by a 
suitably trained mental health professional who should be skilled in human 
communications, and who should have a fairly good background in group processes 
(Mitchell, 1983). The formal CISD protocol consists of seven well-delineated phases:
(a) The introductory phase explains the rules of the debriefing procedure in
which non-judgmental and confidential interactions are emphasised.
(b) The fac t phase allows the participants to recount personal experiences in
relationship to the traumatic event.
(c) The thinking phase asks group members to state their first thoughts in
response to the most stressful aspect of the incident.
(d) The reaction phase encourages group participants to discuss their emotional 
reactions about the incident. There is often reinforcement of the concept that 
having a strong emotional reaction does not constitute weakness or
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unsuitability (Wollman, 1993).
(e) The symptom phase makes inquiries about the presence and types of physical 
or psychological symptoms since the incident.
(f) The teaching phase describes common features of stress response syndromes 
and normalises strong emotional and other reactions to stress.
(g) The final re-entry phase fosters the consolidation of information, and provides 
a safety net of helping professionals for further follow-up actions if needed.
CISDs are normally held between 24 and 72 hours after the traumatic event, 
and can take up to 3 hours to complete (Mitchell, 1983; 1986). CISDs are usually 
held on a one-off basis because the final re-entry phase is essentially a “closure” 
process; although more flexibility in the number of sessions is allowed in the more 
recent Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) model (Mitchell & Everly, 1996).
The Aims o f  CISD
In Mitchell’s 1983 seminal paper on CISD, he remarked that “a critical 
incident stress debriefing will generally alleviate the acute stress responses which 
appear at the scene and immediately afterwards and will eliminate, or at least inhibit, 
delayed stress reactions” (Mitchell, 1983). In a later publication (Mitchell & Bray, 
1990), the authors defined the aim of CISD as “(a way) to reduce the impact o f  a 
critical event and to accelerate the normal recovery o f  normal people who are 
suffering through normal but painful reactions to abnormal events”. In the second 
edition of their operations manual, Mitchell and Everly (1996) continued to assert that
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the CISD process “is specifically designed to prevent or mitigate the development o f  
post-traumatic stress among emergency service professions and other high risk 
disciplines”. From their writings which spanned over 15 years, Mitchell and his 
colleagues have consistently alluded to a “prevention” or a “mitigation” of post- 
traumatic stress by CISD/CISM procedures. Dyregrov (1997), whose model was an 
offshoot of the Mitchell model, was the first to elaborate on the aims of CISD from a 
more process perspective. He said that CISD aimed “to prevent unnecessary after­
effects, accelerate normal recovery, stimulate group cohesion, normalise reactions, 
stimulate emotional ventilation, and promote a cognitive ‘grip ’ on the situation ”. In 
Dyregrov’s (1997) exposition, there was no mention that CISD purports to prevent 
PTSD.
Models o f  CISD
In the past 15 years, the Mitchell model of CISD has gone through gradual 
evolution and expansion. As early as 1986, Mitchell introduced the term Critical 
Incident Stress Management (CISM) to encompass an array of post-disaster 
management procedures for emergency service personnel. These include on-scene 
debriefing, initial defusing, formal CISD, and follow-up work (Mitchell, 1986). 
Mitchell and Dyregrov (1993) further considered that post-incident intervention 
strategies should include procedures of demobilisation and defusing, before formal 
CISD is introduced. Proponents of CISD have consistently emphasised that CISD is 
only one of the many procedures within the rubrics of CISM (Dyregrov, 1997; Everly, 
Flannery, & Mitchell, in press; Everly & Mitchell, 1997; Mitchell & Bray, 1990; 
Mitchell & Dyregrov, 1993, Mitchell & Everly, 1996; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995).
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Even critics of CISD acknowledged that CISD is only one component of a range of 
strategies that may be required following a traumatic incident (Watts, 1994).
Recent writings emphasised that debriefing should be used in conjunction with 
other procedures such as pre-crisis preparation through education, and one-on-one 
intervention either before or after formal debriefing sessions. Other workers also 
emphasised the need for on-scene support and counselling (Hayes et al., 1990), 
mobilising social support networks (Solomon, 1992), and the use of a telephone 
hotline to extend crisis intervention services to vicarious victims in the community 
(Leung et al., 1993, 1996; Wu, Lu, & Leung, 1995). Review of literature on CISD 
and CISM can be found in Everly (1995), Everly and Boyle (1997), Everly et al., (in 
press), Hiley-Young and Gerrity (1994), Mitchell (1988), Robinson (1989), and 
Wollman (1993). Textbooks and manuals on disaster contingencies are also available 
(e.g., Austin, 1992; Figley, 1992; Hodgkinson & Stewart, 1991; Mitchell & Everly, 
1996; Raphael, 1986; van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weisæth, 1996).
As CISD continued to develop, variants of the Mitchell model began to 
emerge. The Dyregrov model called Process Debriefing (PD), for example, studied 
the process variables in the Mitchell model, and focused on the decision-making 
process of the participants during the “thought stage”. It also added a stage of sensory 
impressions of the incident to enhance understanding and processing of the 
experience, and placed emphasis on the normalisation of reactions and responses 
(Dyregrov, 1989; 1997). This variant of the Mitchell model was used in studies as 
those by Ersland et al. (1989), and Deahl et al. (1994).
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A more clinically-orientated model was proposed by Raphael in Australia 
(Raphael, 1986). The Raphael model focuses on the emotional experiences of the 
participants, and is broader in focus than the Mitchell model. Emphasis was placed on 
past experiences which might influence participants’ perception of the current event, 
and the role of interpersonal relationships which would be helpful in returning the 
participants back to everyday working life. It is also assumed that the skills learned 
could be transferred to future critical incidents.
Evidence fo r  the effectiveness o f  CISD
The rapid expansion and proliferation of CISD teams across America provided 
anecdotal evidence to many disaster workers that the procedure must be effective if so 
many people are using it. In most of the uncontrolled studies, effectiveness of CISD 
was often assessed by the participants’ on-the-spot evaluation of its “usefulness”, and 
it is very difficult to tease out factors such as “demand characteristics” and “group- 
think” in a closely-knit community of emergency service personnel. Even Everly et 
al. (in press) have conceded that while CISD was being reported as helpful, there was 
little empirical evidence for its effectiveness. Moreover, it has not been convincingly 
demonstrated that the acclaimed decrement in stress symptoms over time was 
attributable to CISD per se, or just the result of spontaneous remission.
Robinson and Mitchell (1993) conducted a systematic study of group 
debriefing procedures by evaluating 31 Mitchell model debriefings held over a 21- 
month period for 172 emergency service workers and welfare and hospital personnel. 
The types of critical incidents were not controlled, and varied from multiple casualty
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situations, child fatalities, death or serious injury, to patients or work-related matters. 
Post-debriefing situations were assessed by questionnaires within two weeks of each 
debriefing. Ninety-six percent of the emergency service workers and 77% of the 
welfare/medical personnel experienced a reduction in anxiety symptoms attributed, at 
least in part, to the debriefing. Again, critics were quick to point out that there was no 
comparison group to substantiate the effectiveness of CISD (Raphael, Meldrum, & 
McFarlane, 1995).
Ersland et al. (1989) conducted a debriefing for one group of oil rig workers in 
the aftermath of a North Sea oil rig disaster. They compared their findings with a 
group of workers who did not have the opportunity for a debriefing. The debriefed 
group of victims had no long-term negative effects, whereas the non-debriefed group 
experienced significant distress. Yule and Udwin (1991) studied the impact of 
debriefing on 39 British teenage victims of a cruise ship sinking in the Mediterranean. 
One school provided a single debriefing session and two open groups for 24 students 
who were primary victims. The second school declined debriefing assistance. Nine 
months later, the debriefed students had fewer fears and lower scores on the Impact of 
Event Scale (lES) (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). However, it was not a 
randomised controlled study so that there were other possible explanations for the 
group differences. Moreover, there was little information as to how the debriefings 
were conducted, or whether Mitchell’s CISD procedures were being followed.
It is also worth mentioning that Everly and Boyle (1997) utilised data from 
five investigations using Mitchell’s CISD model and subjected them to a meta­
148
CISD review
analysis. In an aggregated sample size of 337, the resultant mean Cohen’s D was 
0.86, which indicated a large positive effect size attributable to the CISD intervention 
(quoted in Everly et al., in press). However, this finding has not yet been fully 
discussed in the literature.
Evidence against the effectiveness o f  CISD
Doubts about the efficacy of CISD have been raised (Raphael et al., 1995; 
Watts, 1994). In fact, the literature contained many findings which consistently 
suggested that group debriefing procedures are of no apparent helpfulness. Many 
uncontrolled studies have found that despite debriefing, a significant proportion of 
participants still experienced PTSD or PTSD-like symptoms (Creamer et al., 1989; 
Dyregrov, Kristoffersen, & Gjestad, 1996; Searle & Bisson, 1992; Weisæth, 1989).
A number of better-controlled comparison studies also failed to prove the 
effectiveness of CISD procedures. McFarlane and his associates studied 469 fire­
fighters who responded to the bush fires known as “Ash Wednesday” in South 
Australia (McFarlane, 1984; McFarlane & Raphael, 1984). In their study, however, 
no randomised control group was used. Participants were assessed at six-month 
intervals for two years, and it was found that the debriefed participants had less acute 
traumatic stress, but had a greater likelihood of developing delayed PTSD. The 
complication of this research was that some emergency service personnel were also 
primary victims due to personal bereavement or property damages.
Griffiths and Watts (1992) reported similar negative findings in the aftermath
149
CISD review
of two large-scale bus crashes in Australia with high casualties and gruesome sights. 
One year after the incidents, nearly half of a group of emergency personnel still 
reported considerable stress symptoms. Of the 182 who had been debriefed out of a 
total of 285, the debriefed group actually had significantly higher scores for morbidity 
and stress on the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979) and 
the IBS (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). Despite the fact that most of those 
participating in the debriefings found the sessions to be helpful, there was no 
relationship between their perceived helpfulness of CISD and the symptoms they 
experienced. Griffiths and Watts (1992) therefore suggested there was little evidence 
to indicate that debriefing was effective in preventing negative psychological 
outcome. However, it could be argued that because the research design was not a 
randomised controlled study, those who experienced greater levels of psychological 
disturbance were more likely to attend the CISD sessions.
Deahl et al. (1994) conducted a controlled study of 64 British soldiers who 
worked as war grave troops during the Gulf war. Their duty was to handle the dead 
bodies of the enemy as well as the allies. For operational reasons, some troops were 
debriefed while others were not. Of the 40 debriefed with a non-standardised 
Dyregrov model (Dyregrov, 1989; 1997), there was no evidence that the psychological 
debriefing had a positive effect on outcome. The authors mentioned that service 
personnel were encouraged to talk about their experience during training, and it was 
likely that the “informal debriefings” within the team was already established prior to 
the CISD session, and the formal procedure could add little further protection from 
subsequent morbidity. Despite the negative findings, the authors remained committed
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to the principles of debriefing and reported that many soldiers valued the opportunity 
to express their feelings.
Hytten and Hasle (1989) assessed a group of fire fighters two weeks after they 
dealt with a hotel fire in Norway in which 14 people died. All but one of the fire 
fighters reported that their attendance at a CISD was helpful and increased their self- 
confidence. However, their scores on intrusive thoughts and avoidance behaviour as 
measured by the IBS (Horowitz et al., 1979) were no different from those of the group 
who had simply talked to their colleagues informally. Kenardy et al. (1996) 
conducted a longitudinal study of 195 people who had helped after an earthquake in 
Newcastle, Australia. Sixty-two were debriefed and 133 were not. Assessments were 
made on four occasions over the first two years post-earthquake. The authors reported 
no evidence of an improved rate of recovery among those personnel who were 
debriefed, even when level of exposure and helping-related stress were taken into 
account. They even found that there was less improvement over time among those 
who had been debriefed, but 80% of the participants rated the debriefing as helpful. 
Clearly, there was a discrepancy between participants’ perceived usefulness of CISD 
and the empirical efficacy of the procedure.
Recently two randomised control trials of psychological debriefing have been 
completed, one on victims of road traffic accidents and one on bum victims (Hobbs et 
al., 1996; Bisson et al., 1997 respectively). In the Hobbs et al. (1996) study, the 
participants were victims from traffic accidents admitted to the John Radcliffe 
Hospital. After screening for exclusion criteria, participants were randomly assigned
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to the intervention group (N = 54) and the control group (N = 52). The intervention 
group received a 60-minute session of debriefing, combining a review of the traumatic 
experience, encouragement of emotional expression, and promotion of cognitive 
processing of the experience. Advice was provided about common emotional 
experience and early graded return to normal road travel. The control group went 
through the assessment procedure, but no intervention was given. Hobbs et al.’s 
results indicated that psychiatric morbidity was substantial four months after injury, 
with no evidence that debriefing had helped. Furthermore, the debriefed group had a 
significantly worse outcome on some symptom measures. Hobbs et al. suggested that 
in their sample of participants, many could still be too numbed or distressed to be 
receptive to debriefing procedures, and the intervention did not seem relevant to those 
participants who was expecting an uneventful recovery. Hobbs et al. warned that a 
single intervention was inadequate for major emotional problems, and early 
intervention may even disturb natural psychological “defences” against fear and 
distress.
Bisson et al. (1997) used participants from the Welsh Regional Bums Unit and 
randomly assigned their participants into the psychological debriefing (PD) group and 
the control group. Fifty-seven PD participants were compared with 46 controls. The 
PD procedures used by Bisson et al. adhered to the structure first described by 
Mitchell (1983). Results of the Bisson et al.’s study suggested that the debriefing 
intervention could, indeed, be disadvantageous. Score on both anxiety and depression 
and the IBS were significantly worse in the PD group. Moreover, the length of PD 
was found to be associated with worse outcome. Bisson et al. took a critical view by
152
CISD review
saying that because psychological debriefing involves intense imaginai exposure to a 
traumatic incident shortly after the event took place, some individual may be further 
traumatised by the process, thus exacerbating their symptoms and hindering emotional 
processing of the traumatic experience. They further commented that PD and other 
single interventions are time-limited, and unless the participant engages in further 
self-directed exposure work such as discussing the trauma with the family, habituation 
may not occur and PD may represent a further traumatic experience. The fear that 
CISD may re-traumatise psychologically vulnerable participants has led to the 
suggestion that all CISD procedures should be conducted on a voluntary basis (Watts, 
1994), or, indeed, ought to be stopped altogether (Bisson et al., 1997).
Raphael et al. (1995) were of the opinion that debriefing focuses only on the 
trauma to the exclusion of other important stressors that may of greater relevance, 
such as organisational stress or personal life stress. A series of publications, 
McFarlane (1985, 1987, 1989) warned that early debriefing intervention could mask 
the symptoms of PTSD, thus making early diagnosis and treatment difficult. Reactive 
processes are often described as “symptoms” in the educational aspects of debriefing, 
and this may also “médicalisé” normal responses to stress (Raphael et al., 1995).
One final point is that the recommended 24 to 72 hours post-disaster timing 
for CISD raised the argument whether the intervention procedure was in fact targeted 
at Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) as defined in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994), and not PTSD. If there is any truth in the assertion that early 
intervention such as CISD may mask symptoms of PTSD (McFarlane, 1984, 1989;
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McFarlane & Papay, 1992), or even re-traumatise victims (Bisson et al., 1997; 
Raphael et al., 1995; Watts, 1994), then its use in any form would raise serious ethical 
problems which may be highly contentious.
While acknowledging that more research data is needed, Robinson and 
Mitchell (1995) argued that all the negative outcomes were attributable to sampling 
bias, and raised questions pertaining to the training backgrounds of the debriefers, the 
timing of the debriefing, and the “un-standardised” procedures that were being used. 
They also argued that a truly randomised controlled trial for CISD is difficult and 
unethical to implement and continued to highlight the effectiveness of CISD on 
anecdotal grounds.
Determinants o f  PTSD
McFarlane has stated succinctly in a series of studies that while psychological 
morbidity was often precipitated by traumatic events, many other determinants such as 
past experience, psychological vulnerability, history of psychiatric morbidity, 
personality structure and individual coping style and coping strategies all interact to 
determine the propensity for an individual’s likelihood to develop long-term PTSD 
(McFarlane, 1985, 1987, 1989; McFarlane & Papay, 1992; McFarlane & Raphael, 
1984).
Many workers in the field of disaster management held the myth that CISD is 
a preventative measure against the development of PTSD. In fact, this has become 
one of the outcome criteria to which the efficacy of CISD was being judged (Bisson &
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Deahl, 1994; Busuttil, 1995; Dyregrov et al., 1996; McFarlane, 1989; Seale & Bisson, 
1992; Weisæth, 1989). A number of issues surrounding CISD will be highlighted.
First, not all those who were traumatised will develop PTSD. Raphael et al.
(1995) have argued against treating trauma as though it consists only of a single 
element such as a threat to life. They have pointed out that it is not viable to treat all 
victims of trauma as if they were equally afflicted psychologically. As argued before, 
a trauma or critical incident does not necessarily equal the development of PTSD, and 
the instigation of early intervention procedures such as CISD does not necessarily 
prevent the development of PTSD. The common myth is that if not treated, all trauma 
victims will ultimately develop PTSD. This is simply not true. McFarlane (1987) had 
emphasised that vulnerability is a more important factor in breakdown than the degree 
of stress experienced. In his studies, only 9% of the GHQ score variance could be 
accounted for by the disaster and other life events, and the effects of the disaster 
appeared to be separate and additive. He further asserted that neuroticism and a past 
history of treatment for a psychological disorder were better predictors of post- 
traumatic morbidity than the degree of exposure to the disaster or the losses sustained. 
Even some of the original data quoted by Mitchell and Bray (1990) suggested that 
about 10% of the fire-fighters would receive no impact at all from the critical 
incidents, while about 10% will eventually develop post-traumatic stress disorder 
despite receiving CISD. There was no empirical evidence to demonstrate that CISD 
has significant and beneficial effects in shifting this normal distribution curve of post- 
traumatic morbidity.
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Second, the role of “spontaneous remission” was often ignored. While critical 
incidents were often precursors of ASD and PTSD, workers often negated the role of 
“spontaneous remission” in their studies. That is, victims will get better in time 
irrespective of whether they had received early intervention or not. In the absence of 
good randomised controlled trails, this will remain a major criticism confronting 
advocates of CISD.
Third, individual coping styles and cognitive structures were not given 
sufficient weight in the CISD literature. Some victims actually attained psychological 
benefits from traumatic experiences and took an even more positive view of life 
(Ebersole & Flores, 1989; Lehman et al., 1993; Thompson, 1985). It is not 
uncommon to hear suiwivors say they are “glad that we are alive”. Most victims 
would be eager to get back to their normal life instead of having to go through the 
debriefing process and to forcibly re-live the traumatic memories. A good example is 
the American hostages freed from Iran in 1970. Most of the hostages were ready to 
fly home immediately and were eager to see their families. But instead, they had to be 
detained in Germany for four days so that they could be “re-introduced” back to 
liberty and to under-go the necessary debriefing procedures before they could leave for 
America (Rahe et al., 1990).
Fourth, the subculture of the debriefed has received very little attention in the 
past. Advocates of CISD (e.g., Robinson & Mitchell, 1993) argued that since CISD 
has received widespread acceptance and proliferation amongst emergency service 
personnel, it must be perceived as useful in such a traditionally self-reliant group.
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Before the advent of CISD in the early 1980’s, emergency personnel had used an array 
of coping mechanisms in stress reduction after critical incidents. Some of the 
strategies used included talking over the event with colleagues over a glass of beer, 
mutual support, ventilation with family members and friends, and other positive 
thinking measures. It would be erroneous to suggest that such traditional ways of 
coping had given way to new innovations such as CISD, and it is methodologically 
difficult to tease out the relative benefits between CISD and the more traditional 
remedies which could still be used.
Fifth, it may not be justified to treat all emergency service personnel as a 
homogeneous group as previous experience was found to play a part in the 
individual’s ability to cope. Hytten and Hasle (1989) found that more experienced fire 
fighter would cope with the impact of critical incidents better than the non­
professional fire fighters, and their findings were replicated by Dyregrov et al. (1996). 
Experience certainly has a role in determining the “robustness” of emergency workers.
Finally, it is dangerous to assume that CISD can be used as often and as 
liberally as possible. The impact of repeated and over-use of debriefing procedures 
has not been adequately researched. It is not uncommon to hear remarks during 
debriefing sessions such as “we have heard all these before” during the teaching 
phase. If debriefing is used frequently and indiscriminately, the law of diminishing 
returns will inevitably set in. Attention to this most fundamental law of economics 
has unfortunately been lost to the overwhelming zeal of CISD implementation in the 
past 15 years.
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Types o f  critical incidents and their impact
Personal trauma and disasters occur at unpredictable times and in 
unpredictable circumstances. There is often no control over the type or extent of the 
trauma, and rescuers and researchers alike are often caught ill-prepared when a major 
critical incident occurs. It is not possible to treat all disasters as if  they are a 
homogeneous phenomenon. Despite the fact that primary victims are invariably 
traumatised in most disasters, the type and extent of their trauma is related very much 
to the type of the critical incident itself. An earthquake which destroys a township 
without prior warning has a different impact on primary victims than a severe tropical 
storm which received warning well ahead by the meteorological department so that 
people can fortify contingency measures or choose to evacuate. The bus crashes in 
Kempsey and Grafton in Australia (Griffiths & Watts, 1992) with severely mutilated 
bodies would have an entirely different impact on rescuers when compared with the 
sinking of the “Jupiter” in the Mediterranean in which casualties were minimal (Yule, 
1992). Another significant variable concerns with the length of time emergency 
personnel spent on the scene. A horrific motor vehicle accident with multiple 
casualties, for example, could be cleared within hours after the incident, whereas 
building collapses after a severe earthquake may take weeks or even months to 
complete the rescue work. None of the studies took into account the time spent on the 
scene by the emergency service personnel, and how this would have an impact on 
them. The long on-duty periods such as the Ash Wednesday fires (McFarlane, 1984) 
and the prolonged body-handling work reported in Deahl et al. (1994), and Taylor and 
Frazer (1982) clearly has a very different impact on rescuers than their counterparts
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who attended to “short and sharp” disasters such as the Kemsey and Grafton bus 
crashes (Griffiths & Watts, 1992). It is unfortunate that there has been little attempt in 
the past to classify critical incidents according to some salient dimensions such as 
predictability, extent, casualties, and time on-scene.
CISD protocols
As discussed earlier, the original Mitchell model (Mitchell, 1983) has gone 
through many changes and metamorphoses. Some examples are the Process 
Debriefing (PD) model of Dyregrov (Dyregrov, 1989; 1997), and the Raphael model 
in Australia (Raphael, 1986). There were other examples in literature in which the 
term ‘debriefing’ was being used loosely in a generic way (e.g.. Bell, 1995; Bisson & 
Deahl, 1994; Busuttil, 1995; Kenardy et al., 1996; Yule & Udwin, 1991). Despite the 
fact that specific manuals on CISD are available (Austin, 1992; Hodgkinson & 
Stewart, 1991; Meichenbaum, 1994; Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Everly, 1996; 
Raphael, 1986), it is only fair to say that ways of conducting CISD sessions are as 
varied as its many variants. None of the reported literature has delineated benchmarks 
and auditing procedures in CISD/CISM, and it is extremely difficult to compare study 
results if the CISD procedures were not standardised. While CISD was originally 
designed to alleviate stress responses of emergency personnel, its use has recently 
been extended to the primary victims of disasters (Ersland et al., 1989; Joseph et al., 
1992, 1994; Stallard & Law, 1993), individuals (Hayes et al., 1990), and even 
vicarious victims inflicted from watching the electronic media (Leung et a l, 1993; 
Wong & Leung, 1994). Using CISD on small groups and individuals would erode the 
group processes that the procedure was originally intended.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Despite the fact that Mitchell’s CISD model (Mitchell, 1983) has enjoyed 
popularity and world-wide proliferation in the past 15 years, there is, unfortunately, 
still a dearth of scientific evidence to substantiate its proclaimed effectiveness in the 
prevention of PTSD after traumatic experiences (Creamer et al., 1989; Deahl et al., 
1994; Dyregrov et al., 1996; Griffiths & Watts, 1992; Hobbs et al., 1996; Hytten & 
Hasle, 1989; Kenardy et al., 1996; McFarlane, 1989; Seale & Bisson, 1992; Weisæth, 
1989). Advocates and critics alike agreed that there is a need for more research data 
to prove the efficacy of CISD procedures (Raphael et al., 1995; Robinson & Mitchell, 
1995; Watts; 1994), but the inherent methodological difficulties in implementing a 
truly randomised controlled study remained a challenging task. While maintaining 
that it is unethical to implement a randomised controlled study in post-disaster 
management, supporters of the Mitchell model have extended their focus to CISM 
which encompasses a much wider range of intervention strategies of which CISD is 
only one part of the total package. This may have taken some heat out of the CISD 
debate, but the question still looms in the horizon that if CISD cannot prove its 
effectiveness in the prevention of psychological morbidity such as PTSD, then the 
resources spent on CISD may not be justified. If, indeed, there are inherent risks in 
early intervention procedures as suggested by Bisson et al.(1997); Hobbs et al. (1996); 
and Raphael et al. (1995), then should CISD be used at all?
Perhaps there was a fundamental misconception about the use of CISD as a 
prophylaxis of PTSD. The aetiology of PTSD is so complex and multi-facet that 
“trauma” does not automatically equal “PTSD”. By the same token, early intervention
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after a traumatic experience is unlikely to have significant effects on the morbidity of 
PTSD in the person. As reiterated by many authors, factors such as previous 
psychological vulnerability, experience, personal coping mechanisms, and so on, are 
more relevant predictors for PTSD than the intensity of the trauma itself (McFarlane, 
1989). A more clinically oriented model (Raphael, 1986; Raphael et al., 1996) which 
emphasised the need for proper psychological “triage” appears to make sense as one 
cannot assume that all those involved in the critical incident will be equally affected. 
Early treatment and intervention should be given to the highly vulnerable groups of 
victims instead of forcing everyone onto the debriefing band-wagon.
Judging from the proliferation of CISD groups around the world, this early 
intervention strategy may be here to stay for some time. It is unfortunate that 
practitioners still showed insufficient concern about the scientific efficacy of CISD. 
Up to this date, there is very little evidence to support their assertion that the CISD
process will “  .prevent or mitigate the development o f post-traumatic stress
among emergency service professions and other high risk disciplines” (Mitchell & 
Everly, 1996). Until we have better research evidence, it may be useful for Mitchell 
& Everly (1997) to rephrase their purported aims of CISD so that ambiguous 
expectations can be avoided. From the evidence gathered so far, debriefing may not 
be appropriate in timing and may not offer the right format for some people.
Instead of arguing about the effectiveness of CISD in the prevention of PTSD, 
it may be an opportune time to develop an universally recognised classification system 
for critical incidents such as major disasters so that different levels of intervention can
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be dispensed in accordance with the needs. Many writers in the past have alluded to 
the importance of these variables, but there has been little effort to organise them into 
a meaningful structure (e.g., Armstrong, O’Callahan, & Marmar, 1991; Dyregrov et 
al., 1996; McFarlane, 1987, 1989; McFarlane & Papay, 1992; Taylor & Frazer, 1982). 
It is important to include parameters such as predictability, number of casualties, 
impact of gruesome sights, time spent on rescue work, human and property losses, 
personal stress, administration stress, organisational stress, and so on.
We are still waiting for a parsimonious model of CISD which can be distilled 
from the major intervention models of Armstrong et al. (1991), Dyregrov (1997), 
Mitchell (1983), Mitchell and Everly (1996), and Raphael (1986). With it will come 
clearer protocols, better clinical auditing, and more relevant and robust outcome 
measures. When these are realised, more vigorous randomised controlled trials should 
follow in order to establish the efficacy of CISD in stress intervention. Until then, the 
scientific efficacy of this early intervention procedure will remain more a hazardous 
myth than an established panacea in post-disaster management of psychological well­
being. It is hoped that the day will come when a definitive judgement can be made of 
CISD based on sound scientific empiricism, so that the deployment of monetary and 
human resources in this field can be better justified.
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*^ The clinician who is fooled by the malingerer 
becomes an unwitting accomplice to a lie 
that may seriously harm an innocent person.”
Faust et al. (1988a) p. 581
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ABSTRACT
Expert opinions given by clinical neuropsychologists are being increasingly 
used in the judicial system to testify a person’s cognitive status following physical or 
psychological trauma. Controversies often arise in legal contentions regarding the 
person’s motivation and genuineness in their presentation of cognitive deficits. This 
review focuses on the psychological assessment and detection of feigned memory 
disorders, the most common of all dissimulated disabilities in the judicial setting. 
Clinical and behavioural indices which might alert the clinician to the possibility of 
malingering are presented. Conceptual and practical difficulties of three specific 
neuropsychological strategies to detect dissimulated memory impairment are 
discussed. These strategies include: (a) “floor effect” malingering tests such as the 
Rey 15-Item Memory Test (RMT), (b) “force-choice” malingering tests such as 
Pankratz’s Symptom Validity Testing (SVT), and (c) malingering tests for “serial 
positioning” effect such as the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT). It has 
been suggested that the use of multiple strategies involving a combination of thorough 
clinical interviews, informed knowledge of brain-behaviour correlates, and 
standardised neuropsychological testing represents a more promising approach to the 
detection of malingered memory impairments.
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Introduction
Psychological assessments are conducted under the assumption that the 
examinees are giving their best performance during the evaluation procedures. This 
apparent trust is often endorsed and fostered by psychologists as an essential 
prerequisite to facilitate rapport, and to create an environment which is conducive to 
optimal performance on the part of the client. However, there are times when the 
psychologist should be alert to the possibility of deception during the assessment 
procedure, especially when secondary gains are obviously involved. Lezak (1995) has
stated that "....  the indirect emotional and social rewards o f  invalidism make
malingering and functional disabilities an attractive solution to all kinds o f  social, 
economic, and personal problems for some people. ” (p. 791). In the judicial setting, 
there are numerous situations where the exaggeration, dissimulation, or fabrication of 
disabilities could bring about significant secondary gains. Therefore, the ability to 
detect malingering during neuropsychological evaluation can have significant and 
sometimes decisive bearing on the adjudication of legal cases.
The Diagnosis o f  Malingering
Malingering is defined in the DSM-IV as the ''intentional production o f  false 
or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external 
incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial 
compensation, evading criminal prosecution or obtaining drugs” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, p.683). The ICD-10 categorised malingering under 
Z76.5 “person encountering health services in other circumstances” (World Health
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Organisation, 1992); and the DSM-IV listed malingering under V65.2 “additional 
conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). These placements indicate that malingering is to be 
conceptualised as a behaviour and not as a diagnosis or illness, and malingering can 
be manifested in any individual whether or not the person is ill (Turner, 1997).
Furthermore, malingering may even be construed as an adaptive behaviour 
under certain circumstances (Rogers, 1988). In an early review of the concept of 
malingering, for instance, Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983) seriously questioned the 
traditional moralistic expectation of honesty in psychological examinations, and cast 
doubt on the readiness of patients volunteering self-damaging information in legal 
cases. The authors even made the remark that “ the voluntary presentation o f  self­
damaging information might be viewed as the inability to comprehend the 
consequences and implications o f  such actions, as poor judgement, and as self­
destructive behaviour... ” (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983).
In any case, when secondary gains are sufficiently high, the motivation to 
dissimulate in formal psychological evaluation becomes a probable issue which no 
responsible neuropsychologists should over-look. This does not necessarily mean that 
neuropsychologists should treat all persons under litigation as potential malingerers. 
According to several authors (e.g., Adams & Rankin, 1996; Pankratz, 1988), 
malingering is strongly indicated if one of the following is noted:
(a) involvement in litigation or criminal proceedings.
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(b) obvious secondary gains from having a deficit,
(c) marked discrepancy between claimed disability and objective 
findings,
(d) lack of co-operation during diagnostic evaluation and prescribed 
treatment, and
(e) presence of factitious disorder or antisocial personality disorder.
While malingering has been found to be relatively uncommon in its pure form 
(Braverman, 1978), the label does carry with it a very negative and socially demeaning 
connotation. Rather than being conceived as a clinical condition, malingering is 
frequently treated as an accusation for lying and deliberate deception. Falsely 
labelling someone as a malingerer may result in the patient being stigmatised, leading 
to the development of an antagonistic relationship with the health care system 
(Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990). The minimisation of false positives in 
malingering detection is therefore just as important as its identification and diagnosis 
(for recent reviews, see Brandt, 1988; Cercy, Schretlen, & Brandt, 1997; Haines & 
Norris, 1995; Nies & Sweet, 1994; Rogers, 1997).
Feasibility in the Detection o f  Malingering
It has often been argued that neuropsychologists have limited success in 
diagnosing malingering. For instance, several studies have cast doubt on the ability of 
neuropsychologists to accurately detect malingering. In an early study, Heaton et al. 
(1978) tried to discriminate 16 participants who were requested to malinger from 16 
non-litigating head trauma patients using a number of neuropsychological and
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personality tests. Basic demographic data and test scores were sent to 10 
neuropsychologists who were asked to make blind interpretations as to whether the 
individual had genuine deficits, or had malingered deficits. The neuropsychologists’ 
ability to correctly classify the participants was only slightly better than chance, 
ranging from 50.0% to 68.8%. Heaton et al. (1978) later applied a discriminant 
function analysis based on the neuropsychological test data and obtained a 100% 
correct classification rate. The 100% diagnostic accuracy may seem impressive but 
full cross-validation is necessary to ensure clinical utility. The authors further 
indicated that their discriminant function formulae were useful only for a “head 
injury-malingerer distinction”. Thus the “generalisability” of Heaton et al.’s 
discriminant function formulae was at best limited.
In another series of studies, Faust and his colleagues (Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 
1988; Faust, Hart, & Arkes, 1988) showed that neuropsychologists' abilities to identify 
malingering were quite poor in evaluating children who were instructed to produce 
faked symptoms. Their first study used 3 children between the ages of 9 and 12 years 
who were administered the WISC-R and the Halstead-Reitan battery for older children. 
The children were asked to fake cognitive deficits in a believable way that would not 
arouse suspicion of the psychologists. The children were given no guidance as to how 
brain-damaged participants usually perform on the tests. A total of 42 
neuropsychologists evaluated the test scores along with a short history of each 
participant. None of the neuropsychologists discerned that any of the children were 
faking their symptoms, and instead recognised neuropsychological abnormalities in 
more than 90% of the cases. Specifically, 93% of neuropsychologists judged the
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protocols as abnormal, and 7% judged the protocols as normal.
However, it may be argued that in the Faust’s (Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988; 
Faust, Hart, & Arkes, 1988) studies, the judges were not able to interview the 
participants to observe their behaviour first-hand, nor did they have the opportunity of 
administering additional tests or measures which they deemed fit. Furthermore, the 
mind-set of the judges could be such that no child or adolescent had any reason to 
malinger given their clinical histories.
Despite these limitations the findings had led to the highly critical conclusion 
drawn by Frederick and Foster (1991) that patients are able to produce realistic 
findings of impairment on neuropsychological tests, whereas clinicians are generally 
unable to detect malingering performed at better than chance levels.
Feigning o f  Memory Impairment in Judicial Cases
Notwithstanding the negative outcomes of the above studies, the present paper 
takes a slightly more optimistic view that there are clinical indices which might alert 
the clinician to the possibility of deliberate faking. Moreover, specific cognitive tests 
are available for gathering objectified findings to assist the Court in deciding the 
possibility of dissimulated cognitive impairments. Owing to the vastness of possible 
candidates for faked cognitive responses, the present review focuses only on the 
dissimulation of memory disorders. In a review of literature on the incidence of 
amnesia in criminal law proceedings, Rubinsky & Brandt (1986) concluded that 
claims for memory impairment was, in relative terms, by far the most common of all
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feigned cognitive deficits. The authors also reported that defendants often claim 
amnesia to prove their incompetence to stand trail or to demonstrate diminished 
criminal responsibility.
Several reasons have been forwarded to account for the high incidence of 
feigned memory complaints in judiciary cases especially those involving 
compensation (Franzen et al., 1990). First, the frequent exposure to portrayals of 
amnesia in everyday lives has convinced malingerers that memory problems can be 
easily feigned by following typical presentations promulgated in the popular media. 
Second, malingerers often volunteer subjective memory complaints which they 
believe to be private and internal phenomena that are not amenable to objective 
verification. Finally, malingerers often consider that it is easier to “inhibit” a 
behavioural repertoire they already possess (e.g., ability to learn and to recall), rather 
than to “produce” on purpose a new set of behavioural responses which they are 
unfamiliar with (e.g., psychiatric symptoms).
Clinical Assessment o f  Malingered Memory Impairment
Lezak (1983, 1995) suggested that when a disability would be advantageous, 
complaints and expressions of distress that appear to exceed by far what the injury or 
illness would be expected to cause signal the possibility of malingering. Inconsistency 
in performance levels or between a patient’s report of disability and performance 
levels, unrelated to any fluctuating physiological conditions, is perhaps the most usual 
indicator of malingering, or at least a psuedoneurologic condition.
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Franzen et al. (1990) suggested that the clinician should remain vigilant for 
inconsistencies with neuropathological findings. The practising clinical 
neuropsychologist should therefore be well-conversant with the latest information on 
brain-behaviour correlates so that any atypical symptomatology or inconsistency 
presentations will be immediately picked up. Dikmen, McLean, and Temkin (1986) 
found that patients with minor head injury experience a multitude of behavioural 
difficulties following their accidents. However, these difficulties would improve over 
time. Neuropsychological deficits seem to largely disappear by one month after 
injury, provided that there are no other system injuries such as orthopaedic or soft 
tissue damages. Depending on the extent and location of the brain injury, the 
neuropsychologist should be alerted to symptoms which had persisted long after a 
reasonable period for the deficit to clear up through spontaneous remission or other 
medical interventions.
Wiggins and Brandt (1988) considered that naive malingerers might not realise 
that personal information is typically retained in organic amnesia, and loss of such 
information is often considered to be an indicator of psychogenic amnesia or 
malingering. They carried out an autobiographical interview of amnesic patients, 
normal controls, and participants instructed to simulate amnesia. Their findings 
indicated that the inability for simulated amnesics to recall basic personal information 
ranged from 17% to 42%.
In the clinical assessment of feigned memory impairment, Franzen et al. 
(1990) emphasise the importance of careful history taking, especially the need to fully
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explore relevant historical antecedents and their aetiological significance to the 
presented memory problems. Collateral interviews are also helpful in corroborating 
the information presented by the persori (Adams & Rankin, 1996). A list of clinical 
signs have been proposed to alert the clinician to the possibility of malingered 
memory deficits (Baker et al., 1993; Drob & Berger, 1987; Wiggins & Brandt, 1988):
(a) demonstrates poor memory only on direct questioning,
(b) memory poorer when questions are labelled “memory testing”,
(c) diminished effort in performing memory items,
(d) misses the easiest information “chunks” in memory tests,
(e) memory problems are circumscribed (e.g. only specific to the crime),
(f) memory is good when serving patient’s interests,
(g) exaggerated memory impairments in the absence of compatible 
neurobiological findings, and
(h) atypical responses such as disproportionate loss of personal information 
and prolonged post-traumatic amnesia beyond an expected course of 
spontaneous recovery.
Psychological Tests fo r  Feigned Memory Impairment
Benton and Spreen (1961) were perhaps one of the earliest pioneers who tried 
to identify deliberately feigned memory disorders by psychometric tests. Using the 
Benton Visual Retention Test (BYRT) which is a short-term visual memory task of 
groups of simple geometric figures, the authors found that dissimulators over-estimate 
the degree of deficits manifested by brain damaged patients. Qualitatively, simulators
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produced more distortion errors whereas brain damaged patients produced more 
omission, perseveration and size errors.
Illuminated by findings such as those obtained by Benton and Spreen (1961), 
special neuropsychological assessment techniques were designed to detect 
malingering. These often capitalise on the person’s erroneous beliefs regarding the 
nature of specific memory deficits. In the Digit Span test, for example, amnesics have 
been found to be relatively unimpaired when compared to normal controls on a digit 
string as long as 7 numerals. The performance of amnesics started to break down only 
when longer strings were presented which had exceeded their short-term memory span 
(Baddeley & Warrington, 1970). Unsophisticated malingerers were often unaware of 
this phenomenon, and would produced worse Digit Span scores than amnesics (Suhr, 
Tranel, Wefel, & Barrash, 1997). In another study (Baker et al., 1993), genuine 
amnesics were found to show inferior performance in a memory task under distraction 
as compared to non-distraction conditions. Malingerers, however, performed 
significantly worse than controls under both of the distraction conditions. It was 
concluded that malingerers tended to exaggerate their overall memory deficits as 
compared to genuine amnesic patients.
In recent years, a wide range of specific neuropsychological tests for 
malingering have been developed. These tests can be broadly categorised into three 
major strategies: (a) “floor effect” malingering tests such as the Rey 15-Item Memory 
Test (RMT), (b) “force-choice” malingering tests such as the Pankratz’s Symptom 
Validity Testing (SVT), and (c) malingering tests sensitive to the serial positioning
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effect demonstrated in experimental psychology such as the Rey Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test (RAVLT). Each of these approaches will be reviewed in detail.
Floor Effect” Malingering Tests
In a typical floor effect test, the patient is presented with a task that seems, on 
the surface, to appear difficult but is actually simple. Malingerers attempting to fake 
memory difficulties will perform very poorly on such tests. Based on this rationale, 
the Rey 15-Item Memory Test (RMT) (Rey, 1964) has been advocated as a quick and 
convenient means for identifying exaggerated memory impairment (Lezak, 1983). On 
this test, participants are told that they will be given a very difficult memory test in 
which they will have to memorise 15 items in just 10 seconds. The test is actually 
quite simple because the items are arranged in a 3 x 5 logical, easy to remember, 
matrix. (See Appendix I). Lezak (1983) suggested a cut-off point of nine items (or 
three sets of rows) as a criterion to suspect the presence of malingering.
Simon (1994) compared the performance of 14 diagnosed malingerers on the 
RMT with a control group of 14 forensic patients who had been acquitted. He found 
that malingerers performed less well on the test than did controls. The 9-item cut-off 
score suggested by Lezak (1983) correctly classified 86% of the participants as 
malingerers or non-malingerers. However, Simon also found that the cut-off score of 
“3 rows remembered” was inappropriate because 57% of controls would have been 
classified incorrectly as malingerers. Bernard and Fowler (1990) compared normal 
controls with a brain damaged group on the RMT. In the study, a cut-off of nine items 
remembered would exclude 88.8% of the brain damaged group and 100% of the
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control group. However, a cut-off of eight items would have excluded 100% of both 
groups, and appears to be the most reasonable cut-off for the RMT.
Schretlen, Brandt, Krafft, and van Gorp (1991) did a large scale study using 
simulators, amnesics, patients with dementia or severe mental illness, patients with 
neuropsychiatrie disorder, and normal controls. They found that many simulators and 
suspected malingerers recalled at least nine correct items or three complete rows. On 
the other hand, many non-faking patients, particularly those with severe mental 
illness, dementia, or other neuropsychiatrie conditions, scored well below normal 
controls, and some even performed below the cut-off scores. It was suggested that the 
RMT lacks the sensitivity to discriminate malingerers and the genuine amnesics. Lee, 
Loring, and Martin (1992), used patients with neurological disorders, suggested that 
taking the cut-off down to seven or below would minimise false positives. Goldber 
and Miller (1986) administered the RMT to 50 psychiatric inpatients and 16 learning 
disabled patients. All of the psychiatric patients could remember at least nine items. 
Six learning disabled patients remembered eight or fewer items. They concluded that 
the number of rows recalled was positively correlated with IQ. Moreover, Hays, 
Emmon, and Lawson (1993) produced evidence to suggest that intelligence quotient 
affects performance in the RMT. They argued that the use of a single cut-off score on 
the RMT to indicate malingering is inappropriate given the psychometric properties of 
the task. They suggested that norms must be ability-based for appropriate 
interpretation.
A number of modifications have emerged in an attempt to “improve” the
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original Rey configuration of the 3 x 5 matrix. Paul, Franzen, Coehn, and Fremoun 
(1992), for example, proposed a 4 x 4 matrix which they suggested would appear to be 
more difficult to the person, as well as the ability to score omissions, perseverations, 
substitutions and reversals. (See Appendix II). However, it may be argued that the 4 
X 4 matrix is in fact easier because there is one category less information to remember. 
Griffin, Glassmire, Henderson, and McCann (1997) produced yet another version of 
the RMT which they called the Rey II. The original RMT was made more 
complicated in the hope that this will improve the face validity and lift the 
classification accuracy. (See Appendix III).
Millis and Kler (1995) compared a group of clinical malingerers with a group 
of brain-injured participants. They found that the RMT, when used as a single 
procedure, is insufficiently sensitive to malingering because only 57% of the clinical 
malingerers were detected even when the cut-off score was set as low as seven. On 
the other hand, the specificity of this cut-off score was excellent as none of the brain- 
injured participants were misclassified. Along similar lines, Arnett, Hammeke, and 
Schwartz (1995) compared neurological patients with malingerers and found that the 
number of rows in the proper location best discriminate the groups. The cut-off point 
of two rows or less correctly recalled produced a sensitivity of 47% and a specificity 
of 97%. They concluded that cut-offs currently used for RMT may incorrectly 
identify a high proportion of neurological patients as malingerers. The empirical 
status of the RMT in terms of its sensitivity and specificity with respect to different 
cut-offs remains a major issue for current debate and scrutiny (Rogers, Harrell, & Liff, 
1!%%).
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Forced-Choice” Malingering Tests
The forced-choice test constitutes another major approach employed to detect 
malingering. Using this method, a participant is presented with one of two choices in 
responding to a given question. The questions are usually very simple. The 
participants by chance would get 50% of the answers correct because there are only 
two choices. If a participant responds at a significantly below-chance level, then the 
probability is that he or she must have deliberately chosen the incorrect response. For 
instance, in the Symptom Validity Testing (SVT) (Pankratz, 1983), participants are 
instructed to select a “signal”, a white light or a red light, to which they have been 
exposed while performing a distraction task. For participants with genuine and severe 
amnesia, their random response by guess, according to the laws of probability, would 
yield a 50% chance of correct responses given a sufficiently large number of trials 
(say over 100). Malingerers, on the other hand, may construe the 50% hit ratio as too 
high for feigning, and thus perform consciously and deliberately at a level 
significantly worse than chance. Binder (1990) stated that ''performance significantly 
worse than chance results from the deliberate production o f  wrong answers
   ...probability o f  an explanation other than malingering is n il” (p.357). For
instance, a score of 41% correct yields a probability of less than 0.05, whereas a score 
of 38% correct gives a probability of about 0.01 (Leng & Parkin, 1995).
The forced-choice technique has been applied in various forms to a variety of 
patients and memory deficits (Binder, 1990; Binder & Pankratz, 1987; Pankratz, 
1983, 1988). In general, patients prone to malingering perform significantly below the 
level of chance. For instance, Brandt, Rubinsky, and Lassen (1985) administered a
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20-item word list to a sample of memory-disordered participants, normal controls, and 
participants requested to simulate amnesia. On free-recall tasks, normals scored 
significantly higher than the simulators and memory-disordered patients. The 
simulators recalled fewer words than the brain-disordered patients, but the difference 
was not significant. Following the recall task, a two-alternative, forced-choice 
recognition procedure in which each word on the original list was paired with a 
distractor word was presented. The unsophisticated malingerer, failing to take into 
account the probability of obtaining a certain number of items correct by chance 
alone, were found to overplay their memory impairment.
Although the SVT procedure seems to be straight-forward to administer, it 
does not necessarily mean that it is immune to faking. Even forced-choice tasks can 
be beaten by some participants who happen to understand the design. With increasing 
accessibility of electronic information, it can no longer be assumed that persons 
purporting to feign memory disorders would be as uninformed as those decades ago, 
and the astute clinician needs to consider the possible sophistication of potential 
malingerers. Cliffe (1992), for example, using the SVT on sophisticated participants 
comprising of clinical psychologists and psychiatrists to feign blindness found that 
they were able to understand the rationale of the malingering test and responded 
accordingly at chance levels. For example, it was observed that the participants might 
elect to give alternate true and false answers prior to the actual presentation of each 
forced-choice trial (cf. Haughton, Lewsley, Wilson, & William, 1979).
It has to be cautioned that if the suspected malingerer does not perform below
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the chance level, data from the SVT would have limited utility (Bernard, Houston, & 
Natoli, 1993). In the light of such limitations, Hiscock and Hiscock (1989) developed 
a variant of the original SVT procedure, in which a 5-digit string number (e.g. 
“54132”) was substituted for the target stimulus which was usually a single digit (e.g. 
“5”). The respondent was required to choose between two alternative 5-digit numbers 
(e.g., “54132” and “76485”). The Hiscock and Hiscock procedure has the advantage 
of appearing to be more difficult to the participants, thereby increasing the face 
validity of the test. However, what the participant needed to do was to remember the 
first digit in the 5-number string in order to make the correct choice. In the Hiscock 
and Hiscock task, the interval between stimulus presentation and response could be 
independently varied, thus manipulating the perceived difficulty of the task without 
significantly altering the actual difficulty. A number of workers have used the 
Hiscock and Hiscock procedure in their studies and have claimed satisfactory 
discriminant power (Guilmette et al., 1994a, 1994b; Prigatano & Amin, 1993).
Like the RMT, it has been suggested that the SVT should be administered at 
the beginning of the test batteries in order to reduce the amount of suspicion by the 
patient when relatively simple tasks were suddenly introduced after a barrage of 
difficult memory tasks.
Malingering Tests using the *^Serial Positioning Effect”
Rundus (1971) produced experimental data with respect to the serial position 
effect in learning and memory tasks. In his classic paper, the “primacy effect” and the 
“recency effect” were delineated in a memory task, showing a highly likelihood for
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participants to remember information presented in the beginning and the ending of a 
serial of stimuli. Information falling within the middle had a lower probability of 
recall. This finding has been found to be true in all verbal learning tasks such as the 
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT).
The RAVLT is a complex measure of several memory functions including 
immediate recall of 15 novel verbally presented items given over five repeated trials. 
Apart from measuring a normal learning curve over the five trials, the presentation 
also allowed the examiner to derive measures of the primacy effect and the recency 
effect during each of the five trials. Bigler et al. (1989) used the RAVLT to look at 
the serial position effect in two groups of participants, namely those with closed head 
injury and those suffering from dementia. They found that dementia patients were 
more impaired as demonstrated by a flat learning curve that showed negligible 
improvement with repeated trials, and an absence of primacy effect. Closed head 
injury patients, on the other hand, showed both primacy and recency effects along 
with improvement over repeated trials. Bernard (1991) used the RAVLT to detect 
faked memory deficits, and found that the malingering group tended to suppress the 
“primacy effect” which was not found in both the control group or the closed head 
injury group.
Finally, a recognition task of words appearing in the original list has also been 
used as an indicator for malingering when simulators performed worse in the RAVLT 
recognition task than amnesics. Bernard (1990) has suggested that 
neuropsychological memory tests were vulnerable to faked deficits, and that
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recognition tasks were often disproportionately affected. Similarly, other 
investigators have found that malingered amnesiacs were characterised by poorer 
performance on recognition than recall tasks, and that recognition performance was 
even poorer than that found in organic amnesia (Wiggins & Brandt, 1998; Brandt et 
al., 1985). Binder, Villanuera, Howieson, and Moore (1993) used the RAVLT on a 
group of mild head injury participants and a group of malingerers. They concluded 
that severe RAVLT recognition memory impairment likely reflects motivational 
problems or exaggerated deficits. While brain dysfunction patients without financial 
incentives typically establish a floor effect on relevant measures, malingering patients 
with incentives tend to fall below that floor.
The Combination Approach
Bernard et al. (1993) argued that an alternative and more economical approach 
to the administration of a battery of malingering tests is to derive objective data about 
the likelihood of malingering directly from a combination of popular standardised 
neuropsychological tests. If the hypothesis of malingering is not confirmed, then the 
data that already exists could be used to draw inferences about brain-behaviour 
relationships. Using 57 participants randomly assigned to control and simulated 
malingering groups, they found that discriminant functions derived from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale Revised (WMS-R), the Complex Figure Test (CFT) and the RAVLT 
achieved classification accuracy of 88% and 86% respectively, without identifying 
controls as malingerers.
Frederick and Foster (1991) found that the combined use of performance curve
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and SVT surpassed the individual detection rates of each strategy. They conducted a 
series of three studies to test the performance curve of simulators, cognitively 
impaired patients and college controls on a modified two-alternative version of the 
Test of Non-verbal Intelligence (TONI; Brown, Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 1982) which 
is a language-free measure of cognitive ability that requires examinees to solve 
problems by identifying relationships among abstract figures. Combining the three 
studies (total N = 228 simulators, 14 patients and 157 controls), the sensitivity for a 
performance curve alone was 36.3% with a specificity of 100%. Sensitivity for SVT 
was only 11.4%. However, when the performance curve was combined with a second 
measure (i.e., consistency of performance across equivalent items), the sensitivity 
increased dramatically to 89.0%, with a specificity of 96.8%. Iverson and Franzen 
(1996) used multiple objective memory procedures to detect simulated malingering 
found that the individual rate of correct classification by single tests ranged from 5% 
to 85%. They suggested that when malingering is suspected, it would be beneficial 
for the clinician to have a large selection of objective procedures with which to 
evaluate the person’s presentation.
Conclusion
Psychologists vary considerably in their views about malingering and their 
sophistication at its detection. While research evidence has provided support for the 
use of specific neuropsychological tests in the detection of malingering, there are still 
inherent problems that need to be addressed, especially with respect to their relative 
sensitivity and specificity (Larrabee, 1990). It seems apparent that determinations of 
malingering involve complex decision processes that should never be based on a
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single symptom, scale or measure.
Bernard (1990; 1991) suggested that there is a possibility that some brain 
damaged patients may also exaggerate their deficits. As they are patients with 
genuine cognitive deficits, to label them purely as malingerers is not justified. This 
group of patients will remain the most difficult category to adjudicate in a court of law 
when compensation or other legal benefits are at issue.
Leng and Parkin (1995) considered that the largest current obstacle to the 
effective detection of malingering and exaggeration is the lack of a standardised 
“malingering battery” comprising a series of tests each with performance profiles 
associated with normal and neurologically impaired patients. They also advised that a 
broad approached should be adopted by neuropsychologists in malingering detection, 
combining both clinical indices and psychometric measures.
It is important to bear in mind that clinical decisions of malingering have far- 
reaching implications. To misclassify a genuine a patient as a malingerer may have 
devastating consequences to that individual’s future treatment, financial well-being 
and legal status. To misclassify a malingerer as a genuine patient may have grave 
consequences for other concerned parties (e.g., insurance companies, employers, or 
the criminal justice system). In applying any newly developed techniques purporting 
to detect malingering, the clinician must evaluate the likelihood of obtaining false 
positive or false negative results, and the relative costs of each.
All in all, psychologists shoulder a heavy responsibility to minimise both types
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of misclassification in their assessment of malingering. They must base their findings 
on a comprehensive evaluation that utilise relevant clinical indices, as well as specific 
neuropsychological measures that are well-validated for malingering and related 
response styles. When data are inconclusive but suggestive of feigning, the response 
style may be described as inconsistent or unreliable. It is ultimately up to the Court 
and the jury to make sense of the information and to make adjudication on the basis of 
such findings.
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Appendix I
Rey’s Fifteen-Item Memory Test
(Rey, 1964)
A B C
1 2 3
a b c
O □ A
I II III
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Appendix II
Modified Sixteen-Item Memory Test
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Abstract
The present research sought to investigate the negative affect structure among 
Chinese in Hong Kong, with particular reference to the emotional states of anxiety 
and depression. Correlational analyses and separate factor analyses on four self-rating 
scales including the BDI, BAI, DASS and PANAS were carried out on a community 
sample of normal Chinese adults in Hong Kong (N = 649). Good convergent and 
divergent validity were established for all the scales used. A three-factor model of 
depression (Cognitive, Functional, and Somatic) as measured by the BDI was found to 
be a more parsimonious structure to our sample. For the construct of anxiety as 
measured by the BAI, two relatively distinct components of “Autonomic Arousal” and 
“Subjective Fear” were delineated. The relationship between depression and anxiety 
was discussed in the light of the tripartite model proposed by L.A. Clark and Watson 
(1991b) which divides symptoms into three groups: general distress (negative affect) 
that are largely nonspecific, anhedonia and low positive affect that are specific to 
depression, and somatic arousal that are relatively unique to anxiety. The present 
results were in support of the various predictions of the tripartite model. Factor 
analysis of the DASS, however, was found to be less consistent with the original 
structure of depression, anxiety and stress as proposed by S.H. Lovibond and P.F. 
Lovibond (1995), but was found to bear some consistency with the three-factor model 
of depression, anxiety/apprehension, and fear/panic proposed by Barlow and his 
colleagues (Barlow, Chorpita, & Turovsky, 1996). As a step further, the hierarchical 
model of negative affect was also investigated by subjecting the pooled items from
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BDI and BAI to a higher order factor analysis. The results were in support of the 
hierarchical model in which the extracted second-order factor could be interpreted as 
a NA dimension, while both BDI and BAI retained adequate saliency to suggest first- 
order specificity dimensions that were unique to depression and anxiety. Similar 
higher-order factor analysis of the DASS produced a different picture in which the 
extracted second-order factor was found to account for most of the variance from the 
autonomic and hyperarousal dimensions. Depression remained a relatively more 
stable dimension which still retained some degree of specificity saliency after the 
higher-order factor analysis. Analysis of the BDI and BAI produced a structural 
pattern which was more in line with the hierarchical, tripartite model; while analysis 
performed for the DASS provided factor patterns which were more consistent to the 
non-hierarchical, three-factor model. Moreover, cognitive elements consistent to the 
themes proposed in Beck’s cognitive content-specificity hypothesis were found to 
emerge as the prominent components for the anxiety and depression measures. In 
sum, the overall results seem to be readily accommodated by both the cognitive 
approach and the phenotypic approach. Finally, the results tended to suggest that our 
Chinese participants did not endorse more somatic items as compared with 
psychological items. The question of whether the Chinese tend more to somatise as 
compared to Western participants could not be adequately addressed in the present 
study, but the overall results seem to suggest that there is a larger degree of 
universality or commonality of emotional constructs between the East and the West 
than what is generally believed. The results were further discussed in the light of 
methodological limitations in the present study.
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Introduction
Anxiety and depression refer to mood states that we all experience as part of 
our daily living. As universal emotions, anxiety and depression are respectively 
characterized by our subjective experiences of dread and fright, and feelings of 
sadness and dysphoria. In the clinical context, however, the terms “anxiety” and 
“depression” refer not simply to subjective emotional experiences of everyday lives, 
but rather to mood disturbances comprising constellations of signs and symptoms 
along several dimensions, including affective, cognitive, behavioural and 
physiological symptoms as described in DSM-IV and ICD-10 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; World Health Organisation, 1992).
In view of the depth and breadth of the various symptoms that distinguish 
clinical anxiety and depression, some workers have held the view that these may 
represent clinical syndromes which are qualitatively different from their normal 
counterparts (e.g. Akiskal, 1980; 1990; Roth, Gurney, Garside, and Kerr, 1972). On 
the other hand, however, many were drawn by the close resemblance in the essential 
quality of normal and clinical mood experiences. For instance, authors often alluded 
to the fact that "'symtoms o f  normal depression do not differ in kindfrom abnormal, or 
major, depression, but they do differ drastically in degree'' (Bootzin, Bower, Zajonc, 
& Hall, 1986, p. 548). Some even asserted that, unlike other psychopathological 
conditions such as schizophrenia, anxiety and depression are some of the best 
examples of the continuity between normality and abnormality” (Barlow, 1988; Lader, 
1983; Petersen, 1996). Drawing a precise line between normal and abnormal
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emotional states is difficult, and is often determined to a large extent by degrees and 
their impact on a person’s normal functions and performance (Depue et al., 1981). 
Although the issue of whether normal affective states differ qualitatively from 
abnormal mood conditions still remains contentious, the study of the former would 
have significant implications for our understanding of clinical anxiety and depression, 
and vice versa.
Epidemiological Studies
Epidemiological studies of psychiatric morbidity in the last 15 years have 
shown that anxiety and depression are among the most frequently occurring 
psychiatric disorders in the general population. In the United States, a large scale 
Epidemiological Catchment Area (EGA) study was completed in the mid-1980s which 
provided unprecedented information on the prevalence rates of some of the most 
frequently-occurring psychiatric disorders. The results showed that anxiety disorder 
was the most common psychiatric disorder in terms of lifetime prevalence rates 
(17.1%), followed by substance abuse disorders (17%) and affective disorders (8%) 
(Robins & Regier, 1991).
A National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) conducted several years later as a 
follow-up project to the EGA study found that nearly 50% of respondents reported at 
least one diagnosable lifetime psychiatric disorder (Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao, et al., 
1994). The reported epidemiological figures were, in general, higher than those 
obtained in the earlier EGA studies. For example, approximately one in every four
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respondents reported a lifetime history of at least one anxiety disorder. For the 
affective disorders, the NCS found that more than 17% of respondents had a history of 
major depressive episode in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 1994), a figure appreciably 
higher than the 8% found in the ECA study. In both the ECA study and the NCS, 
women were found to be more at risk than men, generally in a ratio of about 2:1 
(Blazer, Kessler, McGonagle, & Swartz, 1994; Weissman, Bruce, Leaf, Florio, & 
Holzer, 1991).
The extensive ECA programme sparked similar epidemiological interests in 
other countries such as Canada, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, and New Zealand. Since 
specific epidemiological estimates vary according to methods of investigation and 
sample selection, cross-cultural studies often produce quite disparate results. For 
example, a study in New Zealand gave a very high lifetime prevalence rate for major 
depression of 8.8% for males and 16.3% for females (Wells, Bushnell, Hurblow, 
Joyce, & Oakley-Browne, 1989); whereas similar studies in the Chinese population 
using the Chinese version of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS) gave much 
lower lifetime prevalence rates of 0.8% for males and 1.6% for females in Taiwan 
(Cheng, 1988; Hwu, E.K. Yeh, & Chang, 1989), and 1.3% for males and 2.4% for 
females in Hong Kong (Chen, Wong, Lee, et al., 1993). It is interesting to note that 
despite the wide disparity in lifetime prevalence rates of major depression between the 
Chinese population and its Western counterparts, the preponderance of female to male 
in the ratio of 2:1 remained comparable.
In Hong Kong, a mental health survey undertaken in the Shatin Community
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gave lifetime prevalence rates of 3.5% for depressive disorder and 18% for anxiety 
disorders (Chen et al., 1993). Translating the figures in terms of the region’s 6.5 
million population, there is an excess of 200,000 people afflicted with a depressive 
episode sometime in their lives, and a further one million people would report at least 
one episode of anxiety disorder.
It is evident from epidemiological studies that anxiety and depression 
constitute a significant proportion of psychiatric morbidity in the mental health field. 
A better understanding of the relationship between these two conditions will therefore 
have important clinical and theoretical implications.
Relationship between Anxiety and Depression
At the beginning of the century, anxiety and depression were regarded as 
variants of the same neurotic condition (Osier, 1912). Following the refinement of 
diagnostic criteria punctuated by the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorder (DSM) since the early 1950s, subvariants 
of anxiety and depression were identified and separated nosologically with sets of 
seemingly discrete diagnostic criteria. It has always been implicated in psychiatric 
diagnosis that anxiety and depression should be regarded as conceptually distinct 
entities. Phenomenologically, anxious individuals are generally seen as tense, 
behaviourally agitated, somatically labile and cognitively panicky. By contrast, 
depressed people are seen as sad, behaviourally retarded, somatically quiescent and 
cognitively hopeless and helpless (Garber, Miller, & Abramson, 1980).
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Despite growing diagnostic refinement, questions regarding whether 
depression and anxiety can be differentiated in a reliable and valid way have begun to 
emerge. Research evidence has consistently suggested a strong association between 
anxiety and depression in terms of the (a) considerable overlap in symptoms; (b) 
frequent comorbidity; (c) common genetic diatheses; and (d) concurrence in clinical 
ratings and self-report measures. Each of these areas of research will be reviewed in 
the following sections to highlight some of the major controversies pertaining to the 
relationship between anxiety and depression.
Symptom Overlap between Anxiety and Depression
In addressing the relationship between anxiety and depression, initial studies 
have adopted a symptomatic approach to examine their unique and shared 
characteristics (e.g., Breier, Chamey, & Heninger, 1985; L.A. Clark, 1989; Dobson, 
1985; Stavrakaki & Vargo, 1986). For instance, it was postulated that there are 
certain core symptoms of depression which are unique to depression; for example, 
dysphoric mood, suicidal ideation, diminished libido, an inability to experience 
pleasure (anhedonia), psychomotor retardation, and cognitive sluggishness (L.A. 
Clark & Watson, 1991a; Tellegen, 1985; Watson, L.A. Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson 
& Kendall, 1989a). On the other hand, certain core symptoms are seen as unique to 
anxiety and panic. These include feelings of apprehension, excessive worry, 
autonomic activation, muscle tension, trembling, and nightmares (Zinbarg, Barlow, 
Liebowitz, et al., 1994; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). Symptoms which are shared by 
both depression and anxiety include excessive worry, poor concentration, irritability, 
poor memory, insomnia, sense of worthlessness, crying, guilt, and fatigue (Zinbarg et
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Figure 1:
Unique and Common Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression
Unique to Depression Unique to Anxiety Common to both Anxiety 
and Depression
Affective
• Severe sadness and 
despair
• Low positive affect
•  Severe fear and tension
• Apprehension
• Negative affect
•  Crying
• Irritability
Behavioural
•  Psychomotor 
retardation
• Anhedonia
• Loss o f interest
•  Suicidal acts (and 
ideation)
• Increased activity
• Behavioural agitation
• Edginess
• Trembling
• Decreased activity
• Lowered initiation of  
responses
• Decreased energy
• Behavioural 
disorganisation and 
performance deficits
•  Increased dependency
• Poor social skills
Somatic
• Decreased 
sympathetic arousal
• Decreased appetite
• Reduced sexual desire
• Increased sympathetic 
arousal
• Nightmares
• Restless sleep
• Initial insomnia
• Panic attacks
Cognitive
• Hopelessness
• Perceived loss
•  Perceived danger and 
threat
•  Uncertainty
• Hypervigilance
• Excessive worry
• Helplessness
• Repetitive ruminations 
and obsessions
• Worry
• Low self-confidence
• Negative self- 
evaluation
• Self-criticism
• Self-preoccupation
• Indecisiveness
• Poor concentration
Source: Adapted from Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements (1990). p. 507.
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al., 1994). A summary of symptoms unique and common to anxiety and depression as 
listed by Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, and Clements (1990) is shown in Figure 1 on the 
opposite page.
Comorbidity between Anxiety and Depression
The co-occurrence of two or more disorders in the same individual has come 
to be viewed as a major issue in psychopathology research (Brady & Kendall, 1992; 
Breier et al., 1985; Katon & Roy-Byme, 1991; Maser & Cloninger, 1990). The 
problem of comorbidity began to surface rapidly after the DSM-III-R (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987) abolished the hierarchical exclusion rules of the DSM- 
III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) in which the diagnosis of a second 
disorder is precluded by the presence of a primary diagnosis higher in the hierarchy. 
The ECA study, for example, found that 60% of the respondents with at least one 
lifetime DSM disorder also had at least one comorbid disorder (Robins & Regier,
1991). Similarly, the NCS data showed that individuals with comorbid conditions 
accounted for 79% of all lifetime disorders.
The comorbidity between anxiety and depression continues to be studied and 
the results consistently point to the fact that in primary health care, symptoms of 
anxiety and depression usually co-occur, and patients with a diagnosable depressive 
disorder express almost equal numbers of anxiety symptoms at the same time 
(Sartorius, Ustun, Lecrubier, & Wittchen, 1996). The authors also found that 
depressive disorders are more likely to co-occur with anxiety disorders than with any 
other disorders. T.A. Brown and Barlow (1992) provided very comprehensive data on
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the comorbidity among the different variants of mood and anxiety disorders. It was 
found that there was differential comorbidity between depression and the different 
anxiety disorders, with panic disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) 
being more likely to be accompanied by depression than, for example, simple or social 
phobia. It is interesting to note that anxiety is more likely to appear alone, but 
depression is often accompanied by anxiety at least cross-sectionally (Clarkin & 
Kendall, 1992).
Roth, et al. (1972) reported that the age of onset for anxiety disorders is 
comparatively younger than for depressive disorders. They also noted that long­
standing anxiety states tended to acquire predominant depressive characteristics with 
the passage of time. Furthermore, there is usually a sequential relationship between 
the symptoms of anxiety and depression, both within an episode and between 
episodes. Across a lifetime, individuals are more likely to experience an anxiety 
disorder first and a depressive disorder later, rather than vice versa (Alloy et al., 
1990). Research on the comorbidity of mood and anxiety disorders has mushroomed 
over the last ten years, resulting in a flood of publications on the subject (for recent 
reviews, see den Boer & Ad Sitsen, 1994; Maser & Cloninger, 1990; Mineka, Watson, 
& L.A. Clark, 1998; Satorius et al., 1996). There are also extensive discussions on 
comorbidity between anxiety and depression in children and adolescents (e.g., Brady 
& Kendall, 1992), as well as implications for treatment (e.g., T.A. Brown, Anthony, & 
Barlow, 1995).
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Biological Factors and Genetic Diathesis
A logical lead-up from the wealth of literature on comorbidity between anxiety 
and depression is the postulation that there could be shared genetic diatheses 
underlying these two conditions. In a large, case-control family study of depression, 
Leckman, Weissman and Merikangas (1983) found that 58% of 133 depressed 
probands displayed anxiety symptoms. There were remarkably high rates of 
depression, anxiety disorders, and alcoholism observed among the first-degree 
relatives of probands who manifested both depression and panic disorder. The data 
suggested a partially shared diathesis between panic disorder and some cases of major 
depression, a finding which was later supported by extensive genetic studies of 
Kenneth Kendler which would be discussed below. The general conclusion of 
Leckman et al. (1983) was that if depression runs in a given family, anxiety was likely 
to run in the same family as well.
While family studies are useful in looking at the incidence of comorbidity 
between anxiety and depression among probands, they cannot tease out the relative 
influences of genetic versus environment factors in disposing the disorders. Kendler, 
Heath, Martin, and Eaves (1987) performed multivariate genetic analysis of anxiety 
and depression on 3,798 pairs of twins from the volunteer Australian National Health 
and Medical Research Council Twin Registry. Based on symptom ratings using self- 
report questionnaires, they found that genes appeared to act largely in a non-specific 
way to influence the overall level of anxiety and depression. The major finding in the 
Kendler et al. (1987) study was that no evidence could be found for genes that 
specifically influenced liability to depressive symptoms without affecting liability to
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anxiety. In contrast, it was the individual-specific environment and not the shared- 
family or “common” environment such as parental rearing practices, social class of 
origin, or early parental loss that appeared to be either primarily anxiogenic or 
depressogenic. These results were replicated in both sexes (Kendler, 1996).
Recognising the limitations of their 1987 study using brief self-report forms 
sent through the mail, Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, and Eaves (1992) revisited the 
study using personal interviews on 1,033 pairs of female-female twins from the 
population-based Virginia Twin Registry in the United States. Although the 
participants were all female, results from their study bore remarkable similarities to 
the Kendler et al. (1987) study. The findings suggested that, in women, the liability to 
major depression and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) was influenced by the same 
genetic factor; and whether a vulnerable woman developed major depression or GAD 
was influenced by the environment.
In other genetic studies, Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, and Eaves (1993) 
found that the level of comorbidity of major depression with agoraphobia was much 
greater than that found in the other phobic subtypes such as social phobia, animal 
phobia, and situational phobia. Moreover, non-familial environmental experiences 
pertaining to depression, such as personal losses and major life events, substantially 
increased the vulnerability to agoraphobia. Kendler, Walters, Neale, Kessler, Heath, 
and Eaves (1995) later concluded that from a genetic perspective, anxiety disorders 
were not etiologically homogeneous. Panic disorder and phobias appeared to share 
important etiological factors; while major depression and GAD were more closely
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related etiologically. The workers concluded that genetic influences on various 
psychiatric disorders were neither highly specific nor highly non-specific (Kendler et 
al., 1995).
An important revelation from genetic studies as summarised in Kendler (1996) 
is that biological vulnerability for mood disorders may reflect a more general 
vulnerability; and the specific form of disorder would then be determined somewhat 
later by psychological, social or additional biological factors. Since depression is 
genetically indistinguishable from GAD, and is moderately related to other variants of 
anxiety disorders, evidence seem to suggest that the observed co-variation between 
depression and anxiety could be largely attributable to a shared genetic factor which 
underpins subjective distress and negative affectivity (Mikena et al., 1998).
Finally, another indication for a biological link between anxiety and 
depression comes from pharmacological treatments of the mood disorders. Drug 
treatments for depression were often found to be equally effective in treating anxiety 
disorders, and vice versa. According to Breier et al. (1985), accumulating data 
suggest that a subgroup of depressed patients, like patients with panic disorder, may 
exhibit noradrenergic hyperactivity. Treatment studies have demonstrated that 
monoamine oxidase inhibitors, tricyclic antidepressant medication, and high potency 
benzodiazepines are effective for both panic and depressive illnesses. Although it is 
dangerous to infer aetiology on the basis of treatment success, such evidence has been 
taken as lending some support for the common aetiology model (Hudson & Pope, 
1990). Greist, Jefferson, Kobak, Katzelnick, and Serlin (1995), for example, found
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that tricyclic antidepressants such as chlomipramin (Anafranil) and the Serotonin- 
Specific Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) such as fluoxetine (Prozac) are effective in the 
treatment of anxiety disorders including obsessive-compulsive disorders and panic 
disorders.
Psychometric Studies
Psychometric rating scales and self-report measures for anxiety and depression 
are essential instruments for clinical research because they are supposedly reliable 
means of assessing negative emotional states. A major assumption underlying all 
these scales is their purported specificity in assessing and discriminating the different 
emotional states.
The majority of research results, however, have produced highly contentious 
findings as more and more evidence has pointed to the close relationship between 
measures of anxiety and depression. One of the earliest psychometric studies on the 
overlap between anxiety and depression was undertaken by Mendels, Weinstein and 
Cochrane (1972). They factor-analysed the scores of six widely-used mood rating 
scales such as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck & Steer, 1987), the Zung 
self-rating depression scale (Zung, 1965), and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPl) (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943) on 76 female psychiatric patients. 
Two major factors were extracted and all of the scales loaded heavily on the first 
factor, suggesting that it constitutes a dimension of general psychiatric disturbance. 
The strong correlation between anxiety and depression self-report measures left 
investigators unable to extract distinct mood groups when attempting to examine the
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two constructs of anxiety and depression as orthogonal dimensions (Gotlib, 1984; 
Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 1986).
Generally speaking, most recent studies have shown that self-report measures 
of anxiety and depression are highly correlated with coefficients typically in the .45 to 
.75 range (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991a). This finding is found to be robust across a 
variety of samples including college students (Dobson, 1985; Gotlib, 1984; Gotlib & 
Cane, 1989), children (Wolfe et al., 1987), community adults (Costa & McCrae, 
1980), and psychiatric patients (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991a). Although it is possible 
that the high correlation could be due to comorbidity of separate disorders, it has 
generally been argued that, to some extent, these correlations reflect psychometric and 
taxonomic problems with existing scales and constructs. For example, Gotlib and 
Cane (1989) noted that several symptoms (e.g., insomnia, fatigue, irritability, 
restlessness, and difficulty concentrating) are found in criteria for both generalised 
anxiety disorder and major depression. Furthermore, many scales contain symptom 
items that are actually more appropriate to the other construct. For instance, the State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) assesses feelings of 
failure, disappointment, and unhappiness that are more characteristic of depression 
than anxiety. Consequently, several authors have suggested that these measures 
reflect a non-specific disposition to experience negative emotions rather than specific 
states of anxiety and depression (Watson & L.A. Clark, 1984; Watson, L.A. Clark, & 
Carey, 1988).
Similar finding have been obtained by Feldman (1993) who used confirmatory
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factor analyses to re-examine the mood data obtained from the non-clinical samples of 
Dobson (1985), Gotlib (1984) and Tanaka-Matsumi and Kameoka (1986); and the 
clinical sample of Mendels et al. (1972). The analyses provided evidence that anxiety 
and depression self-report scales do not measure distinct mood constructs and it may 
therefore be thought of as measures of general negative mood rather than as specific 
measures of anxiety and depression per se.
Finally, it has frequently been reported that overlaps also exist between the 
clinician’s ratings of anxiety and depression, although the level of differentiation 
appears to be somewhat higher than what is typically found on self-report ratings 
(L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991b).
Unitary versus Dual Models o f  Anxiety and Depression
Recent research on whether anxiety and depression should be regarded as 
similar or distinct entities has been guided by three conceptual models, namely (a) the 
dual model which views depression and anxiety as distinct disorders; (b) the unitary 
model which considers depression and anxiety as variants of the same disorder; and 
(c) the mixed anxiety-depression model which postulates a separate syndrome with 
specific diagnostic criteria for a mixed anxiety-depression condition.
The Dual Model
The Newcastle Group led by Sir Martin Roth has been a staunch supporter for 
the dual model. According to Roth et al. (1972), depression and anxiety are not only 
regarded as distinct mood states, but also as distinct affective illnesses. While
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cognisant of the overlapping symptomatology between anxiety and depression, the 
Newcastle group demonstrated that the two emotional disorders could be separated 
almost entirely in a sample of 145 affective disorder patients using statistical 
techniques such as discriminant function analysis (Roth et al., 1972). Consistent with 
their view, Hiller, Zaudig, and Bose (1989) agreed that there might be significant 
overlaps between anxiety and depression at the symptom level, but that separation 
would become more refined and distinct as one moves up to the syndrome level, and 
eventually to the diagnostic level.
In some of the earlier studies, Lipman (1982) used physician rating scales and 
patient rating scales to distinguish between those previously suffering from anxiety 
and those previously suffering from depression. His results showed that anxiety and 
depression were highly distinguishable by the use of such scales. He came to the 
conclusion that neither anxiety disorders nor depressive disorders were unitary 
illnesses, and it would be easier to differentiate various types of anxiety and 
depressive disorders using psychometric measures. Along similar lines, Cox, 
Swinson, Kuch, and Reichman (1993) studied a homogeneous sample of clinically 
anxious participants diagnosed by psychiatrists using the DSM-III-R criteria. Using 
the BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) and the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970), Cox et al. 
(1993) found that anxiety and depression could be reliably differentiated with almost 
no overlap.
To sum up, those in favour frf the dual model believe that unique 
characteristics have supported a distinct syndrome view, in which depression and
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anxiety are conceived as discrete syndromes showing considerable differences in 
symptomatology, course, and treatment (Akiskal, 1985; 1990; Cox et a l, 1993; E.B. 
Foa & U.G. Foa, 1982; Roth et al., 1972). Such sentiment is clearly reflected in the 
previous classification systems of DSM-III and DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980, 1987).
The Unitary Model
On the other side of the argument. Sir Aubrey Lewis (Lewis, 1966) has 
considered that anxiety and depression are phenomenologically indistinguishable. 
Studies emphasising the shared features between the two disorders have been used to 
support a unitary syndrome position, in which anxiety and depression are viewed as 
variants of the same disorder along a continuum (Feldman, 1993; Tyrer, 1985, 1990). 
In fact, those in support of the unitary model have repeatedly suggested that anxiety 
and depression are more alike than they are different (L.A. Clark, 1989; L.A. Clark & 
Watson, 1991a; Dobson, 1985; Lipman, 1982; Stavrakaki & Vargo, 1986; Tellegen, 
1985). The failure to find separate factors of anxiety and depression in psychometric 
studies (Mendels et al. 1972) has lent strong supports to a unitary model of anxiety 
and depression. On the genetic level, Kendler et al. (1987, 1992, 1995) suggested the 
possibility of a common genetic diathesis between the depression and some variants 
of anxiety such as GAD. Their findings also supported the causative importance of 
environmental factors in depression, in particular the role of non-familial 
environmental factors such as personal experiences and work stress. Finally, 
treatment studies in which anxious patients have responded favourably to 
antidepressants also prompted some workers to view anxiety and depression as
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variants of the same psychopathology (Kelly & Walter, 1969).
Mixed Anxiety-Depressive Disorder
There is a third view that mixed anxiety-depression is a distinctive and 
separate entity which warrants its own diagnostic categorisation. Tyrer (1985) has 
questioned the usefulness of the diagnostic classification system on account of the fact 
that the separation of anxiety and depressive states are particularly difficult, and there 
is frequent “cross-over” or temporal variability from one clinical state to the other. 
According to Tyrer (1985), clinical differentiation between anxiety and depression 
does not hold good in longitudinal studies, leading to his postulation of a “General 
Neurotic Syndrome” or “Cothymia”, which is essentially similar to the mixed anxiety- 
depressive disorder specified in the Tenth Revision of the International Classification 
of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) (World Health Organisation,
1992). Tyrer (1985, 1990) further postulates a continuum with predominantly 
depressive states at the one extreme and anxiety states at the other. His proposal of 
the General Neurotic Syndrome has been taken up in Australia by Andrews, Stewart, 
Morris-Yates, Holt, and Henderson (1990) who confirmed that there is considerable 
comorbidity in each of the neurotic disorders studied.
Katon and Roy-Byme (1991) found that in their clinical practice, there was a 
group of patients who had mixed symptoms of anxiety and depression that were below 
the diagnostic thresholds for either group of disorders. This group of patients often 
had significant impairment in social and vocational functioning, and frequently used 
non-psychiatric medical care. The issue was followed by a comprehensive field trial
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Figure 2:
DSM-IV Research Criteria for Mixed Anxiety-Depressive Disorder
A. Persistent or recurrent dysphoric mood lasting at least 1 month.
B. The dysphoric mood is accompanied by at least 1 month o f four (or more) o f the following 
symptoms:
( 1 ) difficulty concentrating or mind going blank
(2) sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying sleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep)
(3) fatigue or low energy
(4) irritability
(5) worry
(6) being easily moved to tears
(7) hypervigilance
(8) anticipating the worst
(9) hopelessness (pervasive pessimism about the future)
(10) low self-esteem or feelings o f worthlessness
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas o f functioning.
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects o f a substance (e.g., a drug o f abuse, a 
medication) or a general medical condition.
E. All o f the following:
(1) criteria have never been met for Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder,
Panic Disorder, or Generalised Anxiety Disorder
(2) criteria are not currently met for any other Anxiety or Mood Disorder (including an 
Anxiety or Mood Disorder, In Partial Remission)
(3) the symptoms are not better accounted for by any other mental disorder
Source: From DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) pp. 724-725.
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by Zinbarg et al. (1994) on 666 patients who presented with affective symptoms that 
did not meet definitional thresholds for DSM-lll-R axis 1 disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987). They found that these groups of patients were as 
common as those with several of the already established anxiety and mood disorders, 
and these patients suffered from significant distress or impairment. Moreover, a non­
specific pattern of anxious and depressed symptoms was the modal presentation.
As a result of these investigations, the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) finally recognised that there is the possibility of a diagnosable 
category known as mixed anxiety-depressive disorder. As this diagnosis is still 
uncertain under the DSM nosology, it was put under “Anxiety Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified” (code 300.00) and was being further considered under “Criteria 
Sets and Axes Provided for Further Study” (p.703). By definition, mixed anxiety- 
depressive disorder refers to clinically significant symptoms of anxiety and 
depression, but the criteria are not met for either a specific Mood Disorder or a 
specific Anxiety Disorder. A point of interest is that in the lCD-10 (World Health 
Organisation, 1992) published two years before DSM-IV, there is a separate listing for 
“mixed anxiety-depressive disorder” (code F41.2). This mixed category was used 
when symptoms of both anxiety and depression are present, but neither set of 
symptoms, considered separately, is sufficiently severe to justify a diagnosis. The 
research criteria for mixed anxiety-depressive disorder in DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) is set out in Figure 2.
The Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders (2nd Revised Edition)
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(CCMD-2-R) (Chinese Medical Association & Nanjing Medical University, 1995) 
does not have a separate listing of “mixed anxiety-depressive” disorder in their 
diagnostic nosology. Instead, the CCMD-2-R classifies Anxiety Neurosis (code 40.1, 
p.78) as a diagnostic category comparable to code 300.0 in the DSM-IV (Anxiety 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified) and code F41 of the ICD-10 (Mixed Anxiety- 
Depressive Disorder). Moreover, it regards anxiety symptoms as a primary disorder 
from which depressive symptoms could be one of the many secondary manifestations. 
There is no listing in the CCMD-2-R of a diagnostic category which is comparable to 
mixed anxiety-depressive disorder (F41.2) in ICD-10. In the Chinese classification 
system, anxiety disorders are regarded as superordinate conditions which subsume 
other mood-related conditions.
The most current ethos in the controversy over the unitary versus dual models 
is that the argument is both unnecessary and unproductive. Evidence has shown that 
both the unitary and dual models of anxiety and depression are true depending on 
whether one looks at their comorbidity from a trait/personality level, or from a more 
distinctive, phenomenological level. As Mineka et al. (1998) have put it, the two 
competitive models ''are being replaced by a more nuanced view in which anxiety and 
depression are posited to have both shared, common components and specific, unique 
components
Studies by the Watson and L,A, Clark Group
The most comprehensive series of studies on the phenotypic structure of 
anxiety and depression have been undertaken by a group led by Watson and L.A.
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Clark. Given the poor reliability and substantial correlations between various self- 
report measures of anxiety and depression, L.A. Clark and Watson (1991a, 1991b) 
repeatedly found that no meaningful discrimination between self-reported anxiety and 
depression could be identified, thus casting doubt on the supposedly “specific” self- 
report scales as “pure” measures of the affective states. Instead, they found that most 
exploratory factor analyses of self-reported anxiety and depression ratings have 
produced a general negative mood or dysphoria factor rather than distinct anxiety and 
depression factors.
Disenchanted by the lack of specificity of psychometric measures of anxiety and 
depression, L.A. Clark and Watson, (1991a) worked on a concept of positive-negative 
affect originally proposed by Tellegen (1985). Tellegen (1985) found that two factors, 
namely Positive Affectivity (PA) and Negative Affectivity (NA), were consistently 
reliable in differentiating major affective states including depression and anxiety. 
More specifically, the positive and negative affectivity model focuses on the mood 
component of depression and anxiety. PA is “the extent to which a person avows a 
zest for life” (Watson & Tellegen, 1985, p.221). High PA is associated with good 
experiences, such as being active, elated, enthusiastic, excited, and strong; whereas 
low PA is associated with the experience of being drowsy, dull, sleepy, and sluggish. 
High NA is “the extent to which a person reports feeling upset or unpleasantly 
aroused”, and is associated with feelings of distress, fear, nervousness, and anger; 
whereas low NA is associated with calmness and feelings of relaxation (Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985, p.221).
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To further explore the Positive Affect and Negative Affect model, Watson, 
L.A. Clark and Tellegen (1988) formally developed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS), which is a brief 20-item schedule measuring two affectivity 
dimensions PA and NA. Each of the two affectivity scales includes ten items 
depicting either positive affect or negative affect. The internal consistency and the 
reliability of the PANAS have been established, demonstrating satisfactory 
discriminant and convergent validity (Watson, L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
In elaborating their two-factor model of Positive Affect (PA) and Negative 
Affect (NA), Watson, L.A. Clark and Tellegen (1988) have found that NA correlates 
significantly with most symptoms of both anxiety and depression, whereas PA relates 
much more strongly and consistently to the depressive than to the anxious symptoms 
(Watson, L.A. Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson & Kendall, 1989b). These findings 
suggest that the absence of pleasurable experience (i.e. anhedonia) is especially 
important in depression, and that low PA may be a critical factor in distinguishing it 
from anxiety. On the other hand, NA is considered as a relatively non-specific factor 
that is common to both depression and anxiety, which accounts for the strong 
association between measures of these constructs.
After reviewing a wide range of evidence from both clinical and non-clinical 
studies, L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b) extended their two-factor PA-NA model 
further by proposing another specific factor of autonomic hyperarousal that is 
relatively specific to anxiety. Evidence indicated that symptoms of physiological 
arousal are more characteristic of anxiety than depression. For instance, symptoms of
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somatic tension and arousal tend to be the stronger markers of specific anxiety factors 
that have emerged in factor-analytic studies. Furthermore, somatic symptoms have 
proven to be particularly good differentiators between anxious and depressed patients. 
Finally, content analysis indicated that anxiety scales with the best discriminant 
validity tend to assess somatic symptoms of anxiety rather than anxious mood per se.
The Tripartite Model
In order to capture the above findings, L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b) 
proposed a “Tripartite Model”, in which symptoms of depression and anxiety are 
grouped into three basic subtypes. Firstly, many relevant symptoms are found to be 
relatively non-specific, that is, they are commonly experienced by both anxious and 
depressed individuals as general distress or Negative Affectivity (NA). This non­
specific group of symptoms includes both anxious and depressed mood, as well as 
other symptoms that are prevalent in both types of disorder, such as insomnia, 
restlessness, irritability, and poor concentration. In addition to these non-specific 
symptoms, anxiety and depression are proposed to be characterised by two clusters of 
relatively unique symptoms. While somatic tension and hyperarousal are relatively 
specific to anxiety, anhedonia and the absence of Positive Affectivity (PA) are 
relatively specific to depression, and hyperarousal is specific to anxiety.
To test their tripartite model, L.A. Clark, & Watson (1991b) developed the 
Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ). The questionnaire was 
administered to several large samples of students and also to patients suffering from 
anxiety and depression (Watson et al., 1995a; 1995b). Factor analyses of the
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Figure 3:
Features of Anxiety and Depression in Relation the Tripartite Model
Negative
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Pure Depression t I t
Pure Anxiety t t
Comorbid Anxiety/Depression t t t
Mixed Anxiety-Depression t
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symptom structure of the MASQ using five different samples consistently yielded 
three factors that correspond closely to the symptom structure postulated by the 
tripartite model: (a) one broad non-specific general distress factor; (b) a depression 
specific factor defined in terms of low PA (anhedonia); and (c) a hyperarousal factor 
specific to anxiety (Watson et al., 1995a, 1995b). A summary of the tripartite model 
in relation to anxiety and depression is schematically presented in Figure 3 on the 
opposite page. Accumulative research has provided good empirical support for the 
tripartite model (D.A. Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994; Joiner, 1996; Steer, D.A. Clark, 
Beck, & Ranieri, 1995; Watson et al., 1995a, 1995b).
The tripartite model of L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b), however, has not gone 
unchallenged. In a recent publication. Bums and Eidelson (1998) argued that the 
nonspecific symptoms of anxiety and depression could not be adequately represented 
by a single General Distress factor. Their results showed that Anhedonia and 
Nonspecific Depression factors loaded on a common Depression factor, and the 
Somatic Arousal and Nonspecific Anxiety factors loaded on a common Anxiety 
factor. From their findings. Bums and Eidelson (1998) proposed an altemative model 
in which the two identified factors of 'T4onspecific Depression” and “Nonspecific 
Anxiety” were considered as the most valid and specific indicators of anxiety and 
depression. In contrast to the tripartite model of L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b), 
Anhedonia and Somatic Arousal were found to be significantly less valid measures of 
depression and anxiety. There are, as yet, further debates on this new two-tier model 
proposed by Bums and Eidelson (1998).
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Other Postulations Alternative to the Tripartite Model
In recent research literature, there are at least two major groups of workers 
who postulated affect structure models of anxiety and depression which further 
extended the scope of L.A. Clark and Watson’s (1991b) tripartite model. Barlow and 
his colleagues, on the one hand, postulated a “Three Factor Model” of Depression, 
Fear, and Anxiety which bore marked resemblance to the tripartite model of L.A. 
Clark and Watson (Barlow, Chorpita & Turovsky, 1996; T.A. Brown, Chorpita & 
Barlow, 1998). In their model, “anxiety/apprehension” was distinguished from 
“fear/panic”, while “depression” was found to be a resilient factor emerging from their 
analyses. This group of workers further postulated a hierarchical model of anxiety 
which has interesting implications to the original tripartite model which was non- 
hierarchical (Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). On the other hand. Beck and his associates 
postulated a “Content Specificity Hypothesis” to highlight the distinction of cognitive 
styles between anxiety and depression (Beck, 1976). This group of workers also 
attempted to extract a higher order factor from depression and anxiety measures as a 
direct test for the hierarchical model of negative affects put forward by Watson and 
L.A. Clark (1992). Both these altemative postulations will be reviewed in the 
following sections.
Barlow’s Three-Factor Model
In recent years, Barlow and his colleagues have proposed a three-factor model 
of depression, fear and anxiety on the basis of psychometric analysis of anxiety and 
mood disorders using self-report mood scales (Barlow et al., 1996; T.A. Brown, et al..
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1998; Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1998). In explicating their three-factor model, the 
authors argued that “depression” is indicated by anhedonia, low PA, and helplessness, 
“fear/panic” is expressed by autonomic arousal factor; and “anxiety/apprehension” is 
manifested through general distress and NA. Similar to the tripartite model of L.A. 
Clark and Watson (1991b), symptoms of autonomic arousal and anhedonia/low PA 
are viewed as unique symptom clusters that are specific to the anxiety and mood 
disorders.
The main distinction between the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 
1991b) and the three-factor model (Barlow et al., 1996; T.A. Brown et al., 1998; 
Ormel, Oldehinkel, Goldberg, et al., 1995) is that in the latter, there is a clear 
distinction between anxiety (which is non-specific and generalised) and fear (which is 
specific and focused). Barlow et al. (1996) suggested that fear and anxiety in humans 
may correspond to separate but related neurological systems, in which anxiety 
involves Gray’s (1982) “behavioural inhibition system”, and fear involves the 
“fright/fight/flight” system. The depression factor remains a robust structure 
delineated by both models. The results are not surprising because Kendler et al.
(1995) have posited different genetic factors for depression and GAD on one hand, 
and panic disorders and phobias on the other. It seems likely, therefore, that the 
“anxiety” factor defined in Barlow’s study shares similar attributes with the Negative 
Affectivity factor in L.A. Clark and Watson’s (1991b) tripartite model. The subtle 
difference is that in the three-factor model, distress/NA on its own is considered to be 
anxious/apprehension; whilst in the tripartite model, it was considered to be mixed 
anxiety depression.
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In a separate research programme spanning from 1979 to 1990, S.H. Lovibond 
and P.P. Lovibond (S.H. Lovibond, 1983; P.P. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond 1995) 
conducted psychometric evaluation of a questionnaire that they developed to assess 
the full range of core symptoms of anxiety and depression, while at the same time 
providing maximum discrimination between the scales of anxiety and depression. 
Although the authors intended to develop a measure consisting of two scales, a third 
factor emerged from their analyses of scale structure consisting of items relating to 
difficulty relaxing, irritability and agitation, which resemble to the concept of stress as 
originally defined by Selye (1950, 1974). Accordingly the resulting three scales were 
named the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS). Empirically, the DASS has been 
shown to possess satisfactory psychometric properties especially in terms of 
concurrent validity with BDI and BAI for the depression and anxiety scales 
respectively in non-clinical samples (P.P. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond, 1995). The 
psychometric properties of the DASS have also been supported and replicated in 
clinical samples by T.A. Brown, Korotitsch, Chorpita, and Barlow (1994); T.A. 
Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, and Barlow (1997).
Although the DASS was developed prior to the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & 
Watson, 1991b), the three psychometrically distinct DASS factors could be viewed as 
broadly consistent with the three components in the tripartite model, namely DASS- 
Depression: characterised by low positive affect, loss of self esteem and incentive, 
and a sense of hopelessness (absence of positive affect); DASS-Anxiety: characterised 
by autonomic arousal and fearfulness (hyperarousal); and DASS-Stress: characterised 
by persistent tension, irritability, and a low threshold for being upset or frustrated
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(negative affect). When translated into Barlow’s three-factor model (Barlow et al., 
1996), the DASS-Depression and DASS-Anxiety scales seem to correspond well to 
the respective mood components of depression and fear/panic, while the DASS-stress 
factor coincides more meaningfully with the general domain of affective distress 
labelled as “anxiety apprehension” in the model.
Hierarchical Model o f  Negative Affects
The possibility of a higher order factor underpinning general psychological 
distress was raised by Tanaka and Huba (1984). They reanalysed data from those 
studies using the BDI and the Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview and a 
confirmatory hierarchical model for each of these scales was established. Their 
results suggested the presence of a general higher-order factor. Similarly, as proposed 
by Watson and Tellegen (1985), positive and negative affects could also be interpreted 
hierarchically as general dimensions that are superordinate to the more circumscribed 
emotion factors such as anger, fear, joy, and so on (p. 230).
More recently, the issue has been taken up by Watson and L.A. Clark (1992), 
who conducted a series of studies examining hierarchical arrangement of negative 
affects including fear, sadness, hostility, and guilt, by way of a multitrait-mutimethod 
analysis. Their results showed good convergent validity across different measures, 
occasions, and methods. Moreover, these self-report mood scales were also found to 
be highly interrelated, indicating substantial overlap which could be traced to a higher 
order negative affect factor.
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In their account of the results, Watson and L.A. Clark (1992) formally 
proposed a hierarchical model of negative affects based on the convergent and 
discriminant findings related to different self-report mood scales. According to their 
model, negative emotional experiences comprises two distinct structural levels: a 
higher level that reflects the influence of the general negative affect factor and a lower 
level that represents the unique contributions of specific negative emotions. Whereas 
the former reflects the strong influence of valence or hedonic tone in self-rated affect 
(i.e., whether the experience is negative or positive), the latter denotes unique 
explanatory and predictive power of specific emotions.
Empirical support for the hierarchical approach to anxiety and depression has 
been presented by D.A. Clark, Steer and Beck (1994) and Steer, et al. (1995). These 
researchers factor analysed responses to the BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) and the BAI 
(Beck & Steer, 1990) and they found that a general distress factor accounted for much 
of the variance shared by the two self-report measures. Using the Schmid-Leiman 
transformation technique (Gorsuch, 1983, pp. 248-254; Loehlin, 1987, pp. 205-208), 
the workers attempted to extract a higher order factor from BDI and BAI measures in 
order to examine the common and specific factors which underpin the affective states 
of anxiety and depression. After excluding common variances accounted for by the 
general higher order factor, they found that physiological hyperarousal symptoms 
were strong markers of a specific anxiety factor, whereas low PA symptoms were 
strong markers of a specific depression factor, a pattern of findings that is consistent 
with the tripartite model.
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The idea of a higher order latent variable which subsumes psychopathology 
has been further expounded by the work of Zinbarg and Barlow (Zinbarg & Barlow, 
1991; 1996; Zinbarg, Barlow & Brown, 1997). In their research, Zinbarg and Barlow
(1996) used normal controls and a large sample of patients seeking treatment in an 
outpatient anxiety disorders clinic. Although their preliminary findings provided 
support for the general trait models positing a general diathesis common to all anxiety 
disorders, further hierarchical factor analysis provided results in favour of a factor 
structure comprising one higher order factor and three lower order factors pertaining 
to fear/panic, anxiety, and depression.
More recently, Barlow and his colleagues argued that since the anxiety 
disorders represent a heterogeneous spectrum of symptomatology and correlates, it is 
theoretically likely that each of the individual anxiety disorders contains a shared 
component that represents the higher order factor in a two-level hierarchical scheme 
(T.A. Brown et al., 1998; Zinbarg et al., 1997). This higher order factor was later 
identified as similar to the general NA component of the tripartite model proposed by 
L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b). Accordingly, this higher order factor not only is 
common across the anxiety disorders, but is also shared with depression, thus 
accounting for much the of their overlap observed in the relevant mood measures.
In their latest review, Mineka et al. (1998) have articulated an “Integrative 
Hierarchical Model” of anxiety and depression in the hope of integrating the key 
features of L.A. Clark and Watson’s (1991b) tripartite model with Zinbarg and 
Barlow’s (1996) hierarchical model of the anxiety disorders. A consensus view is
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now emerging that each individual syndrome of anxiety and depression can be seen as 
containing both a common and a unique component within a hierarchical structure.
Beck’s Content-Specificity Hypothesis
From a cognitive perspective. Beck (1971) suggested that the cognitive 
schemata characterising depression was different from that observed in anxiety. More 
specifically. Beck, G. Brown, Steer, Eidelson and Riskind (1987) found that the style 
of thinking and the way the world was perceived (cognitive content) were more 
negative in depressed individuals than in anxious individuals. As proposed in the 
content-specificity hypothesis (Beck, 1976), each pathological mood state has unique 
cognitive products or contents. While depressed patients tend to report automatic 
thoughts that are loss-relevant, absolute and in the past (e.g., ‘7  have lost the only 
friends I  have”), anxious patients often report thoughts that are threat-relevant, 
relative, and in the future (e.g., "something bad is going to happen ”).
In more recent publications. Beck and his colleagues (Beck et al., 1987; D.A. 
Clark & Beck, 1989; D.A. Clark, Beck, & G. Brown; 1989; D.A. Clark, Beck, & 
Stewart, 1990) have stressed the distinctiveness of cognitive contents in distinguishing 
anxious from depressive symptomatology. For instance, several studies have 
demonstrated that patients with pure depressive disorders report more frequent 
depressive cognition, whereas those with pure anxiety disorders report a higher 
frequency of anxious cognition (e.g.. Beck et al., 1987; D.A. Clark, Beck & Brown, 
1989). Using factor analysis, D.A. Clark, Beck & Stewart (1990) have shown that 
depressive cognitions/symptoms and anxious cognitions/symptoms loaded on separate
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factors, providing support for the content-specificity hypothesis. D.A. Clark, Steer, 
and Beck (1994) concluded that anxiety was distinguished by specific autonomic 
symptoms, apprehensive feelings, and threat-related cognitions. Depression, on the 
other hand, was distinguished by anhedonia, dysphoric mood, and cognitions of 
personal loss and failure. In conclusion. Beck’s cognitive content-specificity 
hypothesis remains an important postulation in differentiating anxiety and depression 
in terms of their specific cognitive features.
Along similar lines of a cognitive perspective. Alloy et al. (1990) proposed an 
expansion of the hopelessness model of depression to account for features of 
comorbidity with anxiety disorders. In their “helplessness / hopelessness model”, they 
proposed that anxiety disorders were characterised by prominent feelings of 
helplessness. People with these disorders feel that they are helpless in controlling 
outcomes. However, they believe that control might be possible which can possibly 
lead to increased arousal and anxiety, and an intense scanning of the environment in 
order to gain control. If the person becomes convinced of his or her helplessness to 
control important outcomes, but is still uncertain about whether the bad outcome will 
actually occur, a mixed anxiety/depression syndrome would be likely to emerge. 
Finally, if the person is convinced not only of his or her helplessness, but also 
becomes certain that bad outcomes will definitely occur, helplessness turns into 
hopelessness and depression sets in. Alloy et al. (1990) showed how this perspective 
can explain certain features of comorbidity between anxiety and depressive disorders. 
For example, the sequential relationship is explained by the fact that one is likely to 
go through a stage of feeling helpless for some time before one becomes totally
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hopeless. Some anxiety disorders may be associated with depression because the 
symptoms of the disorder themselves are so distressing and uncontrollable that a sense 
of helplessness is created. It can by itself precipitate a mixed anxiety/depression 
picture. Obsessive-compulsive disorders and panic disorders are good examples of 
such conditions.
Culture and Psychopathology
As discussed in the previous section on epidemiological studies, the lifetime 
prevalence rates for major depression in Chinese samples (e.g., Hwu et al., 1989; 
Chen et al., 1993) were found to be significantly lower than those found in the ECA 
and NCS studies (e.g.. Blazer et al., 1994; Weissman et al., 1991). In accounting for 
such disparity in prevalence data, workers in the field of cross-cultural 
psychopathology have emphasised the emergence of psychiatric morbidity as an 
outcome of interaction between clinical diagnosis and cultural influences, calling the 
need for adopting both emic (culture-specific) and etic (culture-general) approaches in 
the study of psychiatric morbidity (Kirmayer, 1989).
From a cultural perspective, accumulative evidence have shown that public 
beliefs about psychiatric illnesses in general, and culturally constituted cognitive 
styles in particular, would affect how patients recognise, experience and report their 
psychiatric symptoms, as well as by ways they seek help (Kirmayer, 1989; Lin, 
Tardiff, Donetz, & Goresky, 1978). In Hong Kong, Western diagnostic systems 
including the DSM-IV and ICD-10 for mental disorders have been imported 
wholesale into the local Chinese context, carrying with them the implication that
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mental disorders are more or less culture-free. The cross-cultural and intra-cultural 
complexity of human development and psychopathology is thus significantly 
overlooked (Lewis-Femandez & Kleinman, 1994). For instance, such diagnostic 
systems may represent a particular worldview which may not be shared by the non- 
western cultures. In fact, serious question has now been raised as to the universality 
of the concept of emotional disorders as defined by the Western biomedical tradition. 
This issue has been especially amplified by research findings related to the 
phenomenon of somatisation in non-Westem countries (for a review, see Marsella, 
1979).
Somatisation in the Cultural Context
Somatisation has been clinically defined as the expression or amplification of 
physical symptoms in the absence of defined organic pathology, primarily as a means 
to communicate and cope with personal distress (Katon, Kleinman, & Rosen, 1982). 
For a long time, numerous studies in the West have attested to its role in the disguise 
or misdiagnosis of psychiatric morbidity especially involving emotional disorders 
such as anxiety and depressive disorders (e.g., Eastwood, 1971; Mathew, Weinman, & 
Mirabi, 1981; Raft, Davidson, Toomey, Spencer, & Lewis, 1975). Considerable 
evidence has also indicated that emotional disorders in non-Westem societies are also 
associated preponderantly with physical or somatic complaints. In fact, as compared 
to the West, higher rates of somatisation have been generally reported among patients 
with emotional disorders in Chinese societies including Mainland China (Kleinman, 
1982), Taiwan (E.K. Yeh, Hwu, Chang, & Y.L. Yeh, 1985) and Hong Kong (Lau, 
Cheung, & Waldman, 1981).
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Although the exact reason for the lower prevalence of mood disorder among 
Chinese patients remains unclear, one possibility pertains to their tendency to 
somatise their emotional difficulties, seeking help for their mood disorders in ways 
different from what is guided by the Western diagnostic systems (Lin, 1983). For 
instance, it has been frequently noted that Chinese patients with emotional disorders 
tend to present somatic complaints in place of psychological complaints (Kleinman, 
1977; 1982; Tseng, 1975; Yap, 1974), leading to a general under-reporting of 
symptoms conceived to be psychological as opposed to organic in nature.
According to Lau et al. (1981), somatisation as a mode of manifestation of 
emotional disorders may involve different psychological processes. For instance, the 
patients simply may not experience relevant affective states as important symptoms. 
Even if present, they may conceal their mood symptoms for sake of social desirability. 
Alternatively, the tendency to somatise may reflect a genuine difficulty in describing 
or being aware of one’s emotions or mood, a clinical phenomenon resembling that of 
“alexithymia” (Kaplan, Sadock, & Grebb, 1994, p.303).
Lau et al. (1981) reported that depressive disorders were found among 8 to 20% 
of the daily intake of medical patients. These depressed patients complained initially 
of bodily symptoms especially those related to the central nervous system, general 
illness, and the gastrointestinal system. However, when the medical practitioner 
enquired about specific psychological symptoms such as feelings of sadness, 
nervousness, restlessness, or suicidal ideation, patients would often admit to the 
presence of these affective features. The authors concluded that while patients often
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express somatic complaints initially, the medical practitioner should be able to 
recognise the presence of affective problems in the absence of active complaints.
Kwong and Wong (1981) studied the hypochondriachal concerns of mental 
patients and school students. The authors found that when directly asked to produce 
words describing physical and emotional discomfort, a significantly higher percentage 
of words relating to physical discomfort was produced by both patients and normals. 
In another study with normal adult Chinese participants (Wong & Kwong, 1981), 
similar results were obtained showing a general bias in the Cantonese dialect towards 
physical words or phrases. However, data from their studies showed that while there 
were 1,539 words or phrases which described physical discomfort, 1,340 words or 
phrases describing emotional discomfort were also produced (Kwong & Wong, 1981), 
representing a ratio of 1.15 to 1. Contrary to the original claims by several authors 
(e.g., Kleinman, 1977; Tseng, 1975) that there were limitations in the Chinese 
language to express emotions, there was in fact a wealth of Chinese words and phrases 
that describe emotional discomfort. As such, the Chinese are by no means 
“emotionally illiterate”, but they prefer to volunteer physical discomforts as compared 
to emotional difficulties.
In a series of systematic reviews on somatisation, Cheung (1982a, 1982b, 1985) 
has alluded to the social undesirability of emotional disorders within the Chinese 
tradition. The cultural trait of withholding emotional expression was seen as a major 
reason for the Chinese to somatise their affective symptoms. In essence, Cheung 
(1985) suggested that the Chinese resort to presenting physical symptoms to medical
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practitioners because they may rationalise and camouflage their emotional turmoil out 
of fear of the social stigma attached to mental illness.
Summary o f  Review
Anxiety and depression are two of the most frequently occurring disorders in 
the general population.' In the field of psychopathology, they have often been found to 
overlap with each other both clinically and psychometrically. The comorbidity of 
anxiety and depression has raised significant attention amongst researchers and 
clinicians alike. Anxiety has often been found to co-exist with depression, and there 
has been increasing evidence in biological research that they share a common genetic 
diathesis. Furthermore, specific self-report and rating measures for anxiety and 
depression have been found to highly correlate with one another. This has cast doubt 
on the long held assumption of anxiety and depression as “specific” mood states, and 
the way in which these emotions should be conceived.
This puzzle has led to growing interest in recent research on the constructs of 
anxiety and depression, as well as their inter-relationships. A group led by Watson 
and L.A. Clark have identified a number of symptoms common to both anxiety and 
depression, which they referred to as symptoms of negative affect (Watson & L.A. 
Clark, 1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Subsequent studies have found that the 
essential property which distinguishes anxiety from depression is the absence of 
positive affect in depressed patients (anhedonia) (Watson, L.A. Clark, & Carey, 
1988). In contrast, manifestations of somatic tension and arousal have been found to 
be relatively specific to anxiety (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991a).
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Based on their research findings, the Watson and L.A. Clark group have 
further extended their postulation into a "tripartite model", which postulates (a) a non­
specific 'negative affect' shared by both anxiety and depression, (b) a factor of 
anhedonia (low positive affect) characteristic of depression; and (c) an autonomic 
hyperarousal factor specific to anxiety (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991a; 1991b); Watson 
et al., 1995a; 1995b). Other altemative postulation on the affect structure of anxiety 
and depression such as the three-factor model of Barlow (Barlow et al., 1996), the 
hierarchical model of depression and anxiety (Watson & L.A. Clark, 1992; Zinbarg & 
Barlow, 1996), and the content-specificity hypothesis (D.A. Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 
1990; D.A. Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994) were, in many ways, consistent with the basic 
postulations of the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991b) with many 
welcomed extensions in perspective. Taken together, these altemative theoretical 
models have shed important light on the overlap and distinctive features of anxiety 
and depression as affective constmcts.
Present Research Thesis
While a lot of work has been done in the West with respect to the relationship 
between anxiety and depression, cultural investigations into the phenotypic stmctures 
of mood disorders remains at best scarce in non-Westem countries. In one early 
study, Watson, L.A. Clark and Tellegen (1984) tested their postulation of the PA-NA 
affect stmcture on a Japanese sample and found that the results were largely 
comparable to their findings in the West. In Hong Kong, there is a dearth of interest 
in emotional constmcts among Chinese except, perhaps, a series of fervent 
publications in the late 70’s and early 80’s on the role of somatisation in emotional
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disorder (Cheung, 1982a, 1982b, 1985; Kwong & Wong, 1981; Lau et al., 1981; Lo, 
1981; Singer, 1975). However, these investigations approached the topics primarily 
from a phenomenological perspective, with no mention of the basic affect structure 
underlying specific emotions.
Given the significant impact of research on negative affects in the West as 
reviewed above, it is therefore high time to begin a comprehensive examination into 
the structural characteristics of negative affects in a local sample of Chinese. It would 
be interesting to look at the applicability of L.A. Clark and Watson’s (1991b) tripartite 
model to a sample of non-clinical Chinese participants. As a sideline to the present 
investigation, it may also be interesting to evaluate the relative parsimony of the 
hierarchical tripartite model versus some non-hierarchical models such as the three- 
factor model proposed by Barlow and his workers (Barlow et al., 1996; T.A. Brown et 
al., 1998; Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1998). Moreover, following from the 
publicised view that Chinese patients have a heightened tendency to “somatise” their 
emotional symptoms (Cheung, 1982a, 1985; Lau et al., 1981; Kleinman, 1977; 
Kwong & Wong, 1981), it would be interesting to find out if the negative affect 
structure of our local sample differs from its Western counterparts, especially in terms 
of their endorsement of somatic items.
In the present research, a psychometric approach was adopted to examine the 
characteristics and structural arrangement of negative affects in a local sample of 
Chinese. More specifically, well-established self-report mood scales including the 
BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987), the BAI (Beck & Steer, 1990), the DASS (S.H. Lovibond
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& P.F. Lovibond, 1995), and the PANAS (Watson, L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
were investigated to see whether their psychometric properties and factor structures 
conform to those documented in the West. In particular, specific and common 
dimensions of anxiety and depression, as well as their inter-relationships, were 
examined with reference to the conceptual models of negative affect reviewed above.
Specifically, the following predictions were made on the basis of the various 
theoretical models reviewed in the previous sections:
(a) Given the common comorbidity and symptom overlap between anxiety 
and depression as reported in the literature, measures of anxiety and 
depression would show moderate degrees of correlation (L.A. Clark & 
Watson, 1991a; Dobson, 1985; Gotlib, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1989; 
Mendels et al., 1972).
(b) If there were good convergent and divergent validity in the measuring
scales used in the present study (D.T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959), 
corresponding measures of depression (e.g., BDI and DASS- 
Depression) would have higher levels correlation than between 
measures of depression and anxiety. Similarly, corresponding
measures of anxiety (e.g., BAI and DASS-Anxiety) would have higher 
levels of correlation than between depression and anxiety measures.
(c) As implicated by the tripartite model of L.A. Clark & Watson (1991b), 
the construct of depression would be uniquely characterised by items
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pertaining to anhedonia or absence of positive affect, whereas the 
construct of anxiety would be specifically marked by items tapping 
somatic tension and autonomic arousal.
(d) As NA (PANAS Negative) and PA (PANAS Positive) are supposed to 
be independent variables (Watson, L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), 
there would be an absence of correlation between these two measures. 
Based on the tripartite model, there would be high correlations between 
NA and the various measures of anxiety and depression (L.A. Clark & 
Watson, 1991b; Watson, L.A. Clark, & Carey, 1988). Moreover, there 
would be a high negative correlation between the PA with measures of 
depression but not with measures of anxiety.
(e) Factor analyses on self-report scales such as the DASS would delineate 
distinct emotional states similar to those postulated by Watson and 
Clark’s tripartite model (L.A. Calrk & Watson, 1991b), or Barlow’s 
three-factor model of depression, fear/panic, and anxiety/apprehension 
(Barlow et al, 1996).
(f) According to the hierarchical model (D.A. Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994; 
Watson & L.A. Clark, 1992; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996), anxiety and 
depression represent specific lower-order factors subsumed under a 
general higher order factor which resembles NA or distress.
(g) According to Beck’s content-specificity hypothesis, depressive
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cognitions would load on the depressive factor; and anxiety cognitions 
would load on the anxiety factor with minimum overlap.
(h) Given the high prevalence for somatisation among the Chinese, 
participants of the present research would endorse more somatic 
symptoms as opposed to psychological symptoms.
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Method
Participants
All participants were literate Hong Kong Chinese adults over the age of 18 
years. They were sampled from five major sources with an attempt to include 
participants from various occupational and social backgrounds. There were (a) 199 
normal adults either studying part-time courses in the Introduction to Psychology 
courses of the Open Learning University, or undertaking evening courses on mental 
health topics at the School of Professional and Continuing Education (SPACE), 
University of Hong Kong; (b) 66 first year medical students from the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong; (c) 162 parents of students from a secondary school; (d) 
108 nursing officers or student nurses from 3 local hospitals; and (e) a miscellaneous 
group comprising of 114 participants, including friends, relatives, school mates and 
church affiliates, who consented to take part in the research. No incentive of any kind 
was involved in the present investigation. No clinical samples were used in the 
present study. The sampling characteristics were compared, as far as possible, to 
those Western studies using normal participants in community settings.
A total of 822 questionnaire bundles were distributed to the participants. 
Those who were below the age of 18, omitted more than ten items from any of the 
scales, or endorsed the items with non-varying responses were excluded from the 
study. Those who had an expressed wish to refrain from the study were also 
exempted from the participant list. The final sample comprised a total of 649
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participants who successfully completed and returned the questionnaires. The 
successful return rate was 79%. There were 208 males (32%) and 409 females (63%), 
while the sex of 32 participants (5%) were not indicated in their responses. The mean 
age was 32.1 (SD = 8.63) with a range between 18 and 58 for a sample size of 614. 
There were 35 participants who did not reveal their age. A total of 322 (49.6%) of the 
participants were single; while 309 (47.6%) were married. There were 6 (0.9%) 
missing data, and 12 (1.8%) belonged to other categories of marital status. The results 
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Marital Status of Participants (N=643f
Frequency Percent
Single 322 49.6
Married 309 47.6
Divorced 6 0.9
Widowed 4 0.6
Cohabited 1 0.2
Separated 1 0.2
Missing Data 6 0.9
TOTAL 649 100.0
A total of 315 (48.5%) of the participants had tertiary or above tertiary 
education. A total of 311 (47.9%) had secondary education (Grade 7 to Grade 13), 
and 16 (2.5%) had primary education or below (Grade 1 to Grade 6). In the local 
system, primary schools were from P.l to P.6 (six years), whereas secondary schools
251
Negative affect structure
were from F.l to F.5 (five years). Matriculation classes were from F.6 to F.7 (two 
years). There were 7 (1.1%) missing data. The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Education of Participants fN=642f
Frequency Percent
Informal 1 0.2
Grade 1 to Grade 3 3 0.5
Grade 4 to Grade 6 12 1.8
Grade 7 to Grade 10 54 8.3
Grade 11 to Grade 13 257 39.6
Tertiary 280 43.1
Above Tertiary 35 5.4
Missing Data 7 1.1
TOTAL 649 100.0
Occupation breakdown is shown in Table 3. The participants came from a 
variety of occupational backgrounds. The majority was professionals (28.2%). Those 
with clerical, administrative and managerial background made up about 20% of the 
participants, followed by students (11;9%) and the disciplinary forces (10.3%). 
Housewives made up 9.7% of the participants.
With regard to average income, the majority of the participants (72.5%) had a 
monthly income of HK$ 10,000 or above; while 10.5% of the participants had a 
monthly income of less than HK$ 10,000. A total of 15.3% of the participants opted 
for the “inapplicable” category, and 1.7% of this data was missing. The results are 
shown in Table 4.
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Occupation of Participants (TSf=61
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Frequency Percent
Professional 183 28.2
Administrative and Managerial 56 8.6
Clerical 78 12.0
Sales and Business 22 3.4
Service Industry 39 6.0
Hawkers and Farmers 1 0.2
Production Workers 32 4.9
Disciplinary Forces 67 10.3
Student 77 11.9
Housewife 63 9.7
Missing Data 31 4.8
TOTAL 649 100.0
Table 4
Income of Participants nSf=638)
Income per month in HK$ Frequency Percent
0 Income 1 0.2
Below $10,000 67 10.3
$10,001 to $20,000 251 38.7
$20,001 to $30,000 119 18.3
$30,001 to $40,000 47 7.2
$40,000 and above 54 8.3
Inapplicable 99 15.3
Missing Data 11 1.7
TOTAL 649 100.0
Note: HK$10,000 = £735
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Measures Used
The questionnaire bundle consisted of (a) a cover sheet; (b) Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI); (c) Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI); (d) Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scale (DASS); and (e) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Chinese 
versions of the two Beck scales (BDI and BAI) were licenced from the Psychological 
Corporation to the present author on behalf of the Clinical Psychology Services of 
Kwai Chung Hospital in Hong Kong. Permission for exclusive translation rights was 
granted between July 1997 and August 1999. Permission to translate the DASS into 
Chinese was given by courtesy of Dr. P. F. Lovibond of the University of New South 
Wales to Dr. Calais Chan of the Prince of Wales Hospital, Department of Psychiatry, 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. All the scales used in the present research, 
including the PANAS, were translated and back-translated by clinical psychologists of 
Kwai Chung Hospital and the Prince of Wales Hospital for semantic equivalency.
(a) Cover sheet. The cover sheet briefly explained the aims of the present 
study and served as a process to obtain informed consent from the participants. All 
the cover sheets were individually numbered and stapled on top of the measurement 
scales. Names were optional, and all participants could choose to remain anonymous. 
They were, however, required to enter a set of minimal demographic data which 
included sex, age, marital status, education level, occupation type, and monthly 
income range. Confidentiality was assured on the cover note. An original copy of the 
cover sheet is attached in Appendix I, whereas the English version of the cover sheet 
is attached in Appendix II.
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(b) Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The BDI first appeared in 1961 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and has since gone through a 
number of revisions and improvements. The revised version of the BDI (Beck & 
Steer, 1987) is considered in research literature as the most psychometrically solid 
self-report measure of depression. The BDI is a 21-item self-report questionnaire 
measuring the affective, cognitive, motivational, and physiological domains of 
depression. Each item contains four statements indicating different levels of severity 
(score 0-3) of a particular symptom experienced over the past week. Scores for all 21 
items are summed to yield a single depression score. The internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha) of the BDI over a number of samples ranged from .85 to .94, and 
its convergent and discriminant validity has been demonstrated in a number of studies 
(Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; I.M. Campbell, Burgess, & Finch, 1984). Shek (1990) 
investigated the psychometric properties of an earlier version of the Chinese BDI in a 
Hong Kong Chinese sample and found good internal consistency as well as 
satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity. In Shek’s study, a General 
Depression factor and a Somatic Disturbance factor were extracted. Literature on the 
factor structure of the BDI produced varying results ranging from two factors to five 
factors depending on the sample and the factor analytic methods used (Beck & Lester, 
1973; Campbell et al., 1984; Lips & Ng, 1985; Shek, 1990). The translated scale used 
in the present research is attached in Appendix III and the original English version of 
the BDI is attached in Appendix IV.
(c) Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI). The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
(Beck & Steer, 1990) is a 21-item self-report inventory designed to assess somatic.
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affective, and cognitive symptoms that are characteristic of anxiety. During its 
development, emphasis was placed on the unique symptoms of anxiety in order to 
minimise its relation with depression. The instrument consists of 14 items that 
represents somatic symptoms, and 7 items that assesses specific cognitive and 
subjective features of anxiety and panic. Each symptom of anxiety is rated on a 4- 
point severity scale (score 0-3) referring to experience of symptoms over the past 
week. Scores of the 21 items are summed to yield an anxiety score. Beck, G. Brown, 
Epstein, and Steer (1988) reported high internal consistency (a  = .92) and a test-retest 
reliability of .75 over a 1-week period. The BAI has demonstrated concurrent and 
discriminant validity with anxiety and depression respectively (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 
1988).
Investigations into the psychometric properties of the BAI have also been 
reported (Borden, Peterson, & Jackson, 1991; Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995; Hewitt 
& Norton, 1993; A. Osman, Barrios, Aukes, J.R. Osman, & Markway, 1993; Steer, 
Rissmiller, & Ranieri, 1993). Exploratory factor analyses by the various studies 
yielded factor solutions ranging from one to four factors depending on the different 
sample groups and the factor-analytic approaches used (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1998; 
Borden et al., 1991; Creamer et al., 1995; Hewitt & Norton, 1993; Osman et al, 1993; 
Steer et al., 1993). The translated scale used in the present research is attached in 
Appendix V and the original English version of the BAI is attached in Appendix VI.
(d) Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS). The DASS (S.H. Lovibond 
and P.F. Lovibond, 1995) is a notable advancement in measuring anxiety and
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depression since the work of Costello and Comrey (1967). It represents an ambitious 
attempt to develop a self-report instrument that could maximise differentiation 
between the emotional states of anxiety and depression. The DASS is a 42-item self- 
report instrument measuring current (over the past week) symptoms of depression, 
anxiety, and stress. The three psychometrically distinct scales consist of 14 items each 
which are rated on a scale from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very 
much, or most o f  the time). The range of scores for each scale was 0-42. The scale is 
designed to cover a full range symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress, while at the 
same time providing maximum discrimination among these affective states. The 
scores for the three scales are determined by summing the scores for the 
corresponding 14 items. Internal consistencies (Cronbach’s Alphas) for each scale for 
the DASS normative sample were .91 for Depression; .84 for Anxiety; and .90 for 
Stress (S.H. Lovibond & P.F. Lovibond, 1995; P.F. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond 
1995). S.H. Lovibond and P.F. Lovibond (1995) emphasised that the DASS measures 
states rather than traits, and is not directly applicable to the measurement of 
participants’ momentary emotional states since some items refer to experiences and 
situations outside of the testing context.
Empirically, the DASS has been shown to possess satisfactory concurrent 
validity with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(BAI) for the depression and anxiety scales respectively (P.F. Lovibond & S.H. 
Lovibond, 1995). The psychometric properties of the DASS have also been 
demonstrated by T.A. Brown et al (1994; 1997) using clinical samples. The translated 
scale used in the present research is attached in Appendix VII and the original English
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version o f the DASS is attached in Appendix VIII
(e) Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson, 
L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item schedule tapping on different mood states 
comprising of two major scales, namely Positive Affectivity (PA) and Negative 
Affectivity (NA). The PA scale includes ten items depicting positive affects like 
attentive, interested, excited, etc. The NA scale is a 10-item scale tapping into 
negative affects such as irritable, guilty, scared, upset, etc. Participants are asked to 
respond to items on the basis of the way they feel on a 5-point scale (from 1, very 
slightly or not at all to 5, extremely) over the past week. For reasons of uniformity 
with the administration of BDI, BAI and DASS in the present research, participants 
were asked to self-rate their affect state ''during the past week”. The internal 
consistency of PANAS scale ranged from .86 to .90 for PA and .84 to .87 for NA. 
Discriminant and convergent validity have also been demonstrated (Watson, L.A. 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The scales exhibited very similar psychometric properties 
in student, adult, and clinical patient population. The translated scale used in the 
present research is attached in Appendix IX and the original English version of the 
PANAS is attached in Appendix X.
Procedure
Most of the measures were administered en masse on a group basis. Less than 
five percent of the questionnaires were administered on an individual basis. Research 
supervisors were all fully qualified clinical psychologists working in Kwai Chung 
Hospital, including the present author. All questionnaire bundles were numbered
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serially to keep track on the number of non-retumed forms. Informed consent was 
obtained by the researchers from all participants after introducing the nature of the 
present research as a local study of mood states among the Chinese. A cover sheet 
containing basic personal data was to be completed by the participants, with 
reassurance of confidentiality. Participants were reminded to complete all items of the 
questionnaire, and they were requested not to spend too much time on any of the 
items. The same instructions were given in all the scales. In accordance with the 
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Hong Kong Government, 1996) and the 
recommended guidelines as stipulated by the Ethics Committee of Kwai Chung 
Hospital, participants were given the option of omitting their names, but they were 
required to provide their signatures as an acknowledgement of informed consent.
Participants were blind to the nature or name of the questionnaire to eliminate 
possible demand characteristics. The BDI, BAI, DASS and PANAS were presented 
to all participants in the stated order, and the measures were given the designated 
Chinese titles of "Self-Rated Scale No. 1 ”, "Self-Rated Scale No. 2 ”, "Self-Rated 
Scale No. 3 ”, and "Self-Rated Scale No. 4 ” respectively. Participants had no idea 
regarding what the questionnaires were measuring. Moreover, the test instructions 
specifically required them to report their affective states "in the past seven days 
includins today” so as to standardise the reference time-frame for their responses. 
Participants were given ample time to complete the questionnaires which they would 
return at the end of the session.
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were computed by SPSS 7.5 (Hull & Nie, 1981; Nie, Hull
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& Jenkins; 1975; SPSS Inc., 1997) and LISREL 8.0 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) to 
generate results for descriptive statistics, analysis of variance, reliability testing, 
correlational analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and confirmatory factor analysis. 
Both software packages were licensed from the Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of 
Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Close references were made to Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black (1995) and Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) with respect to 
the rationales for choosing particular multivariate analysis procedures.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory analyses were conducted using LISREL 8.0 (Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1993), primarily for evaluating how the data in the present study fit the 
models or solutions reported by previous research. Because of problems related to the 
use of the chi-square statistics, such as sensitivity to large sample size, three 
conventional measures of fit were used: (a) the goodness-of-fit (GFI, values greater 
than .90), (b) the adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI, values greater than .80), and (c) the 
root mean square residual (RMS, values less than .10) to evaluate the adequacy of 
each model. The criteria chosen followed those used by A. Osman et al. (1993) in a 
community study of the BAI.
In term of established models for confirmatory analysis, the BDI data was 
compared with those of the two-factor structure of Shek (1990) because the sample 
was also made up of Hong Kong Chinese community participants. The BAI data was 
compared with the four-factor structure of A. Osman et al. (1993), and the five-factor 
structure of Borden et al. (1991) because they also used community samples. The
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DASS data was compared with the original three-factor model of P.F. Lovibond and 
S.H. Lovibond (1995) derived from normal participants in Australia. The PANAS 
data was compared with the two-factor PA-NA orthogonal structural model as 
proposed by Watson, L.A. Clark, and Tellegen (1988).
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The principal-component model was adopted in the present study as the major 
method for extracting factors in the exploratory factor analysis (Hair et al, 1995; 
Snook & Gorsuch, 1989; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). To delineate the least number 
of factor solutions that would account for most of the variance, the factors were 
rotated orthogonally using the Varimax method for the BDI, BAI, and the PANAS. In 
all the cases, an initial-factor solution was first obtained, and the data were further 
analysed by forcing the number of factors down to a theoretically parsimonious factor 
structure. Moreover, Cattell’s (1966) scree test was used to set an upper limit on the 
optimum number of factors to rotate.
Since the three scales of DASS were correlated (S.H. Lovibond & P.F. 
Lovibond, 1995), exploratory factor analysis of the DASS was based on a principal- 
component model extraction with the factors rotated obliquely using the Promax 
procedure. To test the stability of the three DASS dimensions of depression, anxiety 
and stress, the data was forced to a three-factor solution to see if the item structure 
conformed with those described by P.F. Lovibond and S.H. Lovibond (1995).
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Higher Order Factor Analysis
It has been noted by L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b) that in the tripartite 
model, the shared variance between anxiety and depression measures was due to an 
underlying second-order dimension of NA. In the present study, higher order factor 
analysis was conducted on the pooled items from BDI and BAI to examine if there 
were specific, primary factors of depression and anxiety, subsumed under a general, 
higher-order factor of negative affectivity as postulated by the hierarchical model of 
Watson and L.A. Clark (1992). In this respect, the present study attempted to 
replicate the works of D.A. Clark et al. (1994) and Steer et al. (1995) using the BDI 
and the BAI in extracting a second-order factor.
To examine the hierarchical arrangement of the first- and the second-order 
factors, higher-order factor analysis was performed using the common factor model as 
proposed by Gorsuch (1983, p.243). In the initial first-order factor analysis, iterated 
principal-factor solutions in which all of the BDI and BAI items were rotated 
obliquely using the Promax method to obtain specific primary factors pertaining to 
anxiety and depression. In the second-order factor analysis, the primary factors were 
rotated orthogonally using the Varimax method to extract a higher-order general 
factor.
Schmid-Leiman Transformation
To examine the relative distribution of variance between second-order and 
first-order factors, the Schmid-Leiman transformation procedure was used as 
described by Gorsuch (1983, pp. 248-254) and Loehlin (1987, pp. 205-208). The
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Schmid-Leiman transformation procedure represents a statistical method to 
orthogonalise the factor patterns that have been derived from the first-order oblique 
rotation. The resulting orthogonalised first-order factors reflect independent 
dimensions from which the contribution of the general (second-order) factor have 
been removed.
Schmid-Leiman transformations are considered useful ways for representing 
hierarchical models because they express the variance of the variables accounted for 
by the higher order factors in addition to the unique contributions of each primary 
factor after all higher order factors have been partialled out. Procedurally, the loading 
of a variable on the higher order factor is calculated by first multiplying the loading of 
that variable on each lower order factor by the loading of that factor on the higher 
order factor and then summing these products. The loading of a variable on a 
residualised lower order factor is computed by multiplying the untransformed loading 
of that variable on that factor by the factor’s uniqueness, in which a factor’s 
uniqueness is defined as the square root of one minus its square loading on the higher 
order factor. The procedure has been adopted for use in hierarchical model analysis 
by D.A. Clark et al. (1994), Steer et al. (1995), and Zinbarg and Barlow (1996).
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Total sample means, standard deviations, alpha coefficients, and tests of mean 
difference between the local and reference samples for the BDI, BAI, DASS, and 
PANAS scales are shown in Table 5.
(a) BDI. The mean BDI score was 7.98 {SD = 7.69) and the Cronbach’s 
Alpha was .89. Among non-clinical samples in the West, the mean BDI score was 
10.9 and the alpha was .81 (cf. Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988) {t = -5.857, j!? < .01). 
Thus, the local sample seemed to acquire a significantly lower mean and higher 
internal consistency. The corrected item-total correlation was found to be satisfactory, 
ranging from .36 to .69. None of the items on BDI, however, were found to produce 
significant elevation on the alpha value after deletion.
(b) BAI The mean score of BAI was 8.78 {SD = 8.22), which was found to be 
lower than the U.S. data as obtained in a community sample (A. Osman et al., 1993) 
{t = -4.043, p  < .01). Internal consistency was excellent as indexed by the high 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .92. The corrected item-total correlation of the 21 BAI items 
ranged from .43 to .71, showing satisfactory relationship to the latent construct 
assessed.
264
Negative affect structure
§3
■§c/3
<4-1O
IoU
I1
Q
1
I
c/3
1
I
C/3
COI6^
It
1 2
if
§ %
I f S
Cfl o
II
z  &
* * *
** ** * *in *o o o o o o *
V V V V V V c/3z
00 ■ t> VO VO o \ m
m oo in in m m TTo m in m in VO VO00 CO m m
m C \ in
00o OOOvm VO rnoo o cn 00
V oo in o
Ov00
CNOv Ov
in00 oOv r-00
o' (o'(N Ov ov Ov A'
5 O 6 s r-^ 6
oov in cn o m -rr
o
-
VO '=d- o rncn
oTVO (N Ovm o 0?o mo
00 VO 6 00 VO
ooOv oor-" VO 3 VOO TT tnin
oo in v6 v6CN
o
CN
o
I
o
inTfVO
II
o
I
3
VO
I
o(N
I
»3I
in
o
ov
3
I I
I
g
(2
00
I
sc/3
C/3
I
I
C/3
C/3s
I
I
(Um
?
fï
I I
It
IIm Ü
it
<u
I
0
S1
©o'oo
C3S
OO
Ü
If
cd
i
i |
II
g f r  
■§2
!
u p;I:
U 
1 2  
% œ 
s 6
00 c/5
g c/3
#3
+
Ia
s
*
*
*
f
I
IQ G
! 5 |
I
*
*
f
I
J
I
0*<l
1
I
265
Negative affect structure
(c) DASS. The means of the three scales in DASS were 5.67 {SD = 6.27) for 
Depression, 6.63 {SD = 5.39) for Anxiety, and 12.06 {SD = 7.04) for Stress. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha values for the three scales were .91 for Depression, .85 for Anxiety 
and .89 for Stress, which were highly compatible to the values obtained in the original 
Australian study (P.F. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond, 1995). One notable finding in the 
DASS was that while the Depression mean score in the present sample was 
signifiacntly lower than the reference sample {t = -2.349, p  < .05), Anxiety and Stress 
scores were significantly higher than the reference sample {t = 8.865, p  < .01; and t = 
5.77, p  < .01 respectively). The results showed good internal consistency in the 
translated scale used in the present study.
(d) PANAS. The means for the NA and PA scales were 17.53 {SD = 6.03) and 
26.47 {SD = 8.08) respectively. While the mean NA score was found to be almost 
identical to the US norm {t = 0.4198, N.S.), the mean PA score was significantly 
lower than the US norm {t = -17.308,/? < .01) (cf. Watson, L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The Cronbach’s alpha values obtained were .87 and .90 for the NA and PA 
scales respectively. All items in the two scales were shown to possess satisfactory 
item-total correlation, ranging from .43 to .74.
(e) Sex Differences. In view of the established epidemiological findings that 
females are over-represented in mood disorders (Blazer et al., 1994; Chen et al., 1993; 
Weissman et al., 1991), separate analyses of variance were completed to look at sex 
differences between males and females in all of the measures. The results are 
summarised in Table 6.
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Table 6
Sex Differences of the Group Means of the Scales
Measures Male (#=208) 
M SD
Female(#=409) 
M SD
F-value
(dj)
Sign.
BD I 7.59 7.23 8.17 7.97 0.76 (1,599) NS.
B A I 7.27 6.55 9.57 8.94 10.54 (I, 602) /7<.001
DASS
Depression 5.55 5.90 5.68 6.44 0.06 (1,612) NS.
Anxiety 6.19 4.79 6 .8 8 5.77 2.16 (1, 610) NS.
Stress 10.91 6.12 12.69 7.52 8 .6 6  (1,611) /7<.003
PANAS
Positive 26.33 8.05 26.61 8.09 0.17 (1,607) NS.
Negative 17.03 5.80 17.72 6.15 1.79 (1,611) NS.
Note. BDI
BAI
DASS
PANAS Scale
= Beck Depression Inventory;
= Beck Anxiety Inventory;
= Depression Anxiety Stress Scale;
= Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule Scale.
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Among all comparisons tested, significantly higher scores were found in females on 
BAI (F=  10.54, df=  1, 602, p <  .001), and the Stress scale in DASS (F =  8.66, df=  
1, 6\, p  < .003). Interestingly, sex differences on the other measures including 
depression did not reach significance. No other demographic variable was 
significantly related to the measures used. All participants were treated as a 
homogeneous community sample in the present study.
Correlational Analysis
Pearson product-moment correlation was used to assess relationship between 
scales. The correlation matrix pertaining to all of the scales employed is shown in 
Table 7.
In line with the research predictions, high correlation coefficients were 
obtained between corresponding measures of depression {r = .73 for BDI and DASS- 
Depression Scale). In a similar fashion, high correlation coefficients were obtained 
between respective measures of anxiety {r = .73 for BAI and DASS-Anxiety Scale). 
The results showed satisfactory convergent validity for both of these depression and 
anxiety scales. In general, lower correlations were obtained across the depression and 
anxiety measures, ranging from .57 to .68. The magnitude of correlations between 
corresponding measures for anxiety and depression were found to be significantly 
higher than correlations across anxiety and depression measures {t’s > 2 2 \ , p <  .05).
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In regard to the DASS, the correlation coefficients among the Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress scales were in the range between .68 and .75, showing a higher 
degree of correlation among the three scales, and thus a lesser degree of 
differentiation, as documented in the original DASS studies (P.F. Lovibond & S.H. 
Lovibond, 1995). The correlation between DASS-Stress and DASS-Anxiety (r = .75) 
was signifciatly higher than their respective correlations (r = .67 and r = .68) with 
DASS-Depression {t’s > 3.7, p < .01).
In regard to the PANAS, the low correlation coefficient between the PA and 
NA scales reflected their existence as relatively independent measures (r = -.13). As 
depicted in the correlation matrix, while the PA scale was generally found to bear 
negative correlations with the other scales, the NA scale conversely showed positive 
correlations of a greater magnitude. More specifically, the PA scale was found to bear 
strongest correlations with the depression measures (BDI, r = -.37; DASS-Depression, 
r = -.42), as compared to its correlations with the other anxiety scales which ranged 
from -17 to -.22.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
For purpose of examining how the local data conform to established scales and 
models in the West, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted, using LISREL 8.0 
for Windows (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993). The results are shown in Table 8.
270
Negative affect structure
Table 8
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: BDI, BAT DASS and PANAS
Scale GFI AGFI RMS X
BDI (2-factors) 
(Shek, 1990)
0.906 0.885 0.0499 667.708 
(d f=188) 
/? < .001
BAI (4-factors)
(A. Osman et ah, 1993)
0.838 0.796 0.0735 1266.748
(df=183)
7?<.001
BAI (5-factors) 
(Borden et ah, 1991)
0.861 0.816 0.0610 974.845
(df=144)
p< .001
DASS (3-factors)
(S.H. Lovibond & P.F. Lovibond, 
1995, 1995)
0.759 0.733 0.0651 3384.089 
(d f= 776) 
/?<.001
PANAS (2-factors)
(Watson, L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988)
0.857 0.823 0.0595 980.39 
(d f=169) 
7?<.001
BDI Beck Depression Inventory
BAI Beck Anxiety Inventory
DASS = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale
GFI goodness o f fit
AGFI = adjusted goodness o f fit
RMS = root mean square residue
X
chi square
d f degree o f fi-eedom
p probability level
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(a) BDI. In regard to BDI, there have been various models established for 
different samples. Given the normal participants in the present study, only models 
generated from non-clinical samples were chosen for testing. The first reference 
model tested was a two-factor model suggested by Shek (1990), derived from a 
Chinese version of BDI which was different from the version developed for the 
present study. The first factor was a General Depression factor, while the second 
factor was a Somatic Disturbance factor. This model yielded a significant chi-square,
= 667.7, df=  188, < .001, which indicated a satisfactory match as revealed by
values pertaining to goodness of fit {GFI = 0.91); adjusted goodness of fit {AGFI = 
.89); root mean square residual {RMS = 0.05). The inflation of chi-square value in all 
the confirmatory factor analyses were probably due to the large sample employed in 
the present study (Marsh, Balia & McDonald, 1988).
A four-factor model proposed by I.M. Campbell, Burgess, and Finch (1984) 
which also used community samples was also tested but the solution did not converge 
after 153 iterations. The results implied that the data did not fit the reference factor 
structure.
(b) BAI. Confirmatory factor analyses (LISREL 8; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) 
were used to assess the generalisability of the four-factor model (A. Osman et al., 
1993) and the five-factor model (Borden et al., 1991) to the present participant data.
A. Osman and his colleagues (1993) used a community sample and delineated 
four factors which were Subjective Fear, Neurophysiological Responses, Autonomic
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Arousal and Panic Symptoms. The chi-square obtained was 1,266.8, d f ^ \ Z l > , p <  
.001, GFI — .84, AGFI =.80, and RMS = .07. The confirmatory analysis results 
showed an inadequate match between the model and the present data.
A slight improvement of fit was obtained from the five-factor model of BAI 
proposed by Borden et al., 1991 using undergraduate as subjects. The five factors 
were respectively labelled as Subjective Fear, Somatic Nervousness, 
Neurophysiological Responses, Muscular or Motoric Symptoms and Respiratory 
Responses. The chi-square obtained was 974.8, d f  = 144,;? < .001, GFI=  .86, AGFI 
=.82, and RMS = .06. The results again suggested that the five-factor model still fell 
short of an adequate fit to the present research sample.
(c) DASS. The original three-factor model of DAS S was used as a template to 
test against the data obtained in the present study (S.H. Lovibond & P.F. Lovibond, 
1995). A chi-square value 3,844 with df=  776 was obtained at/> < .001, with GFI = 
0.76, AGFI = 0.73, and RMS = 0.07. These results indicated unsatisfactory match 
between the original model and the present data.
(d) PANAS. The two-factor model of NA and PA was used as a reference 
model for the PANAS (Watson, L.A. Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). A chi-square value 
980.4, df=  169 was obtained atjr? < .05, with GF7= 0.86, AGFI= 0.82, and the RMS = 
0.06. The results fell short of a good fit to the present data.
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Exploratory Factor Analysis
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted separately for all of the scales 
employed in the present study.
(a) BDI. A principal-component analysis of variance with Varimax rotation 
was performed on the 21 BDI items in which communalities were set at unity. While 
five factors satisfied Kaiser’s criterion, with a cumulative variance of 54.8%, a large 
portion of accountable variance was in fact attributed to Factor 1 (17.4%) and Factor 2 
(14.8%), leaving rather small percentages accounted for by each of the three 
remaining factors (8.0%, 7.8%, and 6.9% respectively). The results are summarised in 
Table 9. Briefly, Factor 1 reflected negative cognition and affect including negative 
self attitudes such as self-degradation and self-punitive wishes. Factor 2 related to 
functional impairment and a general lack of satisfaction in life and in the self. The 
remaining three factors constituted a mixture of somatic and vegetative symptoms in 
which Factor 3 was represented by (21) loss o f libido and (11) irritability'. Factor 4 
was represented by (20) somatic preoccupations and (16) sleep disturbance', and 
Factor 5 was represented by (19) weight loss, (18) loss o f  appetite and (10) crying 
spells. Since a three-factor solution was better in terms of Cattell’s scree test and of 
parsimonious interpretability, it was considered more meaningful to describe the 
factor solutions as comprising of three factors, viz., “Negative Cognition and Affect” 
(Factor 1), “Functional Impairment” (Factor 2), and “Somatic and Vegetative 
Symptoms” (Factors 3, 4 and 5). In total, these three factor clusters accounted for 
17.4%, 14.8% and 22.6% of the total variance respectively.
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Table 9
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Orthogonal (Varimax) Rotation for BDI: 
(5-Factor Solution)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Negative Cognitions and Affect
7. Self hate .752 J? 9 .195 .091 .026
6. Sense of punishment .647 262 .080 .089 232
9. Self punitive wishes .629 -.113 .335 .167 .059
5. Guilty feelings .624 223 -.082 222 .065
3. Sense of failure .600 .389 .150 -.021 .076
1. Mood .594 .260 .120 .193 .128
2. Pessimism .576 .301 .251 -.069 .008
Functional Impairment
15. Work inhibition .358 .687 -.027 , .129 -.053
13. Indecision .228 .677 .085 .198 .123
17. Fatigability .060 .611 .113 .434 .077
4. Lack of satisfaction .317 .516 .113 .030 .213
12. Social withdrawal ^18 .513 .473 -.048 .070
8. Self accusations .444 .488 .119 .055 -.077
14. Body image .403 .270 .218 -.075
Somatic and Vegetative Symptoms
21. Loss of libido .181 .018 .794 .127 -.005
11. Irritability .171 .374 .559 .080 .124
20. Somatic preoccupation .105 -.051 .772 -.037
16. Sleep disturbance .014 .239 .210 .620 .176
19. Weight loss .022 .004 -.063 .052 .851
18. Loss of appetite .165 -.008 229 .438 .503
10. Crying spells .304 .386 .143 -.013 .497
Variance accounted by 17.42% 14.80% 7.97% 7.77% 6.87%
the factor
Total variance explained by the five factors = 54.83%
Note. Factor loadings with an absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
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In an attempt to explore the parsimony of Shek’s two-factor model in the 
present data (Shek, 1990), the BDI data was forced into two factors (Table 10). The 
analysis produced less clear-cut results with Factor 1 accounting for 28.4% of the total 
variance. Factor 1 was a mixture of cognitive, affective and functional impairment 
symptoms such as (7) self hate, (3) sense o f failure, (2) pessimism, (15) work 
inhibition, (8) self accusations, and so on. Factor 2 was a cluster of somatic and 
vegetative symptoms such as (18) loss o f appetite, (16) sleep disturbance, (19) weight 
loss, (20) somatic preoccupation, and (17) fatigability. The total variance accounted 
by the forced 2-factor solution was reduced to 39.42%.
To generate more information regarding the frequency and intensity of 
individual items endorsed by the participants, item endorsement percentages and mean 
scores were calculated for the 21 BDI items. The results are presented in Table 11 
according to the two-factor solution, which provides a convenient way for comparing 
endorsed responses to "psychological" (Factor 1) versus "somatic" (Factor 2) items. 
As shown in the table, frequently endorsed items from Factor 1 "Negative Cognition 
and Affect" included (1) mood, (13) indecision, (5), guilty feelings, and so on. On the 
other hand, frequently endorsed items from Factor 2 “Somatic and Vegetative 
Symptoms” included (17) fatigability, (16) sleep disturbance, (20) somatic 
preoccupation, and so on. For Factor 1, the average endorsement rate for cognitive- 
affective symptoms was 29.2%; while the average endorsement percentage for 
somatic-vegetative symptoms was 33.0% for Factor 2. The weighted mean scores for 
Factors 1 and 2 were both .38.
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Table 10
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Orthogonal (Varimax) Rotation for BDI
(2 Factors Forced)
Factor 1 Factor 2
Negative Cognitions and Affect
7. Self hate .782 .098
3. Sense of failure .715 .076
2. Pessimism .684 -.007
15. Work inhibition .659 .137
8. Self accusations .658 .047
6. Sense of punishment .639 229
1. Mood .618 .239
12. Social withdrawal .598 .130
13. Indecision .573 .324
5. Guilty feelings .564 .187
4. Lack of satisfaction .550 238
14. Body image .527 .177
9. Self punitive wishes .503 .136
11. Irritability .502 .247
10. Crying spells .449 .385
21. Loss of libido .388 .161
Somatic and Vegetative Symptoms
18. Loss of appetite .136 .663
16. Sleep disturbance .185 .616
19. Weight loss -.080 .607
20. Somatic preoccupation .212 .516
17. Fatigability .417 .462
Variance accounted by 28.41% 11.01%
the factor
Total variance explained by the two factors = 39.42%
Note. Factor loadings with an absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
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Table 11
Item Endorsement and Item Means for BDI in 2-Factor Solution
Negative affect structure
Item endorsement (%) Mean
Factor 1
Negative Cognitions and Affect
I . Mood 43.8 .553
13. Indecision 3&5 .461
5. Guilty feelings 37.3 .409
12. Social withdrawal 34.9 288
11. Irritability 34.2 .469
8. Self accusations 34.1 .452
14. Body image 34.1 .431
15. Work inhibition 30.3 299
3. Sense of failure 292 .391
4. Lack of satisfaction 27.1 282
6. Sense of punishment 25.2 .379
2. Pessimism 21.6 .320
21. Loss of libido 21.1 .257
7. Self hate 20.7 247
10. Crying spells 18.3 252
9. Self punitive wishes 16.6 .206
Weighted Mean 2&7P
Factor 2
Somatic and Vegetative Symptoms
17. Fatigability 60.1 .678
16. Sleep disturbance 362 .436
20. Somatic preoccupation 35.9 295
18. Loss of appetite 23.6 273
19. Weight loss 8.7 .098
Weighted Mean 32.96 0.376
Note; (a) Endorsement rate: Endorsed items are those items with item scores above zero.
(b) Weighted means are used for adjustment o f unequal number o f items across the two factors.
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(b) BAI. Principal-component analysis of BAI with Varimax rotation resulted 
in a three-factor solution, which accounted for 52.7% of total variance. The factor 
loadings for the solution are presented in Table 12. The first factor, amounting to 
20.3% of the variance, was found to consist of items mainly related to subjective fear, 
such as fear of the worst would happen and feeling terrified. Most of the somatic 
items were found to load on the second and third factor, accounting for 16.9% and 
15.5% of the variance respectively. The second factor consisted of items mainly 
characterised by autonomic changes related to proprioceptor and respiratory functions. 
The third factor appeared to be relatively less coherent, attracting highest loadings 
from items related to proprioceptor and cardiovascular functions. As shown in the 
table, in fact, several items were rather non-specific as they were found to obtain 
moderate loadings on more than one factor.
A more meaningful picture emerged when the BAI data were forced into two 
factors (Table 13). The total variance accounted by the two-factor solution was 47.1% 
with almost equal weights shared by the two factors (24.6% for Factor 1 and 22.5% 
for Factor 2). Factor 1 was clearly a factor of “Heightened Autonomic Arousal” with 
only one item (7) heart pounding/racing loading high on Factor 2 as well. Factor 2 
was clearly a factor of “Subjective Fear and Tension'' contaminated only by two items 
of physiological arousal (8) unsteady and (18) indigestion. Items from Factor 2 
loading also highly in Factor 1 include (8) unsteady, (17) scared, (14) fear o f  losing 
control, and (18) indigestion. Forcing the factors from three to two only resulted in a 
slight compromise of the total variance explained from 52.65% to 47.10%.
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Table 12
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Orthogonal (Varimax) Rotation for BAI
(3-Factor Solution)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Subjective Fear
5. Fear of worst happening .760 .019 .192
9. Terrified .751 .241 .255
10. Nervous .736 .135 .251
8. Unsteady .696 .243 .307
4. Unable to relax .692 .086 .378
17. Scared .691 .398 .125
14. Fear of losing control .553 .539 .012
16. Fear of dying .466 .331 -.079
18. Indigestion .349 .189 .334
Autonomic arousal I
11. Feelings of choking .233 .741 .183
15. Difficulty breathing .197 .715 .252
13. Shaky .165 .617 .378
21. Sweating .134 .607 .168
12. Hands trembling .082 .550 .477
20. Face flushed .229 .447 .340
Autonomic arousal II
3. Wobbliness in legs .173 .158 .684
2. Feeling hot .098 .243 .650
19. Faint .143 .393 .611
1. Numbness/tingling .232 .027 .584
6. Dizzy/lightheaded .226 .295 .562
7. Heart pounding/racing .347 .406 .445
Variance accounted 20.25% 16.86% 15.54%
by the factor
Total variance explained by the three factors = 52.65%
Note. Factor loadings with an absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
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Table 13
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Orthogonal (Varimax) Rotation for BAI
(2 Factors Forced)
Factor 1 Factor 2
Autonomic arousal
12. Hands trembling .719 .136
13. Shaky .695 .216
19. Faint .692 .196
15. Difficulty breathing .677 .246
11. Feelings of choking .648 .280
2. Feeling hot .611 .146
6. Dizzy/lightheaded .581 .271
7. Heart pounding/racing .573 .392
3. Wobbliness in legs .567 .218
21. Sweating .547 .174
20. Face flushed .540 .270
1. Numbness/tingling .399 .265
Subjective Fear
9. Terrified .293 .776
5. Fear of worst happening .088 .770
10. Nervous .214 .755
8. Unsteady .334 .723
17. Scared .324 .717
4. Unable to relax .268 .715
14. Fear of losing control .360 .579
16. Fear of dying .152 .478
18. Indigestion .338 .376
Variance accounted 24.58% 22.51%
by the factor
Total variance explained by the two factors = 47,10%
Note. Factor loadings with an absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
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Similar to the BDI, item endorsement percentages and mean scores were 
calculated for the 21 BAI items, as depicted in Table 14 according to the two-factor 
solution. Frequently endorsed items from Factor 1 “Autonomic Arousal” included (6) 
dizzy/light-headed, (7) heart pounding and racing, (2), feeling hot, (20) face flushed, 
and so on. Frequently endorsed items from Factor 2 “Subjective Fear” included (10) 
nervous, (4) unable to relax, (5) fear o f worst happening, and so on. For Factor 1, the 
average endorsement percentage for autonomic arousal was 23.9%; while the average 
endorsement percentage for subjective fear was 46.4%. The weighted mean scores 
were .30 for Factor 1 and .58 for Factor 2. Items pertaining to subjective fear were 
more highly endorsed by the participants than items pertaining to autonomic arousal. 
The weighted mean score of .58 for Factor 2 {Subjective Fear) was also appreciably 
higher than the weighted mean score of .30 for Factor 1 {Autonomic Arousal).
(c) DASS. Principal-component analysis was conducted using oblique 
(Promax) rotation due to the postulated relationships among the Depression, Anxiety 
and Stress scales in DASS (S.H. Lovibond & P.F. Lovibond, 1995). The procedure 
arrived at a seven-factor solution, accounting for 57.3% of total variance. The factor 
loadings of DASS items were shown in Table 15. The first factor, accounting for 
33.7% of variance, was composed mainly of the original DASS-Stress items 
characterised by nervous arousal and agitation, except for one depression item, (13) /  
fe lt sad and depressed. The second factor comprised of five original DASS- 
Depression items depicting depressive cognitions or attitudes toward life, self and 
future. The third factor was a mixture of DASS-Stress and DASS-Anxiety items 
describing intolerance, worries and inability to calm down. The fourth factor was
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Table 14
Item Endorsement and Item Means for BAI in 2-Factor Solution
Item endorsement (%) Mean
Factor 1
Autonomic arousal
6. Dizzy/lightheaded 39.8 .506
7. Heart pounding/racing 35.8 .454
2. Feeling hot 33.7 .405
20. Face flushed 31.8 .405
3. Wobbliness in legs 27.0 .317
1. Numbness/tingling 26.8 .320
19. Faint 21.5 .266
12. Hands trembling 16.2 .186
15. Difficulty breathing 14.3 .192
11. Feelings of choking 13.6 .172
13. Shaky 13.3 .154
21. Sweating 12.3 .162
Weighted Mean 23.9 .293
Factor 2
Subjective Fear
10. Nervous 62.5 .871
4. Unable to relax 62.4 .854
5. Fear of worst happening 57.7 .874
18. Indigestion 54.7 .728
8. Unsteady 43.3 .548
17. Scared 31.3 .383
9. Terrified 31.0 .416
16. Fear of dying 25.3 .321
14. Fear of losing control 18.0 .256
Weighted Mean ^6.^
Note: (a) Endorsement rate: Endorsed items are those items with item scores above zero.
(b) Weighted means are used for adjustment o f unequal number o f items across the two factors.
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Table 15
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Oblique (Promaxl Rotation for DASS: 
(7-Factor Solution!
Factor loadings 
3 4
Scale
1. Getting upset by quite trivial things .742 -.051 .052 -.120 .266 .033 -.331 s
8. Difficult to relax .687 -.089 -.027 .114 .071 -.078 .061 s
6. Over-react to situations .673 -.023 -.001 -.134 .230 .077 -.108 s
27. Very irritable .665 .017 .316 -.036 -.080 -.088 .038 s
12. Using a lot o f  nervous energy .637 -.016 .013 -.083 -.115 .091 .062 s
11. Getting upset rather easily .614 -.083 .019 .331 .076 -.071 -.101 s
14. Getting impatient when delayed in any way .530 .010 .426 .003 -.324 .134 -.135 s
33. In a state o f nervous tension .529 .060 .094 -.145 .264 -.021 .142 s
18. Rather touchy .503 .079 .391 -.084 -.159 -.124 .147 s
22. Hard to wind down .454 .035 .024 .159 .066 -.095 .169 s
13. Sad and depressed .432 .095 -.183 .290 .232 -.081 .104 D
38. Life was meaningless -.025 .902 -.026 .013 .019 -.040 .001 D
17. Wasn’t worth much as a person -.026 .853 .020 -.123 .067 -.001 .007 D
21. Life wasn’t worthwhile .020 .845 -.051 -.008 .032 .020 .023 D
37. Could see nothing in the future to be hopeful -.099 .810 .035 -.006 .145 .033 -.095 D
34. Pretty worthless -.019 .787 .024 .049 .031 -.095 -.018 D
35. Intolerant o f anything kept me fi*om going .126 .045 .681 -.074 -.009 .069 -.024 S
30. Feared “thrown” by trivial but unfamiliar task -.078 -.059 .656 .036 .298 -.050 .065 A
32. Difficult to tolerate interruptions .050 -.056 .621 .162 .150 .107 -.077 s
40. Worried about situations got panic .016 -.037 .539 .046 .332 -.070 .075 A
29. Hard to calm down after something upset .326 .088 .483 .057 -.002 .019 -.113 S
5. Couldn’t seem to get going .055 -.181 -.003 .796 .139 .010 -.071 D
16. Had lost interest in just about everything -.132 .135 .055 .767 -.079 .073 -.011 D
24. Couldn’t get any enjoyment out o f things -.017 -.026 .175 .762 -.087 -.059 -.021 D
31. Unable to become enthusiastic about anything -.278 .135 .339 .665 -.051 -.003 -.012 D
3. Couldn’t seem to experience positive feelings .260 -.056 -.251 .594 .182 .057 -.106 D
42. Difficult to work up the initiative to do things -.184 -.078 .315 .519 .185 -.026 .111 D
10. Had nothing to look forward to .139 .309 -.135 .508 -.019 -.005 -.156 D
36. Felt terrified .080 .066 .090 .055 .644 .107 -.016 A
39. Getting agitated .063 .156 .086 .061 .591 .110 -.049 s
20. Scared without any good reason .008 .059 .119 -.042 .530 .087 .224 A
28. Close to panic .071 .072 .105 .050 .513 .074 .113 A
26. Felt down-hearted and blue .152 .233 -.047 .225 .325 -.012 .143 D
9. Situations so anxious most relieved when ended .099 -.070 .305 .083 .324 -.059 .163 A
2. .Aware o f dryness o f my mouth -.098 -.009 .222 -.128 .175 .786 -.278 A
4. Experienced breathing difficulty .109 -.080 -.173 .107 .026 .680 .043 A
23. Difficulty in swallowing -.046 -.006 -.005 -.128 .196 .673 -.020 A
25. Aware o f action o f heart -.020 -.015 .071 .102 -.048 .354 .338 A
19. Perspired noticeably -.135 -.029 -.004 -.062 .105 -.200 .821 A
41. Experienced trembling -.024 -.101 .098 -.198 .407 .003 .673 A
15. A feeling o f  faintness .131 .033 -.032 .154 -.292 .291 .501 A
7. A feeling o f  shakiness .091 .070 -.124 -.083 .132 .329 .471 A
Variance accounted by the factor 33.7% 
Total variance explained by the 7 factors = 57.30%
6.7% 4.5% 3.8% 3.2% 3.0% 2.5%
belonged; D=Depression, A=Anxiety, S=Stress.
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made up entirely of DASS-Depression item related to anhedonia and inertia. The fifth 
factor was again a mixture of DASS-Stress and DASS-Anxiety items pertaining to 
subjective fear, agitation and panic. Finally, Factor 6 and Factor 7 were both DASS- 
Anxiety items referring to autonomic changes and physiological arousal. Factor 6 is 
consisted of items pertaining to breathing, swallowing and cardio-vascular activities; 
while Factor 7 is consisted of items pertaining to musculoskeletal activities and 
giddiness.
As the initial seven-factor solution conformed nicely to the three constructs 
assessed by DASS, namely Factors 1 and 3 for stress. Factors 2 and 4 for depression, 
and Factors 5, 6 and 7 for anxiety, a three-factor model was also attempted to see 
whether the three constructs would emerge as distinct factors (Table 16). According 
to the analysis, the three factors accounted for 44.9% of the total variance. The first 
factor comprised most of the depression items, with the exception of one anxiety item 
and one stress item in the original DASS. The second factor, on the other hand, 
contained eight stress items in the original DASS, as well as two depression items and 
three anxiety items. Items in this factor pertained primarily to situational worries, 
intolerance, irritability, upset, and hard to calm down. This is clearly a factor of stress 
and arousal which bore some resemblance to the “anxiety/apprehension” factor 
described in Barlow’s three-factor model (Barlow et al, 1996). The third factor was 
predominately comprised of anxiety items from the original DASS-Anxiety scale but 
also contained five stress items, three of which also loaded highly on Factor 2. Items 
from this factor were those related to acute physiological arousal such as (4) breathing 
difficulty, (7) shakiness, (23J difficulty swallowing,{\5) faintness, and so on. These
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Table 16
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Oblique (Promax) Rotation for DASS:
(3-Factors Forced)
1
Factor loadings 
2 3
Scale
38. Life was meaningless .968 -.168 -.076 D
21. Life wasn’t worthwhile .896 -.189 .042 D
37. Could see nothing in the future to be hopeful .882 -.126 -.082 D
34. Pretty worthless .871 -.060 -.150 D
17. Wasn’t worth much as a person .835 -.147 -.037 D
10. Had nothing to look forward to .639 -.026 .034 D
16. Had lost interest in just about everything .584 .181 -.038 D
26. Felt down-hearted and blue .520 .113 .261 D
31. Unable to become enthusiastic about anything .496 .456 -.302 D
3. Couldn’t seem to experience positive feelings .398 -.007 .314 D
13. Sad and depressed .395 .104 .366 D
39. Getting agitated .382 .189 .252 S
5. Couldn’t seem to get going .356 .296 .068 D
36. Feel terrified .306 .227 .294 A
30. Feared would be “thrown” by trivial but unfamiliar task -.032 .848 -.214 A
35. Intolerant o f anything that kept me from going -.146 .810 .115 S
32. Difficult to tolerate interruptions -.038 .805 -.077 S
40. Worried about situations got panic .029 .758 -.122 A
29. Hard to calm down after something upset .006 .692 -.024 S
18. Rather touchy -.102 .658 .067 S
27. Very irritable -.119 .650 .193 S
14. Getting impatient when delayed in any way -.246 .610 .143 S
42. Difficult to work up the initiative to do things .275 .565 -.136 D
9. In situations so anxious would most relieved when ended :060 .535 .073 . A
24. Couldn’t seem to get any enjoyment out o f the things .397 .431 -.152 D
11. Getting upset rather easily .111 .404 .264 S
22. Hard to wind dovm .158 .314 .281 S
4. Experienced breathing difficulty -.062 -.306 .878 A
7. A feeling o f shakiness .090 -.163 .742 A
23. Difficulty in swallowing .007 -.176 .723 A
15. A feeling o f faintness .031 -.022 .601 A
2. Aware o f dryness o f my mouth -.185 -.042 .575 A
25. Aware o f action o f heart in absence o f physical exertion .006 .038 .515 A
6. Over-react to situations -.084 .242 .487 S
12. Using a lot o f nervous energy -.157 .212 .478 S
41. Experienced trembling -.036 .218 ;443 A
33. In a state o f nervous tension .036 .345 .410 S
8. Difficult to relax -.015 .337 .402 S
1. Getting upset by quite trivial things -.119 .333 .349 S
20. Scared without any good reason .218 .220 .321 A
28. Close to panic .274 .241 .202 A
19. Perspired noticeably .078 .102 .285 A
Variance accounted by the factor
Total variance explained by the 3 factors =
33.7%
44.90%
6.7% 4.5%
Note. Factor loadings with absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed. Scale = The origmal scale to which the item 
belonged; D=Depression, A=Anxiety, S=Stress. The number in parentheses is factor to which the item belonged in the 6- 
factor solution.
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anxiety items described an emotional state which was similar to the “fear/panic” 
factor described by Barlow’s three-factor model (Barlow et al, 1996).
(d) PANAS. On the 20-item PANAS scale, principal-axis factoring with 
Varimax rotation was performed. Three factors which together accounted for 56.1% 
of total variance were extracted. The factor loadings of each item were shown in 
Table 17. The first factor, amounting to 25.6% of variance, consisted of all the 10 
items in the original NA scale. The second factor, accounting for 20.8% of 
totalvariance, comprised 7 out of 10 items from the PA scale. The third factor 
contained the remaining three items, (3) excited, (1) interested, and (19) active 
contributing to 11.7% of total variance. As shown in the table, (9) enthusiastic, (14) 
inspired, (5) strong, and (10) proud also showed moderate loadings on this factor. 
Two of the three items in the third factor, (1) interested and (19) active were also 
found to load heavily on the second factor (factor loadings greater than .300).
When forced using a two-factor solution (Table 18), the original items of the 
PA and NA scales emerged perfectly as the two factors originally proposed by 
Watson, L.A. Clark, and Tellegen (1988), each accounting for 26.5% and 23.6% of 
the total variance respectively.
Higher Order Factor Analysis fo r  Pooled BDI and BAI Items
As a preliminary step towards the extraction of a higher order factor, items 
from the BDI and the BAI were pooled together for exploratory factor analysis. For 
rationale mentioned earlier, the principal-axis factoring method was used and the data
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Table 17
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Orthogonal (Varimax) Rotation for PANAS 
(3-Factor Solution)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Negative
7. Scared .792 -.120 -.028
20. Afraid .769 -.095 -.064
2. Distressed .737 -.016 -.164
18. Jittery .709 -.048 -.020
6. Guilty .688 -.146 .122
4. Upset .683 -.045 -.202
15. Nervous .678 .175 -.265
11. Irritable .628 .170 -.025
13. Ashamed .583 -.070 .043
8. Hostile .522 -.069 .166
Positive
17. Attentive -.098 .863 .043
16. Determined -.107 .843 .114
12. Alert .018 .767 .063
09. Enthusiastic -.047 .662 .461
14. Inspired -.048 .661 .381
05. Strong .003 .659 .313
10. Proud .007 .471 .433
Excitement
03. Excited .008 .251 .783
01. Interested -.143 .312 .729
19. Active -.061 .554 .583
Variance accounted 25.6% 20.8% 11.7%
by the factor
Total variance explained by the 3 factors = 56.08%
Note. Factor loadings with an absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
288
Negative affect structure
Table 18
Principal-Component Factor Analysis with Orthogonal (Varimax) Rotation for PANAS 
(2 Factors Forced!
Factor 1 Factor 2
Positive
9. Enthusiastic .806 -.048
16. Determined .780 -.086
19. Active .776 -.071
14. Inspired .763 -.046
17. Attentive .760 -.074
5. Strong .726 .009
12. Alert .688 .039
1. Interested .646 -.167
10. Proud .628 .002
3. Excited .621 -.020
Negative
7. Scared -.119 .788
20. Afraid -.116 .768
2. Distressed -.101 .743
18. Jittery -.053 .707
15. Nervous .011 .694
4. Upset -.144 .690
6. Guilty -.063 .677
11. Irritable .131 .633
13. Ashamed -.038 .578
8. Hostile .026 .512
Variance accounted 26.5% 23.6%
by the factor
Total variance explained by the 2 factors = 50.14%
Note. Factor loadings with an absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
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were rotated obliquely (Promax) to generate initial factor solutions. The combined 
BDI and BAI data were forced to a two-factor solution (Table 19) which clearly 
separated the original BDI items from the original BAI items with the exception of 
(BAI-05) fear o f worse happening which loaded on the depression factor.
The two primary factors were further orthogonalised according to the Schmid- 
Leiman procedure. The transformed loadings of the 21 BDI and 21 BAI items on the 
second-order factor and the two first-order factors are presented in Table 20. For ease 
of reference, BDI items and BAI items were listed separately and were presented in 
the descending order of the first-order factor loadings which still remained after the 
transformation. The total variance explained by the general second-order factor was 
68.5%, leaving 15.8% of variance for specific components of depression and 15.7% of 
variance for specific components of anxiety. After the Schmid-Leiman 
transformation, many of the symptoms with salient loadings in the first-order analyses 
became nonsalient after the variance shared with the second-order factor was 
controlled. For the BAI, those items which remained salient after the Schmid-Leiman 
transformation included (7) palpitation, (13) shaky, (12) hands trembling, {2) feeling 
hot, (15) difficulty breathing, (19) faint, (11) feeling o f choking, (8) unsteady, (21) 
sweating, (9) terrified, (17) scared, (6) dizzy, (20) face flushed, and (3) wobbliness in 
the legs. Similarly for the BDI, those item which remained salient after the Schmid- 
Leiman transformation included (7) self hate, (3) sense o f failure, (15) work 
inhibition, (8) self accusation, (6) sense o f  punishment, (13) indecisiveness, (2) 
pessimism, (I) dysphoric mood, (14) body image, (4) lack o f  satisfaction, (11) 
irritability, (12) social withdrawal, and (10) crying spells.
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Table 19
Principal-Axis Factoring with Oblique (Promax) Rotation for BDI & BAI Items:
(2-Factors Forced)
1
Factor loadings
2
BDI-07 Self hate .784 -.073
BDI-03 Sense o f failure .696 -.074
BDI-15 Work inhibition .691 -.099
BDI-08 Self accusation .641 -.078
BDI-12 Social withdrawal .625 -.083
BDI-06 Sense o f punishment .622 .041
BDI-13 Indecisiveness .608 .008
BDI-14 Body image .606 -.146
BDI-02 Pessimism .605 -.041
BDI-01 Dysphoric mood .596 .093
BDI-11 Irritability .583 -.085
BDI-04 Lack o f satisfaction .559 .001
BDI-10 Crying spells .559 -.060
BDI-05 Guilty feeling .518 .089
BDI-17 Fatigability .463 .098
BDI-09 Self-punitive wishes .427 .072
BAI005 Fear o f  the worst happening .388 .273
BDI-21 Loss o f libido .370 .029
BDI-20 Somatic preoccupation .280 .153
BDI-16 Sleep disturbance .263 .161
BDI-18 Loss o f appetite .237 .164
BDI-19 Weight loss .075 .069
BAI-07 Heart pounding or racing -.126 .754
BAI-I3 Shaky -.127 .734
BAI-12 Hands trembling -.162 .722
BAI-I5 Difficulty breathing -.024 .659
BAI-02 Feeling hot -.166 .638
BAI-11 Feeling o f choking .008 .629
BAI-19 Faint .006 .619
BAI-2I Sweating (not due to heat) -.118 .576
BAI-I7 Scared .182 .570
BAI-03 Wobbliness in legs -.045 .561
BAI-08 Unsteady .200 .561
BAI-09 Terrified .206 .557
BAI-06 Dizzy or light-headed .069 .545
BAI-20 Face flushed .011 .542
BAI-OI Numbness or tingling -.040 .458
BAI-IO Nervous .284 .441
BAI-I4 Fear of losing control .269 .433
BAI-04 Unable to relax .327 .416
BAI-I8 Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen .132 .380
BAI-16 Fear o f dying .162 .309
Variance accounted by the factor
Total variance explained by the 2 factors =
27.4%
33.21%
5.8%
Note: Factor loadings with absolute value over .300 were bold-face typed.
The BAI item occurring in the BDI factor solution is indicated in bold-face type.
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Table 20
Schmid-Leiman Pattern Matrices of BDI and BAI: 
(arranged in descending order of first-order factor loadings)
Negative affect structure
First Order
Scale Item
Second
Order Depression Anxiety
BAI-07 Heart pounding or racing .52 -.07 .43
BAI-13 Shaky .49 -.07 .42
BAI-12 Hands trembling .46 -.09 .41
BAI-02 Feeling hot .43 -.07 .37
BAI-15 Difficulty breathing .53 .01 .36
BAI-19 Faint .52 .00 .36
BAI-11 Feeling o f choking .52 .02 .34
BAI-08 Unsteady .63 .11 .33
BAI-21 Sweating (not due to heat) .38 -.07 .33
BAI-09 Terrified .62 .11 .32
BAI-17 Scared .61 .10 .32
BAI-06 Dizzy or light-headed .50 .03 .32
BAI-20 Face flushed .45 -.01 .32
BAI-03 Wobbliness in legs .43 -.02 .32
BAI-01 Numbness or tingling .36 -.02 .27
BAI-04 Unable to relax .61 .18 .25
BAI-14 Fear o f losing control .58 .16 .25.
BAI-10 Nervous .55 .14 .24
BAI-18 Indigestion/discomfort in abdomen .42 .06 .23
BAI-16 Fear o f dying .39 .10 .17
BAI-05 Fear o f the worst happening .55 .22 .16
BDI-07 Self hate .58 .45 -.05
BDI-03 Sense o f failure .51 .40 -.05
BDI-15 Work inhibition .49 .38 -.04
BDI-08 Self accusation .47 .38 -.05
BDI-06 Sense o f punishment .54 .36 .01
BDI-13 Indecisiveness .52 .36 .00
BDI-02 Pessimism .48 .35 -.02
BDI-01 Dysphoric mood .57 .34 .05
BDI-14 Body image .38 .34 -.08
BDI-04 Lack of satisfaction .48 .33 .00
BDI-11 Irritability .39 .32 -.05
BDI-12 Social withdrawal .39 .32 -.05
BDI-10 Crying spells .42 .31 -.02
BDI-05 Guilty feeling .48 .28 .05
BDI-I7 Fatigability .46 .27 .05
BDI-09 Self-punitive wishes .41 .24 .05
BDI-21 Loss o f libido .34 .20 .04
BDI-16 Sleep disturbance .36 .17 .08
BDI-20 Somatic preoccupation .35 .16 .09
BDI-18 Loss o f appetite .34 .15 .09
BDI-19 Weight loss .13 .06 .03
Eigenvalue 9.58 2.21 2.19
% variance total 22.81 5.26 5.21
% variance explained 68.53 15.81 15.67
Note: N=649. Salient coefficients > .30 are in bold-face type.
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory 
BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory
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Higher Order Factor Analysis fo r  DASS
Higher order factor analysis was also performed on the three-factor solution of 
DASS as presented earlier in Table 16. The Schimid-Leiman transformed loadings of 
the 42 DASS items on the second-order factor and the three first-order factors are 
presented in Table 21. The total variance explained by the general second-order factor 
was 73.7%, leaving 14.3% of variance for specific components of depression, 7.3% of 
variance for specific components of stress, and 4.7% of variance for specific 
components of anxiety. Almost all of the first-order anxiety items were no longer 
salient after the Schmid-Leiman transformation except for item (4) experienced 
breathing difficulty. For the first-order Depression factor, those items which remained 
salient after the variance shared with the second-order factor was controlled included: 
(38) life was meaningless, (21) life wasn’t worthwhile, (37) could see nothing in the 
future to be hopeful, (34) pretty worthless, (17) wasn’t worth much as a person, (10) 
had nothing to look forward to, (16) had lost interest in just about everything, and 
(26) felt down-hearted and blue. For the first-order Stress factor, those items which 
remained salient after the Schmid-Leiman transformation included: (32) difficult to 
tolerate interruptions, (35) intolerant o f anything that kept me from going, and, (29) 
hard to calm down after something upsetting.
In summary, the Schmid-Leiman transformation procedure for pooled BDI and 
BAI items showed that when the variance was transformed to the high-order factor, 
there still existed specific first-order dimensions for anxiety and depression. By 
contrast, Schmid-Leiman transformation of the DASS data showed that after the 
extraction of a second-order factor, the first-order anxiety and stress dimensions in the
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Table 21
Schmid-Leiman Pattern Matrices of DASS:
(arranged in descending order of first-order factor loadings)
Negative affect structure
First Order
Item
Second
Order Depression Stress Anxiety
D-38. Life was meaningless .52 .65 -.07 -.04
D-2I. Life wasn’t worthwhile .54 .58 -.08 .02
D-37. Could see nothing in the future to be hopeful .47 .55 -.04 -.04
D-34. Pretty worthless .47 .55 -.01 -.06
D-17. Wasn’t worth much as a person .46 .51 -.05 -.02
D-IO. Had nothing to look forward to .48 .37 .00 .03
D-16. Had lost interest in just about everything .56 .34 .09 .00
D-26. Felt down-hearted and blue .71 .31 .05 .12
D-31. Unable to become enthusiastic about anything .50 .29 .22 -.11
D-24. Couldn’t seem to get any enjoyment out o f the things .53 .23 .20 -.05
D-13. Sad and depressed .70 .22 .03 .18
D-03. Couldn’t seem to experience positive feelings .56 .22 .00 .14
D-05. Couldn’t seem to get going .58 .20 .14 .05
D-42. Difficult to work up the initiative to do things .57 .16 .26 -.05
A-04. Experienced breathing difficulty .43 -.05 -.13 .33
A-07. A feeling o f shakiness .55 .04 -.08 .29
A-23. Difficulty in swallowing .46 .00 -.07 .27
A-15. A feeling o f faintness .51 .01 .00 .23
A-02. Aware o f dryness o f my mouth .30 -.09 .00 .19
A-25. Aware o f action o f heart in absence o f physical exertion .46 .01 .02 .18
A-41. Experienced trembling .53 -.03 .09 .17
A-36. Feel terrified .68 .17 .10 .14
A-20. Scared without any good reason .62 .12 .10 .14
A-28. Close to panic .65 .15 .10 .13
A-I9. Perspired noticeably .31 .05 .06 .07
A-09. In situations so anxious would most relieved when ended .56 .03 .23 .04
A-40. Worried about situations got panic .57 .01 .34 -.04
A-30. Feared would be “thrown” by trivial but unfamiliar task .52 -.02 .39 -.08
S-32. Difficult to tolerate interruptions .59 -.03 .37 -.02
S-35. Intolerant o f anything that kept me from going .48 -.09 .35 -.03
S-29. Hard to calm down after something upset .57 .00 .30 .01
S-27. Very irritable .63 -.08 .27 .10
S-I8. Rather touchy .54 -.06 .27 .05
S-14. Getting impatient when delayed in any way .46 -.14 .24 .07
S-11. Getting upset rather easily .66 .05 .16 .13
S-33. In a state o f nervous tension .67 .01 .14 .18
S-22. Hard to wind down .63 .09 .13 .13
S-08. Difficult to relax .62 -.02 .13 .18
S-OI. Getting upset by quite trivial things .49 -.07 .12 .15
S-39. Getting agitated .66 .22 .08 .11
S-06. Over-react to situations .55 -.05 .08 .21
S-12. Using a lot o f nervous energy .46 -.09 .08 .19
Eigenvalue 12.73 2.47 1.26 0.81
% variance total 30.31 5.88 3.00 1.93
% variance explained 73.70 14.30 7.30 
Note: N=649. Salient coefficients > .30 are in bold-face type.
D = Depression subscale o f the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-D) 
A = Anxiety subscale o f the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-A)
S = Stress subscale o f the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-S)
4.69
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DASS became almost totally nonsalient. The depression factor again proved that it is 
a stable and robust dimension which still retained its specific saliency even after the 
varianee of a second-order factor were partialled out.
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Discussion
The present thesis sought to examine the negative affect structure among 
Chinese in Hong Kong, particularly with respect to the emotional states of anxiety and 
depression. Several psychometric scales were compiled and translated to assess the 
various mood conditions concerned. During the study, attempt was made to select 
local participants from diverse backgrounds so as to enhance generalisability of the 
present findings, although the partieipants were still dominated by young adults with 
relatively high levels of education. Apart from generating considerable data 
pertaining to the above issues addressed, the present study also provided preliminary 
normative data for a number of established psychometric scales, including BDI, BAI, 
DASS and PANAS, which have been gaining inereasing attention from current 
research in the field. Close reference was made to the tripartite model of L.A. Clark 
and Watson (1991b), the content-specificity hypothesis of Beck (Beck, 1976), and the 
three-factor model of Barlow and his colleagues (Barlow et al., 1996; T.A. Brown et 
al., 1998). By way of higher order factor analysis, an attempt was also made to 
extract a general second-order affectivity factor, which underpins the negative 
emotions of anxiety and depression (D.A. Clark, Steer & Beck, 1994; Watson & D.A. 
Clark, 1992). In addition, the cultural influence of somatisation was examined in the 
present study with local Chinese participants.
The Constructs o f  Depression and Anxiety
As reported earlier, all of the employed scales resulted in excellent internal 
consistency despite the fact that all the scales used were Chinese versions translated
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from English. According to confirmatory factor analysis, the BDI data was found to 
concur satisfactorily to the two-factor structure reported in a local study (Shek, 1990); 
but did not fit the five-factor model obtained for community sample in the West 
(Campbell et ah, 1984). It is important to note here that no single consensus has so 
far been reached regarding the factor components of BDI. Instead, various studies 
have suggested that the number of factors for BDI ranged variably from three to 
seven, depending on the extraction procedure and samples employed (Beck, Steer & 
Garbin, 1988). Nevertheless, based on latent structure analysis, several studies have 
contented that depression as assessed by BDI would be best depicted as a general 
syndrome composed of three highly intercorrelated components described by Beck 
and Lester (1973), namely “Negative Attitudes Toward Self’, “Performance 
Impairment”, and “Somatic Disturbances” (e.g., D.C. Clark, Cavanaugh & Gibbons, 
1983; D.C. Clark, Gibbons, Fawcett, Aagesen & Sellers, 1985; Tanaka & Huba, 
1984).
Interestingly, according to exploratory factor analysis, the initial five factor 
solutions of BDI obtained in the present study clustered nicely into three domains: 
“Negative Cognition and Affect”, “Functional Impairment”, and “Somatic and 
Vegetative Symptoms”, which were reminiscent of the three factor components 
described by Beck and Lester (1973). In view of the fact that the present data 
produced a satisfactory fit to the two-factor model of Shek (1990), an attempt was 
also made to force the present BDI data into a two-factor solution. The outcome was 
a near replication of the two factors identified by Shek (1990), namely, “General 
Depression” and “Somatic Disturbance”. However, as compared to the three-factor
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model, the two-factor solution ended with a significant drop in accountable total 
variance from 54.8% to 39.4%. Considering the close concordance of factor patterns 
between the present study and that of Beck and Lester (1973), a three-factor model of 
depression as measured by the BDI appears to be a more parsimonious structure for 
our Chinese samples in Hong Kong.
As for the construct of anxiety, confirmatory factor analysis performed for 
BAI failed to fit both the four-factor structure (A. Osman et al., 1993) and the five- 
factor structure (Borden et al., 1991) for Western community samples. On the other 
hand, exploratory factor analysis of the BAI produced an initial solution of three 
components with rather blurred distinctions, including a factor of “Subjective Fear” 
and two factors of “Autonomic Arousal". The three factors together accounted for a 
total variance of 52.7%, albeit containing considerable non-specific items with shared 
loadings between factors. When forced into a two-factor solution, however, the 
resulting factor matrix delineated two relatively distinctive components of 
“Autonomic Arousal” and “Subjective Fear”, associated with only a small decrease of 
accountable variance to 47.1%. These two factors emerged to form a more 
interpretable structure of anxiety, highly compatible to that reported by Beck et al. 
(1988) in their original development of BAI for measuring clinical anxiety in a 
Western sample of psychiatric outpatients.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
For both the anxiety and depression scales, satisfactory convergent validity 
was established in the present study, as shown by the high correlations between the 
respective anxiety and depression measures, r=.73 for BAI and DASS-Anxiety; r=.73
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for BDI and DASS-Depression. Moreover, there was evidence of divergent validity 
for the anxiety and depression measures, as their convergent correlations consistently 
exceeded the discriminant coefficients as shown in the correlational matrix (Table 7), 
r=.64 for BDI and BAI; r=.61 for BDI and DASS-Anxiety, r= 57 for BAI and DASS- 
Depress. According to the classic criterion originally proposed by D.T. Campbell and 
Fiske (1959), if emotion scales tap distinct and important constructs, they should 
produce clear convergent and discriminant patterns. That is, alternative measures of 
the same affect should be more highly related than scales which were supposed to 
assess different affects. The present data has clearly established the viability of 
anxiety and depression as meaningful, discernible constructs.
It is noteworthy, however, that all of the psychometric scales employed also 
bore significant correlations with each other, as typically found in research on self- 
rated emotional experience (Gotlib, 1984). Because of findings like this, several 
investigators have questioned the discriminant validity of self-report scales for 
measuring specific mood states, leading to suggestion that they are more or less 
interchangeable measures of general psychological distress or negative affectivity 
(Tellegen, 1985; Watson & L.A. Clark, 1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two opposing contentions with 
respect to the construct specificity of depression and anxiety that have generated 
considerable debate. On the one hand, depression and anxiety have been viewed as 
separate, distinctive mood conditions as implied in the dual model (e.g., Roth et al., 
1972; Lipman, 1982), which appeared to receive good support from the satisfactory 
patterns of convergent and divergent findings obtained in the present study. On the
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Other hand, the significant correlations between anxiety and depression measures in 
the present study also seemed to lend support to the view that they reflect relatively 
non-specific variants of a general affective condition as implicated in the unitary 
model (e.g., L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991a; Tyrer, 1985).
In recent years, the unitary versus dual construct debate has given way to more 
sophisticated views on the relationship between depression and anxiety. Typically, 
investigators in the field have used a variety of multivariate techniques to isolate 
common and unique features of the two constructs, developing various structural 
models for accounting the accumulative data (e.g., Barlow et al., 1996; D.A. Clark, 
Steer & Beck, 1994; L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991b; Zinbarg, Barlow & Brown, 1997). 
It has gradually come to the realisation that affective specificity (dual position) and 
non-specificity (unitary position) are not necessarily exclusive phenomena. In other 
words, evidence for significant specificity does not thereby suggest that non-specific 
relations do not exist; conversely, evidence of strong and consistent relations among 
primary affects does not necessarily indicate that specific emotions cannot be 
identified. In essence, according to recent structural views on depression and anxiety, 
affective specificity and non-specificity are assumed to exist concurrently in a 
complementary fashion (Watson & L.A. Clark, 1992).
Relationship Between Depression and Anxiety
Several competing models addressing the relationship between depression and 
anxiety have emphasized both their distinctive and differentiating features (Watson & 
Kendall, 1989). In general, two major conceptual approaches have received much
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recent attention, namely the phenotypic approach exemplified by the tripartite model 
(L.A. Clark and Watson, 1991b) and the cognitive approach represented by the 
cognitive content-specificity hypothesis (Beck, 1976). While the phenotypic 
approach emphasizes the explanatory power of deriving affective structures for 
differentiating the common and specific dimensions of depression and anxiety, the 
cognitive approach focuses on the different cognitive aspects that characterise anxiety 
and depression. Both of these conceptual approaches will be discussed alternatively 
in the light of the present findings.
The Tripartite Model
In recent years, phenotypic models increasingly have emphasised that 
depression and anxiety are characterised by both common and distinctive features. 
Based on the seminal work of Tellegen (1985) on the basic dimensions of Negative 
Affect (NA) and Positive Affect (PA), L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b) argued in 
favour of their tripartite model that symptoms of depression and anxiety could be 
categorised into three basic groups: (a) general emotional distress or Negative Affect 
shared by both anxiety and depression; (b) somatic tension and hyperarousal specific 
to anxiety; and (c) anhedonia or absence of Positive Affect specific to depression.
Several significant findings in the present study are in fact consistent with the 
tripartite model. Firstly, a very low negative correlation was obtained between PA 
and NA (r = -.13, see Table 7), indicating that they are relatively independent 
constructs as originally proposed by Tellegen (1985). Secondly, all of the depression 
and anxiety measures were found to be positively correlated with NA to a large 
magnitude ranging from .53 to .66, presumably as a result of their commonality in
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reflecting general emotional distress or NA. Thirdly, while negative correlations of a 
relatively smaller magnitude were found between PA and the anxiety scales, the 
highest correlations were obtained for both of the depression scales, r = -.37 for BDI 
and r = -.42 for DASS-Depression, indicating a lack of positive affect or anhedonia in 
depression. Finally, items pertaining to hyperarousal and somatic tension were found 
to load heavily on the anxiety factor as shown in the factor analysis for the pooled 
BDI and BAI items (Table 19), providing support for the specific relationship 
between autonomic arousal and anxiety as postulated in the tripartite model.
Barlow^s Three-Factor Model
As compared to the tripartite model of L.A. Clark and Watson (1991b), 
Barlow’s three-factor model of Depression, Anxiety and Fear made a further 
distinction between “anxiety/apprehension” and “fear/panic” (Barlow et al., 1996; 
T.A. Brown et al., 1998). At the symptom level, Barlow and colleagues argued that
(a) general distress and Negative Affect are manifestations of anxiety/apprehension,
(b) autonomic arousal is an expression of fear/panic, (c) anhedonia, low Positive 
Affect, and hopelessness are indicators of depression.
With respect to confirmatory factor analysis on DASS, the present data failed 
to conform to the three component factors of depression, anxiety and stress as 
delineated in the original DASS study (P.F. Lovibond & S.H.. Lovibond, 1995). A 
closer examination on the three-factor solution extracted for DASS (Table 16), 
however, showed that the overall distribution of DASS items converge to form three 
symptom clusters highly consistent to the three factors depicted in Barlow's model. 
While the first factor was dominated by homogenous items pertaining to DASS-
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Depression characterised by negative cognitions and anhedonia, the second factor was 
found to contain a mixture of DASS-Stress, DASS-Anxiety and DASS-Depression 
items, which seemed to be characteristic of NA or the “anxiety/apprehension” 
dimension in Barlow's three-factor model. The third factor, comprised of a 
combination of DASS-Anxiety and DASS-Stress items, were nevertheless found to be 
marked by typical signs of autonomic change compatible to the year/panic” 
dimension. In summary, therefore, Barlow’s three-factor model received fairly good 
support from the results of the present study.
Hierarchical Arrangement o f  Depression and Anxiety
The idea of a second-order factor which underpins the negative emotions of 
anxiety and depression was inherent in a number of studies (Tanaka & Huba, 1984; 
Watson & L.A. Clark, 1992; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Although not explicitly 
expressed in their original postulations, the Watson group of workers (Watson & L.A. 
Clark, 1992; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) implied the possibility of a higher 
hierarchical factor of Negative Affect which accounts for the commonality between 
lower order factors of anxiety and depression. The work of Zinbarg and colleagues 
(Zinbarg & Barlow, 1991; Zinbarg et al., 1997) articulated a second-order factor for 
anxiety disorders which bore some resemblance to the NA component of the 
hierarchical tripartite model expressed by L.A. Clark & Watson (1991b). In the 
present investigation, the reference studies to extract a second-order factor of general 
affectivity were those of D.A. Clark et al. (1994) and Steer et al. (1995).
As shown in Table 20, the hierarchical model received fairly good support 
from higher-order factor analysis for the pooled items from BDI and BAI. Principal-
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factor analysis of 42 items from the BDI and BAI revealed the presence of two 
primary, correlated factors in the present sample. The BDI Depression and BAI 
Anxiety factors were then subjected to a high-order factor analysis using the Schmid- 
Leiman transformation procedure (Gorsuch, 1983; Loehlin, 1987). While the single 
second-order factor accounted for 68.5% of the accountable variance, the depression 
and anxiety first-order factors continued to explain significant amounts of unique 
variance, 15.8% and 15.7% respectively, even after removal of common variance 
attributable to the second-order factor.
In the present study, the extracted second-order factor could be interpreted as 
an NA dimension because those with exclusive loadings on this factor were items 
pertaining to a mixture of diffuse anxiety and depression symptoms such as subjective 
fear, worry, nervousness, fatigue, loss of libido, and sleep disturbances. It is 
interesting to note after the Schmid-Leiman transformation, those items in the first- 
order factors of depression and anxiety which still maintained saliency were 
cognitive-affective symptoms for BDI and autonomic symptoms for BAI respectively. 
More specifically, while the specific depression factor was characterised by cognitive- 
affective items pertaining to negative self-attitudes and anhedonia, the specific 
anxiety factor was distinguished by autonomic symptoms of panic anxiety and 
hyperarousal. As such, the present results yielded broad support for the tripartite 
model or the three-system model within a hierarchical framework.
Schmid-Leiman analysis was also performed for the 42-item DASS, which 
unexpectedly showed quite a different picture as shown in Table 21. Firstly, a 
significant second-order factor was extracted which accounted for a substantial
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percentage of the total variance (73.7%). However, after Schmid-Leiman 
transformation, almost all of the DASS-Anxiety items have disappeared from the 
primary factor of anxiety, presumably as an outcome of their heavy loadings on the 
second-order factor. The same effect occurred for the DASS-Stress items, though to a 
lesser extent that a total of five items remained on the primary stress factor. Thus, in 
addition to non-specific symptoms related to NA, the second-order factor was 
contributed significantly by a considerable range of autonomic symptoms and 
hyperarousal items associated with DASS-Stress and DASS-Anxiety. On the other 
hand, the primary factor of depression was found to be relatively more stable, which 
contained eight specific markers related to negative cognitions and anhedonia, as 
predicted by the tripartite model. Overall, the results are clearly at odds with the 
phenotypic structures discussed so far.
To a considerable extent, these apparently inconsistent findings might reflect 
the types of variables that were included in the scales employed for hierarchical 
analysis (Mineka, Watson & L.A. Clark, 1998). For instance, studies using traditional 
assessment instruments laden with items tapping general Negative Affect have tended 
to support a hierarchical model with a dominant higher order factor. By contrast, 
analyses using carefully selected items that are explicitly linked to the tripartite model 
have yielded greater support for a non-hierarchical arrangement (see Joiner, 1996; 
Joiner et al., 1996). In the light of these findings, the present investigation with BDI 
and BAI has produced a structural pattern clearly more in line with the hierarchical, 
tripartite model (D.A. Clark, Steer & Beck, 1994; Watson & L.A. Clark, 1992). On 
the other hand, relevant analysis performed for DASS has provided factor patterns
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more consistent to the non-hierarchical, three-system model (Barlow et al., 1996) as 
discussed earlier. It is perhaps important to note here that, during the original scale 
development of DASS, elaborate attempt was made to extract specific measures of 
depression, stress, and anxiety, while maximising their differentiation through a boot­
strapping technique (P.F. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond, 1995). Further investigation is 
clearly called for examining this methodological issue and its effects on the discrepant 
findings obtained in the present study.
Cognitive Content-Specificity Hypothesis
According to Beck (1967, 1976), depression and anxiety have unique 
cognitive profiles, and each can be characterised by the form and content of 
cognitions associated with these emotions. In depression, automatic thoughts and 
images of loss and failure dominate the stream of consciousness. These cognitions 
take the form of pervasive, absolute statements about past personal loss or failure. In 
anxiety, the automatic cognitions involve anticipated harm or danger to the personal 
domain. Anxious thinking tends to be more situational, future-oriented and 
probabilistic. Thus, according to the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis, anxiety 
and depression can be differentiated on the basis of their specific cognitive contents 
(Beck & D.A. Clark, 1988).
With reference to the present findings, cognitive elements consistent to the 
themes proposed in Beck’s cognitive content-specificity hypothesis were found to 
emerge as the predominant components for the anxiety and depression measures. 
Specifically, factor analysis of the pooled BDI and BAI items resulted in a clear 
separation of depressive versus anxiety items into their respective scales (see Table
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19). Whereas all cognitive items related to loss and failure were found to load 
exclusively on the BDI, most cognitive items related to the theme of danger and threat 
were found to load heavily on the BAI. This pattern of results was obtained even 
cognitive items for the respective emotions were collapsed across BDI and BAI for 
factor analysis, which provided ample support to the cognitive content-specificity 
hypothesis.
When conceptualised according to Barlow's three-factor model discussed 
earlier, the factor analytic results for DASS also provided complimentary support for 
the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. As shown in Table 16, while the 
depression factor (Factor I) was marked by cognitive items pertaining to negative 
attitudes toward self and future, the anxiety/apprehension factor (Factor 2) was 
characterised by cognitive items related to personal threat and worries. Accordingly, 
the overall results seem to be readily accommodated by both the cognitive approach 
and the phenotypic approach. As recently suggested by several investigators (D.A. 
Clark, Beck & Stewart, 1990; Jolly, Dyck, Kramer & Wherry, 1994), the two 
conceptual models should not be taken as mutually exclusive approaches but rather 
complimentary endeavours to understand the intricate relationship between depression 
and anxiety.
Culture and Somatisation in the Chinese
With respect to depression, a significant finding in the present study pertains 
to the lower mean scores of depression obtained on both BDI and DASS-Depression, 
as compared to the Western norms obtained from compatible samples. This 
observation is interesting but somewhat expected in view of the lower prevalence
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rates of depression documented in recent epidemiological studies involving Chinese 
subjects (Chen et al., 1993; E.K. Yeh, Hwu & Chang, 1985). Literally speaking, the 
lower mean scores on depression can be taken to infer specifically a milder level of 
depression experienced by our local Chinese participants. Alternatively, however, the 
same finding might plausibly reflect a general tendency to under-report negative 
emotional experience as a whole. Since higher means were obtained for the other 
scales in the present study relative to the norms obtained from comparable Western 
studies (cf. Osman et al., 1993; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), it does not seem to lend 
support to the notion of a general tendency to conceal or under-report negative 
emotions among Chinese as commonly suggested (cf. Lau, Cheung, & Waldmann, 
1981).
The question of whether a Chinese sample of participants in the present study 
would endorse more somatic items pertaining to autonomic hyperarousal was 
addressed by endorsement rates and weighted mean scores of BDI and BAI items. 
For the BDI, item endorsement rates and weight means were comparable across the 
psychological and somatic factors. For the BAI, the differences between item 
endorsement rates and weighted means were more marked but in a reverse pattern to 
what was expected, i.e. participants endorsed more psychological items with higher 
mean values than somatic items. The results tended to suggest that the Chinese 
participants did not show a preponderance of endorsement rates for somatic items as 
compared with psychological items.
With further consideration, the results were understandable given the use of 
non-clinical, normal participants, most of them would not experience emotional
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distress sufficiently strong to produce significant somatic complaints. Along this 
argument, different findings might arise with clinical samples in future research. The 
question of whether the Chinese tend more to somatise as compared to Western 
participants could not be addressed in the present study owing to the absence of a 
control group for comparison.
Notwithstanding the established epidemiological findings that females are 
over-represented in mood disorders (Blazer et al., 1994; Chen et al., 1993; Weissman 
et al., 1991), the present study failed to obtain the relevant evidence for gender 
difference that females endorsed significantly higher scores for the depression 
measures in our local Chinese sample. In fact, females scored significantly higher 
than males in measures of anxiety (BAI) and stress (DASS-Stress), which might also 
reflect the tendency of our normal participants to endorse items related to daily stress 
and anxiety symptoms, as opposed to depressive symptoms.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, the present research has provided considerable evidence in 
support of the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991b), the three-system 
model, (Barlow et al., 1996) and the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis (Beck, 
1976), which are considered more aptly as complimentary rather than contradictory 
approaches to the understanding on the relationship between depression and anxiety. 
The hierarchical arrangement between common and specific components of 
depression and anxiety requires further investigation in view of the methodological 
issue on item selection as discussed (cf. Joiner, Catanzaro & Laurent, 1996). 
Relevant comparisons between responses to psychological versus somatic items did
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not provide evidence in favour of the cultural effects of somatisation among the non- 
clinical Chinese participants employed in the present study.
There are several limitations in the present study. First, although participants 
were deliberately sampled from heterogeneous backgrounds with respect to age, sex, 
occupations, education levels and areas of residence, they were still dominated by 
young adults with relatively high levels of education, and thus cannot be regarded as 
entirely “representative” of the general populations in Hong Kong. The extent to 
which the present findings can be generalised to local samples with different 
demographic characteristics needs to be further ascertained in future investigation.
Moreover, only non-clinical subjects were included for the present study. 
Therefore, whether the present findings could be inferred for clinical patients poses a 
further question. To address this problem, future attempt is clearly required to 
replicate the study using clinical subjects with significant emotional disorders. 
Patients from different diagnostic groups, including anxiety, depression, mixed 
anxiety-depression, and neurasthenia would be of particular relevance in validating 
the psychometric scales compiled, examining the inter-relationships between 
depression and anxiety with respect to different diagnostic categories, as well as for 
studying the cultural phenomenon of somatisation.
The present research adopted a psychometric approach, relying on self-report 
mood scales exclusively for examining the local construct of depression and its 
relationship with other affective conditions. Although the findings were in general 
satisfying, particularly in terms of the psychometric properties of the scales compiled.
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there appears ample ground for calling methods of investigation beyond the self- 
report psychometric approach, which unfortunately often lends itself to a number of 
intrinsic confounds, including social desirability, response bias, and possible 
misinterpretation of items, which are methodologically difficult if not impossible to 
control for. In this regard, several recent studies have broadened the empirical 
support for the structural relationships of anxiety and depression by way of employing 
interview-based data (e.g.. Brown et al., 1997), as well as genetic (e.g., Kendler et al., 
1995), and psychophysiological (e.g., Cuhbert, Bradley & Lang, 1996) methods of 
investigation. For instance, although the present study did not provide data for testing 
differences between the alternative models of phenotypic expressions of depression 
and anxiety such as the tripartite model and the three-system model, recent genetic 
findings have provide evidence for geneotypic structures more consistent with the 
taxonomic differentiation among depression, anxiety and panic as implicated in 
Barlow's three-system model (for a comprehensive review, see Mineka, Watson & 
L.A. Clark, 1998).
Finally, the hierarchical versus non-hierarchical issue raised by the 
inconsistent findings obtained for DASS as compared to BDI and BAI certainly 
deserves further attention, especially with respect to the effect of item selection as 
discussed earlier. In this regard, the need for expanding the scope of psychometric 
scales to include a more representative range of items pertaining to the common (NA) 
and specific components (autonomic versus cognitive symptoms) of depression and 
anxiety seems warranted for future research in this area. The Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ) developed by L.A. Clark and Watson (1991a;
311
Negative affect structure
1991b) represents one of the best candidates for future consideration. Moreover, the 
application of advanced structural equation modelling techniques such as LIREL 
would certainly help to throw further light on the issue of hierarchical arrangement 
between depression and anxiety.
All in all, the most striking finding refers to the marked similarity in the 
patterns of results obtained in the present study and the relevant findings documented 
in the Western literature, regarding the relationship between depression and anxiety. 
Although the applicability and generalisability of self-report mood measures 
developed in the West have been frequently questioned in local research, primarily 
based on the assumed differences between foreign and indigenous views or 
conceptions of psychological phenomena, the present study on local Chinese provided 
data revealing a rather different picture, portraying a larger degree of universality or 
commonality of emotional constructs between the East and West than what is 
generally believed.
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Appendix II
Kwai Chung Hospital Clinical Research Project
Serial Number:
1.
2.
Consent to Participate in Psychology Rpsparrh
I consent to participate in the present research with the understanding that it is for the 
purpose of understanding emotional problems.
I was also being informed that the obtained results will be used solely for teaching and 
research purposes. All information regarding my personal data will be kept in strict 
confidence.
Name • Date :
Participant's Signature Researcher:
1. Sex: ÜMale Dpemale 2. Year of Birth: 3: Age
4. Marital Status : □  Single □  Married □  Cohabited
D Divorced D Separated D Widowed
5. Occupation : D Professional D Administrative & Managerial
D Clerical D Sales & Business
D Service D Hawkers & Farmers
D Production WorkersO Armed Forces & Educational
D Student D Housewife
D Others: (Please Specify: ._________________ )
6 Average Income (per month): □  Nil Income □  Below $10,000
□  $10,001~$20,000 □  $20,001-530,000
D 30,001-40,000 O Above $40,001
D Not Applicable
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Consent to Participate in Psychology Research {continue)
1. Education : D No Formal Education D P.l g  p.3 D P.4 ^  P.6
D F . l ^ F .4  D P.5 M F.7 D Tertiary
D Above Tertiary (Masters or Doctoral degree)
8. Research Grouping : D Medical Student D OLI *
□  SPACE + □  Parent
D Nursing D Friend
D Others: (Please Specify_____________________ )
Please fill in the following four questionnaires carefully, and hand them back to the 
research supervisor. If you have any questions, the research supervisor will be glad to 
help.
Thank You For Your Cooperation /
* OLI : Open Learning Institute
+ SPACE : School o f  Professional and Continuing Education
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Appendix IV
Beck Depression Inventory
This questionnaire consists o f 21 groups of statements. After reading each group o f statements carefully, circle 
the number (0, 1 ,2  or 3) next to the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have been 
feeling the past week, including today. If several statements within a group seem to apply equally well, circle 
each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice.
1 0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad.
2 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out o f it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.
2 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.
3 0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot o f failures.
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
1 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don’t get real satisfaction out o f anything anymore.
3 1 am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
5 0 I don’t feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part o f the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most o f the time.
3 I feel guilty all o f the time.
6 0 I don’t feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. 0 I don’t feel disappointed in myself.
1 I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.
8 0 I don’t feel I am any worse than anybody else.
1 I am critical o f myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts o f killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10 0 I don’t cry any more than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can’t cry even though I want to.
3 3 3
11 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
2 I feel irritated all the time now.
3 I don’t get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me.
12 0 I have not lost interest in other people.
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
2 I have lost most o f my interest in other people.
3 I have lost all o f my interest in other people.
13 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to.
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
3 I can’t make decisions at all anymore.
14 0 I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to.
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive.
3 I believe that I look ugly.
15 0 I can work about as well as before.
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can’t do any work at all.
16 0 I can sleep as well as usual.
1 I don’t sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.
17 0 I don’t get more tired than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
18 0 My appetite is no worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.
19 0 I haven’t lost much weight, if  any, lately.
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds.
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds.
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. Y es  No______
20 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual.
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or constipation
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it’s hard to think o f much else.
3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else.
21 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
© Psychological Corporation 1997/1998/1999
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Beck Anxiety Inventory
Appendix VI
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please read each item in the list carefully. 
Indicate how, much you have been bothered by each symptom during the PAST WEEK, 
INCLUDING TODAY by placing an X in the corresponding space in the column next to each 
symptom.
Not at all Mildly 
It did not 
bother me 
much
Moderately
It was very 
unpleasant 
but I could 
stand it
Severely 
I could barely 
stand it
1. Numbness or tingling.
2. Feeling hot.
3. Wobbliness in legs
4. Unable to relax.
5. Fear of the worst happening.
6. Dizzy or lightheaded.
7. Heart pounding or racing.
8. Unsteady.
9. Terrified.
10. Nervous.
11. Feelings of choking.
12. Hands trembling.
13. Shaky.
14. Fear of losing control.
15. Difficulty breathing.
16. Fear of dying.
17. Scared.
18. Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen.
19. Faint
20. Face flushed.
21. Sweating (not due to heat),
© Psychological Corporation 1997/1998/1999
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Appendix VIII
DASS
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1,2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part o f time
3 Applied to me very much, or most o f the time
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
25
26
1 found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0
1 was aware o f dryness o f my mouth 0
1 couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0
1 experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 0
breathlessness in the absence o f physical exertion)
1 just couldn’t seem to get going 0
1 tended to over-react to situations 0
1 had a feeling o f shakiness (eg, legs going to give way) 0
1 found it difficult to relax 0
1 found myself in situations that made me so anxious 1 was most 0
relieved when they ended
1 felt that 1 had nothing to look forward to 0
1 found myself getting upset rather easily 0
1 felt that 1 was using a lot o f nervous energy 0
1 felt sad and depressed 0
I found myself getting impatient when 1 was delayed in any way 0
(eg, lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting)
1 had a feeling o f faintness 0
1 felt that 1 had lost interest in just about everything 0
1 felt 1 wasn’t worth much as a person 0
1 felt that 1 was rather touchy 0
1 perspired noticeably (eg, hands sweaty) in the absence of high 0
temperatures or physical exertion
1 felt scared without any good reason 0
1 felt that life wasn’t worthwhile 0
1 found it hard to wind down 0
1 had difficulty in swallowing 0
1 couldn’t seem to get any enjoyment out of the things 1 did 0
I was aware o f the action o f my heart in the absence o f physical 0
exertion (eg, sense o f heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)
1 felt down-hearted and blue 0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Reminder o f rating scale:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some o f the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
Reminder o f rating scale:
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0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part o f time
3 Applied to me very much, or most o f the time
27 I found that I was very irritable 0
28 I felt I was close to panic 0
29 I found it hard to calm down after something upset me 0
30 I feared that I would be “thrown” by some trivial but 0
unfamiliar task
31 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0
32 I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing 0
33 I was in a state o f nervous tension 0
34 I felt I was pretty worthless 0
35 I was intolerant o f anything that kept me from getting on with 0
what I was doing
36 I felt terrified 0
37 I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 0
38 I felt that life was meaningless 0
39 I found m yself getting agitated 0
40 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 0
a fool o f myself
41 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0
42 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Reminder o f  rating scale:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some o f the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part o f time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
© Dr. Peter Lovibond, University o f NSW
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Appendix X
The PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read 
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to 
what extent you have felt this way during the past week. Use the following scale to record 
your answers.
1 2 
very slightly a little 
or not at all
3
moderately
4
quite a bit
5
extremely
1. interested 1 2 3 4 5
2. distressed 1 2 3 4 5
• 3. excited 1 2 3 4 5
4. upset 1 2 3 4 5
5. strong 1 2 3 4 5
6. guilty 1 2 3 4 5
7. scared 1 2 3 4 5
8. hostile 1 2 3 4 5
9. enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5
10. proud 1 2 3 4 5
11. irritable 1 2 3 4 5
12. alert 1 2 3 4 5
13. ashamed 1 2 3 4 5
14. inspired 1 2 3 4 5
15. nervous 1 2 3 4 5
16. determined 1 2 3 4 5
17. attentive 1 2 3 4 5
18. jittery 1 2 3 4 5
19. active 1 2 3 4 5
20. afraid 1 2 3 4 5
©  Clinical Psychology Foundation
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Appendix XI
Beck Depression Inventory
(Item Designations)
BDI-1 Mood
BDI-2 Pessimism
BDI-3 Sense of Failure
BDI-4 Lack of Satisfaction
BDI-5 Guilty Feeling
BDI-6 Sense of Punishment
BDI-7 Self Hate
BDI-8 Self Accusation
BDI-9 Self-punitive Wishes
BDI-10 Crying Spells
BDI-11 Irritability
BDI-12 Social Withdrawal
BDI-13 Indecisiveness
BDI-14 Body Image
BDI-15 Work Inhibition
BDI-16 Sleep Disturbance
BDI-17 Fatigability
BDI-18 Loss of Appetite
BDI-19 Weight Loss
BDI-20 Somatic Preoccupation
BDI-21 Loss of Libido
3 4 3
Appendix XII
Beck Anxiety Inventory
(Item Designations)
BAI-1 Numbness or Tingling
BAI-2 Feeling Hot
BAI-3 Wobbliness in Legs
BAI-4 Unable to Relax
BAI-5 Fear of the Worst Happening
BAI-6 Dizzy or Light-headed
BAI-7 Heart Pounding or Racing
BAI-8 Unsteady
BAI-9 Terrified
BAI-10 Nervous
BAI-11 Feeling of Choking
BAI-12 Hands Trembling
BAI-13 Shaky
BAI-14 Fear of Losing Control
BAI-15 Difficulty Breathing
BAI-16 Fear of Dying
BAI-17 Scared
BAI-18 Indigestion or Discomfort in Abdomen
BAI-19 Faint
BAI-20 Face Flushed
BAI-21 Sweating (Not due to Heat)
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Appendix XVII
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (LISREL 8.0 Output)
C o n f i r m a t o r y  F a c t o r  A n a l y s i s :  P o s i t i v e  A f f e c t  N e g a t i v e  A f f e c t  S c h e d u l e
R e f :  O r i g i n a l  P A N A S
Observed Variables 
panasl - panas20
Correlation Matrix from From File a:\panas\panadata.txt 
Sample Size: 64 9
Latent Variables: positive negative
Relationships :
panasl panas3 panasS panas9 panaslO panasl2 panasl4 panaslG panasl? panasl9 = 
positive
panas2 panas4 panas6 panas? panasS panasll panaslS panaslS panaslS panas20 = 
negative
Number of Decimals = 3 
Wide Print 
Print Residuals 
End of Problems
Sample Size = 6 4  9
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS
CHI-SQUARE WITH 169 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 980.391 (P = 0.0)
ESTIMATED NON-CENTRALITY PARAMETER (NCP) = 811.391
MINIMUM FIT FUNCTION VALUE = 1.513 
POPULATION DISCREPANCY FUNCTION VALUE (FO) = 1.252 
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA) = 0.0861 
P-VALUE FOR TEST OF CLOSE FIT (RMSEA < 0.05) = .38298?12D-06
EXPECTED CROSS-VALIDATION INDEX (ECVI) = 1.639 
ECVI FOR SATURATED MODEL = 0.648 
ECVI FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL = 9.310
CHI-SQUARE FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL WITH 190 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 5992.818
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 6032.818 
MODEL AIC = 1062.391 
SATURATED AIC = 420.000 
INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 6142.32?
MODEL CAIC =128 6.884 
SATURATED CAIC = 1569.841
349
ROOT MEAN SQUARE RESIDUAL (RMR) = 0.0595 
STANDARDIZED RMR = 0.0595 
GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (GET) = 0.857 
ADJUSTED GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (AGFI) = 0.823 
PARSIMONY GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (PGFI) = 0.690
NORMED FIT INDEX (NFI) = 0.836 
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI) = 0.843 
PARSIMONY NORMED FIT INDEX (PNFI) = 0.74 4 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (OFT) = 0.8 60 
INCREMENTAL FIT INDEX (IFI) = 0.861 
RELATIVE FIT INDEX (RFI) = 0.816
CRITICAL N (CN) = 142.899
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Depression Anxiety Stress Scale
R e f :  O r i g i n a l  D A S S  L o v i b o n d  & L o v i b o n d  ( 1 9 9 5 )
Observed Variables 
DASSl - DASS42
Correlation Matrix from From File A:\DASS\DASSDATA.TXT
Sample Size: 64 9
Latent Variables: DEP ANX STR
Relationships :
DASS3 DASS5 DASSIO DASS13 DASS16 DASS17 DASS21 DASS24 DASS26 DASS31 DASS3 
DASS37 DASS38 DASS4 2 = DEP 
DASSl DASS6 DASS8 DASS11 DASS12 DASS14 DASS18 DASS22 DASS27 DASS29 DASS32 
DASS33 DASS35 DASS39 = ANX 
DASS2 DASS4 DASS7 DASS9 DASS15 DASS19 DASS20 DASS23 DASS25 DASS28 DASS30 DASS36 
DASS40 DASS41 = STR
Number of Decimals = 3 
Wide Print 
Print Residuals 
End of Problems
Sample Size = 64 9
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS
CHI-SQUARE WITH 776 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3384.089 (P = 0.0)
ESTIMATED NON-CENTRALITY PARAMETER (NCP) = 2608.089
MINIMUM FIT FUNCTION VALUE = 5.222 
POPULATION DISCREPANCY FUNCTION VALUE (FO) = 4.025 
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA) = 0.0720 
P-VALUE FOR TEST OF CLOSE FIT (RMSEA < 0.05) = 1.00
EXPECTED CROSS-VALIDATION INDEX (ECVI) = 5.485 
ECVI FOR SATURATED MODEL = 2.657 
ECVI FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL = 20.134
CHI-SQUARE FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL WITH 820 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 12965.010
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 13047.010 
MODEL AIC = 3554.089 
SATURATED AIC = 1722.000 
INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 13271.503 
MODEL CAIC = 4019.500 
SATURATED CAIC = 6436.34 8
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ROOT MEAN SQUARE RESIDUAL (RMR) = 0.0651 
STANDARDIZED RMR = 0.0651 
GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (GFI) = 0.759 
ADJUSTED GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (AGFI) = 0.733 
PARSIMONY GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (PGFI) = 0.684
NORMED FIT INDEX (NFI) = 0.739 
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI) = 0.773 
PARSIMONY NORMED FIT INDEX (PNFI) = 0.699 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.785 
INCREMENTAL FIT INDEX (IFI) = 0.786 
RELATIVE FIT INDEX (RFI) = 0.724
CRITICAL N (CN) = 167.704
352
Confirmatory Factor Analysis : Beck Depression Inventory -  Two Factor
R e f :  S h e k  ( 1 9 9 0 )  ,  H o n g  K o n g  S a m p l e
Observed Variables 
BDIl - BDI21
Correlation Matrix from From File a:\bdi\bdidata.txt 
Sample Size: 64 9
Latent Variables: 'general depression' 'somatic disturbance'
Relationships:
BDIl BDI2 BDI3 BDI4 BDI5 BDI6 BDI7 BDI8 BDI9 BDIIO BDIll BDI13 BDI14 BDI15 = 
'general depression'
BDI12 BDI16 BDI17 BDI18 BDI19 BDI20 BDI21 = 'somatic disturbance'
Number of Decimals = 3 
Wide Print 
Print Residuals 
End of Problems
Sample Size = 64 9
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS
CHI-SQUARE WITH 188 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 667.708 (P = 0.0) 
ESTIMATED NON-CENTRALITY PARAMETER (NCP) = 47 9.708
MINIMUM FIT FUNCTION VALUE = 1.030 
POPULATION DISCREPANCY FUNCTION VALUE (FO) = 0.740 
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA) = 0.0628 
P-VALUE FOR TEST OF CLOSE FIT (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0000278
EXPECTED CROSS-VALIDATION INDEX (ECVI) = 1.163 
ECVI FOR SATURATED MODEL = 0.713 
ECVI FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL = 6.417
CHI-SQUARE FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL WITH 210 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 4116.352
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 4158.352 
MODEL AIC = 753.708 
SATURATED AIC = 4 6 2 . 0 0 0  
INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 4273.336 
MODEL CAIC = 98 9.151 
SATURATED CAIC = 1726.825
ROOT MEAN SQUARE RESIDUAL (RMR) = 0.04 99 
STANDARDIZED RMR = 0.04 99 
GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (GFI) = 0.906 
ADJUSTED GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (AGFI) = 0.885 
PARSIMONY GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (PGFI) = 0.738
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NORMED FIT INDEX (NFI) = 0.838 
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI) = 0.8 63 
PARSIMONY NORMED FIT INDEX (PNFI) = 0.750 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.877 
INCREMENTAL FIT INDEX (IFI) = 0.878 
RELATIVE FIT INDEX (RFI) = 0.819
CRITICAL N (CN) = 230.061
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C o n f i r m a t o r y  F a c t o r  A n a l y s i s :  B e c k  D e p r e s s i o n  I n v e n t o r y  -  F o u r  F a c t o r  
R e f :  C a m p b e l l  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  J o u r n a l  o f  C l i n i c a l  P s y c h o l o g y
Observed Variables 
BDIl - BDI21
Correlation Matrix from From File a:\bdi\bdidata.txt 
Sample Size: 64 9
Latent Variables: 'negative attitude' 'vegetative somatic' 'sadness
hopelessness' 'guilty weight loss'
Relationships:
BDI7 BDI8 BDI9 BDIIO BDIII BDI12 = 'negative attitude'
BDI13 BDI14 BDI15 BDI16 BDI17 BDI18 BDI19 BDI20 BDI21 = 'vegetative somatic' 
BDIl BDI2 BDI3 BDI4 BDI5 BDI6 = 'sadness hopelessness'
BDI4 BDI5 BDI19 = 'guilty weight loss'
Options: AD=OFF 
Number of Decimals = 3 
Wide Print 
Print Residuals 
End of Problems
Sample Size = 6 4  9
W_A_R_N_I_N_G: The solution has not converged after 153 iterations.
The following solution is preliminary and is provided only for the purpose of 
tracing the source of the problem. Setting IT>153 may solve the problem.
The above warning implies that the data fit poorly to the conformed factor 
structure.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis : Beck Anxiety Inventory - Four Factor
R e f :  O s m a n  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 9 3 )  ,  J o u r n a l  o f  P s y c h o p a t h o l o g y  a n d  B e h a v i o r a l  A s s e s s m e n t
Observed Variables 
BAIl - BAI21
Correlation Matrix from From File a:\bai\baidata.txt 
Sample Size: 649
Latent Variables: subjective neurophysio autonomic panic
Relationships :
BAI4 BAI5 BAI9 BAIIO BAI14 BAI17 = subjective 
BAIl BAI3 BAI6 BAI8 BAI12 BAI13 BAI19 = neurophysio 
BAI2 BAI18 BAI20 BAI21 = autonomic 
BAI7 BAIll BAI15 BAI16 = panic
Options: AD=OFF 
Number of Decimals = 3 
Wide Print 
Print Residuals 
End of Problems
Sample Size = 64 9
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS
CHI-SQUARE WITH 183 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 1266.748 (P = 0.0)
ESTIMATED NON-CENTRALITY PARAMETER (NCP) = 1083.748
MINIMUM FIT FUNCTION VALUE = 1.955 
POPULATION DISCREPANCY FUNCTION VALUE (FO) = 1.672 
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA) = 0.0956 
P-VALUE FOR TEST OF CLOSE FIT (RMSEA < 0.05) = .49555567D-06
EXPECTED CROSS-VALIDATION INDEX (ECVI) = 2.103 
ECVI FOR SATURATED MODEL = 0.713 
ECVI FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL = 9.508
CHI-SQUARE FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL WITH 210 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 6119.038
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 6161.038 
MODEL AIC = 1362.748 
SATURATED AIC = 4 62.000 
INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 627 6.022 
MODEL CAIC = 1625.569 
SATURATED CAIC = 1726.825
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ROOT MEAN SQUARE RESIDUAL (RMR) = 0.0735 
STANDARDIZED RMR = 0.0735 
GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (GFI) = 0.838 
ADJUSTED GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (AGFI) = 0.7 96 
PARSIMONY GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (PGFI) = 0.664
NORMED FIT INDEX (NFI) = 0.7 93 
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI) = 0.790 
PARSIMONY NORMED FIT INDEX (PNFI) = 0.691 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.817 
INCREMENTAL FIT INDEX (IFI) =0.817 
RELATIVE FIT INDEX (RFI) = 0.7 62
CRITICAL N (CN) = 118.872
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Beck Anxiety Inventory  -  Five Factor
R e f :  B o r d e n  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 9 1 )  ,  J o u r n a l  o f  P s y c h o p a t h o l o g y  a n d  B e h a v i o r a l  A s s e s s m e n t
Observed Variables 
BAIl - BAI21
Correlation Matrix from From File a:\bai\baidata.txt 
Sample Size: 64 9
Latent Variables: 'subjective fear' 'somatic nervousness' neurophysio muscular
respiration
Relationships :
BAI4 BAI5 BAI9 BAIIO BAIl4 BAIl6 BAIl7 BAIl8 = 'subjective fear'
BAI7 BAI8 BAIIO BAI12 BAII3 = 'somatic nervousness'
BAI2 BAI6 BAIl9 BAI20 BAI21 = neurophysio 
BAIll BAI15 BAI16 = respiration
Options: AD=OFF 
Number of Decimals = 3 
Wide Print 
Print Residuals 
End of Problems
Sample Size = 64 9
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS
CHI-SQUARE WITH 144 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 974.845 (P = 0.0) 
ESTIMATED NON-CENTRALITY,PARAMETER (NCP) = 830.845
MINIMUM FIT FUNCTION VALUE = 1.504 
POPULATION DISCREPANCY FUNCTION VALUE (FO) = 1.282 
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA) = 0.0944 
P-VALUE FOR TEST OF CLOSE FIT (RMSEA < 0.05) = .43189150D-06
EXPECTED CROSS-VALIDATION INDEX (ECVI) = 1.646 
ECVI FOR SATURATED MODEL = 0.58 6 
ECVI FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL = 8.786
CHI-SQUARE FOR INDEPENDENCE MODEL WITH 171 DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 5655.106
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 5693.106 
MODEL AIC = 1066.845 
SATURATED AIC = 380.000 
INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 5797.139 
MODEL CAIC = 1318.715 
SATURATED CAIC = 1420.332
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ROOT MEAN SQUARE RESIDUAL (RMR) = 0.0610 
STANDARDIZED RMR = 0.0610 
GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (GFI) = 0.8 61 
ADJUSTED GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (AGFI) = 0.816 
PARSIMONY GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (PGFI) = 0.652
NORMED FIT INDEX (NFI) = 0.828 
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI) = 0.820 
PARSIMONY NORMED FIT INDEX (PNFI) = 0.697 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.848 
INCREMENTAL FIT INDEX (IFI) =0.849 
RELATIVE FIT INDEX (RFI) = 0.7 95
CRITICAL N (CN).= 124.900
NOTE: CONFIDENCE LIMITS COULD NOT BE COMPUTED DUE TO TOO SMALL P-VALUE FOR CHI- 
SQUARE
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Abstract
A review of literature on the psychology of pain showed that it is inadequate to study 
pain merely from a physiological point of view. Research evidence have ascertained 
the role of psychological variables as an integral part of the experience of pain. A 
multivariate model of pain was thus suggested. It was the aim of the present study to 
examine the functional relationships between some of the more important 
psychological factors in clinical pain. Patients attending a general practice clinic with 
pain as their major presenting symptom were interviewed individually. After two 
screening procedures, a total of 48 patients (27 males and 21 females) successfully 
completed the questionnaires, which included Spielberger’s STAI, Eysenck’s PEN, 
and a Pain Rating Form designed for the present investigation. Assessments were 
made of the patients’ anxiety, personality, pain intensities, and five other 
psychological parameters which were thought to be relevant in qualifying the pain 
experience. It was found that a great majority of the patients displayed considerable 
anxiety about their pain (Focal Anxiety). This anxiety rating was found to be 
unrelated to the intensity of the pain felt at the time of the interview. Instead, it 
correlated highly with ratings of pain when it was at its worst. Inter-correlation 
among the anxiety and personality measures were quite consistent with Eysenck’s and 
Spielberger’s theories. The results also helped to establish the validity of the Focal 
Anxiety measure. As predicted, the rating of the frequency of attacks was found to be 
correlated with the amount of pain felt during the time of the interview. However, the 
predicted relationships between Focal Anxiety and the pain parameters failed to reach 
any statistical significance. Sorhe marginal results and their possible implications 
were also discussed. The characteristics of the types of clinical pain encountered in 
the present study, and the ways in which patients perceived of their pain experience, 
were briefly described. Multivariate analysis of variance on the Focal Anxiety factor
363
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showed that the rating of the pain when its was at its worst was the most important 
variable discriminating the “high”, “medium” and “low” Focal Anxiety groups. 
Similar statistical analysis on A-State anxiety and A-Trait anxiety did not give any 
new information apart from those already shown in the correlational data. No sex 
differences in the present sample was evident. Implications of the present findings 
were discussed, and future research possibilities were also suggested.
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spite o f  the importance ofpain, it is astonishing how little we 
understand pain, but how confident we are o f  our knowledge ofpain, ”
George L. Engel
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Introduction
Pain is perhaps one of the most fundamental of all human experience. With the 
exception of the extraordinary few who are bom with an innate insensitivity to pain, 
we have all experienced, time and again, this rather unpleasant sensation in our lives. 
Important and universal though it is, pain has somehow escaped the attention of 
clinical psychologists. One main reason for this unfortunate neglect may be traced to 
the misconception that pain is exclusively a “medical” problem. It is interesting to, 
but not a concern of, psychologists. The commonly-held belief that pain is entirely a 
“physical” process amenable only to physical methods of treatment also deterred 
many clinical psychologists from the subject. To most medical practitioners, pain is 
constmed as the symptom and not the disease. By treating the disease, one relieves 
the symptom. So pain has been forced into a subsidiary position for active research 
and examination. To most laymen, pain is a very common manifestation of physical 
illness or external injury; so much so that they almost tend to take the semantics of the 
term for granted. Everyday communication of the term often needs no qualification 
nor elaboration. It is not surprising, therefore, to find physicians and patients alike 
talking about pain as if they have full understanding of the phenomenon.
Pain has in fact intrigued physiologists for centuries. It was not until the last few 
decades that investigators have devoted increasing attention to the role played by 
psychological factors. Still, the number of workers in the field is small in comparison 
with the magnitude of its importance. Despite the voluminous research literature 
accumulated through the years, our understanding of pain is in fact a very complex 
phenomenon.
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It is the purpose of this dissertation to look at the complexity of pain, and to consider 
the role of psychological factors as an integral part of the experience. Attempts are 
also made to examine the inter-relationships of some of these factors, with the hope of 
implicating methods of modification in the clinic.
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2
Concepts of Pain
Pain: Physiological or Psychological ?
The question whether pain is a physiological or a psychological phenomenon has 
puzzled workers for a long time. Engel (1959) took up this discussion succinctly. He 
considered that what is experienced and reported as pain is a psychological 
phenomenon. There is no pain without the participation of higher nervous centres. 
Developmentally, however, pain also evolves from patterns of impulses from 
peripheral receptors which are part of the basic biologic nocioceptive system for the 
protection of the organism from injury. Hence the experience of pain develops 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically from what was originally only a reflex 
organisation. Through the years, writers have generally come to the consensus that 
the perception of pain is the result of the interaction between the physiological and the 
psychological systems. Lord Brain (1962), for example, stressed that “(studies of 
pain) involve the relationship between the nervous system and the mind”. Yet, much 
research has been devoted exclusively to the physiology of pain. Gonda (1962a) did a 
review of literature on pain by looking through the 1961 Cumulated Index Medicus. 
He found a total of 470 articles related to pain; but only eleven, that is, less than three 
percent, were primarily classified under “psychology of pain”. This imbalance is 
indeed unfortunate as it has resulted in a number of unsatisfactory conceptualisations 
of the phenomenon.
One of these is the traditional concept of pain as a specific modality of cutaneous 
sensation. In their classic discussion on cutaneous sensory mechanisms, Melzack and 
Wall (1962) have pointed out that “the traditional concept of p a in  has led to the
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physiological assumption of straight through transmission from skin receptor to a pain 
centre in the brain; and to the psychological assumption that there is one-to-one 
relationship between stimulus intensity and the intensity of pain experience”. Both of 
these assumptions are inadequate for a number of reasons.
The physiological assumption that pain is a primary sensation subserved by a direct 
communication system from skin receptor to the pain centre is a grossly simplified 
concept. It nevertheless has a profound influence on neurologists and neurosurgeons. 
In fact, this misconception of pain is still being actively taught to undergraduate 
medical students. It is therefore not surprising that medical practitioners have 
generally accepted this assumption as a fact. To them, the logical treatments for pain 
would be the removal of the noxious stimulus that is causing the pain, or to dampen 
the skin receptors by local anaesthesia, or to block the pain pathway by surgical 
means, or even to interface with the supposed pain centre in the brain. But as clinical 
and research data accumulate, one finds it more and more difficult to explain the pain 
phenomenon merely on the basis of this direct-link system. Beecher (1957), for 
example, has delineated a host of psychological factors that were found to play an 
important role in pain experience. Some of these studies will be considered in greater 
detail in the next chapter.
The psychological assumption that the intensity of pain is a function of stimulus 
intensity has also been subject to doubt. There is good evidence to show that 
comparable extent of tissue damage does not necessarily give rise to identical pain 
reactions (Beecher, 1956). Before moving on to a more detailed review of 
psychological factors in pain experience, it is perhaps necessary to consider how the 
traditional concept of pain has come about. To do this, it is essential to refer briefly to 
some studies centering on the physiology of pain, and to consider their limitations.
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The Physiological Approach
Pain was originally conceptualised, studied and understood purely on a physiological 
level. Haller in the eighteenth century first mapped out the sensitivity of various parts 
of the body, correlating sensitivity to pain with the richness of nerve supply. 
Subsequent advances in neuro-anatomy brought pain into a neurophysiological 
perspective. Charles Bell differentiated the anterior and posterior spinal nerve roots, 
the latter of which was thought to be essential for sensation. He also formulated the 
idea of the specificity of sensory nerves for different sensory modalities, and this idea 
was later developed more systematically by Muller. It was from this formulation that 
the traditional concept of pain as a specific modality of cutaneous sensation 
originated. The work of Muller and subsequently that of von Frey (see Boring, 1942; 
Melzack, 1973) resulted in a group of postulations better known as the “specificity 
theory”. Essentially, the theory proposes that a specific pain system carries messages 
from pain receptors in the skin to a pain centre in the brain. There is also a one-to-one 
relationship between receptor type, fibre size, and the quality of experience (Bishop, 
1946, 1959; Sinclair, 1967). A search was also made for the pain pathway in the 
spinal cord and the pain centre in the brain. Further studies established the spino­
thalamic tract which ascends in the anterolateral cord as the pain pathway, and the 
thalamus as the pain centre with the cortex exerting control over it (Head, 1920: 
Keele, 1957). The differentiation between myelinated and unmyelinated fibres 
(Sinclair, 1967) added further body to the theorising. The unmyelinated fibres have a 
faster rate of impulse conduction than the myelinated fibres, and they were 
consequently termed “pain fibres”.
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Limitations of the Physiological Approach
As referred to earlier, the traditional concept of pain derived from von Frey’s 
specificity theory has been severely challenged by the recognition of psychological 
factors. Its physiological assumption of a direct-link system in pain perception, and 
its psychological assumption of an one-to-one relationship between stimulus intensity 
and the intensity of pain experience did not stand up in the face of clinical data. There 
are examples to show that pain is still perceived in the absence of noxious stimulus, as 
in the case of phantom limb pain, causalgia and neuralgia. Or pain may not be 
perceived even though there is clear evidence of tissue damage. Examples may be 
drawn from masochists, self-mutilating psychotics, injuries incurred in a football 
game, fanatics engaging in a religious ceremony, and so on. The occasional failures 
in relieving pain by neurosurgical means such as neurectomy, sympathectomy, 
rhizotomy and cordotomy (MacCarty and Drake, 1956) adds further doubt to the 
validity of the theory.
The search for pain pathways and pain centres has also been criticised by Lord Brain 
(1962). He considered the jump from structural units in the nervous system (the 
anatomical) to conscious experience (the psychological) without going through a 
consideration of the activities of the structural units (the physiological) as the 
“psycho-anatomical fallacy”. Pain, therefore, should not be conceived as something 
conducted through pain fibres via the pain pathway to the pain centre in the brain, as 
though it is tangible. Instead, pain should be viewed as a form of perception resulting 
from a combination of impulses. The process of impulse conduction in the nervous 
system is not “pain” but “information travelling”, and such impulses are amenable to 
the influence of psychological processes. Melzack and Wall (1965) furthered the 
criticism by stating:
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“Consider the proposition that the skin contains ‘pain receptors’. To say that a 
receptor responds only to intense, noxious stimulation of the skin is a
physiological statement of fact .......... To call a receptor a pain receptor,
however, is a psychological assumption: it implies a direct connection from 
the receptor to a brain centre where pain is felt, so that stimulation of the
receptor must always elicit pain and only the sensation of p a in  There is
no convincing evidence to substantiate the view that there is a special class of 
receptor-fibre units that comprises an exclusive pain modality” (p.971)
There are other physiological postulations on pain which attempt to explain 
phenomena inexplicable by the specificity theory. Livingston’s theory of spinal 
reverberatory activity, for example, gives some explanation to prolonged pain in the 
absence of defined noxious stimulus (see Melzack, 1973). Still, physiological 
approaches to pain are on the whole inadequate in elucidating how higher mental 
functioning such as affective or cognitive factors may modify the quality, intensity 
and tolerability of pain.
The Importance o f  Psychological Factors
Melzack (1973) has enumerated a number of occasions in which pain is not perceived 
after injury even when the person is fully conscious or alert. Pain, therefore, is not a 
single quality of experience that can be specified in terms of defined stimulus 
conditions. A knowledge of pain must essentially go beyond the problem of injury 
and sensory signals. Looking at pain merely from the physiology of nerve fibres alone 
is clearly inadequate. Higher mental functions such as motivational and cognitive 
factors should form an integral part of the whole experience. There is evidence
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showing that selection and abstraction of sensory information occur at successive 
synaptic levels during central transmission, and the processes are under the dynamic 
control of cortical activities (Melzack and Wall, 1970).
A new theory which has tried to come to grips with the complex interaction between 
physiological and psychological systems in pain is the “gate control theory” 
postulated by Melzack and Wall (1965, 1970). They entertain their theory as follows: 
(Melzack, 1973, p.l53)
“Basically, the theory proposes that a neural mechanism in the dorsal horns of 
the spinal cord (more specifically the substantial gelationsa) acts like a gate 
which can increase or decrease the flow of nerve impulses from peripheral 
fibres to the central nervous system. Somatic input is therefore subjected to 
the modulating influence of the gate before it evokes pain perception and 
response. The degree to which the gate increases or decreases sensory 
transmission is determined by the relative activity in the large-diameter (A- 
beta) and small diameter (A-delta and C) fibres and by descending influences 
from the brain.”
Apart from providing satisfactory explanations for atypical clinical pains such as 
diabetic or alcoholic neuropathy, neuralgic pains, referred pain, spread of pain, and 
trigger points for pain, this theory also has other important implications. One of these 
is that pain can be controlled by the activation of inhibitory mechanisms such as 
counter-irritation (Higgins, Tursky and Schwartz, 1971), rather than by inducing 
destructive, irreversible lesions. This theory has also helped to elucidate the role 
played by psychological factors in the modulation of pain experience. It proposes that 
the spinal gating mechanism is influenced by nerve impulses descending from the
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brain, and the process is carried out by a specialised system of large-diameter, rapidly 
conducting fibres which activate selective cognitive processes. Hence the gate control 
theory has achieved one important step beyond theories which dwelt purely on the 
physiological aspects of pain pathways. It should be stated, however, that there is still 
a lack of concrete physiological data on the above propositions; and the remains yet to 
be proved. Nevertheless, the gate control theory stands in the mean time as the 
strongest contender of all pre-existing theories.
The Interaction o f  Physiological and Psychological Factors
The evolution of pain theories from the eighteenth century to the present day has 
undoubtedly resulted in many truths, albeit some theoretical pitfalls. One cannot deny 
that each successive theory has made an important contribution. As Melzack (1973) 
puts it, “Each (theory) provides an additional mechanism to explain some of the 
complex clinical syndromes or experimental data which were previously inexplicable. 
Despite the small differences, each change contains a major conceptual idea that has 
had a powerful impact on research and therapy”. Although a purely physiological 
view of pain is obviously unsatisfactory, one cannot dismiss out-rightly the 
contributions made by the various theories. The gate control theory of pain, which is 
yet the most promising theory among its other contenders, is the result of the co­
operation between a physiologist and a psychologist. As stressed earlier, pain should 
always be construed as a complex interaction between the physiological and the 
psychological processes. While most studies have been concerned with the 
physiology of pain, the following chapter will look at the literature on the psychology 
of pain.
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3
The Relationship of Pain and Psychological Factors
Introduction
Studies have shown that the intensity and quality of pain experience are also 
determined by a host of psychological factors such as meaning of the situation in 
which the injury occurs, early learning experience, level of anxiety, anticipation, 
expectation, suggestion, attention, distraction, competing sensory stimulus, individual 
difference, personality structures, and so on. The present chapter will review some of 
these studies.
But first, it is necessary at the outset to specify the kind of pain phenomenon which is 
of primary interest in the review, and also to define a few terms which will be used 
recurrently. The review will exclude studies of pain as a conversion symptom, such 
as those described by Rangell (1953), Breuer and Freud (1955) and Stengel (1965). 
Also it will not deal with the so-called "psychogenic regional pain" as described by 
Walters (1961). These phenomena are best studied under a psychiatric or psycho­
analytic framework. The kind of pain to be considered in the review will be those 
acquired physically in a clinical setting, or those induced experimentally in the 
laboratory. The aim is to look at the role played by psychological factors in the 
experience of pain, and to see how these factors interact. Recent studies such as those 
by Bobey and Davidson (1970), Neufeld and Davidson (1971), Mitchell and Mitchell 
(1971) and Davidson and Neufeld (1974) have demonstrated that it is possible to 
modify a person's tolerance level to painful stimuli by various psychological 
manipulations.
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The term "pain experience", "pain perception" and "pain reaction" also need clearer 
definitions. So far, the discussion have used "pain" and "pain experience" inter­
changeably to denote the phenomenon in a global manner. But it is also useful to 
distinguish between pain perception and pain reaction. The former refers to the 
subjective feeling of pain which is entirely an idiosyncratic psychological 
phenomenon. The latter refers to the actual reaction towards the pain which takes 
place at a more behavioural level. This may be manifested for example by 
withdrawing the finger from the noxious stimulus in the case of experimental pain 
induced in the laboratory, or by seeking pain reduction measures or medical attention 
in the case of pathological pain. Workers following the psycho-analytic methods of 
Hardy, Wolff and Goodell (1952) in the laboratory have separated "pain perception 
threshold" (PPT) from "pain reaction threshold" (PRT), and regarded this as a 
meaningful distinction.
Meaning o f  Situation
Since man is an evaluation organism, pain perception is not a passive, receptive 
process but an active, interpretative process. Similar to other perceptual processes, 
cognitive factors also play ah integral part in modulating the input of sensory signals 
to the cerebral cortex whether they are processed and evaluated. Merskey and Spear 
(1967) have pointed out how, in masochism, pain may be an unpleasant experience 
which the masochist has to undergo to achieve other aims, i.e. certain types of 
'pleasure' and sexual satisfaction. Writings by Engel (1959), Szasz (1957) and 
Beecher (1956, 1957, 1959) have all implied that the meanings of pain to the patient 
is a determinant of pain description. Evine and Morskey (1965) also suggest that the
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degree of complexity in pain description is related to the severity of pain and the 
meaning of pain to the patient. It is therefore interesting to consider how, in the first 
place, these meanings may be acquired.
In his early book on conditioned reflexes, Pavlov (1927, 1928) mentioned that if 
electric shock were applied to one paw of a dog as a conditioned stimulus for 
salivation, the initial violent reaction to the shock gradually subsided with repeated 
presentation of food after each shock. In other words, the dog had developed an 
entirely new response to the noxious stimulation. Instead of an aversive stimulus, the 
electric shock now became a signal of coming food, and the 'meaning' of the shock 
was thus changed. This was not due to the masking effect or habituation of the shock 
because if the shock was administered to another paw of the dog, the same violent 
emotional reaction to the shock would again be elicited. In other words, the pain 
sensation had not been changed, but a competing response with different signal values 
had been generated by a simple classical-conditioning process. The competing 
response, or the 'new meaning' of the shock so acquired, had altered the original pain 
reaction to the noxious stimulus.
Another important study on the meaning of situation as an important variable 
affecting pain was undertaken by Beecher (1956) on soldiers wounded in the battle­
field. He considered that suffering consists of two principle factors: the initial 
sensation and the reaction to the sensation. The reception phase or the processing 
phase is very often of more important in suffering than is the original sensation. In his 
investigation, Beecher measured the reaction phase by his patients' request of 
analgesic drugs such as morphine. He observed a sharp contrast between soldiers 
wounded in the battle-field and civilians undergoing surgery. In spite of comparable 
tissue damage, Beecher found that only one third of the soldiers required narcotics. In
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the civilian sample, 90% required drugs for their pain. The two groups were carefully 
selected and carefully matched, so that the wounded soldiers were not in a state of 
shock, and reacted normally to ordinary painful stimuli such as injections. The time 
and duration of pain, too, did not affect the results. Beecher therefore concluded that 
the intensity of suffering is largely determined by what the pain means to the patient. 
He said,
“The common belief that wounds are inevitably associated with pain, and that 
the more extensive the wound the worse the pain, was not supported by
observations made as s carefully as possible in the combat zone  The data
state in numerical terms what is known to all thoughtful clinical observers: 
there is no simple direct relationship between the wound per se and the pain 
experience. The pain is in very large part determined by other factors, and of
great importance here is the significance of the w ound  In the wounded
soldier (the response to injury) was relief, thankfulness at his escape alive 
from the battle-field, even euphoria; to the civilian, his major surgery was a 
depressing, calamitous event.”
Although it has been extensively quoted over the years, Beecher’s (1956) study has 
never been replicated, and his conclusions remain unchallenged. There may well be 
other psychological variables which Beecher did not disentangle. His wounded 
soldiers might have had their attention focused on the welfare of their comrades still 
in the battle-field, or they might be actively recalling the heat of the battle, or they 
were being too engrossed with the prospects of home-coming, and so on. His 
civilians, on the other hand, had the surgical wound as their primary concern. As a 
result, they might be focusing their attention on the wound (and the pain) all the time, 
hence lowering their pain perception and reaction thresholds. The availability of
3 8 2
MPhil Dissertation
nursing staff and the atmosphere of a busy, over-strained military hospital might have 
also militated against an active complaint of pain. Finally, the patients’ need of 
attention, their personality structure, knowledge and expectancy of the illness and 
drug effects, etc. also directly or indirectly affect their reactions to pain. Beecher’s 
(1956) conclusions will be even more convincing if his observations can be replicated 
with more vigorous control over the extraneous variables. Nevertheless, Beecher’s 
study is still valuable in emphasising the role played by psychological factors (in this 
case, meaning of the situation) in pain reaction. Since this variable has been shown to 
be important, it would be unfortunate if medical practitioners should overlook the 
meaning of the pain to the patient. By providing information and reassurance, 
physicians may often help to change their patients’ attitude towards the pain in a more 
favourable direction. In this way, they may indirectly modulate their patients’ 
reactions to pain.
The Role o f  Early Learning
Reactions to painful stimuli may also be transmitted through early experience or 
vicarious learning processes. A few writers have touched on the surface of the 
problem. Engel (1959), who argued from a psychoanalytic point of view, assumed 
that from birth onwards, the individual builds up a library of peripheral painful 
stimulation. These pain ‘memories’ form something like a ‘body pain image’. As a 
result, pain has a variety of meanings for the individual. Gonda (1962a, 1962b) made 
a systematic observation of persons who complained of pain to a physician in a 
clinical setting, and found that chronic pain complainers came from significantly 
larger families. A study by Merskey (1965c) on psychiatric patients with persistent 
pain also come to a similar finding. Merskey further observed that there is a high
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frequency of painful physical illness among relatives of patients with psychogenic 
pain. Gonda (1962b) demonstrated that even when age was controlled, family size 
still emerged as a significant factor and a valid indicator of chronic pain complainers. 
He assumed that the phenomenon may be attributable to early interpersonal 
relationships. The infant’s experience of pain represents a stress which motivates him 
to attempt by trial and error to reduce the tension. Through the mechanism of 
‘complaint’, he discovers that assistance can invariably be obtained. Such 
opportunities are more readily available in larger families, which explains why 
chronic pain complainers have significantly larger family sizes. Gonda’s theory also 
implies the importance of family and parental attitudes towards pain, and the effects 
on their offspring. It has been generally agreed that if parents are very sensitive or 
over-reactive to pain, their children will show similar attitudes. It is regrettable that 
no systematic investigation has been done on this problem, i.e. to see if parental 
attitudes towards pain are systematically related to those of their children. In one of 
his early papers, Livingston (1953) suggested that experience with pain in childhood 
is an important determinant of the manner in which the adult perceives and responds 
to pain. That is, the ‘meaning’ involved in a perception such as pain and the attitudes 
of the individual in situations involving pain are largely a function of the earlier, 
related experience of that individual. Unfortunately, very few researchers have 
investigated into this problem.
One of this minority is a very good controlled experiment done on animals by Nelzack 
and Scott (1957). They reared Scottish terriers from weaning at about month until 
eight months, under conditions of sensory deprivation. They were put in social 
isolation in cages that allowed only restricted movement. Litter-mate controls were 
reared in a free environment, in what are normal conditions for domestic dogs. At 
maturity, Nelzack and Scott found that the restricted dogs showed abnormal
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responsiveness especially to noxious stimuli. They did not react in the normal manner 
to pinprick or bums or other painful events, and seemed unable to learn to avoid 
situations involving such stimuli in the manner dogs usually can. These authors 
interpreted the results as showing the normal perceiving and responding to pain 
requires early perceptual experience. Without this experience, overt responsiveness to 
noxious stimulation is abnormal and the capacity to perceive pain is impaired. It is 
important to note that the dogs reared in restriction invariably oriented to the pin as it 
penetrated the skin, showing that they did feel something during stimulation. It was 
this absence of strong emotional arousal and behavioural withdrawal that suggested an 
abnormal perception of the painful stimulus.
In two later articles, Melzack (1965, 1969) re-interpreted the abnormal reactions 
observed in the restricted dogs as part of a more general pattern. Further studies on 
the restricted dogs showed that they only exhibited abnormal responses when the 
stimuli were of low or moderate intensity; whereas high levels of noxious stimulation 
did produce the usual responses. Moreover, the animals also showed markedly 
inferior performance on cognitive tasks, unusual social submissiveness, and excess of 
such behaviour as licking. Nelzack considered that as a result of experience in the 
normal control group, memories or phase sequences (using Hebbian terms) are built 
up, and on the basis of these the input is filtered according to its relevance. The total 
input to the central nervous system is reduced by the elimination of the irrelevant 
input. In this way, normal organisms learn which environmental stimuli are important 
and which are not. The restricted dogs, on the other hand, have not built up these 
memories. All stimuli to which they are subsequently exposed are equally relevant or 
irrelevant. The filtering is inadequate and the CNS is overloaded with excessive 
input. Relevant cues are masked by irrelevant ones, and responsiveness is therefore 
disorganised.
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Anxiety
Rangell (1953) gave a detailed psychoanalytic account of the relation between anxiety 
and pain. He considered that “anxiety provides the soil in which pain can take root 
(as in hyperalgesia in an anxious patient); or pain can serve as a precipitating agent to 
outbursts of anxiety (as in the case where pain represents a feared punishment)”. 
Thus he would view anxiety and pain as reciprocally inter-related. In spite of his 
essentially psychoanalytic approach, RangelTs distinction of the two types of 
relationships between anxiety and pain is still a useful one. It is possible to separate 
conceptually pain in an anxiety-prone person on the one hand, and the existence of 
anxiety as a result of pain on the other. But sometimes it may be difficult to isolate 
the temporal relationship between anxiety and pain as in the case of a hypochondriac 
patient whose somatic complaints are usually accompanied by high levels of anxiety.
From his observations on wounded soldiers in the battle-field, Beecher (1956, 1959) 
also considered the question of how anxiety may emerge from pain experience. He 
pointed out that physiological pain sensations are always accompanied by the 
apprehension of future pain, which may be conceived as a conditioned fear (anxiety) 
response which summates with the physiological pain. Beecher, however, was not the 
first person to observe the role of anxiety in pain. Malmo and Shagass (1949) studied 
the effects of experimentally induced thermal pain in normal subjects and in 
pathologically anxious patients. They found that a higher frequency of pain signalled 
in systematically related to greater degrees of anxiety as manifested through greater 
muscle activities measured by psychophysiological means. Chapman, Fienesinger, 
Jones and Cobbs (1947) looked at the pain thresholds of thermal stimuli between two 
groups of subjects: the normal controls versus the psychoneurotics. Half of the latter 
group was suffering from anxiety. They found that the psychoneurotics had
386
M Phil Dissertation
significantly lower thresholds in reaction point, which seemed to conform to clinical 
findings that reactions to pain were far more frequent in a situation filled with anxiety 
than in one in which tremendous anxiety has been greatly lessened (Beecher, 1956). 
Unfortunately, Chapman et al (1947) did not separate out the anxiety group from the 
other psychoneurotics and was hence unable to elucidate the role of anxiety in pain 
reaction.
There was another group of studies undertaken by Hill and his associates (Hill, 
Kometsky, Flanary and Wikler, 1952a, 1952b; Hill, Belleville and Wikler, 1955; 
Kometsky, 1954). In their studies, they showed that when anxiety was dispelled by 
assuring the subjects that they have control over the pain-producing stimulus, their 
pain threshold was approximately as high as it would have been had morphine been 
previously administered. A combination of both reassurance and morphine was no 
more effective than either alone. They also observed that morphine was effective 
when anxiety was high, but lost its effect when anxiety was low. Hence they 
concluded that anxiety reduction measures were in fact more potent means of raising 
pain thresholds. Hemphill, Hall and Crookes (1952) contrasted four groups of 
psychiatric patients and found that as far as pain tolerance is concerned, anxiety state 
patients have higher perceptual sensitivity to pain than the endogenous depressed 
group, who appeared insensitive. The anxiety group also showed a much lower 
subjective pain threshold than any other group. Not only were they hypersensitive, 
they also tended to be hyper-reactive. Thus in general, there is a common finding that 
anxious or neurotic patients have lower pain tolerance levels than normals or other 
psychiatric patients (Malmo and Shagass, 1949; Chapman et al, 1947; Hemphill et al, 
19%g.
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There is also an interesting study by Schalling and Levander (1964). They looked at 
two groups of male young delinquents, one with a tendency to react in anxiety and 
tension, and the other with predominantly psychopathic traits. They found that the 
anxiety-prone group was significantly more sensitive to pain. On the Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (TMAS), however, no significant difference between the two groups 
was observed. This result may point to two possibilities: either there was a lack of 
validity in the selection of the criterion groups, or the manifest anxiety so-measured 
was unrelated to the diagnosis.
An indirectly relevant study not concerned with pain is the one by Schwab, Marder, 
Clemmons and McGinnis (1967) who looked at the relationship between anxiety and 
illness. The anxiety variable they looked into was free-floating anxiety measured by 
the TMAS. They found that the severity of medical illness was unrelated to general 
anxiety. Surprisingly, low anxiety scores were obtained in more severe medical 
illnesses and in cardiovascular diseases. High anxiety scores were obtained in less 
severe medical illnesses and in a psychiatric population. The mode of onset of illness, 
duration of illness, and characteristics of past medical history were all found to be 
unrelated to anxiety scores.
It should be stressed, however, that the TMAS was originally constructed for the 
selection of subjects in eyelid conditioning experiments in terms of their drive states 
(Taylor, 1951, 1953, 1956). It has satisfactory reliability (Hedlund, Farber and 
Bechtoldt, 1951; Holtzmann, Calvin and Bitterman, 1952) but dubious validity (Hoyt 
and Magoon, 1954; Buss, 1955a, 1955b), and can, at best, differentiate very extreme 
groups (Kendall, 1954). Further findings that the scale is not uni-dimensional 
(Sampson and Bindra, 1954; O’Connor, Lorr and Stafford, 1956) makes the test
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unsuitable for diagnostic purposes. It is regrettable that quite a number of studies 
have been using the TMAS indiscriminately to measure clinical anxiety.
The TMAS has been superseded by other anxiety scales. The most promising one is 
the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) developed by Spielberger and his colleagues 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene, 1970). Spielberger (1966) suggested that it is 
meaningful to distinguish between anxiety as a transitory state (A-State) and anxiety 
as a relatively stable personality trait (A-Trait). Even Rangell (1953) had tried to 
distinguish between two types of anxiety states:
“It may be diffused, free-floating, non-specific, a manifestation and 
accompaniment of the general increase in inner tension (anxiety neurosis); or 
it may be localised and specific, connected with certain well-defined situations 
or objects, as in beginning phobia formation (anxiety hysteria).” (p.26)
Without going into the intricacies of the theory, Spielberger’s State-Trait theory of 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1972) essentially states that A-State anxiety is characterised by 
subjective, consciously perceived feelings of apprehension, uncertainty and tension, 
accompanied by or associated with activation or arousal of the autonomic nervous 
system. It is assumed that the A-State varies in intensity and fluctuates over time as a 
function of the stresses that impinge upon the individual. General or A-Trait anxiety, 
on the other hand, is seen as a personality trait, referring to the degree to which 
individuals are predisposed to manifest A-State reactions disproportionate in intensity 
to the magnitude of the objective danger. Spielberger (1972) further elaborated the 
relationship between A-State and A-Trait as follows:
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“A-Trait may also be regarded as reflecting individual differences in the 
frequency and intensity with which A-State have been manifested in the past, 
and in the probability that such states will be experienced in the future. 
Persons who are high in A-Trait tend to perceive a larger number of situations 
as dangerous or threatening than persons who are low in A-Trait, and to 
respond to threatening situations with A-State elevations of greater intensity.” 
(p. 39)
The distinction between A-State and A-Trait anxieties may help to expand some of 
the studies previously reviewed. A lot of studies have used extreme anxiety groups, 
i.e. psychiatric patients diagnosed as suffering from a state of anxiety (Malmo and 
Shagass, 1949; Chapman et al, 1947; Hemphill et al, 1952). these patients might 
have both abnormally inflated A-State and A-Trait scores since Spielberger et al 
(1970) have shown significantly higher STAI means in a group of neuropsychiatrie 
patients. Other studies, while strongly implicating the role of anxiety on pain reaction 
(Beecher, 1956), pain perception (Schalling and Levander, 1964) and illness (Schwab 
et al, 1967), failed to distinguish between anxiety as a transient emotional state and 
anxiety-proneness. Perhaps the separation of A-State anxiety from A-Trait anxiety in 
future studies may help to clarify some of the issues and explain some of the 
contradictory findings.
Application of the clinical significance of anxiety to pain was first explored by Egbert, 
Battit, Welch and Barlett (1964) who found that surgical patients when informed of 
the nature of their post-operative pain that they might experience, and instructed in 
methods of coping with the pain, required less supportive narcotic medication after 
operations than patients who were not so informed and instructed. They attributed 
these effects to anxiety reduction. Similarly, Andrew (1968) also tested the
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effectiveness of anxiety reduction in helping patients to encounter surgery. She found 
that post-operative recovery could be dramatically influenced by a process of 
preparation for surgery including the giving of information about the forthcoming 
surgery. This seemed to reduce the patients’ anxiety and thus enable them to decrease 
recovery time. Lazarus and Alfert (1964) approached the problem of anxiety in a 
more or less similar fashion by using cognitive rehearsal to ‘short-circuit’ threat, and 
they found this to be extremely effective in reducing stress reactions to psychological 
threat.
This has led to a series of experiments using behaviour therapy techniques to modify 
pain experience. Folkins, Lawson, Opton and Lazarus (1968) in controlled clinical 
trials found that the desensitisation and cognitive rehearsal were most effective in 
reducing psychological stress. Relaxation alone was also effective though less than 
the two techniques just mentioned. As expected, the no-treatment group did the 
worst. Bobey and Davidson (1970), however, did a similar controlled experiment and 
found that contrary to Folkin et aVs findings, relaxation was more effective in dealing 
with a painful stressor than cognitive rehearsal. They also found that cognitive 
rehearsal had significant effects on pain tolerance only with heat measures, and 
worked only with male experimenters. In a more recent study, Davidson and Neufeld 
(1974) came to the conclusion that relaxation procedures are more effective than 
cognitive rehearsal procedures in increasing pain tolerance, while the opposite is true 
for stress tolerance. This may help to clarify some of the previous controversies. 
Mitchell and Mitchell (1971) looked at the efficacy of certain single-model behaviour 
therapy programmes (e.g. relaxation alone) and combined behaviour therapy 
programmes (e.g. relaxation plus desensitisation plus assertive therapy) in the 
treatment of migraine. Their results indicate that the combined programme was 
superior to single-model approaches, and obtained significant reductions in migraine
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attacks. They also attributed the treatment efficacy to the reduction of anxiety of their 
patients.
To sum up, there is evidence that people with high states of anxiety tend to have lower 
pain tolerance levels. From the writings of Rangell (1953) and Spielberger (1966, 
1972), it seems meaningful to make a distinction between A-State and A-Trait 
anxieties. Studies by Egbert et al (1964) and Andres (1968) further suggest that there 
is a third type of anxiety which is specific to the threatening situation itself, i.e. the 
anxiety about surgery. The distinction of these three types of anxiety will be taken up 
again in the present research. There is also sufficient evidence to indicate that pain 
can be modified in the laboratory as well as in a clinical setting by various 
psychological techniques. If the importance of anxiety is ascertained in clinical pains, 
there is no reason why medical practitioners should not attempt to modify pain by 
various psychological techniques such as information giving, reassurance, relaxation 
training, and other anxiety reduction measures known to clinical psychologists.
Anticipation and Expectation
Melzack (1973) has stated that mere anticipation of pain is sufficient to raise the level 
of anxiety and thereby the intensity of perceived pain. Hall and Stride (1954) found 
that the simple appearance of the word “PAIN” in a set of instructions was enough to 
lower the pain threshold towards electric shock. Bowers (1968) shows that the 
perception of no control over shock differentially increases anxiety in his subjects. 
Melzack, Weisz and Sprague (1963) also found that the amount of pain tolerated by 
the subject was often determined by their expectation of future pain on the basis of 
rate of pain increase rather than by pain intensity level as such. Many subjects
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expected the pain to continue to rise with constant slope and anticipated by its 
temporal course the point at which it would reach an intolerable level, and 
consequently required the experimenter to turn off the stimulus before the pain was 
genuinely intolerable. Jones, Beutler and Petry (1966) in their series of experiments 
found that in case of information deprivation, instrumental response rate in terms of 
requesting information about onset of pain was dependent on the magnitude of the 
uncertainty reduced. Hence reduction of uncertainty concerning future pain may 
constitute a positive reinforcement for the majority of subjects. The increasing trend 
of responses over uncertainty values is also consistent with the theory that higher 
degree of uncertainty are associated with parallel increase in anxiety, and that it is 
anxiety which motivates the uncertainty-reducing response, i.e. requesting for 
information. A series of studies mentioned earlier (Hill et al, 1952a, 1952b, 1955; 
Kometsky, 1954) have shown that if the subjects were assured that they have control 
over the pain-producing stimulus, their anxiety was dispelled, and the noxious 
stimulus was perceived as significantly less painful. A study by Staub, Tursky and 
Schwartz (1971) also found that control over the intensity of successive shocks and 
predictability of the timing of shocks did affect reactions to the shocks. Also, the 
evasiveness of the noxious stimulus was reduced. It should be made clear that 
although the majority of the studies have drawn a close relationship between 
anticipation and anxiety, one can sometimes exist without the presence of the other.
Studies on the interaction between anxiety and anticipation in real-life situations can 
be found in a number of investigations carried out in surgical wards. Sutherland and 
Orbach (1953) considered the patient’s fear of death as a major factor mobilising 
anxiety. Morgan (1971) also observed that anticipation for the pronouncement of 
cardiac surgery would invariably increase the anxiety level. Preoperative anticipatory 
fear (Janis, 1958) and the amount of anxiety about surgery (Sutherland and Orbach,
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1953; Morgan, 1971) were found to be good prognostic indicators for post-operative 
course, especially in relation to subsequent occurrence of psychiatric complications 
such as depression. However, the relationship between anticipatory anxiety and post­
operative pain was not considered in these studies.
Attention and Sensoty Distraction
One variable closely linked to anticipation is that of attention. A study by Hall and 
Stride (1954) mentioned earlier also implied the importance of the attention variable 
in pain perception. If a person’s attention is focused on a potentially painful 
experience, he is likely to perceive pain more intensely than he normally would. It 
also follows that if attention is shifted from the painful experience, tolerance level for 
pain would also be raised. Melzack (1973) states that “any situation that attracts a 
sufficient degree of intense, prolonged attention may provide the conditions for other 
stimulations to go by unnoticed.” One good example is a football player who did not 
notice a painful bruise during the heat of the match, and experienced the pain only 
after the game was over. By focusing his attention on the match, the painful 
experience was “masked”. Stemming from this, there have been attempts to raise the 
pain threshold through sensory distraction procedures. W olff and Goodell (1943) 
found that the pain threshold can be raised 40% by hypnosis or by distraction induced 
by the clanging of a loud bell. More recently, Morgenstem (1964) demonstrates that 
sensory distraction is a potent means of modifying sensation. Post-amputation 
phantom limb sensation or stump pain in four patients were temporarily dispersed 
during the experimental course. The patients’ attentions were engaged in a number of 
sensory-motor tasks, and at the same time, they had to practise ignoring other sensory 
distractions such as a flashing light, noise, a mild electric shock and a pressure cuff.
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Morgenstem argues that if the phantom sensation can be suppressed by sensory 
distraction (which involves the afferent nervous pathways from the stump), intensive 
practice should lead to enduring changes. His results are quite encouraging as three 
out of the four patients achieved complete loss of pain during the treatment course, 
although only one had lasting effects. The study by Melzack et al (1963) previously 
mentioned also found that auditory stimulation together with strong suggestion 
successfully abolished pain, and is therefore an effective way of achieving some 
‘control’ over pain.
Suggestion and Placebo Effects
At times it is not easy to separate the effects of distraction and suggestion. Wolff and 
Goodell (1943) in their experiment on thermal pain thresholds found that 
autosuggestion and placebo had similar but less powerful effects than hypnosis and 
distraction in raising the pain threshold. Gardner and Licklider (1959) and Gardner, 
Licklider and Weisz (1960) discovered that intense auditory stimulation (white noise) 
would serve to suppress pain produced by dental drilling and extraction. This 
technique of “audio analgesia” had once been looked upon as a prospective new tool 
for the control of pain in dental surgery. However, the study by Melzack et al (1963) 
found that suggestion is the prominent factor in the control of pain since neither 
auditory stimulation or suggestion alone was sufficient to produce any effect on the 
level of perceived pain. This seems to indicate that Gardner et aVs dramatic results 
reported in the dental clinic could not be attributed to any single mechanism such as 
‘sensory distraction’. Other variables such as suggestion and the personality of the 
dentist should also be considered. Barber (1969) was also able to demonstrate that 
people under hypnotism, with appropriate suggestions, can be cut or burned without
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any report of pain. Blitz and Dinnerstein (1968) found that appropriate instructions 
will elevate pain thresholds, drug request point and ‘quit point’. Wolff and Horland 
(1967) found that non-permissive instructions (suggestions) increased pain tolerance 
as well as pain threshold in their subjects. Other forms of self-hypnosis or auto­
suggestion such as Indian fakirs walking across beds of red-hot coal have also been 
quoted (see Melzack, 1973).
Another variable closely linked to suggestion is placebo effect. Beecher (1955), in his 
controversial article, said that severe pain such as those incurred from surgery can be 
relieved in some patients by giving them a placebo in place of the normal analgesic 
drugs. He furthermore pointed out that about 35% of the patients reported marked 
relief of pain after receiving a placebo. He then commented that since morphine, even 
in large doses, will relief severe pain in only about 75% of the patients, one can 
conclude that merely half of the drug’s effectiveness is in fact due to placebo effect. 
Hence in drug trials, the double-blind technique must always be used to control for 
this variable. Perhaps one illustration may suffice. Jellinek (1946) studied the effects 
of three different drugs and a placebo on 199 patients with complaints of headache. 
No significant difference among the drugs were observed when all the patients were 
considered. However, when the placebo reactors were separated from the non 
reactors, more meaningful differentiations were obtained.
The question emerging from these observations is, of course, how does placebo effect 
work. Whether placebos relieve pain by auto-suggestion, or help to reduce the level 
of anxiety in pain, still awaits further studies. In the mean time, however, doctors 
may find it possible to attenuate the complaint of pain in their patients by prescribing 
inert placebos, or by giving them analgesics of such low dosage that there is no 
appreciable pharmacological effect, in order to minimise unwarranted side-effects.
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Cultural Differences
Chapman and Jones (1944) studied the distinction between ‘pain perception 
threshold’ (PPT) and ‘pain reaction threshold’ (PRT) in normal subjects of different 
ethnic backgrounds. They found that both the Negros and the Mediterranean 
inhabitants have significantly lower PPT; while their European counterparts have 
significantly higher PRT. More recently, Stembach and Tursky (1965) observed that 
all people, regardless of cultural background, have a uniform sensation threshold. 
However, they also found in the laboratory that cultural background may have a 
powerful effect on PPT. Italians and Jews would describe a stimulus as “painful”, 
while North Europeans would describe the same stimulus as merely “warmth”. 
Stembach and Tursky therefore concluded that pain tolerance levels depend, in part at 
least, on the subject’s ethnic origin. There have been some evidence showing that 
PPT is more genetically determined while PRT is more culturally determined, 
although these conclusions are still debatable.
Personality Variables
Most investigations into the relationship between personality variables and pain 
tolerance have been based on the Eysenckian concept of personality dimensions 
(Eysenck, 1947,1957). Petrie, Collins and Solomon (1958) reported their observation 
in prefrontal leucotomy subjects that while their tolerance of pain was increased, the 
perception threshold of pain was unaltered. Since there was a concomitant change in 
personality after prefrontal leucotomy, it logically followed that there might be a 
relationship between personality and pain tolerance. In their experiment, Petrie et al
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(1958) tried to look at the tolerance of pain and the tolerance of sensory deprivation in 
relation to susceptibility to satiation effects. Their results indicate that while pain 
tolerance varies directly with satiation, sensory deprivation tolerance varies inversely 
with satiability. It then follows that pain tolerance is also inversely related to sensory 
deprivation tolerance. From their results, they concluded that satiability may prove to 
be in part the mechanism for tolerance and intolerance. They furthermore quoted a 
finding by Eysenck and Nichols showing that those with high scores on extroversion 
would have high susceptibility to satiation; and that high susceptibility to satiation is 
also related to higher pain tolerance. Petrie et al therefore considered that extraverts 
should have higher pain tolerance than introverts. Lynn and Eysenck (1961) also 
suggested that pain tolerance should be positively related to extroversion and 
negatively to neuroticism. Their experiment using the Brady et al (1952) radiant heat 
method supported their formulation.
On a study of married an unmarried mothers, S.E.G. Eysenck (1961) found that 
extraverts behaviourally exaggerates the painfulness of the situation, whereas 
introverts minimise it. The interesting point about her findings is that according to the 
original formulation, introverts should have lower levels of tolerance than extraverts, 
and consequently they should experience more pain. Instead, the results showed that 
it was the extraverts who had complained more. Hence S.E.G. Eysenck concluded 
that the exaggerations by the extraverts were indeed very gross.
More recent investigations which have helped to demonstrate the importance of 
personality variables in pain can be found in studies carried out in ward situations 
(Bond and Pilowsky, 1966; Pilowsky and Bond, 1967; Bond and Pearson, 1969; 
Bond, 1971). Bond and Pearson (1969) used a sample of patients suffering from 
advance cancer of the cervix so as to control for the location, severity and persistence
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of pain. Their results have delineated three groups. The first group consisted of 
patients who had no subjective report of pain, and who did not require any drugs. 
These patients were found to have low N-scores and high E-scores on the E.P.I. Bond 
and Pearson concluded that this was due to their low emotional outlet and high 
thresholds of pain. So they were a group of ‘non-complainers’. The second group 
consisted of patients who had subjective reports of pain, but who did not request for 
any drugs. These patients had high N-scores but low E-scores. They all had a high 
level of arousal and free emotional discharge. Their low sensory thresholds also gave 
subjective reports of pain. However, their limited reaction to the state of arousal as 
indicated by their low E-scores prevented them from complaining or communicating 
their pain to the nursing staff. The final group consisted of patients who had pain, and 
who requested for drugs. These patients, as expected, had both high N- and E-scores, 
hence had a high degree of arousal with free communication of pain. Bond and 
Pearson finally concluded that the presence of the pain symptom is related to 
neuroticism; whereas the freedom to communicate this symptom is related to 
extraversion. Their observations are also in line with Merskey and Spear’s (1967) 
remark that extraverts complain more and introverts accept less physically or reacts 
sooner.
There is another series of studies looking specifically at the personality traits of 
patients of with pain (Merskey, 1972; Woodforde and Merskey, 1972a; Bond, 1973; 
Parbrook, Dalrymple and Steel, 1973). It has been reported that in certain groups of 
patients with organic lesions, the complaint of severe pain tends to be associated with 
increased N-scores of Eysenck’s measure of neuroticism (Bond and Pearson, 1969; 
Bond, 1971; Woodforde and Mersky, 1972a). A study by Merskey (9172) looked at 
various subgroups of psychiatric patients with and without complaints of pain, and 
contrasted them with normal controls. He found that only females with anxiety
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neurosis and hysteria in the pain group have higher N-scores; while on the whole, 
patients with pain actually have slightly lower N-scores than those without pain. 
From this, Merskey concluded that the neuroticism measure only distinguishes 
psychiatric cases from the normals but not between the different psychiatric subgroups 
with or without pain. Merskey’s results are clearly at variance with the other findings, 
but his exclusive use of a psychiatric population might have biased the results. To 
make the results more meaningful, it is necessary to include another group with pain 
but without psychiatric complications. Workers generally have come to the consensus 
that pain of organic origin but not pain of psychological origin tends to raise N-scores 
(Woodforde and Mersky, 1972). In the above studies, the extraversion-introversion 
dimension is found to be unrelated to the presence of chronic pain. Bond (1973) also 
looked at the pre-and post-operative changes in M.P.I. scores in a group of fifteen 
patients receiving stereotaxic percutaneous cordotomy for removal of their chronic 
pain. There was a tendency for the N-scores to drop and the E-scores to increase post- 
operatively, although none of the change attained significance. Interestingly enough, 
there appeared to be a tendency for pre-operative scores to be more widely distributed 
and polarise towards low and high values. The N- and E-scores obtained after the 
operation were more normally distributed. Parbrook et al (1973) found that only the 
N-score and not the E-score in Eysenck’s PEN inventory was significantly related to 
pain complaint assessed by the 10 cm. graphic method. In female patients, the Lie 
score correlated with the report of the severity of their postoperative pain. An inter­
relationship between neuroticism and extraversion was also found — their patients 
being neurotic extraverts.
Bond and Pilowsky (1966) and Pilowsky and Bond (1967) observed other factors that 
might have affected the request and administration of analgesic drugs to patients with 
chronic intractable pain. They demonstrated that in a clinical setting, pain complaint
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behaviour is linked to a sex factor as well as to the attitudes of the nursing staff. They 
found that the females, while they could tolerate pain better, were more attended to by 
the nursing staff, and powerful analgesics were always given. The males, on the other 
hand, tended to complain more, but were less attended to, and powerful drugs were 
usually with-held.
Apart from Eysenck’s personality dimensions, there are still other psychological 
variables in the individual that differentiate them into ‘types’ according to their levels 
of pain tolerance. Petrie (1960), for example, described two groups of individuals 
classified on the basis of kinaesthetic after-effects. She labelled them “augmenters” 
and “reducers”. The perception of the augmenters were said to be less affected by 
prior perceptions than those of the reducers. Petrie argued that the response to pain of 
the augmenters were exaggerated while the responses of the reducers were inhibited. 
Byrne (1961) also described two types of individuals which he labelled “repressors” 
and “sensitizers”. He stated that those classified as repressors characteristically 
reacted to threat with denying, repressing and avoiding behaviours. Sensitizers, on 
the other hand, were said to react to threat with approaching and intellectualising 
behaviours. Davidson and Bobey (1970) found that subjects classified as repressors 
tolerate pain less upon a second confrontation than upon the first; whereas the 
tolerance of sensitizers does not change from the first to the second confrontation. 
Taking it broadly, Petrie’s “augmenter-reducer” types represent differences in 
cognitive styles which can be related to Eysenck’s personality dimensions (Petrie et 
al, 1958); whereas Eyme’s “repressor-sensitizer” types represent differences in coping 
styles and coping strategies which an individual may possess. Thus it is important to 
note that apart from being predisposed on personality traits or cognitive styles, the 
individual also takes an active role in coping with stressful situations.
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Individual Differences and Coping Styles
Individual differences in pain thresholds have been reported by Clark and Bindra 
(1956). They concluded that such differences are in large part attributable to 
attitudinal variables which are independent of the type of noxious stimulus used. 
They also argued that if individual differences in the tolerance level are determined by 
affective factors such as anxiety, the attitudinal variables underlying individual 
differences in the pain threshold would also appear to be affective in nature. Their 
contention is still arguable since Hardy et al (1952) have suggested a variable of the 
cognitive type (such as different definitions of “pain”) to account for the individual 
differences and discrepancies in mean pain thresholds. Letting this controversy aside, 
both Hardy et al (1952) and Clark and Bindra (1956) have agreed that individual 
differences in pain thresholds is an important variable to be reckon with.
In real-life situations, individual differences in coping style is also of salient 
importance. A paper by Lipowski (1970) is relevant in the present discussion, 
although it is not concerned with pain. Lipowski describes lucidly the coping process 
on an internal (personal) level, and an external (environmental) level. He lists out 
different coping styles such as minimisation, denial, vigilant focusing, tackling, 
capitulation and avoiding. He also lists out different coping strategies such as seeing 
illness as a challenge, an enemy, a punishment or a weakness. The value of 
Lipowski’s paper lies not on its exposition of the different coping processes employed 
by the individual, but on its emphasis on the individual as an active agent in dealing 
with environmental stress. Hence over and above the various psychological variables 
discussed so far, it is also essential to recognise the importance of individual coping 
styles.
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Unfortunately, systematic investigation into the relationship between pain complaint 
and individual coping style have not been documented. It would be interesting to look 
into people’s attitudes towards pain, ways in which pains are perceived or cognitively 
appraised, how well people tolerate pain, the kinds of pain reduction measures they 
would usually engage in prior to seeking medical advice, and so on. It is considered 
that coping styles and coping strategies will directly affect the types of pain behaviour 
one exhibits. A parallel may be drawn from Spielberger’s State-Trait theory of 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1966, 1972) in which he recognises the centrality of cognitive 
appraisal in the evocation of an anxiety state, and the importance of cognitive and 
motoric processes (defence mechanisms) that serve to eliminate or reduce anxiety 
states.
Other Miscellaneous Factors
Beecher (1957) have also listed out a number of less important variables that would 
produce variations in the pain threshold. It was found that in general, females tend to 
have greater pain sensitivity than males; and that both the PPT and the PRT increase 
with age (Sherman and Robillard, 1960; Schluderman and Zubel, 1962). However, 
both of these findings are still debatable.
In a study mentioned earlier, Gonda (1962a) administered structured interviews to 
patients in a neurological outpatient clinic. He found that a group with pain and a 
group with general medical problems differ significantly in age and the number of 
siblings. Schachter (1959) also reported a significant relationship between birth order 
and pain tolerance in a group of females, but his result was not replicated by a later 
study by Gelfand (1963). Collins and Stone (1966) also studied the relationship
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between two family structure variables (birth order and family size) in terms of pain 
measurements, but without any significant results. The exact roles of these 
miscellaneous variables in pain therefore remains indefinite.
A Multivariate Model o f  Pain
It has been shown in the preceding chapter that a pure physiological view of pain is 
inadequate. The quality of pain, its intensity and its tolerability are influenced by a 
number of psychological variables which interact with the stimulation arising from the 
physical damage. The present chapter has reviewed some of the studies done on the 
psychology of pain. It has also been demonstrated that there are considerable 
interactions among the various psychological factors, and these factors very often 
overlap. In this respect, their separation into anxiety, anticipation, attention, etc. are 
essentially artificial, and serves only for the purpose of facilitating discussion. A 
more comprehensive concept of pain should therefore be a complex one. Rachman 
and Philips (1974) have summarised the problem succinctly: “It is now evident that 
sensory stimulation, regarded as the single basis for pain in earlier theories, must take
its place as the principal but not the sole factor in a complex experience  We have
now to deal with a multivariate model of pain and focus interest on the functional 
relationships between these interacting factors.” This will serve as the main theme of 
the present study.
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From the Laboratory to the Clinic
Applicability o f  laboratory Findings to the Clinic
Controversies often arise as to whether laboratory findings with experimental pain can 
be generalised to pathological pain conditions in real life. The laboratory has often 
been regarded as a highly artificial environment where participating subjects are often 
faced with undue anxiety in front of elaborate equipment. On the other extreme, the 
outcome may also be affected by the subject’s apathy or even skepticism towards the 
set-up conditions, so much so that the supposed threat value of the design which the 
experimenter has tried to induce is lost. Beecher (1956), in particular, concluded from 
his observation on soldiers wounded in battle that “a wound is not alone the cause of 
pain, the significance of the wound may be the paramount factor in determining the 
production of pain”. Expanding ftom this, Beecher regarded the statement made by 
Hardy et al (1952) that “the adequate stimulus for pain sensation is the damaging of 
tissue” as unsubstantiated. To Beecher, great tissue damage can be produced without 
pain being experienced. Hence neither the wounding nor the wound is at times an 
adequate stimulus for pain. His argument implies that the bulk of work done on 
experimental pain is not relevant to pathological pain simply because the significance 
of the injury, its meaning and importance in the person’s life, the anxiety it produces, 
etc. cannot be reproduced under the safe conditions of the laboratory. While it is 
justified to conclude on the basis of his observations that psychological factors such as 
‘meaning of situation’ forms an integral part of the pain experience, it may be an 
overstatement to argue, as Beecher did, that the extent of tissue damage in totally 
irrelevant. What Beecher has convincingly demonstrated is the fact that when the
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meanings of pain are quite different between two groups of individuals with 
comparable wounds, the two groups differ significantly in pain reaction as measured 
by their requests for narcotics. It does not necessarily follow that under those 
conditions, the extent of the wound would have no bearing on the person’s suffering 
at all. Even if Beecher is right in saying that under highly stressful conditions, pain 
varies with the emotional state of the individual rather than with the extent of tissue 
damage, it may still be argued that at least within that individual in which the 
psychological state is considered to be constant, a more extensive injury may still give 
rise to higher intensities of pain. So Beecher’s findings, while important in 
demonstrating the paramount effects of psychological factors in pain, have not in fact 
rendered previous experimental findings in the laboratory valueless. Psychophysical 
methods using the Hardy et al (1952) radiant heat technique have shown repeatedly 
that the amount of pain experienced is often a function of the rising level of the 
noxious stimulus calibrated in terms of time exposed under the radiant heat source. 
Melzack et al (1963) have also found that this slow rising function will continue at 
least for some time until a point is reached, after which the sensation levels off to dull, 
fluctuating pain. To reconcile Beecher’s criticisms and the positive contributions of 
laboratory findings, it may be stated that experimental data are still meaningful as 
long as it is made explicit that at least within the same individual, and between groups 
of well-defined individuals, psychological factors not manipulated are assumed to be 
held at constant. Which psychological factors to be manipulated and which 
psychological factors to be held constant depend on the respective experimental 
designs. Finally, although it is difficult to compare experimental pain with 
pathological pain directly on a qualitative level, they may still be regarded as 
subserving similar psychological mechanisms. At this stage, the above contention 
may be accepted on logical and parsimonious grounds since there is no evidence
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against the view that psychological factors capable of influencing experimental pain 
experience are equally effective in modifying pathological pains, and vice versa.
In spite of the fact that laboratory investigations have the advantage of carrying out 
experiments under well-controlled conditions, a number of workers still envisage the 
need of studying pathological pain in clinical settings. Looking back at the literature, 
there is a tremendous overlap between laboratory and real-life investigations. Some 
workers used experimental pain on normal subjects in the laboratory (Wolff and 
Goodell, 1947; Petrie et al, 1958; Lynn and Eysenck, 1961; Jones et al, \966; 
Melzack et al, 1963), some used experimental pain on patient groups (Chapman et al, 
1947; Malmo and Shagass, 1949; Hemphill et al, 1952, Hall and Stride, 1954), while 
the others concentrated their studies on pathological pain per se (Beecher, 1956; Bond 
and Pilowsky, 1966; Pilowsky and Bond, 1967; Spear, 1967; Pearson and Bond, 
1969; Bond, 1971; Merskey, 1972; Woodforde and Merskey, 1972a, 1972b; Rosillo 
and Fogel, 1973).
There are obvious values of moving from the laboratory to the clinic, and study pain 
in a real-life situation. First, we can free ourselves from the constraints of an artificial 
laboratory set-up, and study clinical pain as it really is. One can undoubtedly gain a 
lot of insight into the type and quality of clinical pain confronting the physician in 
everyday life. Secondly, the role of psychological factors should be more prominent 
in clinical pain than in experimental pain since illness manifested through pain is 
often sufficient to instigate a threat to a person’s physical integrity, hence mobilising a 
host of relevant psychological processes pertaining to the pain experience. Finally, 
findings obtained and conclusions drawn are more readily transferable to similar 
clinical conditions without any doubt as to their relevance.
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Pain Research in General Practice
Most of the studies done on clinical pain were carried out in hospital settings. Some 
looked at chronic pain (Bond and Pilowsky, 1966; Pilowsky and Bond, 1967; Bond 
and Pearson, 1969; Bond, 1971; Woodforde and Merskey, 1972a), some looked at 
post-operative surgical pain (Beecher, 1956; Egbert et al, 1964; Andrew, 1968; 
Parbrook et al, 1973), some looked at pain which arises from physical rehabilitation 
(Rosillo and Forgel, 1973), some used a psychiatric population (Spear, 1967; 
Merskey, 1965a, 1965b, 1965c, 1972), some used a general medical population 
(Devine and Merskey, 1965; Klein and Brown, 1967), and some did their observations 
in a pain clinic (Simpson, Rischbieth, Rees, Burnell and Cramond, 1965). There are 
less than a handful of researches on pain done in a general practice setting. A very 
good General Practice Survey undertaken by Shepherd, Cooper, Brown and Kalton 
(1964) did not mention the incidence of pain. In their later publication (Shepherd et 
al, 1966), only the incidence of headache was given. Klein and Brown (1967) 
estimated that about 50% of pain symptoms seen in a general medical practice belong 
to psychogenic pain. However, they did not elaborate the incidence of pain 
encountered as a whole. Dunnell and Cartwright (1972) looked at the incidences of 
illnesses in a general practice clinic, and charted the percentage reported symptom 
over a two week period. Among other physical complaints, they reported headache as 
38%, trouble with joints as 29% and back pain as 21%. There is also one article 
devoted specifically to the study of pain in a general practice setting (Baker and 
Merskey, 1967). In their study, general practitioners were given forms to fill in the 
details of pain, diagnoses, and other demographic information. A total of 276 patients 
were collected, of which 129 were new attendance and 147 were under observation. 
63.8% had pain, the commonest first site was the head, involving 30% of those with 
pain. They also found that more females than males have pain and this distribution
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was unrelated to age. Those with severe pain have higher mean age, and more 
females were affected in this category. More people came with a single location of 
pain than with multiple locations, and the latter group tend to have a higher mean age. 
Thoracic and abdominal pain were more frequent in the older age group; whereas 
back pain and limb pain were characteristic of the younger age group. Those with 
persistent pain also have a higher mean age. Finally, the presence of pain was found 
to have no relationship with diagnosis, retirement, shift-work, civil status, etc. Baker 
and Merskey’s study provides a lot of interesting information that warrants further 
pursuit. Unfortunately, no one has taken up the trail they left behind.
Besides the mentioned advantages of studying clinical pain in real-life situations, 
bringing the investigation into a general practice clinic has further additional values. 
The environment is natural, and a much broader spectrum of pain experience will be 
encountered. Unlike general hospitals and pain clinics where patients have already 
been screened or referred from other sources (Simpson et al, 1965), the general 
practitioner is generally the first member of the medical profession patients would 
consult in event of illness. The patients all come to the clinic on a voluntary basis, 
and their arrival at the clinic itself may be regarded as a form of pain behaviour. As 
discussed earlier, this pain behaviour should be considered as the result of the 
interaction between physical and psychological variables. Hence if one wishes to look 
at a multivariate model of pain, and to delineate the interactions of some of the 
factors, patients from a general practice clinic should constitute an ideal sample.
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The Present Study
Aim
The present study focused on the relationship between clinical pain and some of the 
more important factors present in a general practice population. It was thought 
probable that the behaviour of patients who came voluntarily to a clinic with a 
complaint of pain had already been influenced by the interaction between physical and 
psychological processes. The aim here was to examine some of these psychological 
factors, to see how they inter-relate, and to consider what role these factors play in the 
total experience of pain. It would be difficult, and indeed unrealistic, to encompass in 
a single study all the psychological factors reviewed above. On parsimonious ground, 
therefore, psychological factors which were considered to be important to pain in a 
clinical population were chosen. Reasons for their choice will be discussed below.
Anxiety
Anxiety is undoubtedly one of the most prominent variables affecting pain experience. 
A great deal of research, both experimental and clinical, has been done on the 
interaction between anxiety and pain. In addition, anxiety has implicit relationships 
with other psychological variables such as: meaning of situation, anticipation,
expectation, suggestion, individual coping styles, and so on. In a general practice 
population, clinical pain is often a threat to one’s physical well-being. Hence there is 
little doubt of the importance of anxiety in such patients. As mentioned previously.
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three types of anxiety were distinguished. They were A-State anxiety, A-Trait 
anxiety, and the anxiety towards the pain itself. This third type of anxiety was called 
“Focal Anxiety” in this study. Thus there were three anxiety measures:
(1) A-State Anxiety - This refers to the transient emotional state at the time of the
interview.
(2) A-Trait Anxiety - This refers to a stable personality trait which predisposes an
individual to reactions of anxiety under stressful situations, 
(anxiety proneness)
(3) Focal Anxiety - This refers to the anxiety, or the amount of worry,
concerning the pain that brought the patient to his general
practitioner.
Pain
In the present study, pain was regarded as essentially a psychological phenomenon. 
All the measurements were therefore rated subjectively by the patients. It should be 
emphasised that psychological precepts of pain rather than the physical aspects were 
considered. For example, no attempt was made to assess the exact frequencies of 
pain attacks per day, or the extent of localisation measured in square inches. Only 
subjective evaluations of pain experienced by the patients themselves were 
measured. Hence a person who has had a pain for years might rate his experience as 
less familiar than a person who has had a pain only for a few months. How the 
patient rated his pain experience depended on a host of psychological processes such
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as cognitive appraisal of the situation, and so on. In this section, “pain complaint” 
was distinguished from “pain experience”. The former refers to the patient’s own 
rating of pain intensity, whereas the latter refers to ratings of the pain experience in 
terms of psychological parameters such as familiarity of the pain experience, 
knowledge of the cause of the pain, etc.
Clinical Pain
Because clinical pain usually fluctuates over time, it might be quite misleading if 
assessment was made only of the intensity of pain at the time of the interview. The 
amount of pain felt during surgery time might not be representative of the pain which 
the patient wished to bring to the attention of the physician. Three levels of pain were 
therefore separately rated by the patient: these were “Pain Now”, “Pain At Worst” 
and “Pain When Least”. This was an adaptation of Melzack’s Pain Questionnaire 
which was to be published (Melzack, 1973a; personal communication). Three further 
measures were derived from the above assessments. First, the “range” of pain 
intensity experienced was derived from the difference between the ‘worst’ and the 
‘least’ scores. A very large index in this measure would suggest a fluctuating, on-off 
type of pain, while the opposite would suggest a fairly consistent pain which persisted 
over time. Secondly, the difference between the ‘worst’ and ‘now’ scores was used to 
discover whether the amount of pain felt during consultation was typical of the pain 
which the patient wished to bring to the doctor’s attention. Finally, to complete the 
information, an average pain score was obtained (this score being less meaningful if 
the ‘pain range’ was sizeable). There was therefore six measures of pain complaint.
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(1) Pain Now This refers to the subjective rating of pain intensity at 
the time of the interview. ( A )
(2) Pain A t Worst This refers to the subjective rating of the severity of 
pain when it was at its worst. ( B )
(3) Pain When Least - This refers to the subjective rating of pain when it
was absent or at its least intensity. ( C )
(4) Pain Range This refers to the range between the ‘worst’ and 
‘least’ scores, and is given by: ( B - C ).
(5) Worst-Now
Differential
This refers to the discrepancy between the ‘worst’ 
and ‘now’ scores, and is given by: ( B - A ).
(6) Pain Average - This is given by: ( A  + B + C \  
3
Pain Experience
Five parameters of pain were delineated. These were thought to be important 
psychological variables in pain experience. They were: Familiarity, Frequency,
Localisation, Sharpness and Knowledge. It was hoped that these parameters would 
provide independent information about the experience of pain. Any inter-relationship 
among these parameters would emerge from the results. There was no pre­
supposition that these five parameters were exhaustive in qualifying pain experience, 
but it was considered that an adequately wide sample of choice had been made, and
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that these would provide a description of pain experience which would suffice for the 
purpose of the present study. Familiarity, Frequency and Knowledge were derived 
from a consideration of the research literature. Localisation and Sharpness were 
included because they were thought to be additional important parameters.
(1) Familiarity
This was a rating of how novel or how familiar the pain experience was to the 
patient. The scale ranged from “this pain is a totally new experience to me ” 
to “this pain is very familiar to me'\ Inclusion of this parameter was derived 
from experimental evidence on the role of expectation and anticipatory anxiety 
in pain. It was expected that a person who rated the pain experience as very 
familiar would feel that he had substantial experience and knowledge of the 
pain. His expectations were therefore clear. As a result, he would experience 
less anxiety towards the pain.
(2) Frequency
This was a rating of how frequent the patient thought the attacks were. The 
scale range from ''very infrequent attacks'' to “very frequent attacks or 
continuous pain". Support for inclusion of this parameter came from evidence 
on the role of attention in pain. If the patient rated the pain attacks as frequent, 
it seemed likely that more attention would be devoted to the pain experience. 
It was expected that the pain threshold would be lowered as a consequence.
(3) Knowledge
This refers to the extent to which the patient thought he knew the cause of the 
pain. The scale ranged from "I have absolutely no idea about the cause o f  this 
pain" to "I know the cause o f this pain very well". Inclusion of this parameter
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was derived from the literature on expectation and the meaning of situation as 
important variables in pain experience. It was assumed that those who rated 
their knowledge as high would have more realistic expectations about their 
pain. As a result, they would display less anxiety towards their pain.
(4) Localisation
This refers to a subjective rating of how localised the pain was thought to be. 
The scale ranged from "completely diffused" to "very well localised". This 
parameter was included to qualify the pain experience. Very well localised 
pain if often an indication of physical dysfunction of a specific part of the 
body. From this, a prima facie prediction would be that high ratings of 
localisation would be associated with high anxiety measures, especially Focal 
Anxiety.
(5) Sharpness
This refers to a subjective rating of how sharp the pain was thought to be. 
The scale ranged from "extremely dull pain" to "extremely sharp pain". As 
with Localisation, this parameter was included to qualify the pain experience. 
Due to the lack of evidence on the importance of the sharp-dull dimension in 
pain experience, it was tentatively predicted that sharp pain would have a 
positive relationship with anxiety; while such a relationship would be much 
weaker with dull pain. It was further conjectured that localised-sharp pain 
would provoke the most anxiety.
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Personality
This factor was included primarily to examine the personality structure of the present 
sample. It has been reported that a complaint of pain is sometimes associated with an 
increase in the N-score of Eysenck's measure of neuroticism (Bond and Pearson, 
1969; Bond, 1971; Woodforde and Merskey, 1972a). Furthermore, correlations 
between Eysenck's PEN Personality Questionnaire and Spielberger's STAI have also 
been reported (Rust, 1973; personal communication). Replication of these findings 
might help to establish the reliability and validity of the measures.
The Personality Variable
1. It was predicted that a proportion of patients attending a general practice clinic 
with a complaint of pain would display some degree of Focal Anxiety towards 
their pain. The aim was to look at the amount and range of this particular 
aspect of anxiety.
2. It was predicted that as a result of the pain, the patients would have elevated 
A-State scores but normal A-Trait scores.
3. From the theories of Eysenck and Spielberger, it was predicted that:
(i) There would be a positive correlation between A-State and A-Trait.
(ii) There would be a positive correlation between N and A-Trait.
(iii) There would be a positive correlation between N and A-State.
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4. It was predicted that Focal Anxiety would correlate with A-State but not with 
the other stable personality measures.
5. There would be a positive correlation between Pain Now and A-State.
6 . There would be a positive correlation between Pain Now and Focal Anxiety.
7. There would be a negative correlation between Familiarity and Focal Anxiety.
8 . There would be a positive correlation between Frequency and pain complaint 
measures.
9. There would be a negative correlation between Knowledge and Focal Anxiety.
10. There would be a positive correlation between Localisation and Focal Anxiety.
11. There would be a positive correlation between Sharpness and Focal Anxiety.
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6
Method
The General Practice Clinic
The present study was carried out in a large general practice clinic in South London. 
The clinic is a joint-practice of four physicians catering for residents of the Peckham 
area. There are three surgeries a day: one in the morning, one in the afternoon, and 
one in the evening. The practice has a very large case load averaging about forty 
cases per physician per day. Good co-operation was obtained from three of the four 
doctors. Most of the patients interviewed were from the afternoon and evening 
surgeries.
Subjects
Collection of data took place between 4th February 1974 and 1st March 1974. A total 
of 12 six-hour sessions were spent in the clinic. About two hundred patients were 
short-listed from a quick run-through of all the case-notes before each surgery. Those 
rejected during the first screening were:
( 1 ) Children under the age of 15.
(2) Patients over the age of 70.
(3) Patients with long-standing psychiatric complaints who attended the
clinic regularly.
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All the short-listed patients were seen, with the exception of recent migrants who 
were rejected automatically by the receptionists. The reason for excluding the migrant 
population was to control for a possible cultural and ethnic factor. After a brief 
screening interview, the following additional patients were rejected: (for procedure, 
see Appendix A):
(1) Those who did not come to the doctor because of pain.
(2) Those who did not regard pain as a significant complaint in their
present illness.
(3) Those who were unwilling to co-operate.
(4) Those whose appointment time happened to clash with the time of 
interview.
(5) Those who did not fully understand the test procedures.
(6) Those who had unforeseen mishaps such as forgetting to bring along
their reading glasses, etc.
A total of 48 patients (27 males and 21 females) successfully completed the 
questionnaires, and constituted the sample for the present study. All of these patients 
had a verbal description of "pain" as one of their major presenting symptoms. The 
majority of the patients were of working class background, with ages ranging from 16 
to 69 years.
Procedure
All the patients were seen individual before any contact with the doctor. This was 
possible because the average waiting time for each patient was approximately thirty
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minutes. Details of the screening interview are given in "Experimenter's Guide" (see 
Appendix A). Patients who were successfully selected and who agreed to co-operate 
were first asked to complete Spielberger's Self Evaluation Questionnaires (Forms X-1 
and X-2). STAI Form X-1 which is a measure of A-State was administered first, 
followed by Form X-2 which is a measure of A-Trait. They were then asked to 
complete the Pain Rating Form designed for the present study (see Appendix J). This 
form consists of a series of 10cm. lines upon which the patients rated their Focal 
Anxiety, pain intensities, and the five pain parameters. Reliability and validity of the 
10 cm. graphic method in pain description have been documented (Clark and Spear, 
1966; Woodforde and Merskey, 1972b). This analogue method was extended in the 
Pain Rating Form to encompass ratings of Focal Anxiety and the five pain parameters. 
To enhance understanding of the procedures, detail instructions plus a demonstration 
were given. A question was asked about each rating, and the patients were required to 
give their answer on the rating line. Attempts were made to ensure that all the 
patients understood the procedures fully. In the event that a patient failed to 
understand the exact meaning of the parameter to be rated, more detailed elaboration 
about the parameter would be given. Details may be obtained from Appendix A . All 
the patients found the Pain Rating Form simple and comprehensible, and no undue 
difficulty was encountered . Finally, they were asked to complete Eysenck's PEN 
Personality Questionnaire.
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Results
Raw data of the present study is presented in Ayyendix B. The distribution of scores 
on the 19 variables are presented in Ayyendix C. Means and standard deviations are 
given in Ayyendix D. The correlation matrix is presented in Ayyendix E . Pain 
complaint measures were excluded from the matrix presented here because of the very 
high inter-correlations among these measures. Such correlations were caused by the 
fact that the six pain complaint measures were not independent, some being 
derivatives of the others. Inclusion of these measures in the correlation matrix would 
inevitably confuse the interpretations. The relationship between these pain complaint 
measures and the other variables will be presented separately in Table 3. Since the 
present research was largely exploratory, correlations which were found to be 
marginally significant are also discussed.
Table 1 gives the PEN mean scores of the present sample. In considering personality 
measures, males were separated from females since previous data have shown sex 
differences in the N- and E-scores (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1964, 1969). The present 
results were compared with the normative data of the PEN Personality Questionnaire 
supplied by S.B.G. Eysenck (Eysenck, 1974; personal communication). Since the 
mean age of the present sample was 37.90, norms for the 30-39 age range in Eysenck's 
data were used.
Table 2 gives an excerpt of the correlation matrix presented in Ayyendix E . Here, the 
inter-relationships between the three anxiety measures and the four personality 
measures are given. This abbreviated matrix may help to facilitate reference when the 
relationship between anxiety and personality are discussed.
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3 gives the correlations between the six pain complaint measures and the other 
variables. This table supplements the correlation matrix presented in Appendix E.
Table 1: Means for Eysenck's PEN Personality Questionnaire
EYSENCK'S NORMS PRESENT RESULTS
(Age Range: 30-39) (Mean Age: 37.90)
Males Females Males Females
p 2.28 2.67 2.90
E 12.85 11.97 11.81 12.57
N 9J3 12.57 11.78 14.67
L 7.53 184 7.74 10.10
Table 2: Inter-correlations between Anxiety and Personality Measures
A-State A-Trait Focal Anxiety P E N
A-State 1.0000
A-Trait .4871** 1.0000
Focal
Anxiety
.3709** .1040 1.0000
P .1175 .2291 -.0071 1.0000
E -.2207 -.4052** -.1719 .0136 1.0000
N .4768** .6962*** .1996 .1989 -.3099* 1.0000
L .2143 .1262 -.0641 -.1319 -.1752 -.0240
P < .05  **P< .01 ***P<.001
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Table 3: Correlations between Pain Complaint Measures and the Other Variables
Pain Now Pain At 
Worst
Pain
When
Least
Pain Range Worst- 
Now Diff.
Pain Averg
Age .1731 .1418 .2346 -.0174 -.0507 .2169
A-State -.0256 .0638 -.0686 .1153 .0787 -.0035
A-Trait -.0789 -.2183 .0417 -2578 -.1059 -.1219
Focal
Anxiety
.1589 .5137*** .2040 .3931** .2746* .3618**
FAMILT -.0046 -.1470 .2303 -.3165* -.1189 .0014
FREQCY .2803* .1660 .1257 .0848 -.1355 .2497
LOCALZ .0560 .2659+ -.0346 .3025* .1683 .1330
SHARPN -.0455 .1141 .0740 .0670 .1404 .0478
KNOWLG .0543 -.1524 .0050 -.1629 -.1812 .0369
P -.0930 -.0261 .0573 -.0678 .0693 -.0415
E .0232 .2100 .2173 .0661 .1535 .1657
N -.1304 -.0247 .0199 -.0399 .1072 -.0706
L -.0333 -.0875 .1289 -.1826 .0408 -.0170
+ P < .07 * P < .05 * * P <  .01 *** P < .001
Significant or marginally significant results are extracted from the correlation matrix 
(Avpendix E), and presented in Table 4. Table 5 and Table 6.
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Table 4 shows the interactions among the five parameters of pain. All the correlations 
shown here are only marginally significant.
Table 4: Interactions amons the Five Pain Parameters
VARIABLES r P <
Sharpness and Familiarity -26 .10
Knowlege and Familiarity .24 .10
Localisation and Sharpness .25 .10
Table 5 gives the relationship between anxiety measures and the five parameters of 
pain. Both significant or marginally significant correlations are shown.
Table 5: Correlations between Anxiety and Pain Parameters
VARIABLES r P <
A-State and Sharpness -.36 .01
A-Trait and Familiarity .31 .05
A-State and Localisation -23 .10
A-Trait and Sharpness -.24 .10
Focal Anxiety and Familiarity .26 .10
Focal Anxiety and Sharpness -25 .10
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Table 6 gives the relationship between personality measures and the five parameters 
of pain. Only significant correlations are shown.
Table 6: Correlations between Personality and Pain Parameters
VARIABLES r P <
Neuroticism and Familiarity .40 .01
Neuroticism and Sharpness -.34 .05
Initially, it was hoped to examine whether there were any differences in the response 
patterns between those with high and low anxiety scores. Because of the wide spread 
in the distributions, however, it was necessary to separate the patients into three 
groups, viz. the “high”, the “medium” and the “low” on the basis of the Focal Anxiety, 
A-State and A-Trait scores respectively. Multivariate analysis of variance was 
performed on each of the three anxiety measures to see whether the three levels of 
patients so-divided were significantly different from one another; and, if so, how. 
Details of the analysis are presented in Avpendix F . Appendix G and Appendix H . To 
facilitate reference, the main results of the multivariate analysis of variance are 
presented in Table 7, Table P. and Table 11. Those variables which have accounted 
for a significant proportion of the total variance are presented in abbreviated forms in 
Table 8. Table 10, and Table 12. In this case, only univariate F-ratios are given.
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Variance with “Focal Anxiety” as the
Independent Variable
Three groups were partitioned, viz. High, Medium & Low
(1) High vs. Medium + Low (F = 2.73; P < .008)
(2) Medium vs. Low (F = 1.96; P < .05)
(3) High vs. Low (F = 3.03; P < .01)
Table 8: Univariate F-Ratios of the Dependent Variables
(Focal Anxiety Analysis)
(1) High vs. Medium + Low
Sharpness (F = 6.28; P < .02)
Pain At Worst (F = 5.82; P < .02)
A-State (F = 5.73; P < .02)
(2) Medium vs. Low
Pain At Worst (F= 19.00; P<.0001)
Pain When Least (F = 4.21;P<.05)
(3) High vs. Low
Pain At Worst (F= 18.34; P < .0002)
A-State (F = 5.78; P < .02)
Familiarity (F = 3.55;P<.07)
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Table 9: Multivariate Analysis of Variance with “A-State” as
the Dependent Variable
Three groups were partitioned, viz. High, Medium & Low
(1) High vs. Medium + Low (F = 2.59; P < .01)
(2) Medium vs. Low (F = 1.79; P < .08 N.S.)
Table 10: Univariate F-Ratios of the Dependent Variables
(A-State Analysis)
(1) High vs. Medium + Low
Neuroticism (F = 9.90; P < .003)
A-Trait (F = 7.94; P < .007)
Localisation (F = 7.19; P < .01)
Sharpness (F = 6.79; P < .01)
Focal Anxiety (F = 5.06; P < .03)
(2) Medium vs. Low
A-Trait (F = 6.04; P < .02)
Lie (F = 4.14; P < .05)
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Table 11: Multivariate Analysis of Variance with “A-Trait” as
the Independent Variable
Three groups are partitioned, viz. High, Medium & Low
(1) High vs. Medium + Low (F = 3.03; P < .0045)
(2) Medium vs. Low (F = 1.74; P < .09 N.S.)
Table 12: Univariate F-Ratios of the Dependent Variables
(A-Trait Analysis)
(1) High vs. Medium + Low
Neuroticism (F = 25.30; P < .0001)
A-State (F= 10.45; P < .002)
(2) Medium vs. Low
Neuroticism (F= 10.86; P < .002)
Psychoticism (F= 8.27; P < .006)
Pain At Worst (F= 6.51; P < .01)
Extraversion (F= 3.76; P < .06)
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To see whether there were any sex differences between males and females, 
multivariate analysis of variance was also performed on the sex factor. Details of the 
analysis are presented in Appendix I . The male and female groups did not differ from 
each other significantly (multivariate F-ratio = 1.56; P <.14, N.S.). Univariate F- 
ratios of the dependent variables which have accounted for a large proportion of the 
variance in this analysis are presented in Table 13.
Table 13: Univariate F-Ratios o f  the Dependent Variables
(Sex Analysis)
Males vs. Females
Knowledge (F = 5.74; P < .02)
Neuroticism (F = 3.52; P < .07)
Lie (F = 2.94; P < .09)
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8
Discussion
Age
The distribution of age in the present sample fell into two clusters. The first cluster 
ranged from 16 to 30 years; and the second cluster ranged from 42 to 60 years. It is 
interesting to note that an incidental sample of patients attending a general practice 
clinic with a complaint of pain fell into two distinct age groups: one in their teens and 
early twenties, and the other in their late middle ages. The mean age of the present 
sample was 37.90 years, with a standard deviation of 15.66.
Age correlated significantly with the Lie-score of the PEN Personality Questionnaire 
(P <001). This result was not unexpected since S.B.G. Eysenck (1974, personal 
communication) has reported a trend for the Lie-score to increase with age. Age also 
correlated negatively with Psychoticism (P<05). The reason for this is less clear, but 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1969) have suggested that there may be a U-shaped relation 
between age and Psychoticism. It is possible that the present results reflected only the 
first half of such a relationship before the asymptote was reached. A marginally 
significant correlation also existed between Age and Knowledge (P <10). Although 
this result failed to reach the accepted .05 level of significance, it nevertheless 
suggested a trend of negative relationship between age and the rating of one’s 
knowledge about the cause of the pain. It seems that there is a tendency for patients in 
the older age group to rate their knowledge about the cause of the pain as less. The 
younger age group, on the other hand, felt that they know more about what was 
causing the pain. There are alternative explanations for this finding: either the
4 3 0
M Phil Dissertation
younger age group really knew more about the cause of their pain or it was actually 
the older age group who knew more but tended to be modest or less confident about 
what they knew. Further investigation along these lines would undoubtedly throw 
some light on the problem of patient-doctor communication.
Personality Structure o f  the Present Sample
Mean scores for P, E, N and L of Eysenck’s PEN Personality Questionnaire are 
presented in Table 1. Males and females were considered separately, and the results 
were compared with the normative data supplied by S.B.G. Eysenck on a population 
of 30 -  39 year-olds. Inspection of the results showed that in comparison with the 
normative sample, the males in the present study have lower P and E scores, very high 
N-scores, and comparable L-scores. Females, on the other hand, have only slightly 
higher P, E, N and L-scores. It may be concluded at this stage that the present sample 
generally have higher neuroticism scores, and this holds true both for males and 
females. The present results seemed to be quite consistent with previous findings that 
patients with organic pain generally have higher N-scores (Bond and Pearson, 1969; 
Bond, 1971; Woodforde and Merskey, 1972a).
Distribution o f  Anxiety Measures
Appendix D gives the means and standard deviations of the three anxiety measures. 
Appendix C shows that the scores on the Focal Anxiety measure are distributed along 
the whole range of the scale. All but two of the forty-eight patients displayed some 
degree of Focal Anxiety about the pain. Thus Prediction 1 (p.56) that “a proportion
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o fpatients attending a general practice clinic with a complaint o f pain would display 
some degree o f  Focal Anxiety towards their pa in” was confirmed. Roughly 16 
patients (one third) can be described as having “low” Focal Anxiety scores. The 
remaining 32 (two-thirds) have at least “medium” to “high” Focal Anxiety towards 
their pain. It was therefore quite obvious that the amount of anxiety about the pain 
that brought a patient to the general practitioner was an important factor that warrants 
consideration.
Compared with the norms supplied by Spielberger et al (1970), the mean A-Trait 
score in the present study was slightly lower than their General Medical and Surgical 
(GMS) population, comparable to the normals, and very much lower than the 
neuropsychiatrie population. This suggests that the present screening procedures have 
been successful in excluding patients with psychiatric complications. As far as 
anxiety proneness (A-Trait) is concerned, the present sample was more typical of the 
normal population than Spielberger et aPs GMS patients. Similar to A-Trait, the 
mean A-State score in the present study was also slightly lower than the GMS 
population, comparable to the normals, and very much lower than the 
neuropsychiatrie patients. Thus Prediction 2 (p.56) that "as a result o f  the pain, the 
patients would have elevated A-State scores but normal A-Trait scores scores” was 
only partially confirmed. While the present sample obtained normal A-Trait scores as 
expected, they did not have inflated A-State scores in spite of suffering pain as their 
major symptom. The failure to find high A-State scores is somewhat surprising, and 
the following JT7D5/ hoc explanations are suggested. The patients might have perceived 
the general practice clinic not as a stressful situation, but as a safe place where 
medical attention was at hand. Also, the pain they had might not have been 
sufficiently serious to cause a heightened anxiety state, since the most acute cases 
usually seek help from emergency clinics in general hospitals. As will be shown later.
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the amount of pain felt during surgery time was not always typical of the pain that the 
patient wished to bring to the attention of the physician. It is possible that a 
proportion of the patients were not in a state of great discomfort during the interview, 
hence displaying less anxiety reactions. Moreover, only a small proportion of the 
patients were first visitors. For the remaining patients, high states of anxiety might 
have been ameliorated by previous contact with the doctor who provided them with 
information concerning the pain, reassurance, and so on. Finally, that fact that the 
present sample had normal A-Trait scores would suggest that such patients would be 
less predisposed to exhibit high A-State anxiety even in potentially stressful situations 
(Spielberger, 1972).
Distribution o f  Anxiety Measures
An excerpt from the correlation matrix (Avpendix E) showing the inter-relationships 
between anxiety and personality measures is presented in Table 2. A  significant 
correlation between A-State and A-Trait (P < .01) was quite consistent with 
Spielberger’s (1972) theory of anxiety. This is also in line with the normative data 
given by Spielberger et al (1970). There were also highly significant correlations 
between N and A-Trait (P < .001) and between N and A-State (P < .01). These results 
were also consistent with the State-Trait anxiety theory of Spielberger and the 
personality theory of Eysenck, that neuroticism and anxiety proneness are both stable 
personality traits which predispose a person’s reactions to environmental stress. 
Similar correlations between the PEN and the STAI have also been reported (Rust, 
1973; personal communication). Thus Predictions 3(i), S(ii) and 3(Hi) (p.56) were all 
confirmed.
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It is interesting to note that a significant negative correlation existed between 
extraversion and neuroticism (P < .05). Data from Eysenck and Eysenck (1964) on a 
psychiatric sample have shown that if the N-score of the E.P.I. is abnormally inflated, 
there is a tendency for the E-score to decrease concomitantly. So given that the N- 
scores were generally high in the present sample, it is not surprising to find a negative 
correlation between N and E (S.B.G. Eysenck, 1974; personal communication). The 
negative correlation between A-Trait and E (P < .01) may be explained by virtue of 
the negative correlation between E and N; and the positive correlation between N and 
A-Trait. There was also a trend for E to correlate with A-State in a negative direction, 
but the correlation coefficient failed to reach significance. P and L do not seem to 
have any discernible relationship with the other measures.
As expected from Prediction 4 (p.57), there was a highly significant correlation 
between Focal Anxiety and A-State (P < .01). Focal Anxiety was also unrelated to A- 
Trait and the other personality measures. This is quite consistent with the contention 
that since Focal Anxiety is a measure of the amount of transient anxiety towards the 
pain that brought the patient to the clinic, it should not have any relationship with the 
more stable trait measures. The validity of this measure was thus established.
Distribution o f  Pain Complaint Scores
The distribution of the six pain complaint measures may be found in Appendix C: and 
the means and standard deviations are presented in Appendix D. Approximately four- 
fifth of the patients had a ‘Pain Now’ score of less than 50; while the same majority of 
the patients had a ‘Pain At Worst’ score of over 50. This may indicate that the 
amount of pain felt during the time of consultation was not always representative of
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the pain that a patient wished to bring to the doctor’s attention. As expected, ‘Pain 
When Least’ score clustered around the lower end of the scale. The distributions for 
Pain Range’ and ‘Worst-Now Differential’ scores were widely spread across the 
continua. The ‘Pain Average’ score represented a more normal distribution with a 
mean of 37.95. However, this measure was less meaningful in view of the 
considerable spread of ‘Pain Range’ scores.
The Relationship Between Pain Complaint and the Other Variables
Correlations between the six pain complaint measures and the other variables are 
presented in Table 3. No correlation existed between ‘Pain Now’ and A-State, and 
between ‘Pain Now’ and Focal Anxiety. Thus Predictions 5 and 6 (p.57) were not 
confirmed. In fact, the most significant correlation (P < .001) was between Focal 
Anxiety and ‘Pain At Worst’. This finding may suggest that the pain reported at the 
time of the interview was unrelated to the state of anxiety which a patient experienced 
in the clinic, nor was it related to the amount of anxiety towards the pain. Ratings of 
pain at its worst was the only important factor related to the amount of anxiety 
concerning the pain.
‘Pain Now’ correlated significantly with Frequency (P < .05). This gave some support 
to Prediction 8 (p.57) which expected a positive correlation between Frequency and 
pain complain. This is quite consistent with previous findings that attention on the 
pain experience (ratings of more frequent attacks) tends to lower the pain threshold 
(Hall and Stride, 1954; Melzack, 1973). On the one hand, it is quite logical for 
patients who had a lot of pain during the interview (high ‘Pain Now’ scores) to rate 
the frequency of attacks as higher. On the other hand, a high frequency rating would
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make the likelihood of having a pain attack at the surgery greater, hence contributing 
to higher ‘Pain Now’ scores. Since correlations do not imply a cause-effect 
relationship, speculations have to be made in both directions.
‘Pain Range’ correlated significantly with Focal Anxiety (P < .01) and Localisation 
(P < .05). It also correlated negatively with Familiarity (P < .05). Since a large index 
of ‘Pain Range’ denotes a fluctuating, on-and-off type of pain, it appeared from these 
results that this type of pain tended to be rated by the patients as well localised and 
less familiar. A higher Focal Anxiety rating was also associated with this type of 
pain. There were also significant correlations between Focal Anxiety and the ‘Worst- 
Now Differential’; and between Focal Anxiety and ‘Pain Average’ (P < .05 and P < 
.01 respectively). Interpretations on these results were less straight-forward because 
the pain complaint measures were not independent, and they inter-correlated highly 
with one another. In this respect, the significant correlations that existed between 
Focal Anxiety and ‘Pain Range’; between Focal Anxiety and the ‘Worst-Now 
Differential’; and between Focal Anxiety and ‘Pain Average’ may well be statistical 
artefacts stemming from the very high correlation between Focal Anxiety and ‘Pain 
At Worst’. A marginal correlation between ‘Pain At Worst’ and Localisation (P < 
.07) may also suggest that there was a tendency for patients who rated their pain as 
severe to rate the same pain as well-localised.
Distribution o f  Pain Parameter Scores
It is worthwhile to examine the response patterns of the present sample on the five 
psychological parameters of pain. This will provide some information as to how 
patients attending a general practice clinic with a complaint of pain would rate their
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pain experience. From the distributions shown in Appendix C. there was a large 
cluster of patients who rated their pain experience as relatively novel; while a smaller 
proportion of the patients rated their pain experience as familiar. All but nine of the 
patients rated their pain as very close to the “well-localised” end of the continuum. A 
great majority of the patients also thought that they had very little knowledge about 
the cause of their pain. Only a small proportion of the patients rated their knowledge 
as high. The Frequency and Sharpness ratings were more widely distributed.
Interactions among the five pain parameters are presented in Table 4. There were no 
significant correlations among these five variables, with the exception of three which 
were only marginally significant (all at the P < .10 level). A slight trend of negative 
relationship between Knowledge and Familiarity suggested that patients who rated 
their pain experience as familiar may also tended to rate their knowledge about the 
cause of the pain as high. The marginal correlation between Localisation and 
Sharpness suggested that pain rated as sharp were also rated as well localised, it must 
be stressed, however, that none of the above relationships had reached statistical 
significance. All the suggestions so far discussed were at best speculative.
The Relationship Between Pain Experience and the Other Variables
Correlations between the five pain parameters and the three anxiety measures are 
presented in Table 5. Contrary to predictions, no negative correlation existed between 
Knowledge and Focal Anxiety, and no positive correlation existed between 
Localisation and Focal Anxiety. Thus Predictions 9 and 10 (p.57) were not 
confirmed. Prediction 7 (p.57) expected a negative correlation between Familiarity 
and Focal Anxiety since it was thought probable that patients who were less familiar
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with their pain experience would be more worried about their pain. However, the 
present results showed a marginally positive correlation (P < .10) between these two 
variables. This may suggest that in actual fact, the opposite of the prediction were 
true. That is, patients who rated their pain experience as familiar tended to be more 
anxious about their pain. This conclusion is, of course, highly conjectural because of 
the lack of statistical significance. Prediction 11 (p.57) expected a positive 
correlation between Sharpness and Focal Anxiety since it was argued that pain rated 
as sharp should be more worrying than pain rated as dull. Again, contrary to this 
prediction, a slightly negative correlation (P < .10) existed between these two 
variables. It seemed that dull pain, rather than sharp pain, tended to be associated 
with high Focal Anxiety. It is essential to note that none of the above findings were 
statistically significant, and the conclusions should not be taken at face value. They 
merely point to possible relationships between variables that one can look into if 
similar investigations are attempted in the future. The results in this section were 
slightly disappointing as none of the four predictions concerning the relationship 
between Focal Anxiety and the pain parameters were confirmed.
Sharpness correlated negatively with A-State (P < .01) and also marginally with A- 
Trait in the same direction (P < .10). From the above results, it seemed that dull pain 
was consistently related to the three anxiety measures. Familiarity also correlated 
significantly with A-Trait (P < .05). It appears that ratings of the pain experience as 
familiar were consistently related to the anxiety measures, except A-State. The 
correlation that existed between Localisation and A-State was only marginally 
significant (P < .10).
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The relationship between personality and the five pain parameters is presented in 
Table 6. Neuroticism correlated positively with Familiarity (P < .01) and negatively 
with Sharpness (P < .05). Since there was a high correlation between N and A-Trait 
(P < .001), the present results were considered to be consistent with the findings 
presented in the preceding paragraph, in which A-Trait was found to have similar 
relationships with Familiarity and Sharpness. Looking at Table 5 and Table 6, 
Familiarity and Sharpness appeared to be the two parameters of pain that related 
consistently with neuroticism and the anxiety measures.
To sum up, distributions of the five pain parameters showed that a large proportion of 
patients attending a general practice clinic with a complaint of pain had little 
knowledge about what was causing the pain. The majority of the patients also tended 
to rate their pain as localised and unfamiliar. Their ratings on Frequency and 
Sharpness were more widely distributed. There was no significant interaction among 
the five pain parameters, but marginal relationships among a few variables have been 
discussed. Rather disappointingly, none of the initial predictions concerning the 
relationship between Focal Anxiety and the pain parameters were confirmed. 
Contrary to predictions. Familiarity and Dullness seemed to be associated with high 
Focal Anxiety. Furthermore, diffiised-dull pain tended to be associated with high 
states of anxiety (A-State) during the interview. Finally, Familiarity and Dullness also 
correlated significantly with A-Trait and neuroticism.
Analysis o f  Variance on High, Medium and Low Focal Anxiety Groups
Although a lot of useful information have emerged from the distributions and the 
correlation matrix, it was still interesting to examine whether there were any
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differences in the response patterns between those who were highly anxious about 
their pain, and those who were not. If such differences were substantiated, it would 
be useful to see how the groups differ, and to examine the variables that have 
accounted for most of the variance. As mentioned earlier, a wide spread of scores in 
this measure made it difficult to divide the sample merely into the “high” and the 
“low” groups. The patients in this study were therefore partitioned into three groups, 
viz., the “high”, “medium” and “low” on the basis of their scores in this measure. 
Multivariate analysis of variance was performed with Focal Anxiety as the 
independent variable, separated into three levels. ‘Pain Range’, ‘Worst-Now 
Differential’ and ‘Pain Average’ were omitted from the analysis because they were 
not independent measures. Details of this analysis may be found in Avpendix F, but 
an abbreviated version is shown in Table 7 and Table 8.
The “high” group was significantly different from the “medium + low” combined 
group (P < .008). Variables which have accounted for most of the total variance were 
Sharpness, ‘Pain At Worst’ and A-State. The “medium” group was also significantly 
different from the “low” group (P < .05). The most important variable that 
discriminated these two groups was ‘Pain At Worst’, which has accounted for a very 
large portion of the total variance. ‘Pain When Least’ also appeared to be a 
significant variable, but its importance was far inferior to that of ‘Pain At Worst’. In 
view of the significant difference found between the “medium” and the “low” groups, 
a further analysis was performed to examine the difference between the “high” and the 
“low” groups. These two groups also differed significantly (P < .01). The most 
important variables that discriminate these two groups were ‘Pain At Worst’ and A- 
State. Familiarity also appeared to be of marginal importance.
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Looking at the results (Table 8 \  the ‘Pain At Worst’ score seemed to be the only 
significant and consistent variable that discriminated the “high”, “medium” and “low” 
Focal Anxiety groups. Hence as far as Focal Anxiety towards pain was concerned, 
the ‘Pain At Worst’ score was the most important variable to be reckoned with. 
Between the “high” and the “low” groups, patients with high Focal Anxiety tended to 
have significantly higher ‘Pain At Worst’ ratings. Their A-State scores also tended to 
be high, but this can be explained by the high correlation that existed between Focal 
Anxiety and A-State as shown previously. There was also some suggestion that 
patients with high Focal Anxiety scores tended to rate their pain experience as less 
familiar. The important finding emerging from this analysis was that the amount of 
anxiety concerning the pain was related to the severity of the pain when it was at its 
worst. The amount of pain felt at the time of consultation may sometimes be 
irrelevant. This conclusion is quite consistent with the observations made on the 
correlational data.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to give a brief description of the three groups on the 
basis of their mean scores of the dependent variables (see Avpendix F).
Hish Focal Anxiety Group
They belonged to an older age group, and also tended to display higher A-State 
anxiety during the time o f the interview. They tended to be more familiar with their 
pain experience. High ‘Pain At Worst’ scores and low Sharpness scores also 
characterised this group.
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Medium Focal Anxiety Group
This was a more mixed group. They tended to give higher ratings for the amount o f  
pain fe lt during the time o f  the interview. They also rated their pain attacks as more 
frequent, and their pain as sharp and localised. They also have the least knowledge 
about the cause o f  their pain.
Low Focal Anxiety Group
They tended to be stable extraverts belonging to the younger age group. They also 
have low A-State and A-Trait scores. They have low pain ratings, and also rated the 
frequency o f  pain attacks as less. They rated the familiarity o f  their pain experience 
as low, but at the same time fe lt that they had good knowledge about the cause o f  
their pain.
Analysis o f  Variance on High, Medium and Low 'A-State'' Groups
To further explore whether there were differences between patients who displayed 
high A-State anxiety during the time of interview, and patients who displayed low A- 
State anxiety, multivariate analysis of variance was performed using A-State anxiety 
as the independent variable. For reasons stated earlier, it was necessary to divide the 
patients into the “high”, “medium” and “low” groups on the basis of their percentile 
scores. Details of this analysis may be found in Appendix G. An abbreviated form of 
the results is presented in Table 9 and Table 10. The “high” group was significantly
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different from the “medium + low” combined group (P < .01). The most important 
variables that have accounted for most of the variance in this analysis were 
Neuroticism and A-Trait. Localisation, Sharpness and Focal Anxiety were also 
significant, but marginally so. The present results therefore showed that the high A- 
State group differed from the medium and low groups on the basis of N and A-Trait 
only. This finding was not surprising in view of the very high correlations that existed 
among A-State, A-Trait and N. The difference between the “medium” and the “low” 
groups failed to reach any significance (P < .08). No further analysis was therefore 
performed. In sum, the present A-State analysis did not produce any new and 
interesting information regarding the “high” and the “low” groups.
Analysis o f  Variance on High, Medium and Low "A-Trait" Groups
In spite of the high correlation that existed between A-State and A-Trait, the 
difference in response pattern between high and low A-Trait patients may not be the 
same as the difference in response pattern between high and low A-State patients. To 
explore this possibility, multivariate analysis of variance was also performed on the 
“high”, “medium” and “low” A-Trait groups. The procedures were identical to those 
of the A-State analysis, and details may be found in Appendix I . An abbreviated 
version of the results is presented in Table 11 and Table 12. The “high” A-Trait 
group was significantly different from the “medium + low” combined group (P < 
.0045). The difference between the “medium” and the “low” groups failed to reach 
statistical significance (P < .09). Variables which have accounted for most of the 
variance were N and A-State. These results may also be explained by virtue of the 
high inter-correlations that exist among A-State, A-Trait and N. The present analysis 
therefore did not provide any new and interesting information.
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Analysis o f  Variance on Males and Females
To look into the possibility of sex differences in the present sample, multivariate 
analysis of variance was performed between the male and female groups. These two 
groups failed to differentiate from each other (P < .14), indicating that sex difference 
was not an important factor to be reckoned with in this study. Important variables 
which have accounted for most of the variance were Knowledge, Neuroticism and the 
Lie-score. Since there were no differences between the male and female groups, the 
meanings of these variables were less important.
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Implications and Limitations
Implications o f  the Present Findings
The present study has ascertained the importance of Focal Anxiety in patients 
suffering from pain. It has been shown that nearly two-third of the patients attending 
a general practice clinic with a complaint of pain rated their anxiety about the pain as 
at least medium or high. It would be interesting, therefore, to see whether 
manipulation of this psychological variable will bring about a concomitant change in 
the pain experience. Previous studies by Hill et al (1952a, 1952b, 1955), Kometsky 
(1954), Egbert et al (1964) and Andrew (1968) have all demonstrated the importance 
of anxiety reduction in patients suffering from pain. If pain can be modified by 
dispelling anticipatory anxiety in a surgical ward (Egbert et al 1964; Andrew, 1968), 
there is no reason why similar measures cannot be extended to a general practice 
setting, where a very broad spectrum of pain symptoms is encountered. To study the 
efficacy of such a modification procedure, a group of “no treatment” controls who 
suffered from pain may be contrasted with a group of patients whose Focal Anxiety 
towards the pain has been ameliorated or dispelled by constant information feedback, 
reassurance, and so on. Research in this direction will help to throw some light on 
some of the practical psychological techniques of pain modification which a general 
practitioner can use to supplement his clinical assets.
The present study also found that how much anxiety a patient experienced about the 
pain was unrelated to the amount of pain felt during the time of consultation. Instead, 
it correlated highly with ratings of the pain when it was at its worst. This may imply
4 4 5
M Phil D issertation
that if a physician wishes to modify his patient’s Focal Anxiety towards the pain, he 
may do so by furnishing his patient with the necessary information regarding the type 
and severity of pain that they would expect to get. This may help the patient to take a 
more realistic view of his pain, and to have clearer expectations. In so doing, the 
patient’s perception of the pain when it was at its worst may be changed in a more 
favourable direction, and the patient would be less anxious about his pain.
There was also evidence showing that for some patients at least, the intensity of pain 
felt during consultation was very much lower than the intensity of the same pain when 
it was at its worst. Therefore the amount of pain felt during surgery time was not 
always representative of the pain that a patient wished to bring to his doctor’s 
attention. This may imply that if a physician wishes to gain a better understanding of 
the type of pain brought up by his patient, he should gather more information 
concerning what the pain intensity was like when it was at its worst. Merely 
enquiring about the pain felt during surgery time may lead to unwarranted 
misunderstandings.
There was also a very slight suggestion that patients in the older age group tended to 
rate their knowledge about the cause of the pain as low, although this finding failed to 
reach any statistical significance. Further research is needed to investigate whether 
such a trend of relationship between Age and Knowledge can be replicated. If such a 
finding is confirmed, it may then be interesting to explore whether this relatively low 
rating of Knowledge by the older age group reflects a genuine deficiency in their 
knowledge about the cause of the pain. In this case, information giving by the doctor 
will be of obvious importance. On the other hand, if this low rating of knowledge 
about the cause of the pain reflects modesty or uncertainty among the older patients, 
reassurance by the doctor will be of great benefit.
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A lot of interesting information has emerged from the present findings. In particular, 
the distributions of the pain parameters gave a very good picture of the types of pain 
one would encounter in a general practice setting. It also provided some information 
about how patients perceived their pain experience. It is however a little 
disappointing to find no significant relationships between Focal Anxiety and the five 
pain parameters delineated for the present study. This may imply that none of the 
parameters chosen were important to Focal Anxiety. Subsequent pursuits of this 
problem should explore other possible parameters of pain experience.
Limitations and Difficulties o f  the Present Study
The first and foremost limitation of the present study was the size of the sample. In a 
correlational study like the present one in which approximately 20 variables were 
involved, such a sample size was evidently inadequate. From a statistical point of 
view, a sample of at least 200 subjects should be recruited if the number of variables 
were of such a magnitude. This, however, proved to be difficult and impractical in 
the research time allotted. In fact, the original target was one hundred patients. It was 
thought that in a large general practice clinic like the present one, such a target should 
easily be attained within a one-month period. But after the two screening procedures, 
it was found that only a small proportion of the patients were suitable subjects who 
met the selection criteria. Finally, only 48 out of a pool of over 200 were successful 
in completing the questionnaires. Initially, it was also hoped that only patients who 
came to the clinic for first visits will be selected. This again proved to be impractical 
since only a small proportion of patients came for first visits. Out of this handful of 
potential subjects, only a few, and sometimes none, had pain as their major complaint.
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It was therefore necessary to include patients who came for follow-up visits for their 
pain. In fact, a portion of the subjects were actually regular visitors who came weekly 
for months, or even monthly for years, because of some chronic pain they had such as 
arthritis. It may be mentioned that after a three-week period at the clinic, the majority 
of the regular patients had already been interviewed. By that time, there was also a 
proportion of the patients who were first visitors of the preceding week, and who 
came back for a second follow-up visit. They obviously had to be omitted as subjects. 
What was left in the fourth week, therefore, were several new patients who might or 
might not have pain as their major symptoms. Hence the number of potential subjects 
dropped dramatically. Such difficulties need to be taken into consideration if further 
researches are to be done in a general practice setting.
Secondly, the present study concentrated solely on the psychological precepts of the 
pain experience, and assessments were made only along those lines. Other important 
information such as diagnosis and chronicity of the pain were not recorded because 
they were thought to be irrelevant to the present study. Spielberger (1974; personal 
communication), for example, suggested that in a mixed group of patients like the 
present one in which there were chronic as well as acute cases, time of onset of the 
pain may be an important factor to look into. The failure of finding elevated A-State 
scores in the present study may in part be due to the inclusion of the chronic group 
who had literally lived with the pain for years. In this respect, one possible area for 
future research is to contrast two groups of patients, one group with first acute onsets 
of pain, and the other with chronic intractable pain. Attempts may be made to see 
whether these two groups would differ in terms of the other psychological variables, 
and, if they do, how?
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Thirdly, as was mentioned in the previous chapters, there was no a priori assumption 
that the five pain parameters selected were exhaustive in qualifying pain experience. 
Other related factors such as the potential threat of the pain, expectation of mortal 
consequences, fear of death, concern about physical well-being, interference with 
normal daily life routines, ways of exercising individual coping styles, employment of 
specific coping strategies, self-instigated methods of pain reduction prior to seeing the 
doctor, etc., are only some of the many other things one may look into. Moreover, it 
may also be worthwhile to examine the communication between patients and doctors 
about the pain experience, and to see how much understanding and misunderstanding 
exist between the two parties. If improvements in the communication system between 
doctors and patients would avert misunderstandings about the pain experience, there 
is no reason why such findings should not be made known to general practitioners. At 
the appropriate stages of the consultation, physicians may also employ psychological 
techniques to enhance pain reduction, with or without the use of drugs.
Finally, as far as statistical analysis is concerned, the present study was obviously 
hampered by the shapes of some of the distributions. This limitation appeared to be 
inevitable as with such a small sample size, there was no way of telling in which 
direction would the skewed distributions favour the correlation coefficients. In spite 
of this limitation, however, a lot of meaningful results have been obtained. Hence 
statistical artefacts due to the abnormality of some of the distributions may at best be 
slight. It must also be stressed again that correlations do not indicate cause-effect 
relationships, and merely point to directions for future researchers to look at.
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To sum up, there are excellent potentials for research possibilities on the subject of 
pain by psychologists working in the clinical field. It is hoped that the neglect of this 
important subject will be promptly rectified by more active researches in the future.
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Conclusion
The present investigation into the relationship of psychological factors to clinical pain 
in a general practice population has resulted in a lot of useful descriptive information. 
It was found that the age distribution of the present sample fell into two distinct age 
groups: one in their teens and early twenties, and the other in their late middle ages. 
The patients in general also have higher neuroticism scores, although such a trend was 
more prominent in males than in females. The distributions of the five psychological 
parameters of pain showed that a large proportion of patients attending a general 
practice clinic with a complaint of pain had very little knowledge about their pain, and 
also tended to rate their pain experience as unfamiliar. Most of the patients also rated 
their pain as very well localised. Ratings of Frequency and Sharpness were more 
widely dispersed. No significant interactions among the five pain parameters were 
found, although a few marginal relationships have been discussed.
The reliability of the present assessment procedures was considered to be satisfactory 
since a lot of the previous findings concerning the relationship among the different 
measures have been replicated. Correlations between age and the L-score, and 
between age and the P-score in Eysenck's PEN Personality Questionnaire were quite 
consistent with previous findings (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1964, 1969). The patterns 
of correlation between the PEN and the STAI scales were consistent with 
contemporary findings (Rust, 1973; personal communication), and also conformed 
with the respective theories of Spielberger and Eysenck. Due to the slightly inflated 
N-scores in the present sample, a significant negative correlation existed between N 
and E. As predicted, the Focal Anxiety scale correlated significantly with A-State but 
not with the other stable personality measures. Hence the validity of this measure was
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also established. It is encouraging to find that a very quick and simple rating 
procedure such as the 10 cm. graphic method has succeeded in yielding a lot of useful 
information in the present study. The screening procedures used were also successful 
in excluding those with psychiatric complications since the A-Trait mean score of the 
present study compares favourably with Spielberger et aVs (1970) normal population. 
As far as the A-Trait mean is concerned, the present sample was actually more 
representative of the normal population than Spielberger et aTs GMS patients. 
Contrary to prediction, no elevated A-State score was evident in the present sample. 
Reasons for such an observation have also been suggested.
The distributions of the pain complaint measures showed that very few patients have 
very severe pain at the time of the interview. The majority, however, would give very 
high ratings for the intensity of the pain when it was at its worst. This is quite 
consistent with the contention that the amount of pain felt at the time of consultation 
is not always representative of the pain which the patient wishes to bring to the 
doctor's attention. It is suggested that to avert misunderstandings about the nature of 
the pain, physicians should also enquire about what the pain is like when it was at its 
worst.
Focal Anxiety towards the pain was found in almost all the patients, and was therefore 
an important factor to be reckoned with. The important finding that Focal Anxiety 
correlated significantly with 'Pain At Worst' and not with 'Pain Now' as predicted 
suggested that ratings of pain at its worst, and not the pain reported at the time of 
consultation, were related to the amount of anxiety about the pain. This finding also 
gave some useful implications to possible anxiety reduction techniques in patients 
suffering from pain. Multivariate analysis of variance on Focal Anxiety has also 
demonstrated that 'Pain At Worst' was the only significant and consistent variable
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discriminating the "high", "medium" and "low" Focal Anxiety groups. Characteristics 
of these three groups have also been described. Multivariate analysis of variance on 
A-State, A-Trait and sex failed to yield any new or interesting information.
As predicted. Frequency correlated significantly with 'Pain Now'. This finding 
suggested the importance of the attention variable in pain experience. Other 
alternative explanations for this finding have also been discussed. None of the initial 
predictions on the relationship between Focal Anxiety and the pain parameters were 
confirmed. Contrary to predictions, there were slight suggestions that in fact. 
Familiarity and Dullness were related to Focal Anxiety. Such findings, however, 
failed to reach any statistical significance. This may also imply that the five pain 
parameters delineated for the present study were not important to Focal Anxiety. 
Other possible parameters have been suggested, and it is urged that future 
investigations should look for other more important psychological parameters of 
clinical pain.
It was found that Familiarity and Dullness correlated significantly with N and A-Trait, 
and these observations have been discussed in the light of the earlier findings. There 
were some suggestions that patients in the older age group tended to rate their 
knowledge about the cause of their pain as less; while the opposite was true for the 
younger age group. This finding did not reach statistical significance, and merely 
pointed to possible directions for future research. There was also a very tenuous 
suggestion that an on-and-off type of pain tended to be rated by the patients as more 
anxiety provoking, less familiar and well localised. It is finally concluded that there 
are numerous research possibilities in this field, and it is hoped that more clinical 
psychologists will take an interest in pain studies.
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Introduction
"Good m orning/afternoon/evening! You are M r./M rs./M iss
My name i s  Hr, Wong, I  am a p s y c h o lo g is t ,”
I-I
i II:
"I am doing a research  w ith Dr, on how h is  p a t ie n ts  f e e l
about the aches and pains th a t b r in g  them to  the surgery,"
"Have you come to  see  the doctor because o f  any so r t  o f  nain you have 
had, or are having ?"
(1) I f  the answer i s  "NO"
"W ell, s in c e  we are only in te r e s te d  in  in te r v ie w in g  peop le su ffe r in g  
from p a in , i t  i s  not n ecessary  fo r  you to answer any o th er  q u estio n s .  
Thank you fo r  coming in .  The doctor w i l l  be se e in g  you as u su a l."
( 2 ) Xf_am bivalent answers are g iv en , e .g .  "A l i t t l e " .  "Sometimes", e t c .
"Would you say the pain  i s  an im portant part o f  your p resen t i l l n e s s  ?"
In o th er  words, w i l l  you m ention the p a in  to  th e doctor when you t e l l  
him why you have come to see  him ?"
-  I F "NO" , GO TO ( 1 ) ,
-  IF ."YES" , GO TO ( 3 ) .
( 3 ) I f  the answer i s  "YES"
"Finel The doctor w i l l  be s e e in g  you as u su a l, I  must assure you th a t  
ta lk in g  to me won’t  delay your appointment wit^. the d octor. Okay ?"
"So w hile you are w a itin g , I  wonder i f  you would answer a few gen eral
q u estio n s about how t h is  p a in  f e e l s  to  you . A fter  you have done t h i s ,
you w i l l  a lso  be asked to f i l l  in  a few very sim ple q u estio n n a ires
about y o u r s e lf .  Anything you w rite  or say w i l l  o f  course be q u ite
c o n f id e n t ia l ,  and w i l l  be used only fo r  our research . I s  th at a l l  
r ig h t  ?"
SELF EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE STAI FORM
" F irst o f  a l l ,  I would l ik e  you to  f i l l  in  th ese  two v e iy  sim ple 
q u estio n n a ires . P lease  read the in s tr u c t io n s  c a r e fu lly  as I read  
them to  you."
"Do you have any q u estio n s ? E igh t: P lease  begin:"
( Same procedure fo r  STAI Foim X -2. S tr e ss  "how you f e e l  a t  t h is  moment" 
and "how ^ou g en e ra lly  feel'^ r e s p e c t iv e ly  on th e two o c c a s io n s .)
»»l
u
t.!
'Il
PAIN RATING FORM
"In the b eg in n in g , you to ld  me th a t p art o f  your reason  f o r  coming to  the  
su rgely  today i s  th a t you have su ffe r ed  p a in , o r  are in  p a in  a t  p r e sen t.  
I  would l ik e  to  ask some q u estion s about th e  pain* Okay ?"
Produce Form
" F irst I  would l ik e  to  know how worried or  anxious you are about th e  p a in .
Here i s  a s t r a i ^ t  l in e  on which you can ra te  your a n x ie ty  by p u tt in g  a 
cro ss anywhere a lon g  th e  l i n e .  The extreme l e f t  end rep resen ts  "no a n x ie ty  
about the pain  a l  a l l " ; w hile th e  extreme r ig h t  end rep resen ts  "I ’m extrem ely i'!
about th^s .p a in ' .^ You can mark anywhere- a long th e  l in e  depending on i ; I 
th e degree o f  your a n x iety  about t h i s  pa in ."  I''I
"1*11 g ive  you some examples: I f  your an x iety  i s  medium, you should put
your cro ss  somewhere a long the m iddle o f  th e  l in e  ( INDICATE). I f  you are 
rath er anxious, you should pu4 your cross somewhere a lon g  here (INDICATE).
I f  you are not r e a l ly  anxious about t h is  p a in , you should put your cro ss  
somewhere along here (INDICATE).. Remember, where you put th e cro ss  depends 
on the degree o f  your an x iety  about the pain* Do you have any q u estio n s ?"
• • •
"Now I want to  know how t h is  pain  f e e l s  to  you*"
A ill
"Using the same method, p lea se  r a te  how strong i s  your p a in  r ig h t  now; how 
strong i t  was at i t s  worst; and what i t  was l ik e  when i t ’ s l e a s t .  The l e f t  
end rep resen ts  "ng^pain at a l l" ,  and the r ig h t end rep resen ts  "in te n s e .  
^ x cru c ia tin g t unbea ra b le" . Do you have any q u estion s ?
11 
; i
i:
î^!
" If  you turn  over the page, you w i l l  f in d  some more o f  th e se  r a t in g  l i n e s .  
You can d escr ib e  your pain to  me by u sin g  the same r a t in g  method. 1*11 
ex p la in  each item  to  you as you go a lon g . Okay ?"
DEFINITIONS
F a m ilia r ity  '
This i s  the f i r s t  tim e I  have the pain ; i t  i s  t o t a l ly  a new exp erien ce
-  I ’m m oderately fa m ilia r  w ith  t h is  p a in .
-  1 have t h is  p a in  so o fte n  th a t I ’m q u ite  fa m ilia r  w ith  th e  ex p er ien ce .
Frequency *
-  Veiy in freq u en t a tta c k s  o f  p a in , do not f e e l  i t  o f te n .
-  M oderately frequent a tta c k s , have i t  o c c a s io n a lly .
-  Veiy frequent a t ta c k s , f e e l  i t  a l l  the tim e.
L o ca liza tio n
-  D iffu sed , in v o lv in g  a v e iy  la rg e  p art o f  the body.
-  M oderately d if fu s e d .
-  Veiy w e ll lo c a l iz e d  to  a s p e c i f ic  sp o t.
Sharpness
-  Veiy d u ll  ach e.
-  M oderately sharp p a in .
-  Extremely sharp p a in .
I . .
Knowledge
-  I  f e e l  I  have a b so lu te ly  no id ea  about the cause o f  t h i s  p a in .
-  I  have some id e a  o f  the cause o f  t h is  p a in .
“* I  th in k  I  know the cause o f  t h is  p a in  v e iy  w e l l .
EYSENCK PEN PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE
" F in a lly , i t  would h elp  us a grea t deal i f  you could  a lso  com plete t h is  
q u estion n a ire  about y o u r s e lf .  You may do i t .  6 u ts id e  in  th e w a itin g  room. 
I f  you are c a lle d  in  fo r  c o n su lta t io n , you can f in is h  i t  a fterw ard s. When 
you have f in is h e d , p le a se  hand i t  in  to the r e c e p t io n is t s .  Thank you v e iy  
much fo r  your help  in  t h is  resea rch . Good-byei"
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4 . Focal A nxiety 55.10 28 .82
5 . Pain Now (a ) . 29.56 24 .57
6 . Pain At Worst (b ) 69.17 20.86
7 . Pain When Least (c) 15.15 14.09
8 . Pain Range (B -  C) 54.04 19.95
9 . Worst -  Now D if fe r e n t ia l (B -  A) 59.60 24.85
10. Pain Average (— --  y  ^ -) 57.95 16.11
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F O C A L A N X I E T Y A N A L Y S I S
The "Focal Anxiety" fa c to r  was d iv id ed  in to  th ree  le v e l s :  v i z . the "high", 
the "medium" and the "low", based on th e fo llo w in g  a r b itr a iy  c r i t e r i a : -
( i )  HIGH Score = 70 and above ( n = 21)
( i i )  MEDIUM Score = 3 1 - 6 9  ( n = 14) T ota l N = 48
( i i i )  LOW Score = 30 and below (n  = 1 3 )
P a tie n ts  were a ssig n ed  to  each o f  th ese  th ree  groups on th e b a s is  o f  
th e ir  "Focal Anxiety" s c o r e s .
Keans and Standard D ev ia tion s o f  the Three Groups
VARIABLES K E A N S
' I:High Medium Low
S.D .
1 . Age 39 .14 38.13 34 .38 1 5 .8 7
2 . A -S ta te 44 .90 37 .93 35 .31 11.85
3.- A -T rait 41.05 41.00 39 .46 9 .5 4
• 4 . Pain  Now 29.00 36.40 2 0 .31 24 .21
5 . Pain At Worst 76 .71 77.93 4 9 .23 17 .38
6 . P ain  When Least 15 .52 1 9 .27 8 .5 4 13 .78
7 . F a m ilia r ity 53 .81 48 .67 30 .69 34 .94 .. t
. i
8 . Frequency 58.90 61 .33 53 .69 3 1 . 35
: 1
• 1 
' i
9 . L o c a liz a tio n 76 .38 8 4 .20 7 7 .31 21 .57
10. Sharpness 39f48 65 .87 58 .54 3 1 . 7 7
11. Knowledge 41 .57 36 .13 48 .62 36 .73
■ . j
. I
12. P 2 .71 3 .9 3 2 .6 9 2 .92
13. E 10.90 12.40 13 .08 6 . 2 3 ,
14. N 13.86 14 .20 11.00 5 .4 4
15 . L 9.76 7 .1 3 8 . 4 6 4 .8 7
I
!
.  / nvf»r
tjultivariate Analysis of Variance with "Focal Amletv" as th» Tndenend.n,.
Variable
Number o f  dependent v a r ia b le s  in  input v ec to r  = 1 5
Number o f  fa c to r s  in  design  (independent v a r ia b le s )  = l
Number o f  l e v e l s  o f  fa c to r  = 3
HYPOTHESIS I
There i s  a s ig n if ic a n t  d iffer en c e  between th e "high" group and th e  
"medium +. low" combined group *
R esu lts:
F -ra tio  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  eq u a lity  o f  mean v e c to r s  
2 .7 5 1  (P < .0 0 8 )  j^ p o th e s is  Confinaed.
VARIABLES
1 . Age.
2# A—S ta te
5 .  A -T rait
4 . Pain  Now
5 . Pain At • Worst
6 . Pain When Least
7 . F a m ilia r ity
8 . Frequency
9 . L o ca liz a tio n
10. Sharpness
11. Knowledge
12 . P 
1 5 . E
14. N
15. L
UNIVARIATE F
.3605
5.7345
.0766
.0001
5.8236
.0968
1.7878
.0153
.5 5 0 3
6.2810
.0011 
.5820
1 .0 1 3 0
.5298 * 
2.0522 .
P<_
.5 5  
.0 2  *  
.7 8  
.9 9  
.0 2  *  
.7 6
. 1 9
.9 0
.4 6  
.0 2  *  
.9 7  
.45  
.3 2  
.4 7  
.16
S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  moat o f  the v a r ia n ce .
HYPOTHESIS II
There is a significant difference between the "medium" and "low" groups,
R esu lts: _
-----------  P -ra tio  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  eq u a lity  o f  m ean.vectors
1 .959 (P < .0 5 4 )  ^ P p t h e s is  Confirmed.
VARIABLES UNIVARIATE P p<
1 . Age
2 . A—S ta te  .3420
3 . A -T rait .1813
4 . Pain Now 3.0672
5 . Pain At Worst 18.9960
.3885 .54
.56
.67  
.09  
.0001  *
6 . Pain When Least 4 .2190 .05  *
7 . F a m ilia r ity  1.8426
8 .  Frequency .4137
9 . L o ca liza tio n  .7111
10 . Sharpness .3704
11 . Knowledge
^ 1 .2587  .27
.13
.52
.40
.55
.3 7
1 3 . E .0823 .7 8
2.4104 .13
15 . L •5191 .4 7
S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  most o f  the varian ce.;
Since there was a m arginally  s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe r e n c e  between the "medium"
and "low" groups, a fu rth er  a n a ly s is  was performed to t e s t  the d iffer en ce  
between the "high" and "low" groups.
. . . . / over
hypothesis III
There is a significant difference "between the "high" and "low" groups,
R esu lts;
F -r a t io  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  e q u a lity  o f  mean v ec to rs  
= 3*025 ( P < . 0 1 ) H ypothesis Confirmed.
VARIABLES UNIVARIATE ? P<
1 . Age .7653 .39
2 . A -S tate 5.7825 .0 2  ♦
3* A -T rait .4263
4* Pain Now 1.1620 .2 9
5# Pain At Worst 18,3360 .0002 *
. 6 . Pain When Least 2 .1013 .16
7 * F a m ilia r ity 3.5453 .0 7  +
8 .  Frequency .2303 .63
9* L o ca liza tio n .0114 .9 2
10. Sharpness 2.7559 .11
11 . Knowledge .2786 .60
1 2 . P .0014
1 3 . E 1.0875 . .3 0
1 4 . N 2.6666 . u
1 5 . L • .5081 .48
S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  most o f  the variance
M arginally s ig n i f ic a n t .
- E N D -
A - S T A T E A N X I E T Y A N A L Y S I S
The "A—State" fa c to r  was d iv ided  in to  three le v e ls ;  v i z . the "high", 
the "medium" and the "low", u sin g  a r b itr a r ily  the 3 3 .3  and the 6 6 .7  
p e r c e n t ile  sco res  as c u t -o f f  p o in ts . The normative data used were those  
obtained by S p ie lb erg er  ^  ^  ( l9 7 0 )  from a pop u lation  o f  General M edical 
and S u rg ica l (gMS) p a t ie n t s .
( i )  HIGH Score = 49 --'76 (N = 9 )
( i i )  MEDIUM Score = 3 6 - 4 8  (n = 18) T ota l N = 48
( i i i )  LOW Score = 20 -  35 (N = 2 l)
P a tien ts  were a ssig n ed  to each o f  th ese  three groups on the b a s is  o f  
th e ir  "A—State" s c o r e s .
Means— and Standard D eviations o f  th e  Three Grouns
VARIABLES m e a n s
High Medium Low
Û # JJ #
1 . Age 34.00 36.22 41.00 15 .73
I 2 . A—T ra it 46.11 41 .61 35.86 7 .2 9
1 3 .  Focal A nxiety 73.89 5 4 .17 47.86 • 27 .78
1 4 . Pain Now 33.44 27.89 2 9 .3 3 24 .82
I . 5 .  Pain  At Worst 71.22 65.61 7 1 .3 3 2 1 .1 3
1 6 . Pain \ ^ e n  Least 14.22 16.11 14 .67 14 .38
1 7 . F a m ilia r ity 41 .67 47.89 4 4 .0 5 3 5 .81
I 8 .  Frequenpy 68.67 57.83 52 .52 30 .82
1 9 . L o ca liz a tio n 62.33 79.28 84 .95 2 0 .17
10 . Sharpness 27.11 59 .22 55.86 31.45
I 11. Knowledge 4 1 .0 0 43.39 38 .33 36 .61
12 . P 3 .44 2.61 2 .6 2 1 .9 7
1 3 . E 9 .3 3 13 .1 1 12.52 6 .0 3
1 4 . N 17.78 12.44 11.52 5 .0 1
1 5 . L 8 .7 8 7.11 1 0 .1 9 4 .7 1
/  n v e r
Multivariate Analysis of Variance with "A-State" as the Independent
Variable
Number o f  dependent v a r ia b le s  in  input v ec to r  = 1 5
Number o f  fa c to r s  in  design  (independent v a r ia b le s )  = 1
Number o f  l e v e l s  o f  fa c to r  = 3
HYPOTHESIS I
There i s  a s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe r e n c e  between the " h i^ "  group and the  
"medium + low" combined group.
R esu lts: P -r a t io  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  e q u a lity  o f  mean v e c to r s  
= 2 .5 9 2  (P < .O l)  H ypothesis Confirmed.
VARIABLES UNIVARIATE F P 4
1 . Age
2 . A -T rait
3 . Focal A nxiety
4 .  Pain  Now
5 .  P a in  At Worst
6 .  Pain When Least
7 . F a m ilia r ity
8 .  Frequency
9 .  L o c a liz a tio n
1 0 . Sharpness
1 1 . Knowledge
1 2 . P
1 3 .  E
1 4 . N
1 5 . L
.6792
7 .9 4 3 2
^ .0 6 3 3
.2 7 0 9
.1048
.0437
.0984
1.4429
7 .1 9 2 4
6.7885
.0006
1.2891
2 .4 1 1 5
9.9012
.0000
.41
.007 *
.0 3  ♦ 
.61  
.75  
.84  
.7 6  
.24  
.01  * 
.01 •* 
.98  
.26 
.1 3
.003  * 
1.00
* S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  most o f  the variance
..../over
HYPOTHESIS II I
There is a significant difference between the "medium" and "low" groups.
R esu lts;
F -ra tio  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  e q u a lity  o f  mean v ec to rs  
— 1.792  (P ^ .08 N .S .) H ypothesis R ejected .
VARIABLES
1 . Age
2 . A -T rait
3 * Focal A nxiety  
4*. Pain Now 
- 5 .  Pain At Worst
6 . Pain When Least 
7* F a m ilia r ity  
81 Frequenpy 
9* L o ca liza tio n
10 . Sharpness
11 . Knowledge
12. P 
15 . E
14 . N
15 . L
UNIVARIATE F
.8958
6.0376
.4998
.0328
.7107
.0978
.1116
.2876
.7674
.1110
.1849
.0002
.0920
.5274
4.1417
.35  
.02  *  
.48 • 
.86  
.40  
.76  
.74  
.59  
.39  
.74  
.67  
.99  
.76  
.57  
.05 ♦
S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  most o f  the variance
No fu r th er  a n a ly s is  was perfoim ed because th ere was a n o n -s ig n if ic a n t  
d iffe r e n c e  between the "medium" and "low" groups.
- E N D -
A p H t  N u  I A H
A - T R A I T A N X I E T Y A N A L Y S I S
The "A-Trait” fa c to r  was d ivided  in to  three le v e ls ;  v i z . the "high", 
the "medium" and the "low", u sin g  a r b itr a r ily  the 33*3 and the 66 .7  
p e r c e n t ile  sco res  as c u t -o f f  p o in ts . The normative data used were those  
obtained  by S p ie lb erg er  ^  a l  (l9 7 0 ) from a pop u lation  o f  General M edical 
and S u rg ica l (GNS) p a t ie n t s .
( i )  HIGH Score = 47 -  75 (N = 8)
( i i )  MEDIUM Score = 37 -  46 (N = 24) T ota l N = 48
( i i i )  LOW Score = 20 -  36 (N = 16)
P a tie n ts  were a ssig n ed  to  each o f  th ese  th ree groups on the b a s is  o f  
th e ir  "A-Trait" s c o r e s .
Means and Standard D eviations o f  the Three Groups
VARIABLES •
M E A N S
S.D .
High Medium Low
1 . Age 33.00 39 .67 37 .69 15.82
2 . A—S ta te 51.00 38.79 35 .38 10 .84
3. Focal A nxiety 63.75 51.92  ' 55 .56 29.13
4 . Pain Now 31.25 26.38 •33.50 24.68
5 . Pain At Worst 71.38 62.17 78 .56 19.91
6 . Pain  When Least 21.38 12.92 . 15 .31 14 .07
7. F a m ilia r ity 61.75 44.75 37 .12 34 .87
8 . Frequency 58.75 61.08 51.63 31.10
9 . L o c a liz a tio n 71.25 79.12 8 1 .4 4 21.59
10. Sharpness 43.50 47.29 62 .50 32.81
11. Knowledge 33.25 46.88 35 .25 36.12
12. P 2.75 3.46 i . 7 5 1.84
13. E 10.88 10.92 14.63 5 .92
14. N 19.75 13.46 9 .06 4 .13
15. L 8.13 9.42 8 .1 2 4 .88
. . . / over
Hultivariate Analysis of Variance with "A-Trait" as the Independ^n-h
Variable
Number o f  dependent v a r ia b le s  in  input v ecto r  =s 15
Number o f  fa c to r s  in  design  (independent v a r ia b le s )  = 1
Number o f  le v e l s  o f  fa c to r  ,
HYPOTHESIS I
There i s  a s ig n if ic a n t  d ifferen ce  between the "high" group and the  
"medium + low" combined group.
R esu lts:
F -ra tio  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  e q u a lity  o f  mean v ec to r s  
= 3 .0 2 5  (p< . 0045 ) H ypothesis Confirmed.
VARIABLES
1 . Age
2 . A -S tate
3 . Focal A nxiety
4 .  Pain Now
5 . Pain  At Worst
6 . Pain When Least
7 .  F a m ilia r ity
8 .  Frequency
9 . L o ca liza tio n
10 . Sharpness
11 . Knowledge
12. P
1 3 . E
1 4 . H
15. L
UNIVARIATE F
.9195
10.4473
.8456
.0 4 4 9
.1182
1.8950
. 2 .2039
.0145
1 .1 0 7 9
.6038
.4115
.0012
.4420
25 .3004
.1683
P <
.3 4  
.002  ■ ♦  
.3 6  
. . 83 
.73  
.18  
.14  
.90
.3 0  
.44  
.52  
.97  
.51  
.0001  *  
.68
S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  most o f  the variance,
.../over
hypothesis tt
There i s  a s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe r e n c e  between the "medium" and "low" groups, 
R esu lts: _ . .  ^
-----------  F -ra tio  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  e q u a lity  o f  mean v e c to r s ,
= 1 .7397  (P < .0 9 4  N .S .) g r p o th es is_ R e ^ c te d .
VARIABLES- UNIVARIATE P
1 . Age .1503 .7 0
2 . A -State .9530 .33
3 . Focal Anxie-fcy .1504 .70
4 . Pain Now .8004 • .38
5 . Pain At Worst 6.5129 .0 1  ♦
6 . Pain When Least .2785 .60
■ 7 . F a m ilia r ity .4590 .5 0
8 . Frequency .8879 - .35
9 . L o ca liza tio n .1102 .7 4
10 . Sharpness 2.0622 .16
11 . Knowledge ' .9942 .3 2
12 . P 8.2695 .006 *
13 . E 3.7636 .06
14 . N 10.8638 .002 *
1 5 . L .6733 .42
S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  whi;ch have accounted fo r  most o f  the varian ce  
M arginally s ig n i f ic a n t .
No fu r th er  a n a ly s is  was performed because th ere was n o .s ig n if ic a n t  ‘ 
d iffe r e n c e  between the "medium" and "low" groups.
- E N D -
a p p e n d i x
I i
A N A L Y S I S 0 N S E X
To in v e s t ig a te  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  sex d iffe r e n c e s  in  the p resen t sample. 
K ales were separated  from fem ales#
( i )
( i i )
KALES . 
FEMALES
(n = 27) 
(N = 21)
T ota l H = 48 ■
Keans and Standard D eviations o f  the Two Sexes
VARIABLES S.D
• K ales Females
Age 37.81 38.00 15.85
A -S tate 40.11 1 2 .0 0
A -T rait 40.11 39 .71 8 .2 5
4 . Focal A nxiety 56.85 29.06
Pain Now 24 .60
Pain At Worst 67.93 70.76 21 .04
7* Pain When Least 14.37 16.10 14 .22
8 .  F a m ilia r ity 45.76 35 .4 9
9 . Frequency 62 .57
10 . L o ca liza tio n 75.10 21 .41
11 . Shaipness 47.86
12 . Knowledge 54 .14 3 4 .21
2.67 2 .90 2 .0 0
11.81 12 .57 6.11
11.78 14 .67 5 .2 9
7.74 10.10 4 .7 2
M u ltiv a r ia te  A n alysis  o f  Variance w ith "Sex" as the
I 11
Indenendent Variable
Number o f  dependent v a r ia b le s  in  input v ecto r 16
Number o f fa c to r s  in  design  (independent v a r ia b le s ) 1
Number o f le v e l s  o f  fa c to r 2
HYPOTHESIS '
There i s a s ig n if ic a n t  d iffer en ce between m ales and fem a les .
R esu lts:
/• ■ . ■ 
F—r a t io  fo r  m u ltiv a r ia te  t e s t  o f  eq u a lity  o f  mean v ec to rs
= 1 .5 6 4  ( P < .1 4  N .S .) H ypothesis R ejected .
VARIABLES UNIVARIATE F P <
iV Age .0016 .97
2 . A -S tate .0769 .7 8
3 . A -T rait .0273 .8 7
4. Focal A nxiety .2232 .6 4
5 . Pain Now .1191 .7 3  ;
- 6 . Pain  At Worst .2146 .65 ■ i
7 . Pain  When Least .1738 .68
8 . F a m ilia r ity .0154 .90
9 . Frequency .9998 .3 2
10. L o ca liza tio n .9910 .32
11 . Shaipness .5072 .48
12 . Knowledge ^ 5.7395 .02  ♦
13. P ' .1713 .68
14. E .1809 .6 7
15 . N 3.5227 .0 7  1
16 . L 2.9388 ' .09
* S ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  which have accounted fo r  most o f  the v a r ia n ce .
M arginally  s ig n i f ic a n t .
- E N D -
I ^  L V  I
P A I N R A T I N G F O R M
Name: Age: Sex: Date:
DEMONSTRATION: 
No Anxiety
About The I------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pain At A ll
----------------I
1. How anxious are you about t h is  pain  ?
No Anxiety
ÜÜOUU J.iib JL ' ..... .-1 . -
Pain At A ll
—I
2 . How stro n g  i s  your pain  ? .
( i )  R ight Now
No Pain _
At A ll ■ ■ ■ I
( i i )  When At I t s  Worst
No Pain _
At A ll ^ I
( i i i )  When I t  I s  Least
No Pain ^
A+ An -  .................. — :---------- 1
I'm Extremely 
Anxious About 
This Pain
I'm Extremely 
Anxious About 
This Pain
In te n se ,
E xcru cia tii
Unbearable
In ten se ,
E xcru cia tii
Unbearable
In te n se ,
E x cru c ia tin g ,
Unbearable
( please turn over)
3 - g°y_^gSj:lj:g;_g;g.ygy with this p a m  experience ?
This Pain Is  
T o ta lly  A New 1“ 
Experience To Me
This Pain I s  
"I Very Fam iliar  
To Me
4 . How freq u en tly  do you f e e l  t h is  pain  ?
•Very
Infrequent
A ttacks
Very Frequent 
A tta ck s, Or 
Continuous 
Pain
5 woul d you say your pain  i s  ?
Completely
D iffu sed _j Very Well L oca lised
6 . gO H _sharp_doe3_thigp a in  f e e l  to you ?
Extremely 
D ull Pain Extremely Sharp Pain
7 . How_much_do you know about the cause o f  t h is  pain_?
I 'v e  A b so lu tely  
No Idea About 
The Cause Of 
This Pain
I Know The 
Cause Of 
This Pain  
Very Well ‘
REMARKS:
• a V  ^w fc—i- 3
